100th Congress, 1st Session

S. Rept. No. 100-216

Report of the Congressional Committee Investigating the

Iran–Contra Affair

Appendix D: Volume 2
Testimonial Chronology: Witness Accounts, Supplemented By Documents

Daniel K. Inouye, *Chairman*
Senate Select Committee

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
And the Nicaraguan Opposition

November 17, 1987.—Ordered to be printed.

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United States Senate

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United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 13, 1988

Honorable John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to Senate Resolution 23, Appendix D to the final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition.

Sincerely,

Dan Inouye
Danial K. Inouye
Chairman

Warren B. Rudman
Warren B. Rudman
Vice Chairman

United States Senate

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition

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Appendix D

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Note on Citations in this Chronology

Citations appear at the end of each entry in the Long-Form Version of this *Chronology* (vols. 2-5) and refer to a variety of sources available to the Committees. These sources are noted in the corresponding entries in the Summary Version (vol. 1) only by the witness' name or by the document description or its exhibit number. The sources include:

1. JHICI. Refers to the unpublished transcripts, titled Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation, that were issued daily to the Committees while the Iran-Contra Hearings were being held in May through August 1987. All page references given as "[Witness] Testim., JHICI" are to these volumes which are stored in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C. These transcripts have recently been published by the Committees in a thirteen volume set titled *Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran*, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987-88). A table converting unpublished transcript (JHICI) page numbers to published transcript (referred to in the *Iran-Contra Report* as *Hearings* volumes) page numbers is included at the end of volume I of this Appendix.

2. Executive Session, JHICI. Refers to sworn hearing testimony of John Poindexter or Oliver North taken in closed session because of the classified nature of the testimony. (These witnesses also testified in sessions open to the public.) The transcripts of the closed sessions were publicly released after classified portions of the testimony were redacted. Citations to Executive Session testimony refer to the unpublished transcripts described in the preceding paragraph. These transcripts are available in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C.

3. Dep. A sworn deposition taken in the presence of one or more Members of the Committees and/or counsel for the Committees, and counsel for the deponent. These deposition transcripts have been published as Appendix B to the *Iran-Contra Report*.

4. Int. An unsworn interview conducted by one or more Committee Members and/or Committee counsel, with counsel for the interviewee present if the interviewee wished.

5. Ex. An exhibit used during the Iran-Contra Hearings ("JHICI Ex.____") or during a deposition ("[Witness] Dep. Ex.____").

6. PROF Notes. Messages generated on a computer system used by the National Security Council staff.

7. Document letter and number codes. Source and document file codes for materials that have been assigned a Senate letter code and stamped page number. These materials are stored in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C.

8. Iran-Contra Report. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov. 17, 1987).

9. Tower Report. *Report of the President's Special Review Board* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb. 26, 1987).

10. HFAC, HPSCI, or SSCI. Testimony or statements made by witnesses before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

11. CRS. A numbered report issued by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

Abbreviations

ABA	American Bar Association
AG	Attorney General
ARA	Inter-American Affairs (DoS)
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CATF	Central American Task Force (CIA)
C/CATF	Chief of the Central American Task Force (CIA)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CPPG	Crisis Pre-Planning Group
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CYA	cover your ass
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission (CIA)
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)
DDO	Deputy Director. for Operations (CIA)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
Dep.	Deposition
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DO	Directorate for Operations (CIA)
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
Ex(x).	Exhibit(s)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FM	Foreign Minister
GAO	General Accounting Office
Gorba	Manucher Ghorbanifar
GPS	George P. Shultz
HAWK	Homing-All-the-Way Killer missile
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
IDEA	Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance
IG	Inspector General
Int.	Interview
IOB	Intelligence Oversight Board
Iran-Contra Report	*Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (11/87)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JHICI	Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation
JMP	John M. Poindexter
MOD	Israeli Ministry of Defense
NDR	Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance
NEPL	National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
NHAO	Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office
NIO	National Intelligence Officer (CIA)
NSA	National Security Adviser
NSB	National Security Briefing
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSPG	National Security Planning Group
OD	see DO
ODSM	Office Directors Staff Meeting
OEOB	Old Executive Office Building
OLN	Oliver L. North
PM	Prime Minister
PROF(S)	Professional Office (Computer) System
RCM	Robert C. McFarlane
RIG	Restricted Interagency Group
RR	President Ronald Reagan
SIG	Senior Interagency Group
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
STTGI	Stanford Technology Trading Group International
TIWG	Terrorist Incident Working Group
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided missile
Tower	*Report of the President's Special Review Board* (2/87) (The Tower Board)
UNO	United Nicaraguan Opposition
USG	U.S. Government

Key to Exhibit Prefix Letters

[no prefix]	Richard Secord or Robert C. McFarlane
AC	Adolfo Calero
AH	Albert Hakim
BS	Bretton Sciaroni
C	CIA (from Eggleston Summary, 6/24/87)
C/CATF	Chief of the Central American Task Force (CIA)
CG	Clair George
CJC	Charles J. Cooper
CWW	Caspar W. Weinberger
DoD	Department of Defense (Noel Koch, Henry Gaffney)
DRC	Duane R. Clarridge
DTR	Donald T. Regan
EA	Elliott Abrams
ECG	Ellen C. Garwood
EM	Edwin Meese
FH	Fawn Hall
FIR	Felix I. Rodriguez
GAR	Glenn A. Robinette
GJS	Gaston J. Sigur
GPS	George P. Shultz
JC	Joseph Coors
JKS	John K. Singlaub
JMP	John M. Poindexter
LAT	Lewis A. Tambs
OLN	Oliver L. North
RCD	Robert C. Dutton
RWO	Robert W. Owen
SS	Stanley Sporkin
TC	Tomas Castillo
WBO	William B. O'Boyle

Publications of the Senate and House Select Committees

Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 1 volume, 1987.

Appendix A: *Source Documents,* 2 volumes, 1988.
Appendix B: *Depositions,* 27 volumes, 1988.
Appendix C: *Chronology of Events,* 1 volume, 1988.
Appendix D: *Testimonial Chronology,* 5 volumes, 1988.

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Preface

This *Testimonial Chronology* records the events of the Iran-Contra Affair as recounted by the witnesses who testified before the Congressional Committees, and as disclosed in contemporaneous documents that the Committees gathered. It was prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition as an Appendix to the *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair ("Iran-Contra Report")*. Although this *Testimonial Chronology* is published by the Senate Select Committee, it is based on the evidence gathered by the two Select Committees during their joint investigation.

This *Testimonial Chronology* aims to be thorough, without passing judgment or making editorial comment on the evidence it records. It is intended to serve as a research aid, pulling together the myriad events and disparate threads of the Iran-Contra Affair in the words of the participants themselves. Accordingly, where the evidence contains multiple or differing versions of the same events, the various accounts are summarized or quoted. In every instance, the Committee has attempted to provide an accurate, objective and succinct summary of what the witnesses and the documents actually said—and not how the Committees viewed this evidence. The Committees' subjective views and conclusions are set forth in their *Iran-Contra Report*.

This *Testimonial Chronology*, while comprehensive, is not all-inclusive. The two Congressional Committees gathered hundreds of thousands of documents and took numerous depositions, not all of which could be included here. The primary source material for this *Testimonial Chronology* is the testimony of the witnesses who appeared at the Joint Hearings. Deposition testimony also has been included where the deposition transcripts were released prior to the publication of the *Iran-Contra Report*, or where the deposition transcripts discuss events referred to in the *Iran-Contra Report* or in this *Testimonial Chronology*. The documents quoted or cited were introduced as exhibits during the Joint Hearings or otherwise relied upon in the *Iran-Contra Report*.

Transcript text quoted in this *Testimonial Chronology* is edited only by the use of ellipses (. . .) or by material added in brackets where necessary for clarification or completeness. Such editing has been minimal. Likewise, [sic] has been used sparingly, in recognition of the fact that witnesses gave their testimony orally, not in writing. With this in mind, [sic] has been utilized to note that a quotation which might otherwise appear mistaken is recorded accurately here. Also, where a document or testimony has been quoted inaccurately in other testimony, the accurate text is added parenthetically after the [sic].

The Summary Version of this *Testimonial Chronology* serves as an extended Table of Contents for the Long-Form Version. The Summary Version identifies topic headings in the order in which they appear in the Long-Form Version, and notes the specific witnesses whose testimony is included under each topic, as well as the documents quoted or cited.

Chronology entries are designated by nine-digit index numbers in the left margin before each entry. This number gives the date of each event. For example, 85/11/15-100 means November 15, 1985 (or mid-November 1985). The last three digits after the hyphen (100) were solely for computer sorting purposes; they need not detain the reader.

The dates used are those furnished by the witnesses or the documents; however, certain major topics *(e.g.*, the "diversion") are grouped together for convenience.

Before this *Testimonial Chronology* was released, it was submitted by the Senate Select Committee to the White House for review by a Declassification Committee composed of representatives from the various executive departments. This is the same Declassification Committee which functioned throughout the Congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra Affair. The Senate Select Committee expresses its gratitude to the members of the Declassification Committee, and in particular, to Brenda Reger of the NSC staff, for their diligent work in reviewing this *Testimonial Chronology* and helping the Senate Select Committee insure that all critical evidence was disclosed with due regard for considerations of national security and U.S. foreign relations.

This *Testimonial Chronology* is largely the work of Isabel McGinty, Esq., an Assistant Counsel on the Senate Select Committee staff. Ms. McGinty spent enormous hours—including long days, long nights and weekends—throughout the past year to compile this *Testimonial Chronology* and prepare it for publication. Although the task was extremely difficult and painstaking, Ms. McGinty saw it through to completion, long after the *Iran-Contra Report* had been issued and other staff members had departed for their homes. The Senate Select Committee expresses special gratitude to Isabel McGinty for her dedicated service in producing these volumes.

It is the Senate Select Committee's hope that this *Testimonial Chronology* will contribute to the public's understanding of the complex events which made up the Iran-Contra Affair.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
/ / 1-000 PREFACE	INTRODUCTION TO THIS CHRONOLOGY: "Chairman INOUYE. The hearing will please come to order. ". . . I think we should remind ourselves that this panel here is not convened to determine the guilt or innocence of anyone. This is not a court of law, and we are not here to determine the culpability, criminal culpability of anyone involved. "However, if we are to file a final report to the people of the United States, we would have to have available to us the best factual chronology of what did occur, and the problem we have is that the testimony to date has been confusing and contradictory, and I believe that is an understatement." (JHICI, 7/29/87, at 107 [Sen. Inouye addressing Attorney General Meese].)		
76/00/00-000 SOMETIME IN 1976 OR 1977			SECORD-HAKIM CONTACT SECORD ACCOUNT: While Richard Secord is serving as Chief of the Air Force Mission in Iran, he first meets Albert Hakim, an Iranian businessperson at that time designing and selling electronic intelligence systems to the Iranian Air Force. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 131.)
78/05/31-000 MAY 31, 1978	SINGLAUB BACKGROUND SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Major Gen. John Singlaub voluntarily retires		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	from the U.S. Army. One year earlier, after he had publicly opposed President Carter's plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea, he had been "reassigned to a considerably quieter post." (Singlaub Testim, JHICI, 5/20/87, at 183.)		
78/05/31-010 MAY 31, 1978, AND 1984-87	SINGLAUB AND NORTH: Sen. Cohen's remarks to Lt. Col. North: "Mr. COHEN. . . . [L]ong after the sheer force of your personality has faded from this room, and that may be a very long time indeed, and long after these cameras that are here today are clicked off, I think the American people are going to be left to deal with the policy implications of what has occurred and what has been said in this room. ". . . . "Finally, I want to just recall the words of General Singlaub. I know he is somebody that you admire. He has appeared before this committee. I think we are all satisfied of his dedication and patriotism. He retired from the Army because he was upset. He was upset because President Carter had declared a unilateral withdrawal of troops from South Korea. "Now, a number of us were also upset about it. I recall that Senator Nunn, myself and several others, we went to South Korea, met with the troops, met with the leadership of South Korea; we came back, went to the White House, sat down with President Carter and pleaded with him not to carry forward that plan to unilaterally withdraw troops from South Korea.		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"And in some small measure, perhaps, we were successful, because he withdr[e]w that plan. But General Singlaub didn't have that option. He was faced with the prospect of having criticized the Commander-in-Chief and he couldn't do that and remain in uniform, so he resigned. "After his retirement, he said the following. He said, 'This Administration doesn't want to hear anything that is contrary to the decisions they have already made. That is a bad thing. It is the first symptom of a totalitarian regime when you start rejecting any legitimate criticism, any advice from the loyal opposition.' "Well, if General Singlaub is right, and we have to ask what it means to reject not the voice of the loyal opposition, but the voice of the majority in Congress and the country. Because I think that has been clear by--on the part of a number of us. Democracy demands not only that the rights of the minority be protected, but that the rules of the majority be respected. That is true even if you and I believe the majority is wrong. "We have to respect the rule of law until we can change the law itself, because otherwise the rule of law will be reduced to the law of rule. I think that is one of the central lessons of this hearing. "I thank you very much for your testimony." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 160, 162-64.)		
79/01/16-100 JANUARY 16, 1979			SHAH OF IRAN OVERTHROWN SUMMARY: The Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, is

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			overthrown and replaced by a Shiite Muslim religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. (Iran-Contra Report, at 157; Tower, at B-1.)
79/11/04-100 NOVEMBER 4, 1979			U.S. EMBASSY SEIZED IN TEHRAN SUMMARY: Iranian militants--the Revolutionary Guards--storm the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and take 66 U.S. diplomats hostage. The hostage crisis lasts 444 days. (Iran-Contra Report, at 157; Tower, at B-1.)
79/11/12-100 NOVEMBER 12-14, 1979			U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN SUMMARY: From November 12-14, 1979, the United States adopts economic sanctions against Iran, culminating in the decision on November 14 to block all Iranian Government property and interests in the United States. Iranian oil can no longer be purchased, and weapons can no longer be shipped to Iran, even those previously purchased by Iran. (Order of 11/79, confirmed by Exec. Order, 4/17/80; Tower, at B-1. See 86/11/10-010 [continuation of Exec. Order 12170 on 11/10/86].)
80/04/00-100 APRIL - NOVEMBER 1980			SECORD-DUTTON CONTACT: HONEY BADGER OPERATION DUTTON ACCOUNT: After the Desert I hostage-rescue operation, General Vogt "was instructed to go into full operation to get [the hostages] out." That operation was code named Honey Badger, and was

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			commanded by Vogt with Gen. Secord as his deputy. "Mr. BALLEN. What distinguished Honey Badger and Rice Bowl [the previous Iran hostage rescue operation, started in 1979] as special operations from normal military operations? "Mr. DUTTON. I think in that case, the chain of command directly from General Vogt to the President. "The fact that we had to deal in secret communications. ". . . . "Mr. BALLEN. . . .[Y]ou testified that General Vogt reported directly to the President. How could the normal chain of command be bypassed? "Mr. DUTTON. If it was the desire of the President. "Mr. BALLEN. What access, if any, did General Vogt have to high ranking officials in various branches of the government? "Mr. DUTTON. General Vogt had very broad access to the major agencies of the U.S. Government. I[t] was necessary in order for us to be able to just do the things that we needed to do." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 5-7.)
80/04/00-101 SPRING 1980			SECORD-GADD CONTACT GADD ACCOUNT: Richard Gadd, USAF, meets Richard Secord while both are involved in the Iran hostage-rescue attempt. (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 5-6.)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
80/04/07-100 APRIL 7, 1980			U.S. BREAKS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH IRAN SUMMARY: The U.S. breaks diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980 and imposes further economic sanctions. (Tower, at B-1.)
80/09/22-100 SEPTEMBER 22, 1980			IRAN-IRAQ WAR: THE START SUMMARY: Iraq invades Iran on September 22, 1980. (Iran-Contra Report, at 157; Tower, at B-2.)
81/00/00-100 SOMETIME IN 1981	NORTH-SECORD CONTACT SECORD ACCOUNT: General Richard Secord first meets Oliver North. Secord at the time is serving as the senior Pentagon representative to the Interagency Group charged with responsibility for shepherding through Congress the proposed sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 130-32.)		
81/00/00-101 SOMETIME IN 1981	PRESIDENT-SECORD CONTACT SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord meets President Reagan only in 1981. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 214-15, 284.)		
81/00/00-102 SOMETIME IN 1981	McFARLANE-KIMCHE CONTACT McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Robert McFarlane first meets David Kimche		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	while "on a trip to Israel with General Haig." McFarlane keeps "in personal touch with him while serving as counselor of the State Department in 1981; [during] visits to the area in 1981, 1982, and 1983; and [by] occasional telephonic communications." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 19.)		
81/01/01-100 SOMETIME IN JANUARY 1981 UNTIL JULY 1985	ABRAMS BACKGROUND ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Elliott Abrams serves as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 6.)		
81/03/00-100 SOMETIME IN MARCH 1981		COVERT ACTION FINDING FOR CENTRAL AMERICA: President Reagan signs a Finding authorizing covert programs in Central America generally. (Iran-Contra Report at 52, n.3.)	
81/06/00-100 SOMETIME IN JUNE 1981	POINDEXTER AT THE NSC POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: Adm. Poindexter joins the NSC staff as Military Assistant to the National Security Adviser (NSA). In October 1983, Poindexter moves up to take McFarlane's position as principal deputy to the NSA, as McFarlane in turn moves up to become NSA. When McFarlane resigns as NSA on December 4, 1985, Poindexter replaces him. (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 29-30.)		
81/08/00-000 SOMETIME IN	NORTH AT THE NSC NORTH ACCOUNT:		

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
AUGUST 1981	North is detailed to the NSC staff. North summarized his role at the NSC: "I was simply a staff member with a demonstrated ability to get the job done." From 1981 through the summer of 1983, North is part of the NSC Defense Policies Group. In the summer of 1983, North is "promoted to serve as the deputy director of Political Military Affairs" at the NSC. (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 4; JHICI Ex. OLN 330 [North testimony on his background from the Reed case].)		
81/11/00-000 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1981	SINGLAUB BACKGROUND SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Gen. John Singlaub establishes the U.S. Council for World Freedom, as the U.S. chapter of the World Anti-Communist League. Working with Sen. Robert Close, he shifts "the main thrust of League activities from passive anti-communism to active support of the pro-democratic resistance movements fighting communist totalitarianism." During the early 1980's, he is involved in "assist[ing] El Salvador to cope with the Marxists . . . . I [sc. Singlaub] helped to bring former military personnel to El Salvador to train their army in counter-guerrilla fighting." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 183-84.)		
81/12/00-100 SOMETIME IN DECEMBER 1981		COVERT ACTION FINDING FOR NICARAGUA: President Reagan signs a Finding specifically authorizing covert paramilitary actions against the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. (Iran-Contra Report, at 32. See Gregg memo to	

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		Clark, "Proposed Covert Action Finding on Nicaragua," 7/12/82 [Committee Document N 44654; Gregg states that the "rationale" of the 12/81 Finding "appears to be to have the anti-Sandinista forces strike against the Cuban presence in Nicaragua rather than attacking the Sandinista units"].)	
81/12/04-100 DECEMBER 4, 1981		EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 AND PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Well, did you understand, Colonel North, that if the President wants to follow the law that Congress passed and that he signed on covert operations, he can sign a finding and let the CIA do it, and if he wants to do it without signing a finding, he can let the NSC do it? Is that what you are saying? "Mr. NORTH. It is essentially what I am saying. "Mr. LIMAN. A fielder's choice? "Mr. NORTH. No. I am saying that the President is not precluded by that law, nor is the NSC precluded by that law from conducting the activities that we undertook. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever hear the President of the United States express that view? "Mr. NORTH. No. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. But your belief was that just as the law signed by the President of the United States on findings didn't apply if he chose to have the NSC do it, that Executive Order 12333 didn't apply if he chose to have the NSC do it?	

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. So, it comes down to the fact that because of your belief that the President is the sole authority on foreign policy, he could do whatever he wanted to? In that field?

"Mr. NORTH. Would you repeat that question, please?

"Mr. LIMAN. Does it come down to the fact that from your point of view as the action officer, the staff officer, the person who had to run this covert operation, that if the President wanted it, that was enough?

"Mr. NORTH. And was within the limits of the law, that is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. As you say it?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And when the former National Security . . . Adviser says, 'I didn't know anything about this and we were complying with Boland,' and when the President of the United States says, 'I knew nothing about the NSC staff assisting the contras,' you looked upon that as just another exercise in deniability; is that the fact?

"Mr. NORTH. You will have to take that up with them, counsel."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 234, 237-39. See JHICI Ex. BS 14 [= Ex. JMP 102; Exec. Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 12/4/81. Sec. 1.8 on the CIA provides that "the CIA shall: . . . (e) Conduct special activities approved by the President. No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United

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		States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution . . .) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective . . . ."].)	
82/01/01-600 SOMETIME DURING 1982	NORTH-TAMBS CONTACT TAMBS ACCOUNT: Lewis Tambs serves as consultant to the NSC for "almost a year." During that period, he becomes acquainted with Oliver North who is also on the NSC staff. (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, as 128. See id., 5/28/87, at 294 ["nine or ten months"].)		
82/03/21-400 SOMETIME IN THE SPRING OR SUMMER 1982		CIA SUPPORT FOR THE CONTRAS INMAN ACCOUNT: The CIA decides to support Eden Pastora's forces in the south of Nicaragua. (Inman Int., 3/16/87 [Committee Document IM 52, memo dated 4/27/87]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 32.]	
82/07/00-000 SOMETIME IN JULY 1982	SIGUR AT THE NSC SIGUR ACCOUNT: Gaston Sigur joins the NSC staff as Senior Director of Asian Affairs under National Security Adviser William Clark. During 1983 he will acquire the title Special Assistant to the President, with no change in his		

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	job responsibilities. (Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 102-03.)		
82/07/12-100 JULY 12, 1982		NEW FINDING ON NICARAGUA PROPOSED AND REJECTED GREGG MEMO: Donald Gregg, the head of the NSC Intelligence Directorate, proposes a new draft Finding on Nicaragua to cover CIA support for Eden Pastora (see 82/03/21-400). In a memo to National Security Adviser William Clark, Gregg states that "additional actions not covered by previous authority are now being proposed." Those "additional actions" include "financial and material support," as well as "training, and arms supply" to Pastora's forces. Vice Admiral Poindexter, then Clark's military adviser, disagrees. Poindexter states in a handwritten note, "I don't see this really needs to be approved since the earlier finding covers it, but it may[ ]be it would be good to get a confirmation since we now have a better idea as to where we are going." The proposed Finding is never approved by the President. (Gregg Memo to William Clark, "Proposed Covert Action Finding on Nicaragua," 7/12/82, with Poindexter's handwritten note attached [Committee Documents N 44652 through 44654]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 32.)	
82/09/21-100 SOMETIME IN		INCREASING U.S. PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE	

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THE FALL 1982		Press reports indicate that the CIA is conducting a covert war in Nicaragua. (Iran-Contra Report, at 32, 52 at n.13.)	
82/09/27-100 SEPTEMBER 27, 1982 THROUGH DECEMBER 7, 1983		STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON CONTRA AID: APPLICABILITY: CIA AND DoD FUNDS AVAILABLE: Contingency Reserve USE OF FUNDS: Not to be used "for purpose of" overthrowing Nicaraguan Government or provoking war between Nicaragua and Honduras PERMISSIBILITY OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: Not mentioned PERMISSIBILITY OF SOLICITING OTHER NATIONS: Not mentioned (JHICI Chart VII.)	
82/12/21-000 DECEMBER 21, 1982 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1983		BOLAND I IN EFFECT: By a vote of 411-0, the House passes, and a Conference Committee approves, the first Boland Amendment. It becomes law on Dec. 21, 1982, as section 793 of the Defense Appropriations Act, as enacted in Further Continuing Appropriations 1983, P.L. 97-377. See Iran-Contra Report, at 31. THE BOLAND AMENDMENT: "None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country's armed forces,	

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		for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras."	
83/00/00-200 SOMETIME IN 1983	LEDEEN AT THE NSC McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Michael Ledeen becomes an NSC consultant. McFarlane testified, "I believe . . . that I supported it because I knew of his connections and access to high officials in a number of socialist governments, which made it possible to get, through him, information we would not get from other sources." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 36. See 84/12/00-700 [Ledeen gives a date in 12/84 or 1/85].)	CHAMORRO CALLS THE CIA FROM A PAY PHONE: "SEND MORTARS" CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Castillo testified on the problems caused by the Contra leader Negro Chamorro: "Mr. Castillo. . . . I know of only one occasion when Chamorro actually went into Nicaragua to fight. "Mr. Barbadoro. Could you describe that? "Mr. Castillo. It occurred in '83 when he appeared in a joint attack with the FDN [redacted]--near the [redacted] Nicaraguan border--and he attacked a border post about 30 meters inside Nicaragua and when he came under heavy attack he immediately retreated to [redacted]. "Mr. Bardadoro. And he called you from a pay phone, didn't he? "Mr. Castillo. And he telephoned me at CIA headquarters-- "Mr. Barbadoro. In Washington--he called you from a pay phone in [redacted] and what did he ask you to do? "Mr. Castillo. Send mortars. "Mr. Barbadoro. Did you do it? "Mr. Castillo. Of course not." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 25-26.)	

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83/00/00-300 1983 THROUGH SUMMER 1985	TAMBS BACKGROUND TAMBS ACCOUNT: Lewis Tambs serves as U.S. Ambassador to Colombia. William Clark, then National Security Adviser, instructs him that a key mission is to cut down the narcotics trafficking between Colombia and the U.S. Tambs goes to work against the narcotics traffickers; his targets go to work against him: "Mr. BELNICK. And because of your work against the narcotics traffickers in Colombia, you and your family have both been the recipient of threats against your life, including a bombing at the embassy residence in 1984. "Mr. TAMBS. That is correct. "Mr. BELNICK. Is it also true, sir, during that period, Colonel North sent down certain members of the Delta force to help protect you against the threats that were coming your way for the narcotics traffickers? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 129-30. See id., 5/28/87, at 138 [Beyond his assignment from National Security Advisor Clark, Tambs "never received any instructions [on how] I would have to deal with narco-terrorists."].)		
83/05/00-000 SOMETIME IN MAY 1983	SECORD BACKGROUND SECORD ACCOUNT: Major Gen. Richard Secord retires from the USAF. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 130.)		

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83/05/00-010 FROM 1983 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1985	SECORD BACKGROUND GADD ACCOUNT: After Secord retires from the Air Force, he leases office space from Richard Gadd, who had left the USAF in September 1982. Gadd also provides Secord with staff assistance for his business. Secord tells Gadd "in several occas[]ions that ht [is] a consultant to the National Se[cu]rity Council or the White House, and also a consultant to the Department of Defense." He indicates to Gadd that he knows of Gadd's classified activities with the USG. (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 7-8.)		
83/07/01-100 JULY 1, 1983		OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ESTABLISHED: By Executive Order, the Administration establishes, in July 1983, an Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean within the State Department. In September 1987, the Comptroller General cites as "prohibited propaganda activities" the "White Propaganda Operation" of the deputy director, Jonathan Miller. Through that operation, op-ed pieces would be placed in major newspapers by secret consultants. (Clark memo on the Office of Public Diplomacy, 7/1/83 [Committee Document S 9243]; Letter from the Comptroller General to Reps. Fascell and Brooks, 9/30/87 [Committee Document S 11655]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 5, 34.)	
83/07/12-100		THE CIA PLANS FOR A CUTOFF OF CONTRA AID:	

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JULY 12, 1983 - FEBRUARY 12, 1985		On July 12, 1983, the President directs the DoD to provide enhanced support for the CIA in its efforts to assist the Contras. The following day, the CIA sends a "wish list" to the DoD requesting $28 million in equipment "free-of-charge." The CIA plan involves stockpiling goods in case Congress should cut off aid. That plan is substantially undermined when DoD lawyers determine that, by law, the CIA must pay for the equipment. The project terminates officially on February 12, 1985. (Vessey memo to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff and others, "DoD Support for the DCI," 9/6/83 [Committee Document D 15331]; DoD "Background Paper," 7/13/83 [Committee Document D 15321; "wish list"]; Information Paper, 4/14/87 [Committee Document D 13718; referring to the CIA's original request as a "Christmas List"]; DoD "Memorandum for the Director, J-3, the Joint Staff," titled "DoD Support for DCI," 8/19/83 [Committee Document D 15338-40]; DoD memo, "Background Paper for the Director," 12/9/86 [Committee Document D 13760; chronology of project developments]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 34-35.)	
83/07/12-110 SUMMER 1983 - FEBRUARY 1985		OPERATION ELEPHANT HERD POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Are you aware of any diversion of funds from the Defense Department for the contras? "A. I'm not sure what you would be referring to. "Q. Well, I am asking a question. Did you ever hear of Operation Elephant Herd? "A. I have seen it in the[ ]press.	

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		"Q. Were you ever told the Defense Department was creating any kind of slush fund that could be used for the contras? "A. I don't think I am aware of that. I have seen that speculated, but -- "Q. I am not interested in what the press says. "A. I understand. "Q. We both know that they are not always very accurate. What I am interested in is what you know, what you heard in your capacity as National Security Adviser before. "Did you know or hear that the Defense Department was diverting either any funds or assets to the contras? "A. I vaguely recall -- well, it goes back to '84 when we were searching for ways to take what little money we had and make it go as far as possible. I've got a vague recollection during that time period of not creating a slush fund but somehow transferring to them excess equipment or something like that. "Q. Whose decision was that, do you recall? "A. Mr. Liman, I just can't remember that. "Q. Joint Chiefs of Staff? "A. I'm sorry. I really can't remember. I just have a very vague recollection of that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 227-28. On CIA efforts to stockpile weapons, see 83/07/12-100, and Iran-Contra Report, at 34-35.)	
83/07/28-100 JULY 28, 1983		BOLAND-ZABLOCKI BILL: The House passes the Boland-Zablocki bill,	

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		which cuts off all covert aid to the Contras, while providing overt aid to countries neighboring Nicaragua. The bill eventually dies. (Cong. Rec. H5880-81, 7/28/83. See Iran-Contra Report, at 34.)	
83/09/19-100 SEPTEMBER 19, 1983		NEW FINDING ON NICARAGUA: In response to the request from Congress for a new Finding on Nicaragua, the President signs a Finding that adds a broader rationale for covert aid: to pressure the Sandinistas to negotiate a treaty with nearby countries. (Presidential Finding Scope Paper, 9/19/83 [Committee Document N 6783]. See Gregg memo to William Clark, "Proposed Covert Action Finding on Nicaragua," 7/12/82 [Committee Document N 44654; Gregg states the "rationale" of the earlier 12/81 Finding (see 81/12/00-100) appeared "to be to have the anti-Sandinista forces strike against the Cuban presence in Nicaragua rather than attacking the Sandinista units"].)	
83/09/19-105 SEPTEMBER 19, 1983		NEW FINDING ON NICARAGUA: TEXT "FINDING PURSUANT TO SECTION 662 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 AS AMENDED, CONCERNING OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, OTHER THAN THOSE INTENDED SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION "I hereby find that the following activities are important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this	

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		Finding to the Intelligence Committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to provide such briefings as necessary. "SCOPE[:] "NICARAGUA[.] "PURPOSE[:] "[Redacted] provide support, equipment and training assistance to Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups as a means to induce the Sandinistas and Cubans and their allies to cease their support for insurgencies in the region; to hamper Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; to divert Nicaragua's resources and energies from support to Central American guerrilla movements; and to bring the Sandinistas into meaningful negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreement with their neighbors on peace in the region. "[Redacted.] "The Director of Central Intelligence is directed to ensure that this program is continuously reviewed to assure that its objectives are being met and its restrictions adhered to. "The White House "Washington, D.C. "Date: [not given] "[Signed:] Ronald Reagan" (JHICI Ex. GPS 2.)	
83/10/00-000 OCTOBER 1983	McFARLANE'S TERM AS NSA McFARLANE ACCOUNT:		

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- DECEMBER 1985	Robert McFarlane serves as National Security Adviser. (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 22.)		
83/10/00-010 SOMETIME IN OCTOBER 1983	POINDEXTER AT THE NSC POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: Adm. Poindexter, then Military Adviser to the National Security Adviser, becomes the principal deputy as McFarlane becomes NSA. (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 29-30.)		
83/11/00-000 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1983	NORTH-ABRAMS CONTACT ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Elliott Abrams first meets Oliver North on a trip to Central America. They next meet in the fall of 1984 at a meeting called by Donald Fortier "probably to talk about Central America, about public perception." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 25-26.)		
83/11/03-100 NOVEMBER 3, 1983		GREGG-RODRIGUEZ CONTACT GREGG CHRONOLOGY: A chronology issued on December 15, 1986 and prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President since August 1982, describes his contact with Felix Rodriguez. The chronology commences: "Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, first met Felix Rodriguez in Vietnam in 1970. Working together with other CIA officials, they developed an effective operational concept for use against guerrilla units operating in the provinces near	

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		Saigon. Mr. Rodriguez, a Cuban born intelligence officer of great courage and experience, was instrumental in implementing this concept. It involved the use of small helicopters to launch pinpoint operations against small guerrilla units. The concept was extremely successful. Mr. Gregg and Mr. Rodriguez maintained sporadic contact during the intervening years. Mr. Rodriguez had retired from CIA on a disability, having injured his back in a helicopter crash in Vietnam. Mr. Rodriguez became interested in the insurgency in El Salvador and traveled frequently to the area in 1983 and 1984. Mr. Rodriguez is extremely knowledgeable of low intensity warfare operations and it was for these reasons that Mr. Gregg aided Mr. Rodriguez when he expressed a desire to go to El Salvador to help the counterinsurgency effort in that country. "On November 3, 1983, Mr. Rodriguez met with Mr. Gregg to discuss the general situation in Central America. Mr. Rodriguez had just returned from a trip to the area." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [chronology continues at 84/12/21-215].)	
83/12/08-000 DECEMBER 8, 1983 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1984		CONTRA FUNDING CAPPED AT $24 MILLION: DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT in effect: "During fiscal year 1984, not more than $24,000,000 of the funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which	

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		would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual."	
83/12/08-200 DECEMBER 8, 1983 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1984		STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON CONTRA AID: APPLICABILITY: CIA, DoD and any "entity involved in intelligence activities" FUNDS AVAILABLE: Not more than $24 million (these funds may have been exhausted by June 1984) USE OF FUNDS: Not more than $24 million may be used to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua PERMISSIBILITY OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: Not mentioned PERMISSIBILITY OF SOLICITING OTHER NATIONS: Not mentioned (JHICI Chart VII.)	
83/12/20-100 DECEMBER 1983 - JANUARY 1984		ADMINISTRATION DECISION TO STEP UP COVERT OPERATIONS: Charged by the new National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, to prepare an "in-depth review" of the Administration's Central America policy, a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) concludes, "Given the distinct possibility that we may be unable to obtain additional funding in FY-84 or FY-85, our objective should be to bring the Nicaragua situation to a head in 1984." At a January 6, 1984 NSPG meeting, the President and his advisers concur in the SIG recommendation: "Our covert action program should	

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		proceed with stepped up intensity . . . ." (SIG Paper, "Where Next in Central America," 12/20/83 [Committee Documents N 32308 through 32359, at N 32314]; McFarlane memo, "Meeting with National Security Planning Group," 1/6/84 [Committee Document N 46539-40; summarizing SIG strategy paper]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 36.)	
84/01/00-000 SOMETIME IN EARLY 1984		MINING OF NICARAGUAN HARBORS: Press sources report in April 1984 that Nicaraguan harbors have been mined, and confirm scattered reports of the mining dating from January 1984. The Sandinista Government blames the U.S.; U.S. sources say the mining was done by "unilaterally controlled Latino assets." (CRS Rep. 86-190F [4/29/87 update], at 9.) Sen. Inouye on the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors: ". . . . "[T]his covert operation became public [c. April 1984], resulting in a political firestorm on the Hill. . . . [W]hen the pressure [sic] came up for consideration, Boland II was enacted." (JHICI, 5/13/87, at 97.) Sen. Nunn: "[I]f you look back on history, as I view it, the whole contra operation[,] and perhaps the reason why we are here today, started coming unglued with the mining of the harbor." (JHICI, 5/13/87, at 188.)	

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84/01/00-005 EARLY 1984		MINING OF NICARAGUAN HARBORS SUMMARY: The Iran-Contra Report summarizes the event: "In early April, the country learned that the U.S. Government was involved in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. U.S. Government presence in Nicaragua had become 'embarrassingly overt.' As McFarlane testified: 'The disclosure that harbors had been mined in Nicaragua was received very badly. . . .' "Some in Congress believed that the Administration had misrepresented the activities it conducted under the September 1983 Finding. Senator Barry Goldwater, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman, charged that his Committee Members had been deceived at the very moment they were being asked to vote to support Contra aid. '[I]t is indefensible on the part of the Administration to ask us to back its foreign policy when we don't even know what is going on,' he declared. "After initial assertions by Director Casey and the National Security Adviser that full and detailed disclosure had been provided to Congress, the Administration decided to end the escalating battle and offered a truce. On April 26, Director Casey 'apologize[d] profoundly,' conceding inadequate disclosure. But the 'apology' could not heal the 'fracture' between Congress and the Administration that the mining had created. The Administration's policy to bring the situation 'to a head' had backfired: the plan, rather than	

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		attracting support, lost it." (Iran-Contra Report, at 37 and nn. 103-09.)	
84/01/00-009 DURING EARLY 1984		MINING OF NICARAGUAN HARBORS CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Calero, were you involved in any way in the CIA project to mine the Nicaraguan harbors in 1984? "Mr. CALERO. Well, our involvement--one of our men, I believe it was Commandante Bermudez, took a trip down the Nicaraguan coast and stayed for three or four days out in the ocean at one point. That was back in 1983, and given the period of the mining, so, yes, I mean, we had-- "Mr. BROOKS. You had something to do with it? "Mr. CALERO. We had something to do with it, yes. "Mr. BROOKS. And I note that you were quoted in The New York Times in April, April 20, 1984, saying we claimed there are no Americans involved, not one United States citizen is involved in the mining. "Mr. CALERO. Yes, I was referring to the actual placing of the mines, and I still say it to this day. No American citizen was involved. "Mr. BROOKS. Who did place them? "Mr. CALERO. Operatives, operatives that had been-- "Mr. BROOKS. Operators? "Mr. CALERO. Well, people who were familiar with the Nicaraguan coast. Probably some Nicaraguans and some people who were piloting or-- "Mr. BROOKS. Would they have been Americans?	

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		"Mr. CALERO. No, no. "Mr. BROOKS. Couldn't have been Americans? "Mr. CALERO. I--throughout these years, I understand there were no Americans involved. "Mr. BROOKS. Who told you where to put them? "Mr. CALERO. Well-- "Mr. BROOKS. You just scattered them out, or did you have some pattern? "Mr. CALERO. I am--that is strictly a military thing that was done, and I was not familiar with that. "Mr. BROOKS. Where did you get the mines? "Mr. CALERO. I understand that the mines were made, they were very small mines made in the region. "Mr. BROOKS. Made where? "Mr. CALERO. In the region, in the Central American region. "Mr. BROOKS. In the region? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BROOKS. And who paid the operators to put those in? "Mr. CALERO. I don't know, sir." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 75-78.)	
84/01/00-010 SOMETIME IN EARLY 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MINING OF NICARAGUAN HARBORS NORTH ACCOUNT: "I was a part of, as people now know, the coordination for the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 227. See Iran-Contra Report, at 36-37 and notes cited therein [summarizing the documentary	

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		evidence of North's Anti-Sandinista activities].)	
84/01/00-030 1984-86	NSDD ON NEUTRALIZING TERRORISTS NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: "Mr. Cohen. There was a report you helped prepare a finding to neutralize terrorists, that Mr. McMahon from the CIA had called you in the middle of the night to curse and reprimand you was the way it was phrased. It would have been early 1984. "Mr. North. I don't know how Mr. McMahon has characterized it. Let me just -- I don't know how many folks here -- I have carried NSDD-138, which I wrote and the President signed up here and briefed the intelligence committees, I know, and it may well be, Senator, that you weren't there that day. "I briefed the House Foreign Affairs and Foreign -- Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think I briefed both Armed Services committees on it. "In April of 1986, when that was signed, it just blew up all over town. The word 'neutralize' is in there. The word 'neutralize' in there, as I explained to everybody, did not mean assassination. We have, I think, some hundred-and-some-odd times over the course of my tenure at the NSC acted to neutralize terrorists before they could act. [Redacted.]" (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 53-54.)		

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84/01/00-300 SOMETIME IN JANUARY 1984		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Gen. Singlaub meets Adolfo Calero: "I [sc. Singlaub] approached him on my own initiative, and offered to help the Nicaraguan democratic opposition in the same way I had personally assisted in El Salvador, that is, by sending former military advisers. "In addition, I offered to raise private funds . . . . ". . . [M]y offer to Mr. Calero . . . was an entirely personal one . . . and in no way suggested or directed by anyone in the United States Government. "I did inform U.S. officials, including Colonel North, of my efforts in this regard." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 185 [n.b. Singlaub apparently notified North of his involvement with Calero after May 1984, when they had their "first substantive meeting."].)	
84/01/13-100 JANUARY 13, 1984		NORTH DRAFT NSDD RECOMMENDS RESORT TO THIRD COUNTRIES FOR CONTRA AID NORTH MEMO: In February 1984, North drafts a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) recommending "immediate efforts to obtain additional funding of $10-15 million from foreign or domestic sources to make up for the fact that the current $24 million appropriation will sustain operations only through June 1984." McFarlane ultimately strikes this language and	

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		the NSDD draft is eventually dropped. (Iran-Contra Report, at 38; Menges/North memo to McFarlane, "Central America--Draft NSDD to Implement NSPG Decisions of January 6, 1984," 1/13/84, with handwritten changes [Committee Documents N 43393 through 43397].)	
84/01/25-300 LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY 1984 [OR APRIL 1986?]		CASTILLO'S KL-43 CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Rafael Quintero brings Castillo the KL-43 which North had said was on the way to Central America. "Mr. Barbadoro. It is fair to say that it was without precedent that you would get equipment like that from the National Security Council staff as opposed to the CIA? "Mr. Castillo. I can only speak from a personal standpoint. It was the only experience that I ever had." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 54, 56 [Castillo: "Although I understand Mr. Owen testified that he delivered it[,] I have no recollection of that."]. Castillo's early date contrasts with that given by Owen and Secord; see below at 86/04/00-400: Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 31 [Owen testified he delivered a KL-43 from North to a senior CIA official in a Central American country]. For Secord account of the KL-43s, see below at 86/02/00-000.)	
84/02/00-000 FEBRUARY OR		COUNTRY 1: McFARLANE'S DISCUSSION OF CONTRA AID McFARLANE ACCOUNT:	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
MARCH OF 1984		An official from Country 1 asks McFarlane whether the U.S. can help it qualify for AID contracts: "the specific interest of Country One was qualifying for agricultural contracts or water resource development, but basically on a very obvious, totally above-board contractual basis. . . . They also acknowledged that they were good at police training, internal security forces, and I [sc. McFarlane] asked originally whether or not they had any interest or thought themselves qualified to instruct the contras in basic tactics, maneuver and so forth. My counterpart agreed to find out from his government, and before long, came back again to say that the government didn't believe it could do that, and . . . one of my subordinates I tasked to provide my comment back to him, which was we understand, it is too bad, we are sorry about it, it won't be raised again, and that closed the matter with Country One." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 29-33; see JHICI Exx. 29 [memo of DCI Casey to McFarlane dated 3/27/84: "I am in full agreement with you that you should explore funding alternatives with" Country 1; document quoted below at 84/03/27-100] and 30 [McFarlane memo to Howard Teicher, dated 4/20/84: "Please also let it be known that, in your view, I am a little disappointed in the outcome but we will not raise it further."].)	
84/02/07-100 FEBRUARY 7-21, 1984		APPROPRIATED CONTRA FUNDS RUN OUT NORTH MEMOS: North, in a note to McFarlane on February 13,	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		1984, emphasizes the importance of obtaining "relief from the $24M ceiling." He attaches to the note a memo written by North and Alton Keel on February 7, 1984, which states: "Congressional resistance on this issue is formid[a]ble to the degree that prospects for success are bleak even with a concerted effort. At some point, we may have to reassess our prospects and decide whether prudence requires that we somehow stretch out FY-84 effort to avoid running out of funds." A February 21, 1984 memo drafted by North for McFarlane to give to the President concludes that "[u]nless an additional $14M is made available, the [Contra aid] program will have to be drastically curtailed by May or June of this year." (Iran-Contra Report, at 37; North/Keel memo to McFarlane, "Additional Resources for our Anti-Sandinista Program," 2/7/84, with attached forwarding note from North to McFarlane, 2/13/84 [Committee Documents N 16901 through 16909]; McFarlane memo to the President, "Central America Legislative Strategy -- Additional Funding for the Anti-Sandinista Forces," 2/21/84 [Committee Documents N 16894-95].)	
84/03/18-810 MARCH 18, 1984			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: William Buckley, CIA Chief of Station in Beirut, is kidnapped in Lebanon. Islamic Jihad claims on October 3, 1985 to have killed Buckley in retaliation for the October 1 bombing of PLO

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			headquarters in Tunisia by Israel. (See CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 3-4.)
84/03/21-100 EARLY SPRING 1984 - NOVEMBER 25, 1986		THE FALL GUY PLAN: THE BEGINNING NORTH ACCOUNT: "[I]n the early spring of 1984," as "money for the resistance was running out, and . . . appeals had been made to the Intelligence Committees for the release of certain monies that could be applied to the program," Casey first proposes to North the Fall Guy Plan: "Mr. NORTH. . . . It was seen that that [money from Congress] was not to be forth coming, and at that point in time when alternatives were discussed and we eventually decided to pursue availing ourselves of offers from foreign governments, it was seen that there would need to be someone who could, as I put it so bluntly, take the fall. "My sense is that that occurred off and on, periodically, as we discussed various initiatives over the course of time between early 1984 until the end of my tenure right up at the last days before I departed the NSC in November of 1986. "Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you testifed that the purpose of the plan was to limit the political embarrassment that might result--you are shaking your head no? "Mr. NORTH. It was not only to limit the political embarrassments. "Mr. MITCHELL. That was in part a purpose? "Mr. NORTH. In part. "Mr. MITCHELL. From disclosure of these	

events. And my question is: When you said that, did you mean either the sale of arms to Iran or the use of proceeds from the sale to the contras or the contra resupply effort or all of them?

"Mr. NORTH. All of them. In fact, one must recall that it goes back to the spring of 1984, before there was any Iran initiative, and the discussion was, you needed to have the plausible deniability which ought to be a part of any covert operation.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Now, did you ever discuss this subject with anyone else, either in or out of Mr. Casey's presence?

"Mr. NORTH. I discussed it with Admiral Poindexter and Mr. McFarlane, and I don't recall whether Director Casey was there for all or any of those discussions necessarily.

"Mr. MITHCELL. I see.

"Mr. NORTH. I certainly did talk to both of them about it.

"Mr. MITHCELL. Did you know, of your knowledge, whether Mr. Casey discussed it with anyone other than Mr. McFarlane and Mr. Poindexter?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't know."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 26-28.)

84/03/21-110
EARLY SPRING
1984 -
NOVEMBER 25,
1986

THE FALL GUY PLAN: CASEY'S ROLE
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. MITCHELL. Now, did the suggestion that you be the fall guy originate with you or with Mr. Casey?

"Mr. NORTH. My guess is it was probably

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Director Casey. I mean, we--I've tried to describe the relationship I had with the Director, and at some points it was that of a teacher or a philosophical mentor, in some cases it was that of an experienced hand in intelligence matters, or in some cases just getting the job done. And I would guess that Director Casey was the one who pointed out that there would come a time when there would need to be, if these activities were exposed, somebody to stand up and take the heat for it, or those kinds of words. "Mr. MITCHELL. So your recollection is it was Mr. Casey who-- "Mr. NORTH. I'm not sure Director Casey ever said, 'It has to be you, Ollie.' It was probably Ollie saying, 'Well, when that happens, it will be me.'" (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 30.)	
84/03/21-115 EARLY SPRING 1984 - NOVEMBER 25, 1986		THE FALL GUY PLAN: McFARLANE'S KNOWLEDGE McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "No such [fall guy] plan existed, to my knowledge. I know I wasn't party to any such planning before I left Government at the end of 1985." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 207.)	
84/03/27-100 MARCH 27, 1984		THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING OPTIONS FOR THE CONTRAS CASEY MEMO: Memo from Casey to McFarlane, titled "Supplemental Assistance to Nicaragua Program": "1. In view of possible difficulties in obtaining supplemental appropriations to carry out	

the Nicaraguan covert action project through the remainder of this year, I am in full agreement that you should explore funding alternatives with the [redacted] others. I believe your thought of putting one of your staff in touch with the appropriate [redacted] official should promptly be pursued. You will recall that the Nicaraguan project runs out of funds in mid-May. Although additional moneys are indeed required to continue the project in the current fiscal year, equipment and materiel made available from other sources might in part substitute for some funding. We are therefore currently exploring two such alternatives. Please note, however, that we are unlikely to receive materiel assistance from these sources by mid-May.

"2. The first of these alternatives is acquiring from [redacted.]

"3. The second alternative we are exploring is the procurement of assistance from [redacted.]

"4. Finally, after examining legalities, you might consider urging an appropriate private US citizen to establish a foundation that could be the recipient of nongovernmental funds which could be disbursed to [obscured] and the FDN."
(JHICI Ex. 29. See Iran-Contra Report, at 38.)

84/03/27-110
EARLY 1984

THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING OPTIONS FOR THE CONTRAS:
COUNTRY ONE
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, at that time [in 1984], did you and others in the Administration have to come up with another strategy for carrying out the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		President's policy of ensuring that the contras would not be abandoned when the funding ran out? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And is it fair to say that you contemplated that that $24 million would run out by May or June of 1984? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you speak to the Director of Central Intelligence about this? "Mr. MCFARLANE. All of the Cabinet officers involved, Secretary of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and I believe the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and people in the White House, myself, Chief of Staff, the Director of Legislative Affairs would gather to consider, ostensibly to consider the prospect for Congressional change in attitude to support the supplemental money, the $14 million. "And all of us discussed the matter and concluded that that was virtually a zero probability, and no amount of wringing our hands was going to change that. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you come up with a plan for a third country to take over the assistance and management of the contra effort? "Mr. MCFARLANE. There was never any concrete plan, either written or discussed orally in these meetings. "Mr. LIMAN. Was it a concept of yours, sir? "Mr. MCFARLANE. The possibility of third-country contributions I had thought of, that is correct. Others of the Administration had also, and we had talked about it.	

"Mr. LIMAN. And what was the concept that you talked about?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. At times, since existing law did not prohibit that, there was a hope that perhaps a short bridging of finance by another country, or more than one, would sustain the movement until the Administration could make a better case and be more persuasive with the public and the Congress.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you have any discussion about the possibility of in effect farming out the whole contra support operation to another country, which would not only provide the funding, but give it some direction?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. There was some consideration of that.

"Mr. LIMAN. And whose idea was that?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe it was probably mine.

"Mr. LIMAN. Can we call that country, Country One?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And what did you do to pursue that idea?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I had been following a practice of having meetings with my counterpart from a number of countries, actually, to include Country One, and on the occasion of one of these periodic meetings and exchanges, I believe in the spring, February of March of 1985--4--5 [sic], in these exchanges, I had been asked by my counterpart in these meetings whether or not the United States could help it qualify for contracts in AID, oriented toward implementing the CBI, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the specific interest of Country One was qualifying for agricultural contracts or water resource development, but basically on a very obvious, totally above-board contractual basis, because Country One is quite good at each of those problems.

"They also acknowledged that they were good at police training, internal security forces, and I asked originally whether or not they had any interest or thought themselves qualified to instruct the contras in basic tactics, maneuver and so forth.

"My counterpart agreed to find out from his government, and before long, came back again to say that the government didn't believe that it could do that, and then before long, after that meeting in a follow-up session, one of my subordinates I tasked to provide my comment back to him, which was we understand, it is too bad, we are sorry about it, it won't be raised again, and that closed the matter with Country One." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 27-30.)

84/03/27-111
EARLY 1984

THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING OPTIONS FOR THE CONTRAS:
COUNTRY ONE

McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, let's look at some documents with respect to Country One; could you turn to Exhibit 29? . . .

". . . .

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. LIMAN. Let me just read the pertinent portion. This is a memorandum from Mr. Casey to you. Am I correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is. "Mr. LIMAN. And it says on the second page that it was handed to you on March 27. Do you see the second page? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And it was for your eyes only, and that you were requested to return your copy when you finished reading it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And Director Casey wrote, 'In view of possible difficulties in obtaining supplemental appropriations to carry out the Nicaraguan covert action project through the remainder of this year, I am in full agreement with you [n.b. "with you" not in original document] that you should explore funding alternatives with--' and a blanked out portion relates to officials of Country One-- 'I believe you[r] thought of putting one of your staff in touch with the appropriate country [country name redacted in original document] official[] should promptly be pursued. "'You will recall that the Nicaraguan project runs out of funds in mid-May[. A]lthough additional monies are indeed required to continue the project in the current fiscal year, equipment and materi[e]l made available from other sources ought in part substitute for some funding. We are therefore currently exploring two such alternatives.	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"'Please note, however, that we are unlikely to receive materi[e]l assistance from these sources by mid-May.' "And on number 3, or number 2, he says the first of these alternatives in acquiring from, and that is blacked out, with respect to the country involved. Now, am I correct in your testimony that you did in fact explore this with officials of Country One and got turned down? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And then you refer to the fact that you asked one of your assistants to carry a message to country 1 after that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And if you look at the next exhibit, which is Exhibit 30, are those the instructions you gave to your assistant? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is. "Mr. LIMAN. And your assistant was Mr. Teicher? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And those are dated April 20, 1984? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. And am I correct, you said to him--and I am reading at the bottom-- 'As we discussed, please reaffirm to,' and then the blank is the name of the official, 'as he has already heard from' blank, and that is the name of an ambassador that, 'one, we will not press them on the question of assistance to the contras; two, it is an important matter to us and we face a temporary shortfall in goods.'	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"What did 'goods' mean? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Material of any sort. "Mr. LIMAN. 'Three, we are, of course, very conscious of the vulnerability it would create for' --and the blank is country 1. And what did that mean? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That any country that associates itself with the United States and its policy may be criticized for that affiliation. "Mr. LIMAN. Did it also mean that if the facts were revealed to Congress, that the country might be criticized? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That, too. "Mr. LIMAN. 'Four, if they should decide that they can help, it ought to be done bilaterally, although we would be pleased to provide a point of contact.' "And finally, 'Five, please also let it be known that, in your view, I'm a little disappointed in the outcome but we will not raise it further. Destroy this memo.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And am I correct that after this message was delivered, country 1 still didn't change its mind? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I didn't expect it to, no. "Mr. LIMAN. And you didn't raise it further with country 1? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I did not. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, that left you still with the shortfall in funding. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 30-33;	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		JHICI Exx. 29 [Casey memo to McFarlane, "Supplemental Assistance to Nicaragua Program," 3/27/84; quoted at 84/03/27-100]; 30 [McFarlane memo to Teicher, untitled, 4/20/84; quoted at 84/04/20-200].)	
84/03/27-150 MARCH 27, 1984		THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING OPTIONS FOR THE CONTRAS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. I'll mark as the next exhibit a memorandum dated March 27, 1984. [See 84/03/27-100.] It's from Mr. Casey to Mr. McFarlane, and the only question I have is whether or not you've seen this document before. ". . . . "A. I don't recall seeing it." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 286; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 27 [Casey memo to McFarlane, "Supplemental Assistance to Nicaragua Program," 3/27/84].)	
84/03/27-190 MARCH 27 - APRIL 13, 1984		COUNTRY 6 FUNDING FOR THE CONTRAS: Duane Clarridge, Chief of the Latin American Division of the CIA Directorate of Operations, travels to Country 6. While he is there, CIA Deputy Director John N. McMahon tells Clarridge to "hold off" on his discussions of Contra aid because of the recent harbor mining disclosures. Upon his return to the United States, Clarridge writes: "Current furor here over the Nicaraguan project urges that we postpone taking [Country 6] up on their offer of assistance. Please express to [Country 6 official] my deep regret that we	

must do this, at least for the time being, and I fully realize that he cannot crank up assistance on a moment's notice, should we decide to go forward in the future."

Earlier, on March 27, 1984, DCI Casey had written a memo indicating that Country 6 officials had been approached for Contra aid and that their initial reaction had been favorable.

But Clarridge testified on August 4, 1987 that neither Casey's memorandum nor the cable traffic (in some cases captioned, "[Country 6] Assistance to the Nicaraguan Project") represented CIA efforts to solicit Contra assistance from Country 6. (See 84/03/27-200 through -206.)

(Iran-Contra Report at 38; Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 61-82; JHICI Exx. DRC 19-4 [Casey memo to McFarlane, "Supplemental Assistance to Nicaraguan Program," 3/27/84; Committee Document C 7490], DRC 19-11 [CIA Cable from Clarridge, 4/5/84], DRC 19-14 [CIA Cable, 4/10/84], DRC 19-15 [CIA Cable from Clarridge, 4/12/84], DRC 19-18 [CIA Cable from Clarridge, 5/11/84]. See JHICI Exx. DRC 19-2, 19-3, 19-5, 19-6, 19-7.)

84/03/27-195
1984-86

COUNTRY 6 AID TO THE CONTRAS: NORTH'S KNOWLEDGE

NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION:

"Mr. Stokes. . . . Colonel, early on you were asked about Dewey Clarridge. The committee has certain information that Dewey Clarridge made a trip to country number six, if you have that list, for the purpose of soliciting aid for the contras.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		". . . . "Mr. Stokes. . . . Are you familiar with that visit he made? "Mr. North. I know that he made a trip. And as I have indicated to the committee, I met frequently with Dewey Clarridge on a number of issues over the years, and he was familiar with my activities. I admit to that. I know that this issue was raised in a number of periodicals. I know of absolutely nothing that was ever used or ever sent by [redacted] to the Resistance. I know of absolutely nothing that he solicited [redacted] or was offered for the Resistance. "Furthermore, I was approached by a lobbyist in Washington who offered certain items, munitions, I believe, as well as uniforms, by [redacted] I talked to the Director about it, he said absolutely not. I talked to Admiral Poindexter; he said absolutely not. I never pursued it. "And that person used to send me letter after letter suggesting 'Here is what [redacted] can do for you.' I have no doubt as to why [redacted] wanted to do it given the political situation here in this country. But to my knowledge, we never dealt with him, and I don't believe, unless it was set up outside my operation or the CIA operations, either one, I don't believe the Resistance ever received a bullet from him." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 56-57.)	

84/03/27-200 CONTRA AID: CIA INVOLVEMENT

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
THROUGH 1984		CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 1:	

"Mr. Eggleston. . . . I want to ask you some questions about your prior job, which is during a period of time that you were [redacted] of the LA [Latin American] Division. I take it you have testified that in August of 1981 you became [redacted] of LA?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is correct.

"Mr. Eggleston. And one of your jobs as [redacted] of the LA Division was, among others, was to be ultimately responsible, whatever, for the contra program, is that correct?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is correct.

"Mr. Eggleston. And that was a program tha[t] was funded through Congress up until the time of the Boland Amendment and operated under a covert action?

"Mr. Clarridge. You mean up until 1 October '84?

"Mr. Eggleston. Yes, sir.

"Mr. Clarridge. Right.

"Mr. Eggleston. And the funds for the program begin to run out in the spring of 1984?

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes, certainly by May.

"Mr. Eggleston. They were pretty much gone by May?

"Mr. Clarridge. No, because we had a program to phase them out in early August.

"Mr. Eggleston. But by that time, you knew there was going to be a problem with the funding?

"Mr. Clarridge. Certainly.

". . . .

"Mr. Eggleston. Is it fair to say that where the contras were going to get money in order to sustain themselves in the field militarily and everything, that became a source of concern in the agency?

"Mr. Clarridge. I think that is put a little too strongly. I think within the agency, and that really involved myself and the Director and in the interagency group, there was still the hope that the President would be able to pull it off and that the Congress would vote the money. The effort, as I recall it, from, if you want to say from late spring through the summer, was focused on that particular effort.

"Now, there was discussion about, you know, where could you possibly get other funds from, and there were frankly not very many good ideas.

"Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, you will recall in your deposition, you were asked a series of questions about a trip you took [redacted] --

"Mr. Clarridge. Correct.

"Mr. Eggleston. -- in April, 1984, and you were asked questions about whether there were discussions with [redacted] about providing assistance to the contras. Do you recall being asked those questions in the deposition?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is right, and[ ]I would also like to state that prior to giving that deposition, I did not have an opportunity to review the cable traffic which led up to my trip out [redacted.]"

(Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 59-62.)

84/03/27-201 CONTRA AID: CIA INVOLVEMENT

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
THROUGH 1984		CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, could you take a look at Exhibit [DRC] 18, which is your deposition, excerpts from your deposition? Let me just reference a few sections[ ]of this. [Redacted.] "Page 123, line 11, 'Question: Do you recall any discussion with officials of [redacted] Government about [redacted] providing assistance to the contras? "'Answer: No.' "And if you could just look at page 130, a question by Mr. Barbadoro, Deputy Chief Counsel for the Senate Select Committee, at line 13, 'Question: Picking up on what Mr. Eggleston is asking you about, at any point [redacted] the Latin American Division were you aware of any discussions in the agency about soliciting aid from third countries? "'Answer: No.' "Then, 131, line three, the question is: 'During that period of time, to your knowledge, were there any discussions in the CIA about soliciting aid from third countries? "'Answer: No.' "Mr. Clarridge, if you were asked those questions today would you answer them differently? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes, I would, based on the review of the cable traffic prior to my going out, but I think that cable traffic also needs to be clarified, because I'm not so sure the answer was soliciting. My reading of that cable traffic is	

that at least the agency thought something was being offered.

"Mr. Eggleston. Well, let me ask you to look at Exhibit [DRC] 19-4.

"This is a memorandum from Mr. Casey to Mr. McFarlane dated 27 March 1984. [See 84/03/27-100.] This would have been shortly before your trip to [redacted,] is that correct?

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes. I don't know exactly when I went. I went in April.

"Mr. Eggleston. I seem to remember somewhere it is around the 10th through the 13th.

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes.

"Mr. Eggleston. Paragraph 1 says 'In view of possible difficulties in obtaining supplemental appropriations to carry out Nicaraguan covert action project through the remainder of this year, I am in full agreement you should explore funding alternatives with [redacted] and perhaps others.'

"The rest of that paragraph in paragraph 2 deals with [redacted.] Paragraph 3 says, 'The second alternative we are exploring is the procurement of [redacted.'] There is a name deleted which is apparently [redacted] -- 'has indicated he may be able to make some equipment and training available' -- I think it says 'to the contras, [redacted.]'

"This would indicate that the CIA is itself exploring the possibility of obtaining assistance through [redacted,] is that a fair summary of this?

"Mr. Clarridge. Well, that's what this states, but I don't think the facts are exactly --

were exactly that way.

"Mr. Eggleston. So is it your testimony that this memorandum from the DCI, Casey, to Mr. McFarlane is not an accurate memorandum?

"Mr. Clarridge. As far as my knowledge." (Clarridge Testim., 8/4/87, at 62-65; JHICI Exx. DRC 18 [portions of Clarridge deposition, 4/27/87], DRC 19-4 [Casey memo to McFarlane, "Supplemental Assistance to Nicaraguan Program," 3/27/84].)

84/03/27-202
THROUGH 1984

CONTRA AID: CIA INVOLVEMENT
CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. Eggleston. What is your explanation of -- or your discussion of the events that took place?

"Mr. Clarridge. Well --

"Mr. Eggleston. What is the distinction you are drawing between the facts as you know them and the facts as they are represented in this memorandum [Ex. DRC 19-4], and I guess in the cables?

"Mr. Clarridge. Well, from my reading of the traffic[], after I gave my deposition on this, what I see happening, and it would start, I think, in January when [redacted] official came over to this country.

"Mr. Eggleston. January of '84?

"Mr. Clarridge. Was it January?

"In January '84, came over to this country [redacted] and met with the Director. Now at that meeting or at the end of that meeting, I was called up to it and asked afterwards to give him a briefing on the Central American situation. What it looked like on the ground. I have done that also the year before. Now then there begins a cable exchange in which it appears-that [redacted] had offered something in terms of -- or was prepared to offer training and equipment. I cannot say whether the Director of CIA solicited that [redacted] or whether he offered it. But then as we -- as that traffic goes along, there is a key cable, which I would refer you to, which is [redacted] which states very clearly what [redacted] discussion with [redacted] as to what at least [redacted] understood would be the form of assistance at that time.

"And -- you must have this cable here.

"Mr. Eggleston. I don't know it by that number.

"Mr. Clarridge. What it talks about, if I may say, is bilateral arrangements between [redacted] and [redacted.] All right?

"Mr. Eggleston. I'm asking someone to find it for me. Let me just ask you did you have any conversations directly with [redacted] about -- I'm not using the word soliciting. About them providing assistance to the contras?

"Mr. Clarridge. No. The only thing they raised with us, and that's why I think this cable is significant, because I think there was a misunderstanding within our building throughout, is [redacted] said that they had had a request from [redacted] for assistance and [redacted] said they will have to pay for it. And I said to him

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at that time, there isn't any [redacted] with any money to pay for it.

"Mr. Eggleston. Let me ask you my question over again. Did you have any of these conversations directly with individuals in [redacted] about assistance. I'm not asking about solicitation or payment.

"Mr. Clarridge. No.

"Mr. Eggleston. Did you have conversations with them about that?

"Mr. Clarridge. No.

"Mr. Eggleston. You had no conversations whatsoever with them?

"Mr. Clarridge. No.

"Mr. Eggleston. You were aware, however, that the conversations were taking place inside the building with regard to whether or not [redacted] would provide this assistance to the contras?

"Mr. Clarridge. I don't think that is correct. As least to my knowledge it wasn't. I don't remember any conversations where there were people involved in the building discussing whether they could get help from [redacted] or anybody else.

"Now that may have been going on, but they weren't going on in my presence.

"I was aware that there was 'an offer' from [redacted] which turned out not to be an offer." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 65-68; JHICI Ex. DRC 19-4 [Casey memo to McFarlane, Supplemental Assistance to Nicaraguan Program," 7/84].)

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84/03/27-203 THROUGH 1984		CONTRA AID: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. Well, could you take a look at Exhibit [DRC] 19-2? "Do you have that? "Mr. Clarridge. Right. "Mr. Eggleston. A cable dated 23rd March 1984. It would have been about a week before the memorandum that we just . . . discussed. The upper right-hand corner seems to indicate a copy of this cable went to [redacted] that's handwritten on this cable. That's you, I take it? "Mr. Clarridge. No. I wrote it. "Mr. Eggleston. That's your handwriting? "Mr. Clarridge. No. It's not my handwriting, but the cable says from [redacted.] "Mr. Eggleston. This cable is a cable you drafted? "Mr. Clarridge. Correct. "Mr. Eggleston. There are a lot of code names in this. Let me just take you through it. 'During a meeting with [redacted] -- "Mr. Clarridge. That's with the DCI. "Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Casey? "Mr. Clarridge. Right. "Mr. Eggleston. -- 'on March 23rd on the Nicaraguan project, I mentioned to him [redacted'] "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. "Mr. Eggleston. -- 'comments to you in reference A.' "Reference A is an earlier cable.	

"'He suggested that I send a cable to [redacted'] that's McMahon?

"Mr. Clarridge. Correct.

"Mr. Eggleston. -- 'asking him to meet with [redacted] regarding possible support.'

"This entire cable is labeled Subject: [redacted] Assistance to Nicaraguan Project.

"Doesn't this reflect a conversation that you had with Director Casey about [redacted] assistance to the Nicaraguan project?

"Mr. Clarridge. About a cable which was sent in, I believe, by [redacted] where [redacted] appeared to have made an offer. That's why I think it is important -- you have to get the reference.

"Mr. Eggleston. . . . It's Exhibit No. [DRC] 19.

"This is the first cable in the series?

"Mr. Clarridge. I don't know. We have them here. It's the first cable in your series.

"Mr. Eggleston. Okay. This is a cable from [redacted] to the Director dated March 8, 1984. It makes a reference to various dinners and makes a reference to the possibility of your visiting; and about half way down, it says 'On the latter' -- which is a reference to your potential visit, and you at the time were [redacted] the Latin American Division, the [redacted] official mentioned that he was optimistic of positive support. It's a little hard to read. It appears to say 'to past requests if [redacted] comes here.'

"Are the past requests past requests by the

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		Agency for assistance to the contras? "Mr. Clarridge. Must have been. Must have been. "Mr. Eggleston. Doesn't that imply that the Agency had made past requests for assistance to the contras? "Mr. Clarridge. Certainly does. It does more than implies. "Mr. Eggleston. Wouldn't you derive from this that there had been a past solicitation from the Agency for assistance to the contras? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, I can't really tell this from this, but you know." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 68-71; JHICI Exx. DRC 19 [CIA Cable, "Subject: [Redacted] visit," 3/8/84], DRC 19-2 [Cable drafted by Clarridge, "Subject: [Redacted] Assistance to Nicaraguan Project," 3/23/84].)	
84/03/27-204 THROUGH 1984		CONTRA AID: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 5: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. There are a whole slew of those cables and don't they all deal with discussions between [redacted] and the Agency within the Agency about whether or not they should accept these -- the assistance from [redacted] for the contras, for the Nicaraguan contras? "Mr. Clarridge. That's why I refer you to [redacted] where it is clarified by [redacted] what they are talking about, which is they are not talking about anything. "Mr. Eggleston. But you would agree with me	

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		this first cable seems to indicate there have been past requests and this entire series of cables is arising in the context of [redacted] now responding to past requests by the Agency for assistance to the contras; is that fair? "Mr. Clarridge. It appears to say that. "Mr. Eggleston. Are you referring -- you keep direct[ing] my attention to a cable. Are you referring to [DRC] 19-3? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. "Mr. Eggleston. Paragraph 1 -- the second half of paragraph 1 is the reference to which you have been directing my attention; is that correct? "Mr. Clarridge. Right. "Mr. Eggleston. It reads as follows: [Redacted] 'foresees these being undertaken on direct bases between [redacted] involved, with [redacted'] -- that's the CIA? "Mr. Clarridge. Right. "Mr. Eggleston. -- 'offering behind the scenes advice of where to plug in and what assistanc[e] would be truly useful. However, [redacted] remains open to suggestions for other approaches.' "Isn't this just an explanation of how the assistance is going to be provided? This isn't an explanation of who is soliciting the aid? It's an explanation of how it's going to get there? "Mr. Clarridge. Mr. Eggleston, it became very clear when I went to [redacted] that [redacted] were not offering assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance. Now if they had offered it to the Director or somebody else before, maybe; but I	

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		don't know that. But when I got to [redacted] neither asked for any assistance, they did not offer any assistance to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. "What they said, which seemed to track with what [redacted] finally got out of them in this particular cable, is that they had been -- they had had a request to them from [redacted] which they refused to identify that wanted assistance from [redacted] was thinking about providing this assistance, but it would have to be paid for, which, as I said before, I mentioned to [redacted] that there wasn't any [redacted] with any money that wasn't tied up in -- by some other legislation here in the U.S. that would be available to pay [redacted] for whatever they might give them. "Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, is it your recollection that all these cables and all this discussion relates to a cash deal between the contras and [redacted]. "Mr. Clarridge. No. Nothing to do with a cash deal between [redacted] and the contras. "Mr. Eggleston. I am just not -- I guess I am not understanding you. You indicated that this initiative all dealt with [redacted] being willing to provide to [redacted] weapons that [redacted] would pay for? "Mr. Clarridge. Didn't even know for sure whether it was weapons, backpacks, shoes, or whatever. What I am saying to you, Mr. Eggleston, is that I think there was a misunderstanding or there was a change in [redacted] position from	

January 1984 until you begin to see this particular cable I have drawn your attention to and the time when I arrived in [redacted.]

"Mr. Eggleston. Well --

"Mr. Clarridge. That there was apparently the Director, at least, believed that [redacted] were prepared to offer some assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance. And at a certain point in time, apparently [redacted] thought so also. It became very clear, however, by the time this cable arrived in Washington that what we were talking about was no longer an offer by [redacted] to the Nicaraguan resistance. It was that they were prepared to enter into a bilateral relationship between two sovereign governments. And that was certainly reinforced by the time I got to [redacted.] More than that, more than that, the Director had already decided prior to any trip to [redacted] after I think consultation with Secretary Shultz, that even if [redacted] offered anything, we would not accept it."
(Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 71-75; JHICI Ex. DRC 19-3 [CIA Cable, "Subject. [Redacted] Assistance to Nicaragua," 3/24/84].)

84/03/27-205
THROUGH 1984

CONTRA AID: CIA INVOLVEMENT
CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 6:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

". . . .

"Mr. Eggleston. So what you are telling me is that none of these cables ha[s] anything to do with the contras?

"Mr. Clarridge. I didn't say that. I am

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		saying there was a belief at a certain point in time that [redacted] had -- were offering assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance. Before I ever went out to [redacted] it was very clear that that isn't what they were talking about. And when I got out there, that became patently clear. "Mr. Eggleston. Look at [Ex. DRC] 19-7, will you? This is from [redacted] to the Director. Paragraph one says that [redacted] welcomed [redacted] visit, that is you, and opines he should be able to come up with a 'modest but reasonable amount of equipment, plus a good bilateral [redacted] training program in short order.' "Again, this cable is labeled, subject: [redacted] assistance to the Nicaraguan project. Doesn't this cable indicate that [redacted] are going to provide equipment and a training program in connection with [redacted] -- excuse me, with the Nicaraguan project? "Mr. Clarridge. Let me try at something that is not the best way to do business, but people tend to copy the heads on the cables that they are receiving. You will notice that in the cable you had just referred me to that Director 894326 is referenced by [redacted.] And now if you go to 894326, and look at the subject line, it is [redacted] assistance to Nicaraguan project. "Many of us are like lemmings, we just follow what was said before. So you cannot read into subject lines and all of this that that necessarily meant support to the Nicaraguan project.	

"Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, let me ask you to direct your attention to [Ex. DRC] 19-18, which is the very last cable. It is a cable drafted by you. You do not have the same subject heading.

"It is dated 11 May 1984. It is after you have returned from the trip. The prior cables indicate that there is an additional discussion. Going back -- going on after you get back about whether or not we should permit this assistance to take place. This cable reads as follows: 'Current furor here over the Nicaraguan project urges that we postpone taking [redacted] up on their offer of assistance.'

"This is you writing a cable deciding not to go forward with assistance and you are referring to the furor over the Nicaraguan project?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is right.

"Mr. Eggleston. Is it your testimony that this assistance had nothing to do with the Nicaraguan project?

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes. And I will explain why. The furor was the mining. So it was a big hullabaloo going on about that.

"And a decision was made -- not mine -- may have been an interagency decision or it may have been Casey's decision, that we didn't want to be -- or we could not be seen, the Administration could not be seen as being beholden to [redacted] in any way.

"In this case, we didn't even want [redacted] mucking around in providing bilateral assistance [redacted.] And that is what this says.

"Because in the end that is all they were

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		offering. If they got paid for it." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 77-79; JHICI Exx. DRC 19-7 [CIA Cable, "Subject: [Redacted] Assistance to Nicaraguan Project," 4/84], DRC 19-18 [CIA Cable, "Discussions with [Redacted]," 5/84].)	
84/03/27-206 THROUGH 1984		CONTRA AID: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 7: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, is it your testimony that this cable [Ex. DRC 19-18] is calling off a deal between [redacted] that we were otherwise uninvolved in? "Mr. Clarridge. There was no deal. "Mr. Eggleston. Let me make sure I understand this. Is it your testimony that [redacted] were going to provide assistance to the contras [redacted?]- "Mr. Clarridge. No, never came up. "Mr. Eggleston. So it is your position that these entire series of cables have nothing to do with [redacted] providing assistance to the contras? "Mr. Clarridge. No. I didn't say that. I said that in the beginning there was apparently an impression that the Director had and maybe others, maybe even myself, I can't recall, that [redacted] in January 1984 were prepared to offer something to the Nicaraguan resistance. It became very clear as time went by that that was not the case. "Mr. Eggleston. Let me just summarize so I make sure I understand. At the time this	

initiative began -- and I think you said it began -- initiative may be the wrong word -- that it began in January of 1984. There were discussions involving [redacted] and various people about [redacted] and the contras. That is who [sic (how)] you indicated the whole thing started?

"Mr. Clarridge. No.

"Mr. Eggleston. There was a briefing of them on the situation in Central America?

"Mr. Clarridge. Excuse me. What I said was that there was a meeting between the Director [redacted] and I assumed [redacted] was present in the Director's office. I don't know what they were talking about. I was called up there and the Director asked me to give [redacted] a briefing on what was going on on the ground in Central America.

"Okay? That is all I know.

"Mr. Eggleston. And it is your testimony then that the beginning cables in this series are erroneous because someone has gotten the misimpression that [redacted] want to provide assistance to the contras? You go to [redacted] find out that isn't true.

"Mr. Clarridge. We knew that before I went to [redacted.]

"Mr. Eggleston. And all of these cables then are not dealing with [redacted.] All these cables sometime during the middle of the initiative are not actually dealing with [redacted] assistance to the contas?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is correct. But we were - and maybe we were under a mistaken impression from the beginning that [redacted] were offering assistance to the contras or perhaps in the intervening period, [redacted] changed their mind.

"Mr. Eggleston. And it is your testimony that the reason that the CIA decides not to proceed with this has nothing to do with the fact that [redacted] are interested in providing assistance to the contras and you don't want to mix up those [redacted] in the same operation? That is not what this had to do with?

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes. I think the final cable here that you just drew my attention to reflects the fact that because of the furor over the Nicaraguan project and the mining, the Administration or the interagency group, or who[]ever, decided that it wouldn't be a good idea to have [redacted] mucking around in Central America even on bilateral relations, in giving any kind of assistance down there.

"Mr. Eggleston. What was the name of the country to which [redacted] were going to send the aid?

Mr. Clarridge. They refused to tell us and we only guessed it was probably [redacted.] But that was a guess."

[Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 79-82; JHICI Ex. DRC 19-18 [CIA Cable, "Discussions with [Redacted]," 5/84]. See Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 82-87.)

84/03/27-210
SOMETIME IN
THE SPRING

CONTRA AID: CLARRIDGE'S ACTIVITY
GEORGE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Boland. This was pursued with Duane

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1984		Clarridge, and let me pursue it with you, and I am sure you will have an answer that will be satisfactory. "Did Mr. Casey, or to your knowledge any other CIA official, ever discuss approaching [redacted] with a proposal in which they would support the contras during the pendency of the Boland Amendments in exchange for [redacted?] "Mr. George. There is a very famous trip of Mr. Clarridge to [redacted] in the spring of '84. I am told, I have not read the cable traffic, this committee has it, that there was an indication that Mr. Clarridge was to discuss with [redacted] the general situation in Latin America, and [redacted.] "I am also told there was a countermanding cable sent by Mr. McMahon which said you will not do that. I would only say that at the time that I was not involved with this Directorate, I had a job outside -- I was Director of Congressional Relations. I did not know that event. After I returned to this Directorate, the first of July, '84, Mr. Chairman, I have no knowledge of any occasion when we ever discussed with [redacted] help the contras." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 66-67.)	
84/04/00-100 SOMETIME IN APRIL 1984		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES, AND NORTH-OWEN CONTACT OWEN ACCOUNT: An FDN representative approaches a Gray and Co. vice president to discuss Gray representation. A senior vice president, Neal Livingston, asks Robert Owen (who is then employed by Gray), to	

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		make further contact. "Because this was something new and different," Owen goes to discuss it with North, whom he had met "about a year before." North discusses with Owen the Contras' lack of funds. After Owen speaks with North (and while Owen is still working for Gray), he puts together "several different proposals . . . at a time when no one quite knew where the money for the contras was going to come from." One proposal involves "setting up proprietary companies . . . to purchase goods overseas and provide assistance to the contras." Another proposal involves setting up a non-profit organization to raise funds for humanitarian and non-lethal assistance. Gray and Co. rejects the Contras' offer; North and Owen decide otherwise: "a decision was made that I [sc. Owen] would go down to Central America and visit both Costa Rica and Honduras, and come back with a report laying out what the probable needs would be for the contras during the next period of months." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 206-09.)	
84/04/16-100 APRIL 16, 1984	DoS CHRONOLOGY: BACKGROUND Summary of the DoS Chronology which is excerpted in part throughout this chronology: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [Exhibits GPS-A, -B and -C] are chronologies of certain key events pertinent to Secretary Shultz' testimony which have been prepared by the staff and by the Secretary's office. "The entries in those chronologies are based	THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR THE CONTRAS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "MCFARLANE proposes seeking support for Nicaraguan opposition from Country #1 in a discussion with GPS, CASEY, and two other State officials. MCFARLANE also mentions Countries 11 and 12 as candidates. CASEY and GPS do not reply, focusing instead on legislative strategy with Congress."	

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	on the Secretary's recollection and his records. The Secretary has approved those chronologies after reviewing them as accurately reflecting his knowledge of or participation in the events which are summarized there. "I should note, however, that these chronologies are intended, Mr. Chairman, solely as a convenient reference device and summary of highlights. They are not intended to be nor are they complete or exhaustive of the Secretary's recollection, knowledge, or involvement in any of the matters of the panel." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 4. JHICI Exx. GPS-A [Contras], -B [Iran], -C [Iran II]. DoS Chronology continues at 84/04/17-100.)	(JHICI Ex. GPS-A. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/04/17-100.)	
84/04/17-100 APRIL 17, 1984		COUNTRY 1: APPROACH BY THE NSC FOR CONTRA AID DoS CHRONOLOGY: "Report from US Ambassador to Country 1. MCFARLANE has raised with him aid from Country 1. HOWARD TEICHER has already spoken to official of Country 1, telling him that Country 1 could contribute to the Nicaraguan opposition directly or use USG as a conduit. GPS says no to USG as conduit." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/04/18-100.)	
84/04/18-100 APRIL 18, 1984		COUNTRIES 1 AND 6: SHULTZ ON APPROACHES FOR CONTRA AID DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS tells MCFARLANE he does not favor seeking	

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		aid from Country 1 and is opposed also to seeking aid from Country 6 and says we should not get dependent on others -- we must do it ourselves." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/05/09-100.)	
84/04/18-102 SPRING 1984		COUNTRY 1: SHULTZ ON APPROACHES BY THE NSC FOR CONTRA AID SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . Mr. Secretary, you recall discussions in the spring of 1984 in our Government in which you participated, concerning seeking support for the contras from certain third countries, correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [A]nd you opposed going to Country Number One for contra assistance, am I correct, as well? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I did. "Mr. BELNICK. And by April 18th of 1984, according to the chronology [see 86/04/18-100], you had made clear to Bud McFarlane, who was then the National Security Adviser, that you were opposed to approaching Country One for contra assistance, correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. You had also said and expressed your position that in no event would you agree to the United States Government serving as an intermediary or a conduit for aid to the contras from any third country source; is that correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. That's correct, and I	

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		questioned--without being a lawyer, I questioned the legality of any such arrangement. "Mr. BELNICK. Now, after expressing that position--those positions, rather--did you then learn in May 1984 from our embassy in Country Number One that Mr. Teicher of the National Security Council staff had, in fact, approached Country Number One for a contribution to the Nicaraguan opposition and had said that the United States Government would serve as a conduit for any such contribution? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. We had that from the ambassador, Ambassador Sam Lewis. [See 84/05/09-100.] "Mr. BELNICK. Prior to then, did you have any information from the National Security Adviser or staff that a member of that staff was going to make this approach, the same approach that you had expressed opposition to? "Secretary SHULTZ. No, I didn't. "Mr. BELNICK. I understand that after you learned from our embassy of the information, that you saw Mr. McFarlane at the White House at the beginning of May and confronted him with what you had learned, correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. That's right. I objected to it. [See 84/05/11-100.] "Mr. BELNICK. And what did Mr. McFarlane tell you regarding what you had learned of Mr. Teicher's approach and suggestion that the U.S. Government serve as a conduit for any contribution from country 1? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, as I recall, and I	

think my notes to this effect are that he said that Mr. Teicher was there, was not operating on instructions, he was there on his own hook.

"Mr. BELNICK. Subsequently, did you hear otherwise as to whether Mr. Teicher was there on his own hook?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Mr. Teicher, as I am remembering it, this is all something that can be looked up in these records, but as I remember, Mr. Teicher went to Ambassador Lewis and said that he wanted Ambassador Lewis to know that he was there under instructions.

"Mr. BELNICK. And that what he had said was the result of strict instructions he had received?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Right. That is what Teicher told Ambassador Lewis. [See 84/05/23-100.]

"Mr. BELNICK. I gather, then, Mr. McFarlane did not tell you at the time, after he told you that Teicher was there on his own hook, that he had both asked Mr. Teicher to make the approach to country number 1 and that after you had expressed opposition to any such approach by April 18, Mr. McFarlane had sent Mr. Teicher back to the official of country number 1 with further instructions to make another approach. I take it you were not informed of that?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No, I wasn't."
(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 31-34. See 84/05/23-100.)

84/04/20-100
APRIL 20,

COUNTRY 1: APPROACH BY THE NSC FOR CONTRA AID
SHULTZ ACCOUNT:

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1984		"Mr. BELNICK. . . . [Ex. GPS 58; see 84/04/20-200] is a redacted version of a memorandum from Mr. McFarlane to Mr. Teicher dated April 20, 1984 . . . . "Mr. McFarlane, under the heading 'Helper of the Contras', said to Mr. Teicher on April 20, 'As we discussed, please reaffirm to the official of country number 1 as he has already heard, one, we will not press them on the question of assistance to the contras; two, it is an important matter to us, and we face a temporary shortfall in goods; three, we are of course very conscious of the vulnerability it would create for the government of country number 1; four, if they should decide that they could help, it ought to be done bilaterally although we would be pleased to provide a point of contact', which is blacked out, and 'Please also let it be known that in your view I am a little bit disappointed in the outcome, but we will not raise it further.' "Was that an approach which you had authorized, Mr. Secretary? "Secretary SHULTZ. No. "Mr. BELNICK. Was that an approach you were informed of? "Secretary SHULTZ. No. "Mr. BELNICK. Have you ever learned of it before now? "Secretary SHULTZ. No. This is just stuff coming out here." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 34-35; JHICI Ex. GPS 58. See 84/04/18-102 [Shultz on Teicher's	

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		activity and McFarlane's assurances about approaches to Country 1].)	
84/04/20-200 APRIL 20, 1984		COUNTRY ONE FUNDING FOR THE CONTRAS McFARLANE MEMO: In a memo to Howard Teicher concerning Teicher's meeting with [redacted], McFarlane writes: ". . . . "HELP WITH THE CONTRAS "-- As we discussed, please reaffirm to [redacted] (as he has already heard from [redacted]) that: "1) We will not press them on the question of assistance to the contras. "2) It is an important matter to us and we face a temporary shortfall in goods. "3) We are, of course, very conscious of the vulnerability it would create for the [redacted]. "4) If they should decide that they can help, it ought to be done bilaterally although we would be pleased to provide a point of contact [redacted]. "5) Please also let it be known that, in your view, I am a little disappointed in the outcome but we will not raise it further. "Destroy this memo." (JHICI Ex. 30 [= Ex. GPS 58]. See 84/03/27-111 [McFarlane testimony on the memo].)	
84/05/00-000 SOMETIME IN MAY 1984	NORTH-SINGLAUB CONTACT SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: At the request of Under Secretary of Defense		

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	Fred Ikle, Singlaub chairs a panel (the Singlaub Panel) "examin[ing] the war waged against El Salvador by the Marxist guerrillas." He briefs Oliver North and other NSC staff on his panel's findings. "This was my [sc. Singlaub's] first substantive meeting with Colonel North, although I had met him briefly in early 1981 while briefing a wide range of U.S. defense and security policy officials on the value of special operations forces for counterterrorism and hostage rescue operations." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 184-85.)		
84/05/00-200 MAY 1984 [OR SOMETIME IN THE SPRING OR SUMMER OF 1984]		COUNTRY 2: FIRST CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Country 2 provides $1 million per month to the Contras: McFarlane meets with a Country 2 official and "make[s] clear it looked as though we were heading for a defeat regarding Congressional support for the contras, that it was almost inevitable that the Administration would fail in getting any support for the contras and, because of that, it would represent a substantial loss for the President. "Well, that was the extent of it. He weighed that, he agreed. He said he would like to think about it and did so, and within a matter of days, two or three days, contacted me and made clear that he intended to provide a contribution of $1 million per month, ostensibly from private funds that would be devoted to -- as a humanitarian gesture -- to sustenance of the contras through	

the end of the year.

"I should stress, I described it as it happened, and while there is no solicitation, cry for solicitation, in fact it was unmistakable in his own mind that my concern and my view of this impending loss would represent a significant setback for the President, and if anyone with any gumption could manage without being led or asked, then a contribution would have been welcome." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 34-35 [date - spring or summer 1984]; see id., 5/12/87, at 4 [date - May 1984]. But see id., 5/13/87, at 100 [Sen. Inouye's question gives date as "in July of 1984"; McFarlane's answer does not address date.].)

After McFarlane learns of the Country 2 contribution, he returns to his office and tells his deputy, John Poindexter, about it. He also contacts North and "ask[s] him to be in touch with the contra leaders and to find out where the bank account was kept. And within a matter of days, as I recall, Lieutenant Colonel North came back and provided the name of the bank, its address and the contras' account number for the bank in Miami, Florida, an American Bank, and I provided that 3 by 5 card to the country, or to the person of Country 2, and that was the last that I heard of it." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 36-37.)

"[W]ithin a day, not more than a couple of days, unless [they] were traveling," McFarlane informs

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		the President of the contribution by putting the information on a note card inserted in the President's briefing book. "[A]fter that meeting was over, I was called to come back and pick up the note card which, as I recall, it expressed the President's satisfaction and pleasure that this had o[c]curred." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 37-38.) McFarlane "communicated [the news of Country 2's contribution] to the Vice President personally," he believes, "within a day or so." At the end of a weekly breakfast with the Secretaries of State and Defense, McFarlane "drew them aside . . . and told them that [the money] had been provided for through the end of the year; and neither gentleman pressed the matter further." Neither Secretary asked which country was providing the money. (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 38-39; see id., 5/12/87, at 130-34 [McFarlane testifies further on his approach to Country 2, and the parties whom he informed before and after his action.].)	
84/05/00-400 SOMETIME IN THE SPRING OF 1984		COUNTRY 2: FIRST CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS McFARLANE ACCOUNT (cont'd): McFarlane testified on who else knew that he would discuss the Contras' money needs with the Country 2 official: "Mr. LEON. . . . [H]ad you discussed with the President the prospect of bringing this issue to light with that person in such a way that they	

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		might get the idea that it would be nice to receive some contribution? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I hadn't. "Mr. LEON. How about with the President's then-Chief of Staff, Mr. Baker? . . . "Mr. MCFARLANE. In the spring of '84 I think it is likely . . . . ". . . . "Mr. LEON. Do you recall discussing it besides with anybody else on the White House . . . staff -- for example, Mr. Fielding? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Not that I recall. I do think it is more likely that just Mr. Baker and people in the group there. "Mr. LEON. Mr. Meese? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is possible, yes. He normally came to those meetings." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 130-31.)	
84/05/00-425 1984-86		THIRD-COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONTRAS: McFARLANE'S ROLE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. Isn't it true that notwithstanding your statements to your staff about fund-raising, that you participated in fund-raising, indeed the one country which you directly solicited, Country two, was the country which provided most of the money that was received? "Mr. MCFARLANE. None of what you have said is accurate, Senator Mitchell. I pointed out that the time when the foreign government contributed that first increment, there was no prohibition in	

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		law at all about that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 140.)	
84/05/00-450 SOMETIME IN SPRING 1984		COUNTRY 2: FIRST CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS NORTH ACCOUNT: North described his role in getting the initial contribution from Country 2: "I was instrumental in that I had Mr. Calero establish an account, I passed that accord [sic] card to Mr. McFarlane. I still don't know it was Number Two, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 179.)	
84/05/00-500 1984-85		COUNTRY 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONTRAS: INDUCEMENTS NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: "Mr. Liman. To your knowledge, in connection with country two -- you know what country two is? It is the one that put up all the dough. Were you aware -- "Mr. North. Let me make it very clear. I, to this day, do not know that country two is the one that did it. "Mr. Liman. Colonel, you have said that over and over again. We have told you it is country two. "Mr. North. All right. "Mr. Liman. You have a list. To your knowledge were any inducements given to them such as stingers? "Mr. North. No. Never. If it was, gentlemen, it was done without my knowledge completely [redacted.]"	

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		(North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 30.]	
84/05/00-700 1983-86		THE CONTRA GROUPS, AND THE END OF CIA MONEY IN THE SUMMER OF 1984 CALERO ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. BARBADORO. When you joined the FDN in 1983, what was the size of the FDN fighting force? "Mr. CALERO. Maybe upwards of 2,000. "Mr. BARBADORO. And what happened to the size of that force between 1983 and 1986? "Mr. CALERO. Well, it grew under a ceiling set by this government, and by June of 1984 -- "Mr. BARBADORO. The ceiling you are referring to is a ceiling set by the United States Government? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. Is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir, by this government, yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. And by June 1984 might have amounted to about 6,000 or so, and then from--then came the cutoff of the funds, because there were no more funds appropriated, and again, these are cutoff [sic] of United States Government funds in the summer of 1984; is that correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. Well, in June, it came really because there were no more funds. And from June, July of 1984 to the following year, we more than doubled our forces to about 17, over 17,000 men and then we dropped down a bit towards the end of 1985, and during 1986, and by the end of 1986, we probably had about 16,000 men.	

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		"Mr. BARBADORO. So, is it fair to say that there was a dramatic increase in the number of FDN soldiers after the U.S. Government money ran out in the summer of 1984? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, because we had no ceiling except an economic ceiling. "Mr. BARBADORO. The FDN fights primarily in northern and central Nicaragua; correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. Are there other factions of contras operating independently of FDN? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. There are Indian groups fighting in Nicaragua, are there not? "Mr. CALERO. Indians and Creoles, that is Indians and blacks who are called Creoles in Nicaragua, in the north and in the east, and the other faction which is called the southern front in the deep south. "Mr. BARBADORO. There is a faction operating independently of the FDN in southern Nicaragua known as the southern front, and that is what you have just referred to, right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. What was the size of the southern front forces in 1983 when you joined the FDN? "Mr. CALERO. Well, at the height, I understand it was about 4,000. "Mr. BARBADORO. And what happened to the size of those forces between 1983 and 1986? "Mr. CALERO. They went down, sort of diluted, separated.	

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		"Mr. BARBADORO. Is it fair to say that at the time that the FDN forces were increasing, the southern front forces were decreasing in size? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. And the funding for the southern front was largely independent of the funding for the FDN, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Well, the southern front was funded by the United States Government, as was the northern front and the Indians and Creoles up to June 1984. "Mr. BARBADORO. But the funding for the southern front didn't go through the FDN to the southern front forces; correct? "Mr. CALERO. Not from the United States Government, no." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 10-13.)	
84/05/00-701 1983-84		THE CONTRA GROUPS, AND THE END OF CIA MONEY IN THE SUMMER OF 1984 CALERO ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. BARBADORO. From shortly after the time you joined the FDN in 1983 until the summer of 1984, the FDN was funded by the United States Government through the CIA; correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. And during that time the CIA provided your arms and ammunition for you? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. And did you buy any arms and ammunition on your own during that period? "Mr. CALERO. No.	

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		"Mr. BARBADORO. At that time CIA also gave you food for your troops, clothing and medicines for your troops, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. Well, some of those things would be purchased by us. You know, like food and medicines. "Mr. BARBADORO. With money that the CIA gave you? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. You have mentioned that in the summer of 1984 that the CIA money ran out. When did you learn that that money was going to run out? "Mr. CALERO. Well, more[ ]or[ ]less May. April. We were always under the threat, let's say, of it running out, and in May it was clear that it would run out. "Mr. BARBADORO. When you realized that the money was going to run out, what effort did you make to raise money on your own? "Mr. CALERO. Well, we started telling people, visiting people in foreign countries, friends in foreign countries. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you make attempts to raise money from foreign governments on your own, Mr. Calero? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. From sectors, I should make specific, from sectors of foreign governments. "Mr. BARBADORO. Were you successful in your attempts to raise money on our own? "Mr. CALERO. Well, not money but some materials.	

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		"Mr. BARBADORO. So you obtained some equipment and some material support but you did not obtain any money, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Right." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 13-15.)	
84/05/00-702 MAY THROUGH SUMMER 1984		NORTH-CALERO MEETING CALERO ACCOUNT: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. BARBADORO. When did you meet Lt. Colonel Oliver North? "Mr. CALERO. My recollection is that I met him in Honduras in a meeting that took place maybe in May-June of 1984. "Mr. BARBADORO. Colonel North's appointment books reflect a meeting between you and Colonel North in April of 1984. Do you remember that meeting? "Mr. CALERO. I have been asked about it before. I do not remember it, but like I said, my recollection is meeting him in May-June of 1984. "Mr. BARBADORO. The meeting that you can recall, where was that? "Mr. CALERO. In Central America. "Mr. BARBADORO. Who else attended that meeting? "Mr. CALERO. Well, besides officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, there was Colonel North and some of our directors. "Mr. BARBADORO. What was the purpose of that meeting? "Mr. CALERO. I have described it as a pep talk. You know, things are looking bad and	

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		everything, but we will keep on trying, the President will keep on pressing. We will keep on soliciting funds, and sort of a consolation pep talk situation. "Mr. BARBADORO. They told you that the President wasn't going to give up on the Contras, he was going to keep fighting for support for you, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, that the President would support himself, yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did anyone at that meeting suggest to you that they might be able to raise funds for you from private or foreign government sources? "Mr. CALERO. Not to my recollection that anybody committed himself to do that, but as I say, it was a pep talk. It was something that gave us hope. "Mr. BARBADORO. You saw Colonel North again that summer, did you not? "Mr. CALERO. Oh, yes, yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. What happened at your next meeting with Colonel North? "Mr. CALERO. Well, we went into a lot of detail of the situation, I would say, and he was also very encouraging. I saw in him a very dedicated man and I identified him as my liaison with the United States Government. "Mr. BARBADORO. Well, Mr. Calero, did Colonel North suggest to you at this second meeting that he might be able to raise some funds from foreign sources for you? "Mr. CALERO. Well, he didn't say he	

personally would, but I was led to believe that there were people working on something, that something was going to happen.

"Mr. BARBADORO. When you say you were led to believe, you were led to believe by Colonel North?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Somebody was working on raising money for you, is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, yes, I would say so.

"Mr. BARBADORO. And as a result of that conversation, Colonel North[] asked you for the number for your bank account, correct?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, Colonel North--I gave Colonel North and others a bank account number.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Let's stick with Colonel North for a minute. That would have been some point in the summer of 1984, prior to July of '84?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, yes."

(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 15-18.)

84/05/00-703
1984-85

SECORD-CALERO MEETING, AND THIRD-COUNTRY AID TO THE CONTRAS

CALERO ACCOUNT:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. BARBADORO. . . . Who[m] else did you give the [bank account; see preceding entry] number to?

"Mr. CALERO. General Singlaub and General Secord. And a few others that I wouldn't remember now.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Let me ask you about General Secord. How did you meet General Secord?

"Mr. CALERO. I don't remember if I called him

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		or if he called me. Then we met at the hotel but I would say that it was through the indication of Colonel North. "Mr. BARBADORO. It was Colonel North that arranged the meeting one way or the other, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did General Secord ever suggest to you that he might be able to play a role in raising some money for you from foreign sources? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, he did. "Mr. BARBADORO. What did he tell you? "Mr. CALERO. Well, we had different meetings, but in one of these meetings, he suggested that he had friends in the Middle East and that--Middle East--and that he would approach them, and then at one point he said that he might be able to get from $13, between $13 and $25 million, and that he would visit with his friends. . . . "Mr. BARBADORO. So you had a conversation with him in which he suggested he might be able to raise between $15 [sic] and $25 million from sources he was familiar with in the Middle East? "Mr. CALERO. Yes sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. And at some point he told you that he had played a role in . . . obtaining some of the money that you had received, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, I understood that he had--well, he said that he has visited with these people, had made the solicitation, and apparently took credit for helping out. "Mr. BARBADORO. When was that that he	

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		appeared to take credit for helping you in raising money? "Mr. CALERO. I would not--well, during the course of the, of our receiving the money. "Mr. BARBADORO. Would it have been after February-March of 1985 when you received $24 million? "Mr. CALERO. Well, yes. I mean, that is correct, yes." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 18-19. See 84/09/21-310, 85/06/21-090 [Secord's approach to a third-country for aid to the Contras].)	
84/05/01-600 SOMETIME IN MAY 1984	THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD GARWOOD ACCOUNT: Ellen Garwood first meets North at a Council for National Policy meeting in Williamsburg, VA. (Garwood Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 8. See id., 5/21/87, at 71.)		
84/05/02-100 MAY 2, 1984		CONTRA FUNDING: CASEY DENIES THIRD-COUNTRY APPROACHES BY CIA OR OTHERS IN USG CASEY ACCOUNT: CIA Director Casey appears with Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam before HPSCI. Casey denies that the CIA or "any element of our Government" is "approaching any element of another Government to obtain aid for the Contras." (Iran-Contra Report, at 118-19; Casey Testim., HPSCI Hearings, 5/2/84, at 69-70.)	
84/05/08-810 MAY 8, 1984			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: Benjamin Weir, a Presbyterian minister, is

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			kidnapped in Lebanon. (CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 1.)
84/05/09-100 MAY 9, 1984		COUNTRY 1: APPROACH BY NSC FOR CONTRA AID DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS learns that TEICHER told official of Country 1 that U.S. would be intermediary for funding by Country 1, and that TEICHER made this approach weeks before U.S. Ambassador to Country 1 learned of it." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/05/11-100.)	
84/05/11-100 MAY 11, 1984		COUNTRY 1: APPROACH BY NSC FOR CONTRA AID DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS confronts MCFARLANE with information concerning TEICHER and his approach to Country 1. MCFARLANE says that what TEICHER told the official of Country 1 was not authorized." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/05/23-100.)	
84/05/20-000 LATE MAY - EARLY JUNE 1984		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES OWEN ACCOUNT: Robert Owen flies to Costa Rica and stays 4 to 5 days, then travels on to Honduras for "about another week." He speaks with Contra leaders and discusses "their potential funding needs." They tell Owen "they would need $1 million a month, and if they wanted to increase in size they would need about a million and a half dollars a month."	

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		(Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 211-12.) On his return to the U.S., Owen sends North "several memos . . . and had a couple of meetings with him." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 212.) Owen had previously visited Central America in the summer of 1983 while he was working for Senator Quayle. At the urging of John Hull, "an Indiana constituent" (and Hull's provision of a round-trip ticket to Costa Rica), Owen visited Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 217.)	
84/05/23-100 MAY 23, 1984		COUNTRY 1: APPROACH BY NSC FOR CONTRA AID DoS CHRONOLOGY: "Report from U.S. Ambassador to Country 1 concerning conversations with TEICHER and MCFARLANE. TEICHER advised that he had called the official of Country 1 to say that any further discussions would be handled through the U.S. Ambassador. "TEICHER also told U.S. Ambassador, however, that in his previous discussions with the official of Country 1, he was operating on strict instructions. "MCFARLANE advised Ambassador that he had dropped his idea that Country 1 take over all responsibility for the Nicaraguan opposition forces because Ambassador 'blew the whistle' on him." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. See 84/04/18-102. On the DoS	

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		Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/05/25-100.)	
84/05/25-100 MAY 25, 1984		THIRD COUNTRY FUNDING FOR THE CONTRAS: DoS AND CIA REVIEW DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ASSISTANT SECRETARY/ARA, LANGHORNE A. MOTLEY, presents possible approach to third country funding, developed by ARA/CIA staff, which includes notifying Congress. U.S. would facilitate, solicit and control the third country support, but not serve as conduit. NSPG meeting required. Countries considered as candidates: 1, 3, 5, 6, 11, 7, 13. GPS opposes both the proposal and the candidate contributors. "GPS speaks to CASEY on same day. Casey agrees with GPS' position that U.S. should not solicit aid from other countries; if third countries volunteer, OK. "GPS tells MOTLEY no." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/05/28-100.)	
84/05/28-100 MAY 18, 1984		THIRD COUNTRY FUNDING FOR THE CONTRAS: DoS AND CIA REVIEW DoS CHRONOLOGY: "State and CIA officials continue discussion of funding options. Consensus opposes third country solicitation." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/06/25-100.)	

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84/06/00-001 DURING 1984		MINING OF NICARAGUAN HARBORS: AFTERMATH McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. And did some event happen in 1984 that led . . . the Administration to conclude that it was not feasible to seek more aid from Congress? "Mr. MCFARLANE. The disclosure that harbors had been mined in Nicaragua was received very badly, . . . and it did, you are correct, have a very negative effect on the prospect of Congressional support of any additional funding that year. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. And is it fair to say that you contemplated that the $24 million [appropriated for FY84 under the Defense Appropriations Act] would run out by May or June of 1984? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 26-27.)	
84/06/06-100 JUNE 6, 1984		"CASEY ACCORDS" CIA AGREEMENT: Following the disclosure of the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors (see 84/01/00-005), the Senate Intelligence Committee and CIA Director Casey sign an agreement which ends an escalating battle between the Committee and CIA and reflects a new spirit of cooperation. The agreement states that the CIA will give the Committee prior notice of "any significant, anticipated intelligence activity." (CIA Documents, "Procedures Governing Reporting to	

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		the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on Covert Action," 6/6/84, signed by Goldwater, Moynihan, and Casey [Committee Documents C 0619 through 0621]; "Addendum to Procedures Governing Reporting to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Covert Action," 6/5 - 6/17/86, signed by Durenberger, Leahy, and Casey [Committee Documents C 0616 through 0618]; Iran-Contra Report, at 117-18.)	
84/06/25-095 JUNE 25, 1984		NSPG MEETING: THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING FOR THE CONTRAS On June 25, 1984, the National Security Planning Group meets to consider options for funding the Contras. In attendance are the President, Vice President, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Meese, and McFarlane. Casey urges the President to seek third-country aid. Shultz responds that White House Chief of Staff James Baker has told him that if the U.S. Government should act as a conduit for third-country funding to the Contras, that would be an "impeachable offense." Casey responds that it is permissible if the plan calls for direct contributions from third countries to the Contras. Meese recalls that there was an opinion by Attorney General William French Smith that provided authority for such a plan, but also notes that if an opinion were sought, Justice Department lawyers should be given guidance on what the opinion should say. The meeting ends without any firm conclusion. McFarlane advises that no one do anything without the necessary Justice Department opinion.	

Although McFarlane has already secured the contribution from Country 2, neither he nor anyone else mentions it. (Iran-Contra Report, at 39.)

84/06/25-097
JUNE 25, 1984

NORTH IS ADVISED OF NSPG MEETING AND TRANSFERS FUNDS TO CALERO

NORTH NOTES:

Although McFarlane urges those at the NSPG meeting (see 84/06/25-095) not to do anything, that very day North arranges for the transfer of Country 2 funds to Contra leader Adolfo Calero. North's notes reveal that on June 25, 1984, he tells Calero that funds would be transferred "w/in 24 hrs.," through an offshore account. North issues a series of instructions to Calero: "NEVER let agency know of amt, source, or even availability" of the funds; "no one in our govt. can be aware"; and "your organization must NOT be fully aware."

North makes these plans to send the Country 2 funds to Calero despite his apparent knowledge of the legal difficulties expressed earlier that day at the NSPG meeting. His notes reflected that he was advised of those discussions by Clarridge of the CIA. North's notes record phrases such as "impeachable offense" (presumably referring to Secretary Shultz' remark), and "going to French Smith -- reading on U.S. seeking alternative funding." The note continues: "Seek 3d Party Funding."

(North Notebook entry, 6/25/84 [Committee Documents Q 0340, 0343; emphasis in original]; Iran-Contra Report, at 39.)

84/06/25-100
JUNE 25, 1984

THIRD COUNTRY FUNDING FOR THE CONTRAS:
NSPG MEETING

DoS CHRONOLOGY:

"NSPG meeting. Discussion of third country funding. GPS raises legal questions and suggests seeking opinion from ATTORNEY GENERAL. MCFARLANE proposes no solicitation of third countries pending opinion from A.G."

(JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/08/07-100.)

84/06/25-102
JUNE 25, 1984

THIRD COUNTRY FUNDING FOR THE CONTRAS: NSPG MEETING

SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. BELNICK. I would turn your attention now, Mr. Secretary, to an NSPG . . . meeting which took place on June 25, 1984. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . The subject of that meeting was the situation in Central America and specifically insofar as we have accepted the discussion whether to obtain third-country support for the contras. Am I correct that your position at that meeting on June 25, 1984 was that you did not believe it would be lawful at that time to seek third-country assistance for the Nicaraguan Opposition?

"Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct. What I must have had in mind is that there would be ways of doing it that would be unlawful, and I perhaps would--I am not sure about this--but in my mind, the proposal that I had seen was for us to be essentially a conduit.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you have a view then as to the wisdom of the policy of approaching third countries for assistance at that time, June, 1984?

"Secretary SHULTZ. I am a very strong supporter of the idea of helping those people in Nicaragua who are ready to fight for the freedom and independence of their country to do so. And I am convinced that it is very much in the interest of the United States and of the new democracies in Central America to provide that kind of help, and I hope and pray that when we come to act on this matter, we will continue to do what was put into place last year. So I have always been a very strong supporter.

"My feeling always has been that in the end, to provide that kind of support that really will do the job, it will be necessary to do it with the support of the Congress. I felt, and feel today, that the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance is a genuine force and that somehow they would hold themselves together, and as Tony Motley put it, they could rustle up their own money somehow, at least enough to keep going.

"But our major concern should be to conduct ourselves so that we maximize the chance of persuading the Congress to come back on board and give support. And I felt that if we, if we actively solicited third countries, we would be cutting against those objectives in our arguments with the Congress, and beyond that it seemed to me that since this is a matter of vital interest to the United States, we couldn't, we didn't want to get ourselves in the position where we have to rely on what we can persuade other people to do to serve our vital interests. We have to step up to those ourselves. That was my thinking.

"Mr. BELNICK. On the legal side, did you conclude and express the view at the NSPG meeting that you ought to get an opinion from the Attorney General as to whether the United States could help the contras with assistance from third countries?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. There was a back-and-forth argument about the subject of legality, and I am always a little hesitant to express myself on those subjects surrounded by lawyers, as I am here and everywhere.

"Mr. BELNICK. Sir, there is never enough.

"Secretary SHULTZ. But I have noticed in my--I have noticed in my experience in the government that when you go to an official, professional lawyer--

"Mr. BELNICK. Uh-oh.

"Secretary SHULTZ. --who is holding office and you say 'I want an opinion, I want you to write it down and sign your name to it', that that gets their attention. It is better than a casual, you know, 'I guess it is okay' kind of thing.

"So I said, 'Well, let's have a formal opinion, and then we will know what we can do and can't do.'"
(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 35-39.)

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84/06/25-103 JUNE 25, 1984		THIRD COUNTRY FUNDING FOR THE CONTRAS: NSPG MEETING	

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		SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall what Mr. Meese, who was not Attorney General at that time, but who was present at the meeting, . . . counseled with respect to obtaining an opinion from the Attorney General? "Secretary SHULTZ. No, I don't recall the sort of back and forth of discussion particularly. It was quite a while ago. "Mr. BELNICK. Would you look at page 4, please, of the [classified] excerpts of that meeting and tell me whether it refreshes your recollection . . . of the comments that Mr. Meese made about going to the Attorney General for an opinion. "Secretary SHULTZ. I don't remember that, but I see that he is saying we want to tell the Justice Department we want a proper and legal basis, so I don't have any objection to that. But I don't remember that. "Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall that Mr. Meese also indicated that if you went to the Department of Justice for an opinion, it would be important to tell the Department of Justice where you wanted to come out? "Secretary SHULTZ. No, I don't recall that he said that. Maybe you can get that implication from that sentence, but I don't think that--I don't remember that at all. "Mr. BELNICK. All right, sir. "Do you recall that at the conclusion-- "Secretary SHULTZ. Actually, I don't think	

that it works that way. At least based on my experience. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . And at the end of the June 1984 meeting, as I understand it, Mr. McFarlane proposed that things be held in abeyance and that there be no authority for anyone to seek third country support for the contras pending receipt of an opinion from the Attorney General?

"Secretary SHULTZ. I believe that is right.

"Mr. BELNICK. While Mr. McFarlane so proposed at that time, Mr. Secretary, did he inform you that at the same time, or thereabouts, that he, Mr. McFarlane, had met with an official of Country No. 2 and obtained a contribution of one million dollars per month for the contra cause?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No, he didn't.

"Mr. BELNICK. And is it the fact, sir, that the same information was withheld from the S[t]ate Department when the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Armacost, asked Mr. McFarlane on August 7, 1984, how the contras were being funded?

"Secretary SHULTZ. We were having a discussion of that fact among a group of people, and I have some notes on that that say[] who; but Mr. Armacost did raise the question where are they getting the money; and Mr. McFarlane said he didn't know. But they seemed to have money coming in at a rate of about a million dollar[s] a month. [See 84/08/07-100.]

"We didn't think that was particularly surprising. That is, it seemed to us quite possible that the freedom fighters could raise

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		that much money. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. . . . Did you ever receive the legal opinion from the Attorney General that was discussed at the June 1984 meeting? "Secretary SHULTZ. No. The subject seemed to die down. "Mr. BELNICK. Do you know if the opinion was formally sought from the Justice Department? "Secretary SHULTZ. I don't." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 40-43.)	
84/06/26-100 JUNE 26, 1984		ATTORNEY GENERAL GIVES OPINION ON THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING: On June 26, 1984, Director Casey meets with Attorney General William French Smith along with members of the DoJ and CIA legal staff. In a memorandum recording the meeting, CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin reports that in response to Director Casey's question about the "legal limits" of funding options, the Attorney General stated "that he saw no legal concern if the United States Government discussed this matter with other nations so long as it was made clear that they would be using their own funds to support the Contras and no U.S. appropriated funds would be used for this purpose. The Attorney General also said that any nation agreeing to supply aid could not look to the United States to repay that commitment in the future. The DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] made it clear that if there is a possibility this option might be used, he would advise the CIA oversight committees."	

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		The Congressional Intelligence Committees are not advised of the Country 2 contribution until 1987. (Sporkin Memo for the Record, 6/26/84, Subject; "Nicaragua" [Committee Document C 8322]; Iran-Contra Report, at 39-40.)	
84/07/00-070 1984-86		NORTH'S CONTACT WITH CALERO CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. Mr. Calero, Colonel North's appointment books show approximately 50 meetings with you between 1984 and 1986. Would you accept that as a fair statement of the number of times you met with Colonel North? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, I met with him every time I came to Washington, and sometimes we would meet very fast for one day and he would have to leave. Maybe we talked five minutes, and then he said, come back in the afternoon or come back the next day. "Mr. BARBADORO. You have already testified that you discussed the contributions you were receiv[ing] with Colonel North, correct? "Mr. CALERO. I informed him, yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. And also informed him of what arms you were purchasing? "Mr. CALERO. I informed him of that, yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. What else did you talk about in these meetings? "Mr. CALERO. The general aspects--how the war was going, what our prospects were, what the situation, internal situation in the United States was. The overall. I had--I think I said before I	

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		had no reservations when I spoke to Colonel North. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North ever give you military advice? "Mr. CALERO. Well, we commented, let's say, on military things. And I remember talking about that it was best to take out helicopters on the ground. It was easier, cheaper. "Mr. BARBADORO. That was in about November of 1984 that you had that discussion with him? "Mr. CALERO. About that time probably. "Mr. BARBADORO. And that was specifically--specifically you were concerned about HIND helicopters that had been delivered to Nicaragua, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North ever give you intelligence information? "Mr. CALERO. Well, he could have only known if it was really intelligence. I have no way of knowing. "We did discuss positions of Sandinista troops, and he did tell me about the Sandinistas massing up at some point and about the Sandinista troops threatening, about a possible Cambodia-type operation by the Sandinistas." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 43-44. See generally JHICI Ex. OLN 255 [= Ex. JMP 3; North memo to McFarlane, "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom," 11/7/84, on North's contact with Calero (quoted at 84/11/07-275)].)	
84/07/00-080 JULY 1984 -		BANK DEPOSITS FOR CALERO CALERO ACCOUNT:	

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FEBRUARY 1985		[Calero testimony continues from 84/05/00-703:] "Mr. BARBADORO. Let's go back to the summer of 1984. You received your first substantial deposit in July of 1984, correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, $1 million. "Mr. BARBADORO. Before you received that $1 million, did Colonel North or anyone else tell you that it was going to be arriving? "Mr. CALERO. No, I was never told when or how much would be arriving. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you tell Colonel North that you had received the million dollars? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, I did. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did he tell you where the million had come from? "Mr. CALERO. No, he didn't. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you ask him? "Mr. CALERO. No. I didn't care where it come from. "Mr. BARBADORO. You were happy to get the money and you didn't care where it come from, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, I had other, much more important worries than to find out where it had come from. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North tell you that you could be expecting more money deposited in the future? "Mr. CALERO. Well, I remember that every time we got money, I mean, we were very happily	

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		surprised or some sort. I don't think that anybody told me that there will be something coming. As a matter of fact, I could not plan for arms purchases because we didn't know, we made our first arms purchases after we had received an amount and it wasn't until the third receipt that he figured, well, this might be something that will be followed up. "Mr. BARBADORO. You mentioned additional deposits. After July you continued to receive deposits of $1 million a montn, did you not? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. And did you continue to keep Colonel North informed when you had received deposits? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. You continued to receive those deposits until February of 1985, correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 19-22. See below at 85/02/00-800 [Calero testimony on the increased deposits in 2/85 and 3/85].)	
84/07/00-100 SOMETIME IN JULY 1984		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES SECORD ACCOUNT: Lt. Col. Oliver North calls Gen. Richard Secord; he says he has been talking to other private persons, including Gen. John Singlaub, after the cap placed by Congress in May on further aid for the Contras. North gives Secord a brief overview of the current situation, mentions FDN chief Adolfo Calero, and asks Secord for his services. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at	

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		116-17; see also id., 5/6/87, at 140.)	
84/07/00-101 SOMETIME IN JULY 1984		NORTH-SECORD-CALERO CONTACT SECORD ACCOUNT: A short time later, Secord meets Calero at North's office at the OEOB. A few days later, Secord, accompanied by Rafael Quintero, meets with Calero at the Marriott Hotel near National Airport in Washington. They discuss finding lower-priced arms. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 135-40.)	
84/07/00-110 THE EARLY DAYS OF 1984, OR SPRING OR SUMMER 1984		CASEY SUGGESTS SECORD NORTH ACCOUNT: ". . . [I]n the early days of 1984 when we saw the money running out, we had a number of discussions within the Administration as to what the alternatives were, and my recollection is that the first person to suggest General Secord was Director Casey, as a person who could, acting outside of the Government of the United States, provide assistance, relying on his abilities that he had demonstrated while on active duty, his experience with covert operations, and his connections throughout the world, having come from a Pentagon job where he had that kind of a background where he had contacts with senior officials in other governments." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 151-52.)	
84/07/00-112 THE EARLY DAYS OF 1984,		CASEY SUGGESTS SECORD NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. JENKINS. Who gave you at that point or	

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OR SPRING OR SUMMER 1984		gave the NSC the direction to contact General Secord? Did that come from Casey or did that come from someone else? "Mr. NORTH. The person who suggested General Secord to me--and I then took the name to Mr. McFarlane--was Director Casey. "Mr. JENKINS. And did you at that time already know General Secord? "Mr. NORTH. I had met General Secord in 1981, shortly after I arrived on the NSC staff. He was at that point, I believe--I don't want to get this title wrong, but I think his title was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. ". . . . "Mr. JENKINS. At that time, did you know that there had been some question at one time or another about a security clearance for General Secord? "Mr. NORTH. No, I did not. . . . "Mr. JENKINS. At any rate, you contacted him and it was he that brought in Mr. Albert Hakim? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. I went to General Secord, as I recall it might have been in the spring or summer of 1984[,] basically seeking someone who could give the kind of advice and logistics and activity support to the resistance that we perceived they needed because the CIA was being pulled away and of course with the most stringent of the Boland strictures in October basically cut off very abruptly at that point. "By then, General Secord had been engaged and money had started to flow to the Nicaraguan	

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		resistance from outside sources." (North Tesim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 153-54.)	
84/07/00-120 SUMMER 1984		WHETHER CASEY DIRECTED NORTH TO SECORD GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Sarbanes. North testified that Secord in effect was sent to him by Casey[.] "Mr. George. I know that. I saw or heard that testimony. [See 84/08/00-110, -112.] "Mr. Sarbanes. What is your view of that? "Mr. George. I would doubt it. "Mr. Sarbanes. Why? "Mr. George. Gut instinct, I know Bill Casey. If Casey sent Secord to North, someone else talked Casey into it. I don't know -- why am I conjecturing -- I can't believe that Bill Casey sent Secord to North because if he did he had to send him in the summer of 1984, I think as I put it back together historically. Bill Casey knew the problems with Secord. The problem -- the problem is that when who[]ever it was told Ollie North that he had one little task, all Ollie had to do was get money or make sure money was obtained, obtain arms, make sure arms are sent to Central America, get somebody to give private support to the benefactors. Those who charged North with that activity were grossly unfair and who would walk into Ollie North's life first in the United States of America, you are not going to deal with foreigners, but Dick Secord who is in the international arms business and has experience in the United States Government in some version of clandestine activities."	

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		(George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 111-12.)	
84/07/00-150 SOMETIME IN 1984		CONTRA FUNDING: OFF-SHORE ACCOUNTS NORTH TESTIMONY: "Mr. NORTH. . . . Mr. McFarlane was the person who turned to me to establish the initial resistance account offshore to which money was sent by a foreign government. "Mr. FOLEY. He specifically directed you to do that? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. . . . [I]n 1984, I asked one of the resistance leaders to establish an offshore account to which money could be provided by a foreign government. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you specifically direct the establishment of the Lake Resources account? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall saying that I wanted to call it Lake Resources. As a consequence of the conversations I had with Director Casey, with the concurrence of Mr. McFarlane, the offshore entities as part of the overseas, non-U.S. Government activities were established by General Secord. I don't recall that anybody in the U.S. Government mandated that it be called Lake Resources or anything like that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 131.)	
84/07/00-160 SOMETIME IN		SECORD'S ROLE AND OFF-SHORE ACCOUNTS NORTH TESTIMONY:	

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1984		North testified that by the time of Boland's enactment in October 1984, "Secord had been engaged and money had begun to flow to the Nicaraguan resistance from outside sources." North's description of Secord's role and Contra funding continued: "Mr. JENKINS. And those outside sources [were] through Calero primarily? "Mr. NORTH. The one I was aware of started in the spring or summer of 1984. Mr. McFarlane came to me and asked me for my recommendations. I went to Director Casey and asked him his advice. ". . . . "Mr. JENKINS. . . . Then Secord and Hakim commenced the arms purchase for the contras. "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. . . . [A]fter I conferred with Director Casey, I then, with his advice, recommended to Mr. Calero the establishment of an offshore bank account, and he then gave me that account number. "I gave that acccount number to Mr. McFarlane and shortly thereafter money started to flow. And I can't say for certain even today that there is a direct connection, but I certainly assumed there was and it flowed to that account. And then General Secord began providing the kind of support which is now so evident. "At that point in time, I had never even heard of Mr. Hakim and it wasn't until some time later that I met him. "Mr. JENKINS. But at any rate, Mr. Hakim and General Secord were in this as I understand it as a profit-making business?	

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		"Mr. NORTH. Well, again, my understanding was, and I--the word 'profit' may have come up, but the two criteria that Director Casey and I talked about, three criteria actually and that I communicated with General Secord on was that these had to be stand-alone, off-shore commercial ventures, that they ought to be ultimately revenue producers, that they would generate their own revenue and be self-sustaining, and that those engaged in these commercial ventures were certainly deserving of fair, just, reasonable compensation. "Mr. JENKINS. Which you never did define and it was never defined to you? "Mr. NORTH. No, sir. "Mr. JENKINS. And at that time, Mr. McFarlane and later Mr. Poindexter understood that; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. I certainly believe they did, sir. "Mr. JENKINS. And as a matter of fact, at some point in the initial stages, Mr. Hakim and General Secord decided to eliminate the Canadian arms dealer and give that portion of the profits to Mr. Clines, is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. I will have to say apparently so, because I am not--those were the kinds of details within the operation in which I did not involve myself. I didn't see any necessity for that. I am not even sure that I was aware of that at the time. "Mr. JENKINS. You left that entirely to General Secord?	

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		"Mr. NORTH. Exactly." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 154-57.)	
84/07/00-161 1984-85		NORTH-SECORD CONTACT: McFARLANE'S AWARENESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. General Secord has testified to a number of conversations and meetings with North during the period that you were National Security Adviser relating to the contras. Were those things that you were unaware of? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 98.)	
84/07/00-163 SOMETIME IN 1984		SECORD'S ROLE AND McFARLANE'S AWARENESS McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. NUNN. . . . Colonel North was under the clear impression, according to his testimony, that he did have your approval to ask General Secord to undertake the airlift effort. Is that a correct impression on his part? And that was the airlift effort for the contra operation. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I heard the testimony on that point, Senator Nunn, and I was surprised by that. I don't recall being aware of General Secord's involvement with any activity really of support to the Administration after he left until December of '85, when on a visit to London for meetings with the Iranians I encountered him there. And no earlier offer or proposal to my knowledge for either directly with Colonel North or for the contras to engage him had ever come to my attention as far as I recall." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 218.)	

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84/07/00-165 1984-86		SECORD'S ROLE AND McFARLANE'S AWARENESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. . . . Colonel North said here that in the early days of 1984, when it was seen that money was running out, there were discussions within the Administration as to the alternatives and that Director Casey suggested General Secord to him as a person who could act outside of the Government of the United States, provide assistance in this contra support effort. And he then said, 'The person who suggested General Secord to me, and I then took the name to Mr. Mc[F]arlane, was Director Casey.' "Now, I take it it is your testimony that you didn't know about General Secord's role in any of this until the Honduran [sic] meeting in December of 1985; is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct, Senator Sarbanes, and I think that the statement is also reinforced by the facts that are on the public record. "Specifically, in 1984 to my knowledge, there was no meeting or deliberate plan developed to plan for the contingency of a congressional cutoff. "The reason why you wouldn't need to do that was because as we have learned separately a country, a second, third country had volunteered to support and continue to sustain the needs of the contras. "That same country continued that into 1985, so as a practical matter at least from my point of	

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		view, there wasn't any need for there to be some new creation, because the funding level was carried on. "Mr. SARBANES. Did the account number in which these countries that were being solicited would deposit their money come to you from Colonel North? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir, I testified to that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 254-55.)	
84/07/00-168 UNTIL 1986		SECORD'S ROLE AND NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: McFARLANE'S AWARENESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCCLURE. A little bit earlier, in response to a question I believe by Senator Rudman, you were asked, did Ollie tell you that General Secord was involved? And you said, no, you didn't know that, you learned that later. But you must have known that somebody was involved? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Of course. "Mr. MCCLURE. That there was resupply operation? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. MCCLURE. And that somebody was flying supplies to them? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. MCCLURE. . . . Did Colonel North ever indicate to you that he knew that that resupply operation was going on? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, of course. He reported the fact that airdrops were occurring, that some of them got through and some didn't, that	

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		shortages existed. I would not pretend ever that Colonel North wasn't in almost real time contact with the contra leadership. And I knew that, and I approved that. "Mr. MCCLURE. It isn't something you would have told him you shouldn't know? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. "Mr. MCCLURE. Please don't talk to those folks? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 238.)	
84/07/00-170 1984-86		SECORD'S ROLE AND McFARLANE'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Is it correct that you knew that Colonel North had secured the services of--or encouraged, let me put it that way--General Secord to set up the contra supply operation? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I was aware that he did that, and I was certainly operating under the impression that Mr. McFarlane had approved that." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 187-88.)	
84/07/00-185 AT VARIOUS TIMES BETWEEN 1981 AND 1986		NORTH-SECORD CONTACT, AND SECORD'S CONTRA SUPPORT ROLE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "General Secord, obviously, plays a very big part in this. I'm very fuzzy on the origination of that. As the Tower Commission Report points out, I think probably Colonel North met General Secord when we were back in 1981, when Colonel North first came to the NSC staff and we were working the AWACS issue for Saudi Arabia. But as	

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		-- when we reached the point that the CIA was restricted as to what they could do in terms of supporting the contras and because the contras didn't have a -- any sort of logistics organization of their own, Colonel North, to carry out his general responsibilities, had to figure out a way to privately arrange a logistics organization. "I don't recall being involved in the decision to use General Secord, but when I learned of it, I had no problem with it. I was an admirer of General Secord's, thought he was a very competent, capable officer, and also didn't see any problem with it because he was doing this as a private individual. "I would suppose with hindsight, that he probably became involved when [redacted] money began to flow to the democratic resistance and the problem arose as to how to -- for the democratic resistance to use that money to obtain arms and ammunition and the other supplies and stuff that they needed. I am sure Colonel North will have a better recollection of the exact details there. But I understand from the reports that Colonel North made to me that generally the way it worked is that General Secord either had or set up several companies that essentially ran the logistics organization for the democratic resistance going all the way from procuring arms from third countries with funds that were available from whatever source, private or third party, and then transporting those arms and supplies from their third-country location to the	

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		Central America area, including direct parachute drops into contra units that were in Nicaragua. . . ." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 60-61. See below at 85/07/01-050 [other Poindexter testimony on Secord's role].)	
84/07/00-200 JULY 1984 THROUGH APRIL 9, 1985		CONTRA FUNDING: SUMMARY NORTH MEMO: North memo to McFarlane, dated April 11, 1985, contains "a summary analysis of how the FDN has expended funds which have been made available since USG funding expired in May 1984. From July 1984 through February 1985, the FDN received $1M per month for a total of $8M. From February 22 to April 9, 1985, an additional $16.5M has been received for a grand total of $24.5M[.] Of this, $17,145,594 has been expended for arms, munitions, combat operations, and support activities." (JHICI Ex. 37; McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 61-62. See 85/04/11-200 [text of North memo].)	
84/07/00-300 JULY 1984 THROUGH DECEMBER 1986		CASTILLO BACKGROUND CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Tomas Castillo serves as CIA Chief of Station in a Central American country until late December 1986, when he is called back to Washington, D.C. and put on administrative leave. (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 14 ["actually on TDY"].)	

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84/07/00-500 AFTER JULY 1984 UNTIL 1986		NORTH-CALERO CONTACT CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. Now, between July of 1984 and 1986 when the U.S. Government funding resumed, you spent approximately $19 million for arms and ammunition, correct? "Mr. CALERO. Correct, sir. ". . . . "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you also consult with Colonel North? "Mr. CALERO. Oh, I told him, I used to tell Colonel North practically everything. I had no reservations. I had full confidence and trust in him. "Mr. BARBADORO. So you discussed your purchases with Colonel North in advance, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. I discussed our needs and probably told him that I was going to purchase, yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you also tell him after you made a purchase what you had purchased and how much you have paid and who you had bought it from? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. BARBADORO. Mr. Calero, Colonel North's appointment books show approximately 50 meetings with you between 1984 and 1986. Would you accept that as a fair statement of the number of times you met with Colonel North? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, I met with him every time I came to Washington, and sometimes we would meet	

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very fast for one day and he would have to leave. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. What else [besides contributors and what arms you were purchasing] did you talk about in these meetings?

"Mr. CALERO. The general aspects -- how the war was going, what our prospects were, what the . . . internal situation in the United States was. The overall. I had . . . no reservations when I spoke to Colonel North.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North ever give you military advice?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, we commented, let's say on military things. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North ever give you intelligence information?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, he could have only known if it was really intelligence. I have no way of knowing.

"We did discuss positions of Sandinista troops, and he did tell me about the Sandinistas massing up at some point and about the Sandinista troops threatening, about a possible Cambodia-type operation by the Sandinistas."

(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 27-28, 43-44.)

84/07/01-100 GEORGE BACKGROUND
JULY 1, 1984 GEORGE ACCOUNT:

Clair George, with the CIA since 1955, becomes Deputy Director for Operations at the CIA.

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	(George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 260.)		
84/07/02-000 JULY 2, 1984		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES OWEN LETTER: Robert Owen, in a letter to North, refers to firecracker costs of a minimum of $1.5 million, toys, and obtaining weapons from Country 6: ". . . . "I just returned from a meeting with the individual who has access to the contacts for the toys. If this is to be a reality, he would like a meeting with you. He does not know whom I'm dealing with and won't until it is necessary. He believes it can be done, but as you suspected there probably will be some quid pro quo. It may only be assurances that come December or January certain equipment could be purchased from here or possibly even from a third country. He does not speak for the party in question, but does have an idea what they might want. ". . . . "I talked with our friend in Florida this afternoon and he gave me the following information: "Immediate needs for the next 2 weeks: $100,000 This would pay for rentals, food, medicine and certain necessities such as phone bills. "They are figuring on $.50 per[ ]day per man for food as the majority are inside. Based	

on 10,000 people one month
costs are: $150,000

"If they lowered the level of
military actions they could get
by on $5.00 a day per man
for firecracker costs. Per
month this is: $1,500,000

"As of yet nothing has come through from his fundraiser. To quote him, 'Something must have got screwed up somewhere.'

"He plans on going to [redacted] on Thursday and probably won't be back up here for 2 weeks. Said if he is needed for a meeting with the individual on the toys, he would come up before.

"Told him about the [redacted] idea. Thought it was good as he has never talked with them about money, but he did meet with them last year. His trip this weekend got him a pat on the back but according to him no money. 'They are broke.'" (JHICI Ex. RWO 1. See Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 212-16.)

84/07/25-100
JULY 25, 1984
AND MARCH
1985

BURN NOTICE ON GHORBANIFAR
GEORGE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Kerr. . . . The first area I would like to touch on is an area relating to the operations directorate's contact with and knowledge of the activities of Mr. Ghorbanifar in the period '85 until January of 1986 when the finding came down and you all received a formal assignment to support the NSC.

"Let me start with the knowledge the directorate had. The directorate, prior to '85, had had dealings with Mr. Ghorbanifar; is that correct?

"Mr. George. If I recall from recent study on this, Counsel, we had our first contacts with Mr. Ghorbanifar in the year 1979, after he came out of Iran at the time the Shah fell.

"Mr. Kerr. And those contacts had resulted in what is called a burn notice that went out in July of '84?

"Mr. George. It was a long, complicated relationship. [Redacted.]

"We found him basically, to put it as simply as I can, uncontrolled. His information was unverifiable. In many cases we could prove it was not true and we put out, using our jargon correctly, and I'm sorry -- '83, a burn notice, meaning, in our language, we send a notice around the world that the individual that we are speaking about should not be dealt with because he's dishonest and untruthful.

"Mr. Kerr. I believe the date of that first notice was approximately July 25, 1984. That kind of a notice is not an everyday occurrence, I take it?

"Mr. George. It is a very rare occurrence. Our business is to deal with a very strange variety of people. If we only served and dealt with the honest and fair, we would be out of business fairly fast. You have to work at it pretty hard, Counsel, to get a burn notice out of the operations directorate at the CIA.

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			"Mr. Kerr. And one of the purposes of a burn notice is essentially to warn off others that the person that is the subject of the burn notice can cause them difficulty? "Mr. George. Yes, [redacted] I don't know, I'm sure the record will show whether we told others, but what we do is we send a telegram, cables [redacted] abroad, and we say if a man named Ghorbanifar strolls in, here is his size, weight, coloring and so on, and he's a liar. "Mr. Kerr. That also gets circulated through the U.S. Government? "Mr. George. I can't answer that. I assume we would certainly share it with our friends in the State Department and others in the foreign affairs world. "Mr. Kerr. There is a reference in the Agency [redacted] File to a repeat of the burn notice that occurred in March, '85. Are you familiar with that event? "Mr. George. A second burn notice? "Mr. Kerr. Yes. "Mr. George. I'm not, Counsel." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 262-64.)
84/08/00-100 SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1984		NORTH-CASTILLO MEETING CASTILLO ACCOUNT: "Mr. Barbadoro. . . . You met Colonel North in August 1984 at a Chief of Stations meeting [redacted] didn't you? "Mr. Castillo. Yes, sir. "Mr. Barbadoro. Do you know how Colonel North got to that meeting?	

"Mr. Castillo. No, I don't.

"Mr. Barbadoro. Wasn't that a meeting principally of CIA officials?

"Mr. Castillo. Well, there were more of us than others.

"Mr. Barbadoro. Do you recall any non-CIA officials other than Colonel North at the meeting?

"Mr. Castillo. I think there was a State Department official, but I can't recall.

"Mr. Barbadoro. Do you know what Colonel North was at the meeting to do?

"Mr. Castillo. It wasn't explained to me.

"Mr. Barbadoro. What contact did you have with Colonel North at this meeting?

"Mr. Castillo. Well, during the several days that we were there, each of the chiefs of station would present an overview of his station's activities, operations problems and then in the evening we would have dinner or attend a cocktail party hosted by one of the [redacted] station officers. And at one cocktail party I introduced myself to Colonel North, and of course he was familiar with the problems, the situation that I was experiencing in [redacted] and so we chatted about that.

"Mr. Barbadoro. Did you discuss the problems of supplying the southern front with Colonel North at that meeting?

"Mr. Castillo. Only in terms that the non-supply was having a devastating effect on the troops in the field, as our intelligence was--was indicating, and--but that was not really news to him because we would routinely report in

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		disseminated intelligence reports the condition of the field troops as we learned of them. "Mr. Barbadoro. Did he suggest to you at this meeting in 1984 that he might be able to do something to help in the resupply effort? "Mr. Castillo. No, sir. "Mr. Barbadoro. Did he say anything to you at this meeting about how the contras were being funded? "Mr. Castillo. No, sir. "Mr. Barbadoro. Is it fair to characterize this meeting with him as being brief and primarily a social meeting at a party? "Mr. Castillo. Yes, sir. "Mr. Barbadoro. After that did you have subsequent meetings with him? "Mr. Castillo. Yes, sir. "Mr. Barbadoro. What was the purpose of those meetings? "Mr. Castillo. Just to keep in touch with someone that I felt was influential in Washington and who was in a position to understand the circumstances or the difficulties of the political problems among the Nicaraguan groups. "Mr. Barbadoro. Mr. Castillo, is it fair to say that over time starting from the time you met him in August until, say, the beginning of 1976 that you gradually developed a friendship with Colonel North? "Mr. Castillo. Oh, yes, sir." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 20-22.)	

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84/08/07-100 AUGUST 7, 1984		CONTRA FUNDING: McFARLANE MENTIONS $1 MILLION A MONTH DoS CHRONOLOGY: "UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST asks MCFARLANE status of alternative funding. MCFARLANE replies that the Nicaraguan opposition is getting $1 million per month, but he is not sure of source. Confident, however, that the funding will continue for the next 6 months, but cannot carry on next year without new source of funds." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 84/10/12-100.)	
84/08/20-000 SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1984		DALLAS MEETING OWEN ACCOUNT: While "doing volunteer work for the Republican Convention," Robert Owen has several meetings in Dallas with North, Singlaub and Calero. They discuss "[t]he need to continue to find assistance for the contras." Owen thinks this is the first time he meets Calero and Singlaub. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 218-19.)	
84/09/02-150 SEPTEMBER 2, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTRA HELICOPTER NORTH MEMO: North memo to McFarlane, titled "FDN Air Attack of 1 September": "Shortly after noon on 1 September, three FDN Cessna O-2 (push-pull) aircraft . . . attacked the Sandinista Military School at Santa Clara, Nicaragua . . . . Accompanying the strike	

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		aircraft, for command and control, was a Hughes 500-D helicopter [redacted]. Aboard the helicopter was a U.S. private citizen who apparently was killed when the helicopter was downed by Sandinista small arms/AA fire. . . . ". . . From a military perspective the loss of the only operating FDN helicopter on the Northern Front is a serious blow. . . . It may therefore be necessary to ask a private donor to donate a helicopter to the FDN for use in any upcoming operation against an arms delivery. We are knowledgable that FDN resources are not adequate to purchase a hel[ic]opter at this time. ". . . . "RECOMMENDATIONS "3. That you approve my approaching a private donor for the provision of a replacement civilian helicopter for use on the Northern Front." (JHICI Ex. JMP 2.)	
84/09/02-151 SEPTEMBER 2, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTRA HELICOPTER McFARLANE RESPONSE: McFarlane initialed the "Disapprove" box for recommendation 3 and wrote in at the bottom, "I don't think this is legal." (JHICI Ex. JMP 2.)	
84/09/02-155 SEPTEMBER 2, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTRA HELICOPTER McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now you gave instructions to Colonel North on what he was supposed to do? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you tell Colonel North	

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		that unless the contras became a credible military force, they would never gain political support in the Congress and among the American people? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell Colonel North that he was to encourage them to become more credible on the battlefield? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you put any limitations on what Colonel North should do with respect to the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Only to stay within the law and to be particularly careful not to be associated with or take part in any fund-raising activities. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you tell him that he was not, as your statement indicates, to broker any contributions or solicit contributions or encourage contributions? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It became a kind of a litany of mine in staff meetings, solicit, encourage, coerce, or broker. It was applicable to everyone on the staff. "Mr. LIMAN. And you understood that that was something that was prohibited? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And indeed, do you recall that in September of 1984, even before Boland went into effect, Colonel North asked your permission to try to raise money to replace the one contra helicopter that they had that had been shot down? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I recall that, and at the time it seemed to me that that was probably not	

legal, and I wrote that on the paper and sent it back to him disapproved.

"Mr. LIMAN. That was Exhibit 30-B where you said, 'I don't think this is legal?'

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. So that to be clear, you understood that you could encourage them to show more military prowess, but that you shouldn't get involved in 'solicitation of funds.'

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And there is no doubt at all in your mind that those instructions were given to Colonel North?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Clearly."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 47-48; JHICI Ex. 30-B [North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Attack of 1 September," 9/2/84].)

84/09/02-160
SEPTEMBER 2,
1984

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTRA HELICOPTER
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Q. I'm going to mark as the next Exhibit [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 26] an NSC document dated September 2, 1984, from North to McFarlane. It shows that you have received it, but, if I read this correctly, before McFarlane. And I'll ask you to look at it, see if you can recall it. The handwriting on the end is hard to read, but it says 'Let's wait a week or two.' Then it's crossed out, and it says 'I don't think that is legal.'

". . . .

"Q. This was also printed, I should tell you, in the Tower Report, as I recall, or summarized [at C-2 and -3].

"Do you recall that at all?

"A. No, I don't. In fact, the way this route sheet is marked I can't recall whether I saw it. The only way that you can be sure that I have read a memo is if my initials are on it someplace.

"Q. Why don't we get into that now? During the period that you were the Deputy could you give me an estimate of how many pages a day of reading you did?

"A. Hundreds. I don't know the number -- a very large amount.

"Q. Do you speed read?

"A. No. I'm a slow reader.

"Q. And after you became National Security Advisor did the reading increase or decrease?

"A. Decreased.

"Q. Because you had a Deputy who could do it?

"A. Yes, for a period of time. But, of course, then I operated from the middle of May until the first of, I guess, the end of September without a Deputy. But still it seems to me my staff filtered out the stuff, as I had done for Mr. McFarlane.

"Q. Now if you filtered out the material for McFarlane, who would have filtered out a report like this for McFarlane?

"A. This must have had some time urgency. It looks like the President was getting ready to [g]o someplace in the afternoon. What I was going to say is that the check mark means that a copy of it was sent to me. Whether I saw the copy before Mr. McFarlane did would be highly questionable.

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		"Q. But who would -- "A. And the chances are I did not see everything that came out from Mr. McFarlane. "Q. But who would screen the memos that were addressed to McFarlane during the period that he was National Security Advisor? "A. I would normally. "Q. And would someone screen them for you? "A. Yes." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 281-83; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 26 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 2; North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Air Attack of 1 September," 9/2/84].)	
84/09/02-161 SEPTEMBER 2, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTRA HELICOPTER POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. So that if somebody sent a memorandum to McFarlane what would be the process? "A. Well, it depends on what system it's in. "Q. Let's take System IV. "A. Again, on System IV it would depend on the content. Some of the System IV items -- the normal flow of paperwork for all the Systems was from the staff officer to the Executive Secretary, from the Executive Secretary up to the Deputy, and from the Deputy in to the National Security Advisor. "Now under me I did it a little bit differently. Before it got to me, after it left the Deputy, it also went to my military assistant, who did even more filtering. "Q. But would somebody put them in piles for	

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		you so that you'd understand that some things really required action and you should read and other material[] was just to tell you that something had been sent but it was not a matter that required your paying any attention to it? "A. That's correct. I had several categories -- urgent items that were in a red folder, action items that were less urgent but that I had to take some sort of action on, and then information items. Chances are, just looking at this document, that because it was going in to Mr. McFarlane at the same time it was going in to me, it probably went into my information folder. "Q. You see, in this memorandum Oliver North is recommending that a private donor be approached to fund the purchase of a helicopter for the FDN; correct? "A. Um-hum. "Q. And he talks about the fact that the only helicopter that the FDN had on its northern front had been shot down. "A. Um-hum. "Q. And if the notation there was put on at the time, Mr. McFarlane indicated that he thought it wasn't legal to approach a private donor. "A. I don't know what Mr. McFarlane was thinking. I mean, I see what he wrote, but I don't know the background. "Q. But you have no recollection of the memo and you have no recollection of Mr. McFarlane expressing a view against solicitation of funds? Is that what it comes down to? "A. That's not exactly what I've said before.	

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		What I've said before is that my impression was that he was sensitive about solicition on any sort of a broad scale. "Q. What does that mean? "A. Well, for example, he didn't want, for example, State Department going out and soliciting funds from third countries. "Q. But this was Oliver North. He's not State Department. "A. Yeah, that's true. Again, I don't recall it. I don't recall having any discussion with Mr. McFarlane about it. I don't know what his rationale was for saying that. I frankly wouldn't see anything wrong with it. "Q. And I think I know the answer. Is it a fact that you don't recall whether this was ever elevated to the President of the United States? "A. I'm sorry. I just don't know." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 284-86.)	
84/09/21-300 SOMETIME IN THE FALL OF 1984		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION SECORD ACCOUNT: North asks Secord to contact a foreign official whom Secord knows for a possible contribution to the Contras. Secord makes the approach, but it is "not very well received." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 154-55; see also id., at 154-56 [second approach by Secord in early Feb. 1986 at North's request]; id., 5/7/87, at 102-04 [Secord submits name of official to Committee in sealed envelope].)	
84/09/21-310		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION	

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SOMETIME IN 1984-85		OF COUNTRY 2 OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen discusses with Secord the latter's participation in soliciting Country 2. Secord says "he thought that [Country 2] had given $15 million." Secord also tells Owen about the decision he and North had made in the summer of 1985 to take away Calero's funding. "It was potentially inappropriate," Secord explained, "that Adolfo Calero be using his brother, Mario Calero, to purchase goods." Secord also mentions rumors that the money was not going where it was intended and was being wasted. North and Secord therefore have decided to use Lake Resources for channeling funds to the Contras. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 33-36. See 84/05/00-703 [Calero on Secord's approach to a third country for Contra aid].)	
84/09/21-400 SOMETIME IN THE FALL OF 1984		NORTH-ABRAMS CONTACT ABRAMS ACCOUNT: After their initial meeting in November 1983, Abrams next meets North at a meeting called by Donald Fortier "probably to talk about Central America, about public perceptions." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 25-26.)	
84/10/01-200 OCTOBER 1, 1984 THROUGH DECEMBER 3, 1985		STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON CONTRA AID: APPLICABILITY: CIA, DoD and any "entity involved in intelligence activities" FUNDS AVAILABLE: None (until 8/8/85 humanitarian aid) USE OF FUNDS: No funds may be used to support	

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		military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua PERMISSIBILITY OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: Not mentioned (until 8/15/85) PERMISSIBILITY OF SOLICITING OTHER NATIONS: Not mentioned (until 8/8/85) (JHICI Chart VII.)	
84/10/03-000 OCTOBER 1984 - DECEMBER 1985		BOLAND II IN EFFECT.	
84/10/03-030 OCTOBER 1984 - DECEMBER 1985		BOLAND II SUMMARY: For a summary of Boland II, see Iran-Contra Report, at 41-42, 489-500.	
84/10/03-050 FROM OCTOBER 1984		THE BOLAND AMENDMENT: THE LAW Rep. Boland, addressing Lt. Col. North: "I know you would be disappointed if I didn't talk a little bit about the Boland Amendment which, from October 1, 1984, until October 18, 1986, prohibited the provision of military assistance to the contras. It has been called so many different things during the course of these hearings, but I sort of like it best when it is described simply as it was: the law." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 123.) Rep. Hyde, addressing Lt. Col. North: (1) "Now, I stipulate it is the law. The	

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		President did sign this. By the way, here is his signature. It is on the back page. The back page. "The President had to sign it because that's the way we legislate around here." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 165.) (2) "That was part of a huge appropriation that is absolutely indispensable to keep government going, that the President has to sign literally with a gun to his head, because that is the way we appropriate. . . . ". . . I'm told it was the largest continuing resolution we had ever passed to date." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 204.) Rep. Fascell and Sen. Inouye, responding to Rep. Hyde: "Mr. FASCELL. . . . I don't want to be part of an effort to demean the President of the United States--he doesn't know what he is signing . . . . "Chairman INOUYE. And I believe the record should show the President did sign the bill." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 206.)	
84/10/03-100 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, NSC ACTIVITY, AND THE McFARLANE LITANY AS BOLAND II TOOK EFFECT McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "[T]he President repeatedly made clear in public and in private that he did not intend to break faith with the contras. He directed that we continue--make continued efforts to bring the movement into the good graces of Congress and the	

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		American people and that we assure the contras of continuing administration support--to help them hold body and so[ul] together--until the time when Congress would again agree to support them. "Congressional restrictions made it impractical for either the Defense Department or the Central Intelligence Agency to function even as a liaison with the contras. The State Department has always been disinclined to be associated with a covert action. "But the President had made clear that he wanted a job done. The net result was that the job fell to the national security council staff. I think it is fair to say that this occurrence was not an example of a[n] NS[C] staff eagerly grabbing power from other departments and agencies. In the case of the contra operations, it was the NSC was the agency of last resort. And it was not the right agency, as subsequent history clearly revealed. "To carry out the President's wishes, I relied on two staff officers, Donald Fortier, now deceased, Director of the Political Military Affairs Division, and one of his deputies, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, whose existing responsibilities included Latin American and military affairs. "I told Mr. Fortier, who had long, long experience in legislative relations, to oversee the effort to gain Congressional support. "I told Colonel North two things. The first was to be a visible sign of the President's strong personal support, to show the contras that they	

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		would not be forgotten or abandoned, even though we could not provide them with financial support. "The second, more specific responsibility I gave Colonel North was to help the contras in their efforts to become a real political movement, genuinely respecting democratic principles and human rights. "I did make a special point of stressing to my staff that we were to operate at all times within the law, and that in particular we were not to solicit, encourage, coerce or otherwise broker financial contributions to the contras. I took this to be the Congress'[] foremost concern, from having worked with many people involved in the drafting of legislation in the months before. "In this instance, as in all others, the rule of law had to govern national policy, as well as our actions in support of it. "The aspect of Administration support that has attracted the most attention is the question of funding for the contras from private sources. At the time--as today--there was, in my judgment, no need to find additional funds. The support needed to sustain them in the short run--1985--was coming from the foreign government that had made a contribution in mid-1984 and then doubled it in 1985." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 12-15. See 84/10/03-130.)	
84/10/03-130 OCTOBER 3, 1984 -		PRESIDENT'S CONCERN FOR THE CONTRAS, AND BOLAND COMPLIANCE: NSC McFARLANE ACCOUNT:	

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DECEMBER 19, 1985		McFarlane on the period while Boland II remained in effect: [n.b. The dates when McFarlane makes his reports to the President are not made clear in this exchange. McFarlane served as National Security Adviser from October 1983 until December 1985.] "Mr. BOLAND. Based on your reading of the so-called full prohibition Boland amendment in effect from October, 1984, to December, 1985, would any type of assistance to the contras by a member of the NSC or any other intelligence agency have been permitted? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. "Mr. BOLAND. How many times did the President mention his desire that something be done to help the contras? Was that offered to you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. BOLAND. Did you ever give the President reports on what you and your staff were doing to carry out his wishes? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Frequently, yes, sir. "Mr. BOLAND. On how many occasions? Many occasions? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Dozens. "Mr. BOLAND. Can you indicate what you told him? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Basically I would convey to him what information came from the intelligence agencies or any other source on changes in the situation, increasing the size of the forces, expansion to include political figures, declining forces on the battle field, basically change in status that occurred as well as how the trends in	

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		the Congress were going and where, if necessary, he could help or contribute to -- "Mr. BOLAND. Well you spoke with him on a number of occasions. Let me ask. How did you keep track of what was being done at the NSC to implement the President's request? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Every morning at 7:30 I had a staff meeting at which I would get that report on the Central American situation . . . . There would be daily reports from the staff in writing, ofter PROF notes, meetings with Director Casey, the Secretary of Defense. "It was a matter on which there was real time reporting almost every day. ". . . . "Mr. BOLAND. I would imagine that [John Poindexter, while serving as McFarlane's deputy] took notes frequently. Was that one of his tasks at an NSC meeting? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. And there would be a formal note-taker where the NSC met in full plenary session. In the more restrictive meetings called NSPG planning group, Admiral Poindexter, as the only deputy present, would normally be note-taker. "Mr. BOLAND. Did you ever know him to attend an NSC meeting and not take notes? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 10-12. See id., 5/11/87, at 12, 43-47 [McFarlane on the President's instructions about keeping the Contras together body and soul, and the President's views on continued support for the Contras].)	

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84/10/03-131 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		BOLAND COMPLIANCE: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW OF NSC ACTIVITIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane, testifying further on how he kept the President informed: "Mr. COURTER. . . . Did you withhold, consciously withhold information from the President . . . to protect him? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't really believe I did. . . . [I]t reflects immaturity to not understand if what you are doing puts the President at risk, he had better not do it, but he had better know about anything you are doing that might, and I believe the President was conscious of everything I did that was close to the line." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 81.)	
84/10/03-140 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		KEEPING BODY AND SOUL TOGETHER: NORTH'S CONTRA ROLE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [You] testified that you were given a task of keeping the body and soul of the contras together, correct? "Mr. NORTH. That's correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Whose words are 'the body and soul'? "Mr. NORTH. As they were relayed to me, they were the words of the President. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you understand those words to mean to keep them together in the field as a fighting force until Congress turned money back on?	

"Mr. NORTH. And more. To keep them together as a viable political opposition, to keep them alive in the field, to bridge the time between the time when we would have no money and the time when the Congress would vote again, to keep the effort alive, because the President committed publicly to go back, in his words, again and again and again to support the Nicaraguan resistance.

"And I not only do [sic] that, but I went down and talked, as you now know from my notebooks, with the heads of states of Central America and other countries, in an effort to do just exactly that.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. And did you understand that that direction was emanating from the President of the United States himself?

"Mr. NORTH. I did.

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [T]he Tower Board Report says, and it is in the last paragraph on the page[:] 'The President told the Board on January 26, 1987, that he did not know that the NSC staff was engaged in helping the contras.' Take that sentence.

"Mr. NORTH. I read it.

"Mr. LIMAN. Does that come as a surprise to you?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, who was it who conveyed the instructions of the President that you should keep the body and the soul of the contras together?

"Mr. NORTH. Mr. Robert C. McFarlane.

"Mr. LIMAN. Over the course of the period that you were at the NSC, you reported, as you have testified, regularly to Mr. McFarlane and . . . Admiral Poindexter, on what you were doing to carry out this mission, correct?

"Mr. NORTH. You have far more than my testimony to confirm that.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you also reported to Mr. Casey?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now--

"Mr. NORTH. And you have more than my testimony to confirm that.

"Mr. LIMAN. Is it fair to say, Colonel, that you were confronted with a dilemma?

"Mr. NORTH. When?

"Mr. LIMAN. I will explain what it is. And you will either confirm it or not. On the one hand, you were told to keep the contras alive, including as a fighting force, to run what you called a full service covert operation.

"Mr. NORTH. I didn't call it that.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, to provide them covert support, including covert support assisting them militarily. And, on the other hand, you had the Boland Amendment there. Did that present a problem for you, sir?

"Mr. NORTH. Is the question did the Boland Amendment create a problem?

"Mr. LIMAN. No, did you find that you were in a conflictive position, sir?

"Mr. NORTH. No. We sought means by which we could comply with Boland and still keep the Nicaraguan Resistance in the field politically

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		viable and supported diplomatically and politically throughout the world, and I think we found it." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 210-14.)	
84/10/03-142 1984-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. . . . [T]he Tower Commission indicated that the President said he was not aware of the involvement of his NSC staff in the resupply effort to the contras. "To the best of your knowledge, is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think it is correct and I don't want to contribute as I think I did contribute in my earlier testimony to the fact that the President was witness[] of everything Ollie did when clearly he was not. "I briefed the President on what I thought Ollie was doing, but I don't want to lift the blame from my own shoulders. I did tell Ollie I want the movement to become more credible in the sense of political leadership and I had no illusions whatsoever that Ollie was down there doing everything he could manage to help the contras. "But my judgment, and it is my judgment and error if it is, was that no one single human being could undertake the sufficient scale of activity to be in conflict with the law which I saw to be foremostly a prohibition on raising money and in no sense was I aware of those activities.	

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		(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 211-12.)	
84/10/03-150 AROUND OCTOBER 1984		KEEPING BODY AND SOUL TOGETHER: McFARLANE'S INSTRUCTIONS TO NORTH McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. Mr. McFarlane, did you give Colonel North a direct instruction from the President that he should keep the contras together, body and soul, as a viable fighting force? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I did, and I explained what I believed that meant, that it was to spend his time trying to turn them into a credible political organization by incorporating acknowledged leaders within Nicaragua into the military leadership and also working with him to come up with a platform so that they would be seen by Congressmen as a political movement of real substance interested in negotiation; and he did that. And I think if anything is missing from the past six days, it is to acknowledge the enormous diplomacy of Colonel North in being able to pull off what was an extremely solid platform and peace proposals. "Mr. FOLEY. Was the instruction also to assist the contras in a military way to keep them as a viable military fighting force in the field? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you receive these instructions from the President personally? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Clearly the President wanted the contras to survive and stated so to me many times, and I translated that expressed wish of the President to Colonel North and others on my staff.	

He also, the President, expressed this to the Secretary of State and Defense, Director Casey. It was no secret.

"Mr. FOLEY. So he, the President, told you that he wanted to see this result occur, and you translated that into a direction directed to Colonel North, is that correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. FOLEY. The President didn't say[,] 'Tell Colonel North that I want him to do this'?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir.

"Mr. FOLEY. When did the President make this general statement to you that you felt necessary to pass on to Colonel North? Do you remember the timeframe?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, sir, it must have been in the days leading to Boland II. The President was often commenting upon his concern over the results of congressional restrictions over time, but became particularly worried ab[o]ut it as the time of the total cutoff of funding in October of 1984 or '85--no, '84--came about and was hopeful that they would survive until we could persuade the Congress to turn it back on.

"Mr. FOLEY. Did you ever have any discussion with the President about third-country funding for the contras?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Only when I reported the results of what had been offered by Country Two." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 245-48. See id., 5/11/87, at 14, 47-48 [McFarlane's instructions to North].)

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84/10/03-160 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ROLE: "SWITCHING POINT" AND "KINGPIN"; AND PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "A. . . . Colonel North kept very close contact with the contra leadership, not only in terms of their logistics but also in terms of getting organized as a more effective political entity. He met with the democratic leadership often and I think was largely responsible for getting them to organize the United Nicaraguan Opposition Organization, getting them to focus on what their objectives were. The leaders, Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and Adolfo Robelo -- and sometimes you will see in my notes a shorthand AAA, and that refers to those three leaders. He maintained very close contact with them. Colonel North maintained close contact with Secord. "So my view of the operation was that Colonel North was the switching point that made the whole system work. You know, what he got involved with directly or somebody else did is a little fuzzy in my mind, but clearly I viewed Ollie as the kingpin to the Central America opposition once the CIA was restricted. "Q. How much did the President know of this? "A. Well, that's a little hard to tell for me. I think the President was clearly aware that Colonel North was the primary staff officer on the NSC for the democratic resistance. "Colonel North would have participated in probably several meetings with the President. Certainly when the AAA came up to meet with the	

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		President, Colonel North would be in those meetings. He would be in any NSC and maybe some of the NSPG meetings that were held on Central America, so the President would see his face on any event associated with Central America. "Colonel North would -- once in a while -- would go up to the 9:30 meetings if he had something to report about Central America. "The President is not a man for great detail, which I think everybody is aware. It wasn't a matter we would brief him in great detail on, where all the funds were coming from or exactly . . . ." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 62-64. See 86/04/10-115 [Poindexter's view of North as the "switching point" in Contra support under Boland].)	
84/10/03-161 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ROLE: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . [L]ast time you described Oliver North's role in the support of the contras during the Boland period. Do you remember giving a description? "A. Vaguely. I'd have to go back and reread it again. ". . . . "Q. But you described him at page 60 [of the 5/2/87 deposition] where you said that the contras didn't have any sort of logistics organization of their own and Colonel North had to figure out a way to privately arrange a logistics organization. And a little further on you described him	

essentially as the switching point that made the whole system work. [See 84/07/00-185 and 84/10/03-160.]

"Do you recall that?

"A. Yes, I recall that.

". . . .

"Q. Did you ever describe to the President of the United States what Colonel North was actually doing?

"A. I don't recall discussing that with him at any level of detail.

"Q. Or were you present when Colonel North's role was described?

"A. I don't recall that.

"Q. You said that he was the action officer on Central America and that was something which the President had been told, I assume, or knew.

"A. Yes. The President knew that Colonel North was the action officer on Central America.

"Q. But did he know, so far as you can say, that North was filling this vacuum that had been left by the CIA dropping out?

"A. Well, I don't think -- you see, in the President's mind he wouldn't know the details of what CIA was doing, what Defense was doing, what State was doing, and what we were doing. He knew the job was getting done. The exact way we were getting it done was something that would not have been particularly relevant to him.

"Q. Is it fair to say that because of the Congressional restrictions that the NSC ended up with an operational role that was not normally the role of the NSC? Is that fair?

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		"A. Well, I think it's a mistake to say that the NSC doesn't have an operational role. It is not an organization that sits in an ivory tower and thinks grand thoughts. I don't think it's ever been that way, not in this Administration or in any Administration, and their operational involvement is always a function of the circumstances. "From an operational standpoint, I think it would be fair to say that on Central America we were more operational than in other areas, but that was not the only operational area we were involved with. We were heavily involved in Libya. "Q. Were you more operational than you had been when the CIA was free to handle the contras? "A. I think that would be fair to say. "Q. Did you or anyone in your presence describe to the President of the United States that the NSC had picked up some of the CIA's responsibilities? "A. Again, I just can't recall a specific incident. No doubt McFarlane in 1984 or '85 did cover that at some point, but I simply can't recall it. "Q. You can't recall it. What I'm getting at is did anyone sit around the table with him when you were there and say, look, we have a problem. The CIA has been handling the supplying of the contras. They supply them with munitions. They give them training. They give them direction. Now under Boland they can't do any of that and we at the NSC are going to have to pick up that task. "Did someone say anything like that in	

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		substance in your presence to the President? "A. As I have said, I can't recall it. I think it's important to add, though, that I don't think that it's accurate to say that we picked up all. "Q. I didn't say all. "A. Because clearly we couldn't have as many people in country, obviously. "Q. You did pick up some of what they were doing. "A. Some. And primarily, frankly, the part that we picked up was the direct contact with the contra leadership. By and large, I mean, if you look at the wh[o]le scheme of things, that was the biggest aspect." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 314-18. On North as the switching point, see also 86/00/09-196.)	
84/10/03-175 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. . . . [D]id you tell the President about the resupply operation? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I told him that they were being resupplied, buying things, getting deliveries, yes, sir. "Mr. SARBANES. Did you tell the President how it was being done? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I did not. My own assumption was that they were buying things the same way they had for years and it wasn't a matter of great importance to the President. It would have been[,] if this is your point, had there been a	

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		member of his Administration that was doing it. I didn't believe that there was. "Mr. SARBANES. Did he know of North's activities? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Not from me, no, sir. "Mr. SARBANES. But do you know whether he knew of them through someone else, either from North directly or from Casey? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I have no reason to believe that he did, no, sir. "Mr. SARBANES. Did the President know that other countries were being solicited for money? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 257-58.)	
84/10/03-200 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		THE McFARLANE LITANY McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, in your prepared statement this morning, you said that the President repeatedly made clear in public and in private -- and in private, does that mean to you [--] "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. -- that he did not intend to break faith with the contras; that is correct, is it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is. "Mr. LIMAN. He continued to make clear that he wanted to bring the movement into the good graces of the Congress and the American people, is that so? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is. "Mr. LIMAN. And that we assure the contras of	

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		continuing Administration support to help them hold body and soul together until the time when Congress would again agree to support them. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Now whose term is this 'body and soul together[,]' holding them body and soul together? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't know. It is my words there, but I did what expresses the sentiment of what the President directed me to do. "Mr. LIMAN. Now it says that you were to assure the contras of continuing administration support to help them hold body and soul together until the time when Congress would again agree to support them. Tell us exactly what kind of support you were to assure the contras of during this period when you were prohibited from spending any money to support them? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, basically it was smoke and mirrors. It was a matter of trying to demonstrate simply by the presence of a White House person, someone close enough to the President to achieve simply by dint of that proximity, credibility with the contra leaders and to make clear that you are going to have to make do money-wise on someone else. But the President, whose political influence is not insignificant, is going to make your cause a very high priority cause for himself, second or third on this foreign policy agenda. "But I also made very clear that this has to be done within the law and because I took the law to express what I had gotten personally from a	

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		number of members of Congress and the Senate, that we are cutting off money for the contras, and we don't want any money raised for the contras, and bring an end, really, to the contra movement and campaign was their purpose through the purse string. "Mr. LIMAN. Now you gave instructions to Colonel North on what he was supposed to do? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you tell Colonel North that unless the contras became a credible military force, they would never gain political support in the Congress and among the American people? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell Colonel North that he was to encourage them to become more credible on the battlefield? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you put any limitations on what Colonel North should do with respect to the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Only to stay within the law and to be particularly careful not to be associated with or take part in any fund-raising activities. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you tell him that he was not, as your statement indicates, to broker any contributions or solicit contributions or encourage contributions? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It became a kind of a litany of mine in staff meetings, solicit, encourage, coerce, or broker. It was applicable to everyone on the staff.	

"Mr. LIMAN. And you understood that that was something that was prohibited?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I did.

"Mr. LIMAN. And indeed, do you recall that in September of 1984, even before Boland went into effect, Colonel North asked your permission to try to raise money to replace the one contra helicopter that they had that had been shot down?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I recall that, and at the time it seemed to me that that was probably not legal, and I wrote that on the paper and sent it back to him disapproved.

"Mr. LIMAN. That was Exhibit 30-B where you said, 'I don't think this is legal?'

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. So that to be clear, you understood that you could encourage them to show more military prowess, but that you shouldn't get involved in 'solicitation of funds.'

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And there is no doubt at all in your mind that those instructions were given to Colonel North?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Clearly."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 44-48. See JHICI Ex. 30-B [North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Air Attack of 1 September," 9/2/84]. See also 84/10/03-100, -130.)

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THE McFARLANE LITANY
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. Well, Admiral, did you listen to McFarlane's testimony?

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1985		"A. I did. "Q. Do you recall McFarlane testifying that he stated on more than one occasion at staff meetings of the NSC that the NSC should not solicit, coerce, encourage, or broker contributions for the contras? "A. I don't have any recollection of that. "Q. Well, that's his testimony. "A. I know. I heard him testify to that. "Q. But do you recall him? I'll get it, Mr. Beckler. Do you recall him ever saying that at the NSC staff meetings? "A. I don't recall his saying that. That doesn't mean he didn't do it. I just simply don't recall it." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 251-52.)	
84/10/03-220 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		THE McFARLANE LITANY NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . Mr. McFarlane has testified that he gave you instructions not to solicit money from foreign countries or private sources. "Did he give you those instructions? "Mr. NORTH. I never carried out a single act, not one, Mr. Nields, in which I did not have authority from my superiors. I haven't in the 23 years that I have been in the uniformed services of the United States of America ever violated an order, not one. "Mr. NIELDS. But that wasn't the question. "Mr. NORTH. That is the answer to your question.	

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		"Mr. NIELDS. No. The question was, did Mr. McFarlane give you such instructions? "Mr. NORTH. No. I never heard those instructions. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that it was your understanding from what you have just said that quite to the contrary, you were authorized to seek money from foreign countries? "Mr. NORTH. I was authorized to do everything that I did. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. I take it you are saying not only did Mr. McFarlane not instruct you not to seek money from foreign countries, but that he was aware of each and every one of your actions to obtain money from foreign countries and approved of it? "Mr. NORTH. I believe so, yes." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 197-99.)	
84/10/03-221 1984-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: AUTHORIZATION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. I take it you take issue with this statement that he [North] never carried out a single act, not one, which did not have the authority of his superiors? I take it your testimony is that you did not authorize all of his acts; is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I do, but, Senator Sarbanes, I think that in saying that I did not authorize him of his activities that I can believe that Ollie North testified here in good faith, believes exactly what he said.	

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		"The fact that his own judgment about what fell within the scope of the authorities I gave him differs from mine doesn't mean that he has come up here and told you something that was false. "I think, however, that it is useful for the public and colleagues perhaps to just stop and think a couple of minutes about not what I say or Ollie says, but the objective data about what happened and when it happened and what moneys existed and where did they come from. "For example, I think by Colonel North's testimony that he asserts that the organization that was used to help with contra resupply didn't go into--in fact, didn't get any money, if I understand correctly, until November of 1985. "That was while we were getting ready for Geneva and within three weeks I resigned. "The facts and data and reports and evidence that has [sic] been reviewed here deal foremostly with activities that occurred in 1986, and so it is an entirely reasonable question, but apparently from what the record shows, most of the activities are activities that occurred after my time." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 253-54.)	
84/10/03-223 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		THE McFARLANE LITANY McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. SARBANES. . . . Colonel North . . . was asked, [']Mr. McFarlane has testified that he gave you instructions not to solicit money from foreign countries or private sources. Did he give you those instructions?['] And then Colonel North	

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		said this litany, [']I never carried out a single act, not one that did not have authority from my superiors['], and it was then pointed out that that wasn't the question. [']The question was did McFarlane give you such instructions.['] He said[, 'N]o, I never heard those instructions,['] instructions from you not to solicit money from foreign countries or private sources. "As I recall your testimony when you were here before us it was your opinion that you had given such instructions repeatedly and explicitly to all members of the National Security Council staff, is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It is and I can identify with certainty an occasion where Colonel North and I talked about the several speeches, which I encouraged, and exactly what happened at each one of them and he explained to me that he at no time was party to taking of money or even facilitating getting it from a potential giver to a bank account and so forth. And quite honestly trying to put myself in his position I could imagine where that would have been very hard to do. And I said look Ollie, with some fairly candid Marine Corps expletives, this is Bud, this is me, this is not some Member of Congress--what is the story? Are you out raising money? And he said I have never in any fashion breached the law concerning any activities, nor have I ever raised money. "He was very emphatic. I believed him. "Mr. SARBANES. He has even testified here that he was authorized by you, and I will quote him--[']I was authorized to have a meeting in this	

particular case, and specific[ally] by Mr. McFarlane for the purpose of talking to the man about a suggestion that had been made to him by others and to encourage that process along and I did so.['] Now that process was seeking money from a foreign country. And eventually he was asked as a result of this line of questioning. [']I take it you are saying not only did Mr. McFarlane not instruct you not to seek money from foreign countries, but that he was aware of each and every one of your actions to obtain money from foreign countries and approved of it.[']

"Colonel North's answer to that was[, ']I believe so, yes.[']

"I take it that does not square with your recollection of what took place, is that correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct, Senator Sarbanes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 256-57 [quoting North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 197].)

84/10/03-225
1984-86

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: AUTHORIZATION
McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH:

"Mr. FOLEY. Colonel North testified that you specifically authorized him to direct the air resupply of arms to the contras, to coordinate the procurement of such arms and to solicit money, funds from foreign countries in order to provide the funds necessary to purchase these arms.

"Did you authorize any or all of these activities?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir.

"Mr. FOLEY. You have no recollection of any

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		specific directive to Colonel North to carry on the activities I have just stated? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Mr. Foley, I have explained what I told Colonel North to do and that was all that I told him to do, but I hold myself accountable for the fact that as a very, very energetic person, he would go beyond the point of simply advising to the point of participating. "Mr. FOLEY. I take it from your previous answer that the President at no time told you to advise Colonel North to conduct such activities? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 248-49.)	
84/10/03-230 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		THE McFARLANE LITANY NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, you are aware, it has been referred to by my friend, Mr. Nields, that Mr. McFarlane said that he considered that the NSC was bound by Boland; correct? "Mr. NORTH. I don't want to-- "Mr. LIMAN. You are aware he testified to it. You either saw a summary or watched him on television? "Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, let's see the testimony . . . ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. It is Mr. Courter [speaking]. "'Mr. McFarlane, you testified yesterday morning--yesterday and the day before, about the fact that it was your opinion that the Boland amendments, particularly the more restrictive of those amendments, applied to the National Security	

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		Council; is that correct?' "'Mr. McFarlane. Yes.' "'Question: Is that a personal opinion of yours?' "'Answer: Yes, sir.' "And there is more testimony to that effect. "You are aware that that is the position he has expressed at these hearings; correct? And if you weren't before, you are now? "Mr. NORTH. Correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And as I understand your testimony, other than in the letters that were sent to Congress in which he said that the NSC was abiding by Boland, you never heard him say that? "Mr. NORTH. I carried out my instructions to the letter, to the very best of my ability, Mr. Liman. "I have said that innumerable times over the course of the last three days. "Mr. LIMAN. But can you answer that question? Did you ever hear him say Boland does not apply to the NSC? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall him saying that. "Mr. LIMAN. You did hear Mr. Casey say that Boland doesn't apply to the NSC? "Mr. NORTH. At length. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, is it correct, sir, that you were put in a position in which everybody was eager and content to have Ollie North do whatever was necessary to energize the contras, to keep them together as a fighting force, to instill democratic values in them, to open up a southern front, to promote unity, to provide them with	

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		intelligence, to provide them with advice on munitions, to help provide them with that air base in the Central American country. "They were all content and eager for you to do this as long as you didn't create a record opinion pinning it on them? "Mr. NORTH. You would have to ask them." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 225-27.)	
84/10/03-235 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4,1986		THE McFARLANE LITANY NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NUNN. One other point I want to ask along this line. Is it clear in your mind that you never received instructions from Mr. McFarlane in regard to soliciting contributions? "I believe that he testified very clearly--I won't read all of it--that he did give instructions to his staff in the NSC not to in any way solicit contributions for the contras. "Mr. NORTH. And I never solicited contributions. "Mr. NUNN. I understand that. "The question really is--you made that very clear-- did you get those instructions from him? Do you remember receiving those instructions? "Mr. NORTH. I may have been told to separate myself from dollar operations, or however one calls it, but I was very much of the understanding that I personally would not sit and solicit. "Every single activity that I conducted, as I described them to this committee, I conducted with the authority of my superiors; and to this day, Senator Nunn, I do not believe any of them to be	

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		illegal. I don't now." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 95-96.)	
84/10/03-251 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		BOLAND COVERAGE: NSC McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. COURTER. Did you in writing ever indicate to those people in your office while you were the head of the National Security Council of [sic] your opinion that the Boland Amendment covered the National Security Council? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, I never did. But I would like to add that if you are a member of the staff and you are sitting there and you hear the boss come to the meeting once a week and had [sic] a rage and pound the table about how hard we have got to try to overturn the Boland Amendment, what other conclusion is possible? I didn't like it. I wanted to get rid of it. We fought like crazy to get the votes. If it didn't apply to us that was a lot of wasted effort." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 262.)	
84/10/03-300 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		BOLAND COVERAGE: NSC McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "I accepted that the law applied to the NSC and that we must obey it, because I think in good faith when you deal with the Congress you must reach conclusions based upon your own personal dialogue with people who have written the legislation. And if you know because you have been told by Dante Fascell, God damn it, don't raise money, you better not raise money." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 127.)	

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84/10/03-310 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		BOLAND COVERAGE: NSC McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "And it was very evident that the intent of the Congress was that this amendment applied to the NSC staff. So it was a political judgment on my part without prejudice to the legal position that must ultimately be determined by the courts. And I think also that the evidence that surely I did believe that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC staff is expressed in the fact that otherwise why would we have worked so hard to get rid of it after it was passed? If we felt that we were not covered, what was I doing? What was Don doing coming up here day after day trying to get rid of it?" (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 202.)	
84/10/03-320 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		BOLAND COVERAGE: McFARLANE'S INSTRUCTIONS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. DEWINE. . . . [Y]ou already expressed your opinion . . . that . . . Boland does not apply to the NSC. Mr. McFarlane previously testified and told this committee that in his opinion it did. In fact, he even went on to say, talking about . . . the chairman of our Foreign Affairs Committee, that if Dante Fascell tells you not to do something, by golly you better not do it. . . . [D]id he ever tell you that? . . . "Mr. NORTH. I never heard that, sir. "Mr. DEWINE. Did he ever call a staff meeting and s[i]t down and [say,] look, in my opinion, Boland applies to the NSC?	

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		"Mr. NORTH. I never heard that. "Mr. DEWINE. Did he ever send you a memo that you can recall or a memo to the rest of the staff that said that? "Mr. NORTH. No. There are memoranda that I received back from both Mr. McFarlane and Admiral Poindexter telling me not to do certain things and when they told me that, I didn't do them. "Mr. DEWINE. You don't recall that? "Mr. NORTH. No, sir. And I want to make it very clear again. Every single thing that I did that required a decision, I sought approval for, and if I didn't get approval, I didn't do it." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 146-47.)	
84/10/03-324 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		BOLAND COVERAGE: McFARLANE'S INSTRUCTIONS AND NORTH'S AUTHORIZATION McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Colonel North testified that I gave him general authority to conduct covert operations involving widespread military and paramilitary activities based upon the position that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC staff. He also stated that he kept me advised of all of his activities. Colonel North did report to me from time to time on a few, but certainly not all, of the activities that went beyond mere political support for the contras. "The committee has seen those memoranda, all six of them. One, for example, involved his request for permission to ask a private U.S. donor to provide a helicopter to the contras. I specifically disapproved this proposal and noted	

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		that I did not believe that it was legal. And other memoranda in which Colonel North asked me to solicit funds from foreign governments, I rejected the proposals, and that is stated on the face of those documents, and you have them. "On other memos, I did not respond or the proposals were mooted by events. But implicit in all of this was the premise that the Boland Amendment governed our actions." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 201.)	
84/10/03-325 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - NOVEMBER 25, 1986		BOLAND COVERAGE: NSC POINDEXTER ACCOUNT "Mr. LEON. Now, with regard to the Boland Amendment, Admiral, just a few questions in that regard. "You have testified that you position was, and still is, I believe, that the NSC is not covered by the Boland Amendment? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. That's what I believe. "Mr. LEON. And of course you have acknowledged that that is a different opinion than your predecessor, Mr. McFarlane had? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's my judgment. I recognize others have different judgments. That's supposedly left to the courts to decide. "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure if Admiral Poindexter ever acknowedged in so many words what Mr. McFarlane's opinion is of it and how it's different from his own. "Mr. LEON. I think he now has. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I just simply said that I	

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		recognize that others have other judgments. "Mr. LEON. Were you aware when you were Mr. McFarlane's deputy that he had a different opinion than you as to the applicability of Boland to the NSC? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that that was as clear to me then as it has been made during his recent testimony." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 95-96. See id., 7/15/87, at 133 [Poindexter's view: Boland not applicable to the NSC]; id., 7/16/87, at 24 [Poindexter: "I have always felt that the Boland amendment did not apply to the NSC staff"]; id., 7/21/87, at 26-28 [Poindexter's view of the Boland Amendment, generally].)	
84/10/03-326 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		BOLAND COVERAGE: NSC POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: [Note: During October 1984 and through December 1985, Poindexter served as principal deputy to McFarlane, the National Security Adviser. Poindexter's term as National Security Adviser began in December 1985.] "Mr. RUDMAN. I want to now turn to Boland and I want to start by saying I don't want to debate whether Boland applied or didn't apply. I am more interested in the process, how our Government works, because I must tell you that I found your testimony on how the conclusion was reached somewhat surprising or I would say astounding. "My friend from Georgia and I have consistently supported aid to the contras and neither of us liked the Boland amendment. We	

liked Eddie Boland, but not the Boland amendment. I don't want to talk about whether it is good or bad. I want to talk about how this came about.

"We have testimony before us that Mr. McFarlane believed that it applied. We have testimony, I believe, from Mr. Gates before the Intelligence Committee indicating that the general hue was that it applied, and I believe to the NSC.

"I want to make sure I am right. I will get back to that. I will have someone check that part of the deposition.

"But you are a highly trained naval officer with a masters and a Ph.D., I believe, in physics; am I correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, nuclear physics.

"Mr. RUDMAN. I would not want to discuss nuclear physics with you, Admiral, I can assure you. But neither you nor Bud McFarlane nor Oliver North, all bright people, graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy, advanced degree in your case, had any substantive legal training whatsoever; am I correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. RUDMAN. As a matter of fact, as far as I can see, no one in that entire operation, including those who had law degrees, had what I would call extensive experience with legislative law and intent of Congress; would you say that is correct?

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think Commander Thompson did have significant legislative experience.

"Mr. RUDMAN. He did not render an official opinion; did he?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Not in writing or in what I think you are referring to as in an official way, but I think his opinion was that the Boland Amendment didn't apply. Don't forget, Senator, my feeling about this was reinforced by the Intelligence Oversight Board.

"Mr. RUDMAN. But I must point out, and I won't go to the page of the deposition, but I will characterize it, you testified that without going over it word for word, that you knew there was an opinion, you knew the existence of it, but you hadn't read it yourself?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, that is correct. [sic] But I knew the results of it. If I had read it, I am not sure it would have added anything.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Here you have this highly contentious piece of legislation, fought over for a long time in the Congress, high emotion. Means a lot to the President, opposed vigorously by very powerful Members of the House and the Senate who believed that it covered the NSC if it was involved in intelligence activity.

"I want to understand how you can make a statement that you made here today, 'We were on strong legal grounds on Boland.' You are not going to tell the committee--you don't think that Mr. Sciaroni's opinion or Commander Thompson's oral opinion would be what you would call strong legal grounds, are you?

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not consider that--I recognized that the opinion or the determination

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		from the Intelligence Oversight Board was not just Mr. Sciaroni's determination, so I don't think it is fair to characterize it as his. "It was from the Intelligence Oversight Board, a group of three very eminent people with legal training and understanding, and I thought that that was a valuable piece of information to use. "It happened--I mean, I had concluded personally some time before that that I didn't think it applied--you know, the Boland Amendment, in my view, was an anti-appropriation law that affected how the U.S. Government could spend appropriated funds. "Mr. RUDMAN. Well-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. And the policy to support the contras was very clear, and if we could find another way to do it outside of appropriated funds, I didn't see any problem with it. There was also, I can recall some discussion on the staff as to if we really wanted to push the issue whether CIA could do a little more--could do some of the activities." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 164-68.)	
84/10/03-327 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		BOLAND COVERAGE: NSC POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Adm. Poindexter's response continues from preceding entry:] "[Mr. POINDEXTER.] CIA, at least below Bill Casey, were very leery of that and didn't want to get cross-threaded, frankly, with the congressional committees involved. We never pushed that, but I think if we had really pushed	

the legal issue, we might have been able to open that up a little bit.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Well, talking about the oversight board, with all due respect, they have no line authority whatsoever over NSC.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Here is my question--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. But I think they are good advisors.

"Mr. RUDMAN. They may be. But you have been around this town long enough to know how contentious this issue was. You certainly knew that if Congress knew that was your view there would be an uproar?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I knew that there would be an uproar from some members.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Maybe even some who would agree with your policies. My question is this: certainly you had a problem with White House counsel. I don't want to get into that, it is not important to get involved in personalities, but you had your own reasons for not going to White House counsel. We will respect those.

"But Ed Meese is one that you had a great deal of respect for.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is true.

"Mr. RUDMAN. And he was consulted on a number of important measures that you testified to. When you had problems with things, there was one reference where you and Meese got together and talked about some issues that were proper to talk about; I am not talking about anything that wasn't. So you had a relationship with Meese.

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		"I have a question. I think the people of the country would like to know. Why didn't you, as the National Security Advisor, go to the Attorney General of the United States and say, General Meese, it is the view of the NSC that we are not covered by Boland, I want a secret legal opinion to the President, which he has a right to do as the President's client, telling us that we are right or we are wrong, so we can proceed? "Why didn't we avoid the situation we are in now where we had [sic (when we could have had?)] an opinion of the Attorney General essentially agreeing with your position. He is the highest legal officer in the land. It was the single, most important foreign policy initiative in this hemisphere that the President was concerned about, is one that you were immersed in enormously and put great stakes in, why not the Attorney General give an opinion? "I would like an answer to that and that will be my last question on that subject, because I don't understand it. "Mr. POINDEXTER. The thought never crossed my mind. In carrying out my duties, I simply didn't think about them in terms of going to Ed and asking for a legal opinion from him. "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you know the Justice Department does that as a matter of course for agencies if they request the Office of Legal Counsel, they do issue opinions? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I guess I am generally aware of that. I don't think I have ever initiated something like that.	

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"Mr. RUDMAN. I hesitate to ask this question, but I--

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. RUDMAN. I am going to ask this question. Was there any consideration of the fact that you didn't want to go outside for an opinion because you might get an answer you didn't like?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that crossed my mind.

"Mr. RUDMAN. That was never discussed among your staff?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, not that I initiated or participated in.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Your answer, Admiral, you know I don't mean to make light of this, but it is like a book written a few years ago, like everything we always wanted to know about Boland but were afraid to ask. It doesn't make sense to me that we are in this mess without getting an opinion from a valid lawyer. If we had an opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel here today that said you could do it, a lot of people might disagree with it, but nobody would get into the process.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think an important point here in terms of my thinking in these legalistic ways that you are describing, clearly my involvement with Central America evolved over a long period of time. When the Boland Amendment first passed in October of I believe--the fall, early winter of '84--I was the deputy, and Central America was not one of my major responsibilities. I had generally followed what was happening there."

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		(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 168-72.)	
84/10/03-328 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		BOLAND COVERAGE: NSC POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Adm. Poindexter's response continues from preceding entry:] "[Mr. POINDEXTER.] So when I took over in January of 1986, the activity of the staff in support of the contras was well under way. My instruction[] to Colonel North was to continue on course. "So I don't mean by that statement to pass the buck to anybody else, I am just telling you that that accounts to some extent, in my mind, for not going through a very thorough analysis of all these considerations that you have raised. "Mr. RUDMAN. I would just point out Exhibit JMP-8, which is . . . a note from North, and it says in part, shares my concern--not the Admiral--that our legal fellow is going to create unhelpful speculation re our intentions on this matter as he proceeds around town asking questions about the Boland Amendment and its legal legislative intent. [See 85/08/20-151.] So there was almost a nervousness with some of your staff, 'Don't ask, because you are afraid to get the wrong answer.' At least that is how I read other memos. That was not your intent? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That was not my memo, and I have seen that exhibit in my preparation for these hearings. I am not sure who[m] he was even talking about. "Mr. RUDMAN. One part of your testimony I	

have a hard time understanding, and you said that you could say that you were complying with the spirit and the letter of Boland because you knew in your heart that it didn't apply; is that basically what you said?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Well, on another law that I am interested in, is that like if I had come down to you a year ago and said to you, 'Admiral, are you complying with the spirit and the letter of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,' would you have said to me, yes, sir, I am, because in your heart of hearts you thought it was unconstitutional? That is what you are saying.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I have some problems with your piece of legislation.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Lots of people do. You join a lot of folks, Admiral. I am simply saying to you that I don't understand--and I will tell you why I don't understand it. In all the dealings that I had with you heretofore in committee, I believe you would agree with me that government must operate in good faith.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I agree.

"Mr. RUDMAN. And it is the trust that we put in each other in government that makes it work. You would agree with that?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I would agree with that.

"Mr. RUDMAN. And I would simply ask that if it didn't trouble you a bit at least to have to look people in the eye and say to them, 'I am complying with the letter and the spirit of your law' because essentially you said to yourself the

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		law doesn't apply. That really isn't dealing in good faith, is it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified before, I was clearly withholding information, and unless it is for a very good reason, I think that that is a difficult thing to do. I would much have preferred if we had had another way to do it. "As I have testified before, often you don't have good options or solutions. You have got to make do with what you have. I did the best that I thought I could under the circumstances." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 172-75; JHICI Ex. JMP 8 [North PROF to Poindexter, re B[redacted] letter, 8/20/85].)	
84/10/03-330 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - NOVEMBER 25, 1986		BOLAND'S IMPORTANCE: NSC VIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, was the Boland Amendment the subject of some discussion at the White House? "Mr. NORTH. It was. "Mr. LIMAN. It was not something that slipped through; is that fair to say? "Mr. NORTH. The whole issue of the many different Boland proscriptions and amendments and the like were for a protracted period of time a subject of discussion. "Mr. LIMAN. You participated with other members of the NSC in an effort to persuade Congress that it was wrong? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, we did." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 207-08.)	
84/10/03-340		BOLAND COVERAGE: NSC	

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OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 19, 1985		NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. You are aware that there was a law of Congress passed by the Congress, a statute of the United States, in effect at that time which prohibited the use of funds available to any agency involved in intelligence activities to support, militarily or paramilitarily, the contras? "Mr. NORTH. I am not sure that I understood the way the Boland Amendment or Boland proscriptions of October 1984 read exactly the way you just said, but what I am certain is that we -- Director Casey, other lawyers -- looked at that and said that the NSC staff was not proscribed from doing those activities. "Mr. NIELDS. In fact, you had an opinion drafted by a lawyer within Congress in your files saying exactly the opposite, didn't you? "Mr. NORTH. I may have. I had a lot of files. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And the cover sheet [of Ex. 106] is from Vince to Ollie? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And it says, 'On the chance Steve didn't give you a copy, attached is for your use.' "And the attached is a memorandum dated August 8, 1985, on House of Representatives stationery from a lawyer employed by the House of Representatives, and two-thirds of the way down the page it says, 'NSC is clearly a U.S. entity involved in intelligence activities subject to the	

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		Section 8066(a) prohibition.' "8066(a) is the Boland Amendment, which prohibits . . . funds available to the CIA, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities to be obligated or expended to provide military support for the contras. "I take it this document was in your files as of on or about August 8, 1985? "[Witness confers with his attorney.] "Mr. NORTH. Well, I will -- I -- if you tell me this was found in my files, I believe you. "I don't recall the document. I am not saying I didn't receive it. I don't know when I received it. I will tell you that I had other people who suggested -- in fact, it was suggested regularly in our media that anything like this was contrary to law. "But I will also tell you we also had opinions that said that we were fully legitimate. We had one of those from the Intelligence Oversight Board. I had the -- Director Casey and I started talking about this in 1983 and then carried it on until I left the NSC, reminded me frequently that he was a lawyer and others would remind me that he was a good one, and that it was clearly my understanding that what I was doing was legal." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 188-90; JHICI Ex. OLN 106.)	
84/10/03-370 1984-86		ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICIES ON NICARAGUA	

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		McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, in your statement, . . . referring to the fact that congressional policy on Iran, on the contras had changed, as can been seen from these charts, and that the Administration's policy remained constant, you wrote, 'People simply cannot carry out policy under the conditions I have described. If you try to make them do so, you will produce conflicting allegiances, lack of communication and blurring of essential lines of authority and responsibility.' [McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 17.] "Were you referring to this conflict between the policy on the contras set in their appropriations and authorization bills and the policy of the Administration? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I was referring to ambiguities, both within the Executive Branch, and between the Congress, and the Executive Branch, and in the formal area, whenever the nominal direction is under the hand of one agency, which by Presidential order it was, and that was the State Department, and, two participating agencies, Defense and CIA, are foreclosed in law from participating in the interviews, and the State Department is basically indifferent about it--although I would have to say, Mr. Abrams was not indifferent about it--then you have people that by default receive a responsibility, the NSC staff, but they don't have the authority that needs to go with any mission that is assigned. "Separately, the matter of evolution in the legal framework is an extremely difficult [sic] to	

manage in any fashion that preserves credibility vis-a-vis not only in this case Nicaragua[] and our friends in Central America, but more and more any ally anywhere.

"I think since the time of the War Powers Resolution is the extent to which a country can count upon the ability of the United States to fulfill its commitments is diminished. [Sic.] And when the Congress goes from, in this case, full funding to restricted funding, to no funding, to quadrupling the funding, in the space of five years, it is extremely unsettling to friends and allies, because it implies that the Executive Branch does not have the ability to fulfill commitments that it makes.

"Mr. LIMAN. All right.

"When you said that it, referring to people, that it will produce conflicting allegiances, what were the different allegiances that you saw in conflict?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I think any member of the RIG, for example, who was subordinate to the Chairman of the RIG, the Assistant Secretary of State, recognizing that the State Department was disinclined to promote the policy, and the other two agencies were unable to by law, that the people either looked to the NSC, whose representative happened to be subordinate to all of them, and his ability to coordinate with them as a very junior officer and to whom they should be accountable, is blurred. [Sic.] And that is what I was implying.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, was the conflict between

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		the mission to keep the contras going and this legislation? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I think that is fair." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 100-02.)	
84/10/03-440 OCTOBER 3, 1984 AND THEREAFTER		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES AS BOLAND II BECAME LAW NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Is it correct to say that following the enactment of the Boland Amendment our support for the war in Nicaragua did not end and that you were the person in the United States Government who managed it? "Mr. NORTH. Starting in the spring of 1984, well before the Boland Amendment proscription of no appropriated funds made available to the DOD or CIA, et cetera, I was already engaged in supporting the Nicaraguan resistance and the democratic outcome in Nicaragua. "I did so as a part of a covert operation that was carried out starting as early as the spring of '84 when we ran out of money, where people started to look in Nicaragua and Honduras and Guatemala and El Salvador and Costa Rica for some sign of what the Americans were really going to do, and that that help began much earlier than the most rigorous of the Boland proscriptions and, yes, it was carried out covertly and it was carried out in such a way as to ensure that the heads of state and the political leadership in Nicaragua, in Central America, recognized the United States was going to meet the commitments of the President's foreign policy, and the President's foreign policy was that we are going to achieve a democratic	

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		outcome in Nicaragua and that our support for the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters was going to continue, and that I was given the job of holding them together in body and in soul, and it slowly transitioned into a more difficult task as time went on and as the CIA had to withdraw further and further from that support, until finally we got to the point in October when I was the only person left talking to them. "Mr. NIELDS. You are talking about now October of 1984? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. That was my question. Following October of 1984, was the U.S. Government support for the war in Nicaragua managed by you? "That was the only question. "Mr. NORTH. The U.S. contact with the Nicaraguan resistance was me, and I turned to others to help carry out that activity. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you manage it? "Mr. NORTH. I tried. In terms of coalescing the activities that went on, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, you said you were given the job. Who gave it to you? "Mr. NORTH. I guess it fell to me by default. Mr. McFarlane was the one who originally tasked me to go make contact with the resistance, assure them of our unflagging support. I made a trip in the spring of 1984 to that effect and basically it just persisted thereafter. "Mr. NIELDS. Maybe it would be most useful to get into specifics of the areas of your support. "I take it one area of your support was to	

endeavor to raise money from sources other than the U.S. Treasury.

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct. Boland proscriptions did not allow us to do so and so we sought a means of complying with those Boland proscriptions by going elsewhere for those monies.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you went to foreign countries?

"Mr. NORTH. I did not physically go to those foreign countries.

"Mr. NIELDS. Representatives of --

"Mr. NORTH. Representatives of foreign countries and I had discussions about those matters, yes.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. And you asked them for money for the contras?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, I want to be a little bit more specific about that. I don't recall going hat in hand to anybody asking for money.

"I do recall sitting and talking about how grateful this country would be if the issue that they had discussed with others were indeed brought to fruition.

"For example, a representative of Country Three and I met and we talked about an issue that had been raised with him beforehand by others outside of the Government. And I told him I thought that was a dandy idea and I told him where he could send the money and he did so."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 193-97.)

84/10/03-460 NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES AS BOLAND II BECAME LAW

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AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . The CIA was covered by the Boland Amendment, so was the DoD and also the State Department, because everyone knows the State Department . . . has an intelligence capability. Why do you believe you had the ability to direct employees of those agencies to do things which the law said they couldn't do? "Mr. NORTH. Congressman Boland, I will take issue again with the word 'direct.' I certainly solicited from them help. If I didn't solicit money, I sought help, and I did seek a lot of that, and they provided it. "My understanding of the Boland proscription was that funds could not be expended for those purposes, and I don't know that any of those people engaged ever expended a nickel on behalf of the programs that I sought their help for." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 132-33.)	
84/10/03-500 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 19, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LEGAL CONCERNS NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on his and others' attempts to stay within Boland: "[O]ver the five and a half years that I had served on the NSC staff, I had . . . sought every possible means to do what needed to be done within the law. "We had done in extremis [sic] to find a way to live within the constraints and prescriptions of Boland, and I had sought a means in 1985 in working with various lawyers, various counsel, to find a way to implement a policy that started	

without my acquiescence or support or direction or anything else, and work very, very hard to find legal ways to carry out the policy of the President . . . ."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 146.)

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LEGAL OPINIONS ON BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC, AND WHERE McFARLANE WENT WRONG

McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. DEWINE. . . . Looking back, would you say that it would have been better when you were in the position of National Security Adviser if you, when you faced these questions, when some of the red lights went off, when you saw North doing some of these things, when you say the Boland amendment and you saw different interpretations of it, and you saw three different versions of the Boland amendment, when you saw Congress giving aid or not giving aid, would it have not been better to call in legal counsel and say, look, give us a legal opinion exactly what can we do in this area, exactly what should we do, and then once you got that opinion, maybe gone out and sat down with your staff and said, this is what we can do, and what we can't do.

"Again, it is hindsight, but one of the recommendations of the Tower Commission was that they upgrade the National Security Adviser legal staff and legal adviser. Would you agree with that recommendation?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I do, Mr. DeWine. I think you point out one of a dozen places where I went wrong. I guess I do feel, though, that there is even a better testimony to my error in the fact that, as I guess I said in the opening statement, I felt that this was a very important issue, that is showing the Russians that we can deal with this phenomenon, but we didn't choose the right instrument to do it.

"Succinctly put, where I went wrong was not having the guts to stand up and tell the President that. To tell you the truth, probably the reason I didn't is because if I had done that, Bill Casey, Jean[e] Kirkpatrick and Cap Weinberger would have said I was some kind[] of a commie.

"My solution should have been that we are going to make clear that we are prepared to keep Soviet support for a totalitarian regime in this hemisphere out.

"It has been ironic under this Administration, where the President is a man of courage, decisiveness and action, that when you try to get the Defense Department to do something, they give a lot of reasons why they can't do it. A lot were good reasons, some weren't, but it was my mistake, really."
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 61-62.)

84/10/03-560
OCTOBER 3,
1984 -
DECEMBER 19,
1985

LEGAL OPINIONS ON BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. . . . [Y]ou knew that there were restrictions being imposed in the Government by the Boland amendment, but what was your understanding of the restrictions that applied to your activity as a member of the NSC?

"Mr. NORTH. My understanding was that, first

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		of all, we were to work to comply with Boland and that we were to work to keep alive the Nicaraguan resistance. "Second, I did not view, nor did my superiors view that the National Security Council staff was covered by Boland. "There were people who were concerned about that, and we sought and obtained legal advice to the effect that it was not; not the least of those was Director Casey. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Did you ever get any kind of written legal opinion from Director Casey on that point? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall. We may have. If I did, it would have been left in my files, I suppose. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Can you tell the committee whether you ever obtained any other written legal advice on that specific question of the coverage of the Boland Amendment? "Mr. NORTH. There was a legal opinion provided by counsel to the Intelligence Oversight Board. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. . . . The bottom line of it is we looked at that as saying that very clearly, the CIA could not use its appropriated monies for this, and we couldn't use DOD monies for those purposes, but very clearly, Boland did not proscribe the National Security Council from being the point of contact, the coordinator, whatever." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 48-50. See id., 7/13/87, at 240 [Casey told North the NSC was not	

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		covered by Boland].)	
		North summarized his view of the Boland Amendment: "I understood Boland to be an appropriations measure; in other words, here is [sic] monies and here is what you can and cannot do with those monies." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 52.)	
84/10/03-565 1984-86		BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC: DoJ VIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . Was the Department of Justice ever asked for an opinion on the applicability of the Boland Amendment to the NSC? "Attorney General MEESE. Not to my knowledge." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 174. See id., 7/29/87, at 307-11, 324-26 [Meese on the Boland Amendments and the NSC staff, generally].)	
84/10/03-570 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 19, 1985		LEGAL OPINIONS ON BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Singlaub on his dealings with North while Boland II was in effect: "Mr. FOLEY. Did you ever discuss with Colonel North the Boland amendment? "Mr. SINGLAUB. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. FOLEY. Did you ever discuss with him his compliance with the Boland amendment? "Mr. SINGLAUB. Yes. "Mr. FOLEY. And what did he tell you? "Mr. SINGLAUB. Well, I believe there was a	

disagreement among the lawyers with whom he had been in contact as to whether or not it applied to the National Security Council and to the White House.

"Mr. FOLEY. These are official lawyers?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. I understand them to be, yes.

"Mr. FOLEY. And you got the impression from him that some lawyers had told him that he was not covered by the Boland amendment and other lawyers had told him that he was?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. Yes, that is correct.

"Mr. FOLEY. So some of the legal advice that he was receiving was that he was in violation of the Boland amendment by the activities that he was undertaking?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. That is correct. So we decided that we would plan for the worse case, which was that it did apply, and we attempted then to work within those parameters.

"Mr. FOLEY. . . . [W]as there also a consideration of secrecy and avoidance of publicity in order to avoid any focus on the violations that might occur of the Boland amendment?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. Yes. That certainly was a major factor."
(Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 209-11.)

LEGAL OPINIONS ON BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC
SINGLAUB ACCOUNT (cont'd):

"Mr. MCCOLLUM. The implication . . . was that the Boland amendment was indeed being violated and that, therefore, that is why you were seeking to avoid the publicity.

"That is the implication that could be read into it.

"Mr. SINGLAUB. I regret that that is the case. . . . [O]ur concern was primarily to avoid embarrassing those countries who were providing assistance on the ground and did not want to admit publicly that there were Nicaraguan freedom fighter base camps on their territory and that some of their air fields were being used in support of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

"Mr. MCCOLLUM. The avoiding of publicity had nothing to do with the Boland amendment as such then, your comments with regard to that?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. Certainly not with respect to my activity.

"Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, with respect to Colonel North's activity?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. As far as I know Colonel North was operating within the law, within the Boland amendment."

(Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 233.)

84/10/03-580
OCTOBER 1984
AND
THEREAFTER

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CASEY ON LEGAL CONCERNS AND USING SECORD

NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified how the Boland Amendment was taken into account in the Contra program:

"[W]e made every effort not to expend U.S. Government funds to support the Nicaraguan resistance and thus when Director Casey suggested setting up outside entities and gave me the name of General Secord as a person who could help do

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		it, we did it as an effort to comply with the Boland proscriptions." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 192.)	
84/10/03-588 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 4, 1985		NSC LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY DURING BOLAND II POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. You've testified that you did not believe that what you and Colonel North were doing in these different operations w[as] unlawful. That's what I understand your position to be. "A. That's correct. "Q. Both this morning and yesterday. Did you ever receive any kind of memos or other documents discussing whether the NSC was free to solicit funds from third countries during the period of the absolute Boland prohibition? "A. It is conceivable. It doesn't jump right out at me. "Q. Well, let me see what you do recall, and for a time frame let me just state certain facts, that in October of 1984 the full prohibition of Boland was adopted, first in the continuing resolution on the appropriations, then in the Intelligence Authorization Act. In August of 1985 an amendment was adopted which permitted exchanges of intelligence, and then in December of 1985 the provision came in that permitted the solicitation of third country funding and also during that period you had the adoption of the $27 million humanitarian aid provisions. "Now I want to talk about that period from the fall of 1984, when the Boland amendment was adopted, until the provision came in that	

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		authorized third country solicitation for humanitarian aid by the State Department. Did you participate in the discussions of legislative strategy that led to seeking from Congress permission for the solicitation of humanitarian aid? "A. I conceivably could have participated in conversations, although that was not my major area of responsibility during that time period. As I think I've testified before, Mr. McFarlane, with his experience on the Hill and also because he was the National Security Advisor, took the responsibility in our front office for legislative action and relations with the Congress. "And one of the other deputies, Mr. Fortier -- see I was the principal deputy at the time, and there were some other deputies. Mr. Fortier, who had been on the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff, did most of the staff work for Mr. McFarlane on legislative strategy, so I was probably in rooms during discussions of the issues but I really didn't contribute very much and didn't really get involved in the action." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 246-47.)	
84/10/03-600 SOMETIME IN 1984 OR EARLY 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES AS BOLAND II BECAME LAW SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Prior to his trip to Central America in March of 1985 ("[t]o the best of my belief"), Singlaub discusses with North the legality of arms purchases for the Contras. Singlaub asks "what are the parameters within which I must operate if I am going to do this." North replies "that he had	

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		discussed this with lawyers" (Singlaub believes this was "someone in the Justice Department"). North tells Singlaub two rules to ensure the transaction is done entirely outside of the U.S.: (1) that the funds not be solicited or deposited in the U.S.; and (2) that no U.S. bank or carrier, air or surface, move the funds. (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 204-06; see id., 5/21/87, at 209.)	
84/10/03-700 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 19, 1985		NORTH'S SALARY UNDER BOLAND NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. . . . [Y]ou essentially testified that Director Casey told you that the NSC was not covered by Boland; am I correct? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. He also told you that the Defense Department, the CIA, the State Department were covered but the NSC was not. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. The thing that disturbs me, Colonel . . . is that you were employed by DoD. Your superiors knew it. Admiral Poindexter knew it. "I've checked to make sure I'm correct--and you correct me if I am wrong--but since the day that you were assigned to NSC, you have been compensated as a Marine, from the Marine Corps, am I correct? "Mr. NORTH. As a major and then as a lieutenant colonel, sir.	

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"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . And as a matter of fact, Mr. Sciaroni in his opinion said although the NSC is not subject to the Boland Amendment prohibitions, nevertheless Lt. Colonel North might be as he evidently is on a non-reimbursed detail from the Marine Corps. He went on to say if he was reimbursed by the NSC it might change. But the fact is it was never reimbursed by the NSC; correct?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't know that it was and I don't know that it wasn't, but I assume it was not.

". . . .

"Mr. NORTH. . . . [I]t did not occur to any of us that my salary, whether I would be paid as a Lt. Colonel in ADAC or whether I was paid being as a Lt. Colonel in NSC, was covered by that particular proviso. . . . It never in my wildest dreams occurred to me that my salary would be subject that kind of a proviso."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 240-42.)

84/10/03-710
OCTOBER 3,
1984 -
DECEMBER 19,
1985

NORTH'S SALARY UNDER BOLAND
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"At some point, we did get, from the Intelligence Oversight Board, an opinion that the more restrictive version of the Boland Amendment didn't apply to the NSC staff. This is in the Tower Commission Report. There was the cav[e]at that possibly Colonel North, because he was a detailee from the Defense Department, might be prohibited; but, frankly, I thought -- and I think Mr. McFarlane felt -- that that was a debatable

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		point. Very frankly, we were willing to take some risks in order to keep the contras alive, as I said, until we could eventually win the legislative battle. "So, for all intents and purposes, Colonel North largely took over the -- much of the activity that CIA had been doing prior to their being prohibited from carrying activity [sic] because of the Boland Amendment. "When I say 'carrying out all activity,' obviously, one person can't do everything that [redacted] CIA people were doing. "One other point here; I think this is important. I don't mean to be pejorative or critical of Colonel North, because I have the highest regard for him. But Colonel North did have a tendency to be a little bit expansive in describing things. As you read through the PROF's notes, he uses the word 'our' and 'we.' I am not trying to distance myself from that, but I think you are going to need to be very careful, if I can offer advice, in analyzing exactly what he did or what somebody else was doing and he was reporting it as we and our. At least, that's the filter that I used as I read Colonel North's reports." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 51-52.)	
84/10/03-780 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		BOLAND COMPLIANCE: NORTH NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified he never personally asked anybody for money for the Contras. He explained why: "I want to be very clear about that. Not	

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		because of Boland but because I understood that there were regulations against government officials soliciting, I do not recall ever asking a single, solitary American citizen for money. I want to make that very clear. You may have found someone who said that I did, but I sure don't remember it, and I tried very, very hard to live with that proscription, not because it was Boland, not because we perceived that the NSC was in any way obviated from doing what I was doing, but only because someone had told me that a U.S. Government official should not, cannot, will not, whatever, solicit." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 234.)	
84/10/03-800 SOMETIME IN 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ROLE: SCAPEGOAT NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [Y]ou said that when the time came, you were going to [be] dropped like a hot rock, that you were going to be the deniable link, and I think you also used terms like scapegoat. For whom were you going to be the scapegoat? "Mr. NORTH. For who[m]ever necessary, for the Administration, for the President, for however high up the chain they needed someone to say that is the guy who did it, and he is gone and now we have put that behind us, let's get on with other things. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you tell Admiral Poindexter that you were prepared to play that role? "Mr. NORTH. I had told Admiral Poindexter	

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		that, and I had told Mr. McFarlane that as early as 1985. "Mr. LIMAN. Had you told Mr. Casey that? "Mr. NORTH. I think it may well have been his idea to begin with, that there had to be somebody who is going to stand up and take the rap for this. "Mr. LIMAN. And this means what, sir? "Mr. NORTH. Well, starting in 1984 for the political or international consequences of what we began to call the support for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87 at 130. On who was to be protected, and whether the President was covered by the Fall Guy Plan, compare North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 147-50 [quoted below at 86/11/23-370].)	
84/10/03-810 1984 - PRESENT		THE FALL GUY PLAN: HOW IT DEVELOPED NORTH ACCOUNT: (1) "First of all, the concept of a person who would be held responsible and take the political spear, if you will, began way back in 1984." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 150.) (2) "We had the lives of people at stake. We had this nation's foreign policy at stake. We had the lives of the people involved in the resistance activity at stake. And we have, as in any other covert operation, a problem of deniability. I was to be the deniability. I was to go when the time came--political liability, he's gone." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 203 [North testifying on disclosing his Contra activities to Bretton	

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		Sciaroni of the IOB or to Congress].) (3) "[T]hat is, after all, the essence of deniability and I was that deniable link and I was supposed to be dropped like a hot rock when it all came down. And I was willing to serve in that capacity. I was not willing to become the victim of a criminal prosecution." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 236-37.)	
84/10/03-850 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 19, 1985		BOLAND COMPLIANCE: CIA CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Castillo testified that the CIA rejected certain activities, though permitted under Boland, because of the political fallout. He illustrated his assertion: "At one point, we had a bad problem with . . . Mountain Leprosy in the Southern Front. This is a terribly debilitating disease, and I had asked our Office of Medical Services for assistance in locating a serum. It is only fabricated in France and Brazil, and it couldn't be found, so I called Colonel North and I asked him if through his contacts he might not be able to get some of this serum. It is very expensive, and it is only manufactured in limited quantities. "In any case, he was able to get and somehow transport to [redacted] I think it was[] 1500 ampules or doses. The agency disapproved the transport of this serum . . . [location redacted] to be delivered to the PBs [Private Benefactors] who would have included it in one of the drops, because they thought that it would have or, as I understood it, that it had political	

ramifications."
(Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 152-53.)

84/10/03-855
OCTOBER 1984
- AUGUST 1985

BOLAND AMENDMENT: C/CATF ACTIVITIES
C/CATF ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Carome. What is your understanding of the law as it applied between October 1984 when you took your job and August '85 on the subject of Central Intelligence Agency passing intelligence to the contras?

"[C/CATF.] It was my understanding that intelligence could not be passed to the contras, period. There was one point that was a matter of discussion in the law and that was whether or not we could pass defense intelligence to the resistance forces. We met with the intelligence committees, particularly the House Intelligence Committee, debated that issue and finally came down to the fact that it probably was not something that was politically wise to do but under extenuating circumstances we probably could.

"Mr. Carome. Was it permissible for you to pass intelligence information to Colonel North and for him to then pass information on to the contras?

"[C/CATF.] No, I would not think so.

"Mr. Carome. During that time frame did Oliver North ever ask you for intelligence information relating to Nicaragua?

"[C/CATF.] Yes.

"Mr. Carome. Did you sometimes provide it?

"[C/CATF.] Never when I thought it was going

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		to Nicaragua. As a matter of fact, many times when I thought that was where it was going I did not provide it. When I was told that it was to be used in the context of his White House job, I think it is important to say here that he was the central figure for the Administration on Central American policy during the period in question, and there were unique circumstances that created that circumstance. I would provide it to him and did I think as I go back and reflect and look at some of these exhibits which thanks to the committee I have seen, might have from time to time but mostly I did not. [Sic.]" (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 237-38. See id., 8/5/87, at 73-75 [George Jameson memo of 3/2/87 on CIA involvement with the Contras, JHICI Ex. TC 13], 75-78 [Boland and the CIA], 140-44 [C/CATF's lack of knowledge of third-country sources], 229-30 [C/CATF's knowledge of North's Contra activities].)	
84/10/03-860 OCTOBER 1, 1984 - OCTOBER 18, 1986		CIA ACTIVITY UNDER THE BOLAND AMENDMENTS GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. George. Beginning the first of October, 1984, we accepted the absolute total and complete cut off of any support whatsoever to the contras, and I believe there are a series of cables from my office, from the Latin American office, from the Central American Task Force. [Redacted] says -- this is dated 12 October 1984. 'We are in the process of obtaining the legal reading as to what we can and cannot do in our dealings with the FDN in light of this Congressional action. Until such	

a reading is obtained, all field stations are to cease and desist with actions which can be construed to be providing any type of support, either direct or indirect, to the various entities with whom we dealt under the [redacted'] -- which was our previous para-military program. 'All future contact with those entities are [sic] until further notice to be solely -- repeat solely -- for the purpose of collecting positive and or counter-intelligence information of interest to the United States Government.'

"Mr. Boland. Thank you. That is a rather positive direction. Let me ask you: this committee has received evidence indicating that [redacted] was a[n] integral part of the operation to supply contra units in the field with weapons and ammunition, in the so-called Secord Supply Operation. When did you first become aware of [redacted] activities and from what source?

"Mr. George. There was great concern as the amendment was modified over the years as to what we were allowed to do and I think we were very cautious and very careful to read --

"Mr. Boland. Was there really any great concern in that period, from October 1984 to October of 1986 with respect to the kind of activities [redacted] was engaged in in [redacted]?

"Mr. George. Chairman and [sic] Boland, yes[,] sir. Yes. There was no other issue that we worried more about.

"Mr. Boland. Would you quarrel with my description . . . that [redacted] was engaged in

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		what one could say was a military operation down there? "Mr. George. I would say that [redacted] activities were against the procedures and the regulations of this directorate. "Mr. Boland. All right. "Mr. George. I would also -- and I would -- you haven't asked me, but there's a lot to be said for [redacted] and the problems that he faced. "Mr. Boland. Well, when did you first become aware of [redacted] activities and from what source? "Mr. George. I first became aware of the fact that [redacted] had a radio and was transmitting independent information to Oliver North in late October 1986. I became aware in the summer that [redacted] had possible -- had one or two direct contacts by telephone with the private benefactors in [redacted]. "Mr. Boland. How did you learn this information? "Mr. George. I learned the information about his contacts with the people in [redacted] from [redacted] who had just returned from a trip to Central America where he had found out either directly from [redacted] or from [redacted] associates. "Mr. Boland. I take it [redacted] informed you? "Mr. George. He informed me of everything. "Mr. Boland. Did you inform Mr. Casey o[f] [redacted] activities? "Mr. George. I certainly did.	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. Boland. Colonel North testified that he thought you were aware of his contra activities while they were ongoing. [See 86/00/09-430, -470.] "Mr. [George.] I read that remark that Colonel North made about me. I would repeat what I have said previously -- first of all, Colonel North was the National Security Council's point man in Central America. You dealt overtly and openly with Colonel North in Central America no matter what the issue was. "Mr. Boland. And you dealt with him frequently on the telephone? "Mr. George. Yes, sir. It was my impression that Colonel North was aware of, if not involved in, some of the private benefactor activity." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 59-62.)	
84/10/03-875 OCTOBER 3, 1984 - DECEMBER 19, 1985		BOLAND COMPLIANCE: NORTH'S CONTACT WITH SECORD SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord on the period while Boland II was in effect: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . Can you indicate what your activity was on behalf of the contras at that time during that period, October 3, 1984, through December 19, 1985 -- I have a list of them here, but you were pretty well involved in the contra activities during the period, were you not? "Mr. SECORD. Yes, sir. "Mr. BOLAND. What was the role of Oliver North in those activities? "Mr. SECORD. Oliver North introduced me to the contra leaders. Oliver North collected the	

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		information for me. He kept track of what was going on during these operations. He urged me ahead when the time came to try and create the air operation which I described earlier. "He urged me strongly to move forward in that area and I did." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/8/87, at 192.)	
84/10/12-050 OCTOBER 12, 1984		PRESIDENT SIGNS BOLAND II INTO LAW SUMMARY: Boland II is signed into law by the President. (Iran-Contra Report, at 41-42; Tower, at C-1. See entries starting at 84/10/03-000.)	
84/10/12-100 OCTOBER 12, 1984		BOLAND II DoS CHRONOLOGY: "Prohibition enacted against the use of funds available to agencies or entities involved in intelligence activities to assist directly, or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On Boland II, see entries starting at 84/10/03-000. On the DoS Chronology, see 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 85/01/10-100.)	
84/10/20-000 LATE OCTOBER 1984		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: COURIER ROLE OWEN ACCOUNT: Robert Owen travels to Costa Rica and meets Calero. They discuss Owen's working for Calero. Either here or at a later meeting they agree Owen will be paid "$2500 a month, plus most of [Owen's] expenses . . . . My job description was very	

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		fluid. . . . Doing whatever I could to support their cause." His job "evolved . . . at one point" into acting as courier between Calero and North. John Hull ("an Indiana constitutent") also meets with Owen and Calero during this trip. "Calero asked him if he would provide humanitarian assistance to the Southern Front. Mr. Hull agreed and a deal was worked out where Adolfo Calero provided $10,000 a month to a bank account for Mr. Hull to use to provide food and humanitarian goods to the . . . remnants of the Southern Front." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 217, 219-21; see also id., at 222 [Owen leaves his job at Gray and Co. in late Nov. 1984].)	
84/10/20-100 FROM OCTOBER 1984		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: COURIER ROLE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it among other things that you did was direct moneys to various contra leaders and other persons in Central America? "Mr. NORTH. I did, as I testified this morning. "Mr. NIELDS. And some of those were carried down by Mr. Owen? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, they were. "Mr. NIELDS. And some of those were taken there by General Secord or people working under his direction? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, and others. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it that Mr. Owen did a number of things in furtherance of support of the contras?	

"Mr. NORTH. Yes, he did.

"Mr. NIELDS. Indeed you had a name for him, I take it it was the courier?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall giving him that name, but I recall that his documents would come in marked TC.

"Mr. NIELDS. And that stood for the courier?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. As you have said, he would carry money down from your office to various contra leaders?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he scouted the air strip?

"Mr. NORTH. I guess he did, yes. I am not -- yes, I guess that was prior to Olmstead.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he would bring you a list of weapons from the contras that they wanted?

"Mr. NORTH. That is right, among other things.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he carried intelligence from you down to the contras for particular operations?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. Indeed, I think he testified before this committee that he was, in his words, your 'eyes and ears' in the contra movement.

"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall his testimony, but I won't dispute the description."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 161-62.)

84/10/20-149
FROM OCTOBER
1984

OWEN'S COURIER ROLE: POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. Admiral, did you know [North] was using a

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		man by the name of Owen[] as a courier? "A. I knew that. "Q. Did you approve of it? "A. In essence I did." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 329. On Poindexter's knowledge of North's Contra activities, see below at 86/00/09-195, -196.)	
84/10/20-150 FROM OCTOBER 1984		OWEN'S COURIER ROLE: POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Is it also true that you knew that he was using Mr. Owen as a courier? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm not sure I actually knew that he was a courier. I was aware that Mr. Owen was a private citizen that was assisting in some role. I'm not sure I really understood the exact role." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 190.)	
84/11/00-000 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1984		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ARMS TRANSACTION SECORD ACCOUNT: Gen. Secord arranges the first of four arms transactions with Adolfo Calero of the FDN. The initial 2 transactions involve Transworld Armament, a Canadian arms dealer, and consist of a small ship load of munitions from the Far East in Nov. 1984, and a 90,000-pound plane load from Europe in the spring of 1985. The final 2 transactions are arranged through Tom Clines -- a sea lift in May 1985, and a second undated and unspecified transaction. Clines uses the Portuguese arms company, Defex. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 143-46, 148; JHICI Ex. 2 [arms	

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		involved in the 4 shipments].)	
84/11/00-050 AUGUST 1984 - APRIL 1985		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ARMS TRANSACTION CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. When did you buy your first weapons from General Secord? Would it have been sometime in the fall of 1984? "Mr. CALERO. Maybe, yes. Maybe August, September. "Mr. BARBADORO. And is your first purchase -- "Mr. CALERO. I mean I ordered in August-September. "Mr. BARBADORO. You ordered the weapons and they didn't arrive until 1985, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. And the first purchase that you made from General Secord is listed on this chart as sealift No. 1, correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. When did sealift No. 1 arrived in Central America? "Mr. CALERO. . . . That one arrived in April. "Mr. BARBADORO. It was delayed in arriving, correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. And what did you do because the sealift was delayed in arriving? "Mr. CALERO. We were having a very, very difficult situation, and in December, I called General Secord and asked if he could get us emergency supplies and he said yes. So he--what is called the airlift No. 1, airlift No. 2 were	

planned.

"Mr. BARBADORO. So these first two airlifts that arrived in February-March of 1985 were emergency supplies that you needed because the sealift was delayed in arriving, is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BARBADORO. In addition to the purchases from General Secord that you just described, you also purchased a second boatload of weapons from him, is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. That was the big picture, and this one was planned when we got the big money.

"Mr. BARBADORO. And in total you spent approximately $11 million in purchases that you made from General Secord, is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, just about.

"Mr. BARBADORO. How did you come to purchase arms from General Secord?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, from his offer to help us out in that regard. I was very much--I was very wary of just dealing with anyone, so I was happy to deal with the United States retired general.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you approach General Secord or did he approach you?

"Mr. CALERO. No, he told me that he would help me out in that. Or I asked him, I mean. You know, it is very difficult to establish.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did General Secord tell you when you were buying test arms from him that his company was going to charge between 20 and 30 percent markup on the weapons?

"Mr. CALERO. No, sir.

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		"Mr. BARBADORO. In fact, he led you to believe that he was selling these weapons for cost, correct? "Mr. CALERO. That was my understanding, my impression. "Mr. BARBADORO. Were you surprised to learn that General Secord testified a couple weeks ago that he was charging a 20 or 30 percent markup on the weapons? "Mr. CALERO. Well, it was a revelation." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 30-33. See 84/11/00-000, 85/03/21-400 [Secord on the first two arms deliveries he arranged for Calero].)	
84/11/07-275 NOVEMBER 7, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES NORTH MEMO: North memo to McFarlane, titled "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom": "[11/5:] Calero called . . . expressing grave concern about delivery of HIND-D helicopters at El Bluff. He was very distressed that the Agency had not forewarned the FDN of the delivery and that by the time he learned of it from his own assets, it was too late to position forces in an effort to interdict/destroy the helicopters. . . . Calero indicated that he was undertaking plans to 'take-out' the HINDs and asked that he be given all possible information on the location of the helicopters. I told him I would try to get the information to him. - "Later this same evening, I called Bob Vickers (NIO for Latin America) and GEN Paul Gorman and asked them for all we had on the location of the	

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		HIND-D's. "[11/6:] . . . Subsequent to this call, I called Calero . . . and advised that the HINDs had been moved [redacted] . . . . "[Redacted] the new Central American Task Force . . . Chief . . . called to provide additional information [redacted] . . . . During the course of his call, he indicated that [redacted] Calero was coming to Washington unexpectedly. I told [redacted] that Calero would be meeting with me and invited him to sit in. We discussed the matter and agreed that [redacted] would meet separately with Calero in view of the Agency's determination that Section 8066 of the CR [Boland] forbade the Agency from providing ANY information or assistance to the FDN. "Calero and I met privately mid-afternoon. . . . Calero asked for detailed information on the location of the HINDs and the Sandinista anti-air defenses. We also discussed longer-range planning for a Calero-Cruz coalition and the requirements for military cooperation with the MISURA in the seizure of Puerto Cabezas. "The meeting with Calero was terminated by the 5:00 p.m. CPPG and Calero returned to Miami on a 6:30 p.m. flight. After the CPPG, I again called [redacted] and asked for any further updates on the HINDs and new info on the MIG's. [Redacted] indicated that he was unable to meet with Calero on this trip due to the short lead time in notice of his arrival, [redacted] then asked if I was aware of a tasking to the NIO for an assessment of the Resistance capabilities. I told him that I	

was and that this was a fall out of the CPPG. I noted concern that State was of the opinion that the Resistance had become largely ineffective since our funding had run out in May 1984. [Redacted] shared my assessment that quite the opposite was true and that the Resistance obviously had considerable outside support. I asked [redacted] if he was aware of the source of the Resistance funding. He told me no, that CIA had been trying to determine this, but that it was obviously substantial. I told [redacted] that it was important that the SNIE reflect the fact that there was substantial outside support which had continued for some months and showed no signs of abating. [Redacted] agreed that this was the case. I asked him if the dollar amounts could be quantified. [Redacted] responded that they were spending at least $1 million per month. I told [redacted] that the SNIE should include this estimate.

". . . .

"[11/7:] GEN Paul Gorman called . . . to relay new information on collection efforts for MIGs and the HIND aircraft.

". . . .

"At no time did I discuss with [redacted] financial arrangements for the FDN. At no time did I indicate that Calero was attempting to attack the MIGs. I specifically told [redacted] that Calero was attempting to collect information on the MIGs [redacted] and would pass this information to a CIA agent [redacted] if it was available.

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		". . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 3 [= Ex. OLN 255].)	
84/11/07-277 NOVEMBER 7, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NORTH'S DISCRETION MCFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that even before this second contribution of $25 million [from Country 2; see entries starting at 85/02/00-400] was communicated to you, that you had received through Admiral Poindexter a complaint from the DCI, Mr. Casey, that Colonel North had talked about the sources of funding to a CIA official? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I recall that, yes, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall--and this is Exhibit 31--that Colonel North wrote you a memorandum defending the fact that he was discreet and that he, in fact, did not tell the CIA about where the money was coming from? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 55; JHICI Ex. 31 [North memo to McFarlane, "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom," 11/7/84].)	
84/11/07-280 NOVEMBER 7, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LOCATING HINDs McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH MEMO: McFarlane on North's memo to him, which had relayed a request from Contra leaders for help in locating Sandinista HIND-D helicopters: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . [W]ere United States Government employees tasked to locating the HIND-D helicopters through intelligence information? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Not to my knowledge. "Mr. BOLAND. This exhibit [31] indicates that	

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		Colonel North called Bob Vickers, who is the NIO for Latin America[], and General Paul Gorman, who is the Commander of the Southern Command at that time, and asks them for all that they had on the location of the HIND-Ds. Would that tasking have been a violation of the Boland Amendment, in your judgment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, on its face I would think if that information in turn were provided to the contras, that it would." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 8-9; JHICI Ex. 31.)	
84/11/07-300 NOVEMBER 7, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NORTH'S DISCRETION NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Well, do you remember, Oliver North, that you had a conversation once with the Chief of the Central American Task Force at the CIA right after Boland was passed and that--I am going to show it to you, if you don't remember--and that you got criticized for being indiscreet in mentioning what you were doing and you were told, 'Be more discre[et] next time,' . . . that you shouldn't do it? "Mr. NORTH. I recall the event. I don't recall the time. "Mr. LIMAN. It is an exhibit here. We don't have to go over it. "Mr. NORTH. I recall it. "Mr. LIMAN. But that really was the spirit, wasn't it, of it all? Don't infect other people with knowledge-- "Mr. NORTH. Unnecessary knowledge is the	

term.

"Mr. LIMAN. You do it, you provide the deniable link, you take the rap if it gets exposed? That was what this was all about, right?

"Mr. NORTH. I have testified to that.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it is also fair to say that the people who chose your for this knew and appreciated your qualities?

"Mr. NORTH. You are asking me to put myself in the minds of other people, counsel. I don't believe that any of those people foresaw the outcome of what has happened. I certainly didn't. I do honestly believe that they expected that Ollie would go quietly and Ollie intended to do so right up until the day that somebody decided to start a criminal prosecution."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 227-29. See Ex. OLN 255 [North memo to McFarlane, dated 11/7/84, titled "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom"]. See also 86/09/09-250.)

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NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NORTH'S DISCRETION
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

Adm. Poindexter testified concerning North's memorandum to McFarlane, titled "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom" (Poindexter Dep. Ex. 19):

"Q. Admiral, remember I asked you before whether you had received any criticism of the fact that Colonel North was talking about fund raising, sources of funds to [redacted] and the CIA. If you look at this memorandum, it says: 'Admiral Poindexter indicates that the Director called you expressing concern that I had discussed with Mr.

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		Meyers' [redacted] 'Calero, MiGs, dollars,' et cetera. [Original document reads: 'ADM Poindexter indicates that the Director called you expressing concern that I had discussed with a Mr. Myers: Calero, [redacted,] MIGs, dollars, etc.'] "Then it consists of North's denials that he discussed any of these things, and it goes on at the very last on page 3 to say: 'At no time did I discuss with [redacted] financial arrangements for the FDN. At no time did I indicate that Calero was attempting to attack the MiGs,' et cetera. "Does that refresh your recollection, Admiral, that you did get some criticism from the CIA that North was telling them things that they didn't want to know? "A. The only -- I don't recall see this memo. I no doubt did at the time, although that is not totally clear, because it is marked 'eyes only.' It could have gone directly in[ ]to Mr. McFarlane. "Anyway, I do have a vague recollection of some years ago Director Casey calling and asking that Colonel North be careful in talking to his people about things they shouldn't know about. That's a very vague recollection." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 204-05; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 19 [= JHICI Exx. 31, JMP 3, OLN 255].)	
84/11/07-400 NOVEMBER 7, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LOCATING HINDs, AND DoD INVOLVEMENT WEINBERGER RESPONSE TO NORTH MEMO: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . [E]vidence has been presented to these committees indicating that in	

November of 1984, Lieutenant Colonel North tasked General Paul Gorman, who was the Commander of the Southern Command at the time, with furnishing information of the location and status of Sandinista Hind helicopters to Colonel North for his passage to the contras.

"To your knowledge, did General Gorman make his superiors in DOD aware of this request?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. I didn't know [o]f it and Mr. North has no authority whatever to task anyone.

"Mr. BOLAND. The evidence was presented to this committee--Exhibit 31 in the testimony of Mr. McFarlane when he was here.

"Let me ask, given the disparity of their rank, between general and lieutenant colonel, would you attribute General Gorman's compliance with North's request to that 'White House mystique' that you mentioned last Friday?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, if there was, indeed, compliance with it, yes. There are a number of people who feel that when the White House calls, that everything has to be done, but in accordance with that call. But I found this very shortly after I came to the Department and right after that time, I issued very strict instructions--which, to the best of my knowledge, have been followed--that any calls or requests for tasking of the military had to be referred to my office, to the Deputy Secretary, if I was away, and that they would be acted on only when we were--confirmed that this was indeed something that was desired by officials and not just by some

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		building." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 8/3/87, at 86-87; JHICI Ex. 31 [North memo to McFarlane, "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom," 11/7/84].)	
84/11/07-500 MID-NOVEMBER 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LOCATING HINDs C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Carome. Robert Owen has testified to this committee that in mid-November '84 North gave him intelligence including maps to take to contra leaders for use in a possible operation to take out Hind helicopters. [See 84/11/15-000.] Owen said that North told him that these maps had come from across the river and that that meant either the Pentagon or the CIA. "My question is were you aware at the time that Oliver North was seeking to obtain intelligence relating to the Hind helicopters and seeking to pass that intelligence to the contra leadership? "[C/CATF.] Let me take the question in two parts. During the time that the Hind helicopters were delivered to Central America and Nicaragua, I was very much aware that not only North but everybody in the United States government and Congress and the press was trying to seek information on exactly what was delivered. There was first a thought that they were MIG-21s which called into place serious political questions and questions as to whether or not they were in fact Hind-21s. There was an intense exchange that took place within the Administration, particularly with the White House and particularly with North, about	

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		whether or not they were Hind-21s. There were also discussions about what options were to exercise contingency plans or to exercise markers which had been laid down by the Administration. [Sic.] "So in that context, yes, I was very much aware that Oliver North, others at the highest levels of the government were deeply and intensely interested in following this matter and were seeking intelligence from multiple sources. "The second question: Was I aware that Oliver North was seeking intelligence on that issue to pass to the Nicaraguan resistance. There were meetings that I attended in the Department of State under the chairmanship of Ambassador Motley where the whole issue of how to deal with the MIG-21s was discussed. One particular issue discussed was whether or not CIA could exercise a particular contingency plan which had been laid out prior to the Boland Amendment. I said we could not and repeated the law. I was aware that Oliver North was interested in exercising sort of an option like that or looking at options. I cannot recall a specific awareness that he was looking for intelligence to take out the Hind-24s and was seeking for intelligence to pass to the contras on that subject. "It is possible that two or three years ago I was aware of it but I don't recall specific knowledge of that." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 238-40. See id., 8/5/87, at 229-30 [C/CATF's knowledge of North's Contra activities].)	

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NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LOCATING HINDs
C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. Carome. Would you please turn to [C/CATF] Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 is a memorandum dated November 7, 1984 from Oliver North to Robert McFarlane. It indicates that North was trying to get intelligence information to Calero to take out the Hinds. In the middle of page 1 it states that Mr. North had on the evening of November 5th called Bob Vickers, NIO for Latin America, and General Paul Gorman and asked them for all we had on the location of the Hinds. Were you familiar that such a request had been made on November 5th?

"[C/CATF.] I could have been. I don't recall specifically.

"Mr. Carome. Turn to the middle of page 2 -- at the beginning of the last paragra[p]h it states, the meeting with Calero was terminated by 5 p.m. and then after the CPPG [Crisis Pre-Planning Group] meeting I again called [redacted] and asked for any further updates on the Hinds and on new information on the MIGs.

"Does that refresh your recollection that Colonel North was speaking directly to you and asking you for intelligence information on taking out the Hinds at that time?

"[C/CATF.] As I told you, it does not bring back specific memories but I know that we talked about the MIGs until about a year ago or the deliveries. [Redacted.] It was an intense discussion and in his capacity as the focal point

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		for the NSC and the White House on this subject, I talked to Ollie a lot about those things. I don't remember the details of those discussions in passing information to him, but I undoubtedly did do that. "Mr. Carome. When you did that did you do anything to make sure that that information was not being passed on to the contra leadership? "[C/CATF.] I didn't pass it to the contra leadership. At that time I had been in my job for 6 weeks or thereabouts and had no reason I don't [sic] think to believe that Oliver North would have been doing that at that point in time, and frankly wouldn't have probably said Ollie, don't you pass this to the contras, because I am not sure I had developed much of an understanding. "Mr. Carome. But you knew that would have been illegal if that had occurred? "[C/CATF.] I would have known that I couldn't have passed the intelligence to the contras, and as you will hear throughout this testimony, I couldn't do with Ollie something that I couldn't have done myself directly and that was my guiding light in dealing with Ollie for the next 2.5 years. "As I would talk to him racing through my mind would be could I do this myself. So the answer is I would have known I couldn't have done that, and it would not have been proper for me. Whether or not it was legal for Ollie to do it, at that point in time I don't think the thought crossed my mind. It does, as you'll hear my testimony, at a later date."	

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		(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 240-42; C/CATF Ex. 1 [North Memo to McFarlane, "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom," 11/7/84].)	
84/11/07-510 NOVEMBER 7, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: C/CATF AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. McClure. . . . I want to return for a moment to a very early exhibit. If you will return to your book, [C/CATF] No. 1 that is a November 7, 1984, memorandum from Oliver North to Robert C. McFarlane. "The second page of that memorandum, near the bottom of the page, it says, 'I asked [redacted] if he was aware of the source of the resistance funding. He told me, no, that CIA had been trying to determine this,' et cetera. "You see that statement? ". . . . "[C/CATF.] Yes, I see it. I was on page 3. "Mr. McClure. Do you recognize that this is not your memorandum, it is that of Mr. North? Do you recall Colonel North asking you if you were aware of the source of the resistance funding? "[C/CATF.] No, but I believe this is a good point in time for me to put something on the record that is not on the record. The reason it is not on the record is frankly, the first three times I testified to the Senate, to the Tower Commission, and after that, to -- I don't remember, a couple of other times, I forgot it. Then I remembered it and I just didn't put it on the record. I'm going to do it today. "At some point in November of '86 [sic], I	

don't remember the time, I would have put it later than this, there were a series of events, and I don't recall them -- I was trying to figure out what was happening, and I began to wonder whether or not Oliver North were not involved in something. I took it to my supervisor, my supervisor took it to Clair George, he took it to Director Casey, Director Casey convened a meeting between Clair George, the division chief and myself and Oliver North, and confronted him. He said, 'Ollie, are you operating in Central America?' And Ollie said, 'No, I'm not operating in Central America.'

"I was obliged to kind of lay out my concerns. Ollie backed out of the meeting. It was about 10 minutes. It was a terribly sort of awkward meeting. We left that meeting. Ollie went his way, I went back and Clair George and I sort of talked about it a minute and that is where I, along with Clair, decided that we were going to stay within the bounds of the law, how we would handle the problem if it was a problem, and it might have been this time or precipitated this memo. That was the first time that I really began to understand this.

"That has never been put on the record anywhere before today that I know of. I forgot the thing and didn't put it on the record in my deposition because it didn't come out and it didn't fit into the conversation at that time, but it does now. I want it on the record. I think it begins to set some of the backdrop as I develop the nutcracker that I was in.

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		"Mr. McClure. The second part of that sentence after he told me no, it says that 'CIA had been trying to determine this.' Do you know of any other efforts other than the one you referred to? "[C/CATF.] We were trying to figure out what was happening. We were trying to find out [redacted] what was going on. We were doing calculations. We were then fully collecting intelligence because one of the key intelligence questions confronting the Central American task force was, can the resistance survive and how long. Our projections were that there was no money and they were going to fall apart and they weren't[.] So we were looking at it wondering where the money was coming from. "[Redacted.]" (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 183-86; C/CATF Ex. 1 [= JHICI Ex. 31; North memo to McFarlane, "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom," 11/7/84]. See C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 195-99 [C/CATF further testimony on being in the nutcracker].)	
84/11/15-000 MID-NOVEMBER 1984		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES OWEN ACCOUNT: Robert Owen meets with North in preparation for his next trip (probably Owen's 4th) to Central America. North gives Owen "some photographs and some maps" which he has acquired "from across the river" -- from the Pentagon or Langley. "[T]here was the potential that an operation [to destroy Sandinista military equipment] would be mounted, that this information and intelligence would be	

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		most important for it to succeed." After the maps are received (Owen believes this is the timing) by Calero in Central America, it is decided that the mission would be too risky and would not be undertaken. Owen conveys to Calero "what Colonel North's thoughts were and also what he thought the possibilities of success were." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 222-25.)	
84/11/15-100 BETWEEN 1984 AND 1986		NORTH'S AND OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PASSING INTELLIGENCE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you believe that you were complying with Boland when you took intelligence from the CIA and passed it to the contras through Robert Owen? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. And the intelligence that I passed myself personally, and it wasn't all from the CIA, much of it came from the Department of Defense. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you understand at the time that the CIA and the Department of Defense couldn't pass that intelligence directly? "Mr. NORTH. Exactly. "Mr. LIMAN. And you believed that it was compliance with Boland, that it was fulfilling the purposes of Boland for you to take the intelligence from the CIA or the Department of Defense and pass it to the contras? That is what you are saying? "Mr. NORTH. I am not saying that it was fulfilling the purposes of Boland. I am saying it was working around the problem that Boland would	

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		have created in trying to comply with Boland that allowed me to do that. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, another word for working around, for people who have had some Latin, is circumvent. Are you saying that you thought you found a legal way of circumventing Boland or that you found a way of complying with Boland? "Mr. NORTH. I think we found a legal way of complying with Boland?" (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 215-16. See id., 7/13/87, at 224-25 [information came "both from the CIA and the Department of Defense"].)	
84/11/15-140 SOMETIME IN 1984-86		NORTH'S AND OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: McFARLANE'S KNOWLEDGE OF INTELLIGENCE PASSING NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. Okay, Now, you testified that you kept your superiors advised of your actions. "Did Mr. McFarlane know that Robert Owen was taking, at your request, militarily significant material to the contras? "Mr. NORTH. I do not know that I ever told Mr. McFarlane or Admiral Poindexter that it was Robert Owen who was serving in that capacity. "I did apprise my superiors of intelligence that I was having passed to the resistance." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 125.)	
84/11/15-160 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PASSING INTELLIGENCE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. Colonel North testified that you authorized him in 1985 to pass military intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency	

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		and the Department of Defense to the contras. "Do you recall doing so? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, but I do recall the change in law which made possible the passing of intelligence in 1985. "Mr. FOLEY. During the period when it was prohibited for the CIA to pass intelligence to the contras, do you ever recall suggesting that Colonel North could pass such information after obtaining it from the Central Intelligence Agency, thus diverting from the or circumventing the restrictions of the law? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't recall any such authority [sic]." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 249-50.)	
84/11/15-170 1985-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PASSING INTELLIGENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: Adm. Poindexter testified on his knowledge of North's passing intelligence to the Contras starting in 1985: "Mr. BOREN. . . . Admiral Poindexter, there was a period of time that the CIA was prohibited from sharing intelligence with the contras, and Colonel North has testified that during that period of time, it was his practice to request certain intelligence from the CIA for the National Security Council; and then pass on that intelligence to the contras, usually without informing CIA that he was doing this; in other words, he was keeping the CIA in a position of thinking they were furnishing it only to the National Security Council with a few exceptions to	

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		that, a few individual exceptions. "Did you know that this was going on? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I recall it first coming up in probably 1985 sometime. Frankly, many of us felt that the CIA probably could under the Boland amendment provide some intelligence, especially if it was intelligence that involved a direct threat to the contra forces; but we didn't push the point and I was aware that Colonel North was passing intelligence unbeknownst to many at the CIA to the contras. "Mr. BOREN. So this was with your approval and authorization? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is right. Although initially Colonel North's actions would have been under Mr. McFarlane's time." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 122-23.)	
84/11/20-100 NOVEMBER 20 - DECEMBER 11, 1984			GHOBANIFAR PROPOSES HOSTAGE RELEASE SHACKLEY ACCOUNT: At the suggestion of Manucher Hashemi (former head of the SAVAK Counterespionage Department VIII), Theodore Shackley (a former CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations) travels to Hamburg, West Germany where he meets with a group of Iranians, including Ghorbanifar. Shackley, now with the "risk management" firm of Research Associates, Inc., meets with Ghorbanifar on November 20, who suggests that for a price he could arrange for the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon through his Iranian contacts. Ghorbanifar says he requires a response on the "ransom deal" by December 7.

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			On returning to the United States, Shackley sends a memorandum about his meeting with Ghorbanifar to State Department officials, who label the hostage ransom proposal a "scam." On December 11, 1984, Shackley is told that the State Department is not interested in pursuing the Ghorbanifar proposal. (Report on American Hostages in Lebanon, 12/22/84 [Committee Documents N 7451 through 7456; reprinted in Iran-Contra Report, Appendix A, Vol. 1, at 955-59]; Shackley Int., 2/27/87, at 5-7; Iran-Contra Report, at 164. See generally Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 41-44 [Ledeen's relationship and contact with Ted Shackley].)
84/11/23-100 NOVEMBER 23, 1984		NSC CONTRA ACTIVITIES POINDEXTER PROF: Poindexter PROF to McFarlane, titled "A Proposal for Resolving Inter-agency Conflict": ". . . . "Central America. Continue active negotiations but agree on no treaty and agree to work out some way to support the Contras either directly or indirectly. Withhold true objectives from staffs." (JHICI Ex. JMP 4 [all other portions of PROF are redacted].)	
84/11/23-150 NOVEMBER 23, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ISOLATING THE NSC STAFF, AND CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY OBJECTIVES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, did you also want to	

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		keep what your plans and operations were relating to the contra[s] secret from people in the NSC and in the White House? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Exhibit [JMP] 4 is . . . an excerpt copy of a memorandum you wrote to Mr. McFarlane, am I correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. If you look--we have blacked out most of it because there were personal observations. There is a section on Central America, and it says there, as one of your recommendations, 'continue active negotiations, but agree on no treaty and agree to work out some way to support the contras either directly or indirectly, withhold true objectives from staffs.' "Now, why was it that you wanted to withhold what your true objectives were from your staffs? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, it is a little hard for me now--it is almost three years hence--to recall exactly what I had in mind, but just based on my general feelings on the subject, what I probably meant was that we had to make an effort to get a treaty. But my personal view, and that is what these are, my personal views to Mr. McFarlane, was that a treaty was very dangerous because I did not personally believe that even if the Sandinistas agreed to a treaty that they would ever live up to it. "Mr. LIMAN. But the official policy being told to the Congress and the American people was that we were trying to get a treaty, correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Correct. And indeed, we	

were, and I am not saying that anybody else agreed with me on these points.

"Mr. LIMAN. But your personal view was that a treaty wouldn't be effective, correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And, therefore, . . . your personal recommendations to Mr. McFarlane [were] that you should continue the active negotiations, but agree on no treaty and agree to work out some way to support the contras but not tell the staff?

"Mr. BECKLER. . . . A clearer reading of it is there were lots of thoughts on lots of different ideas at a point in time where there seemed to be a little time to have some sort of change between two individuals.

"I think that would be a fairer characterization; right, Mr. Liman?

"Mr. LIMAN. I accept your characterization.

"It was ideas you were expressing to your colleague?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right. Musings I would call them.

"Mr. LIMAN. And they were ideas that you had at that moment?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [T]his was a memorandum that you kept because it was something that you were proud of.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 194-95; JHICI Ex. JMP 4 [Poindexter PROF to McFarlane, "A Proposal for Resolving Inter-agency Conflict," 11/23/84].)

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84/11/28-100 NOVEMBER 28, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 4 SIGUR ACCOUNT: North asks Sigur to introduce him to a representative of Country 4. North says he wants "to talk to him generally about the situation in Central America and the contras." Sigur sets up a luncheon meeting at the Cosmos Club in Washington. Sigur attends the lunch on Nov. 28, 1984, but does not take part in the conversation. (Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 125-27. See also Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 216-17 [Poindexter on Sigur and third-country funding for the Contras, generally].) Memo from North to McFarlane, dated Dec. 4, 1984: Memo (quoted at 84/12/04-001 through -003) records the discussion at the luncheon among the Country 4 representative, North and Sigur. Sigur testified he did not recall any discussion about Canadian arms transactions at the lunch. (JHICI Ex. GJS 1 [= Ex. 32]; Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 128. For text of memo, see 84/12/04-001 through -003.)	
84/11/28-140 AFTER OCTOBER 1984		SOLICITATIONS OF COUNTRY 4 BY THE NSC STAFF: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, when were you first informed that country number 4 had been solicited by the NSC staff to provide lethal	

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		assistance to the contras in 1984? "Secretary SHULTZ. I--these things have all emerged during the hearings. That is when I learned of them." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 9.)	
84/11/28-200 NOVEMBER 28, 1984		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION OF COUNTRIES 3 AND 5 SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Singlaub meets with officials from Countries 3 and 5 at their embassies in Washington, D.C. He tells them that, "as a private citizen, I [sc. Singlaub] had certain flexibility that the governemnt officials did not have in view of the fact that the Boland amendment had been passed. . . . I was specific in stating that [the Freedom Fighters] needed bullets and guns." He stresses particularly his concern "about the air defense situation." The officials, in turn, are "concern[ed] that they did not want to irritate the Congress by openly defying the Boland amendment." After his meeting with those officials, Singlaub reports his coversations to North on November 28, 1984, and tells him of his request for funds for military assistance for the Contras. He tells North of the countries' interest and that they will transmit Singlaub's request on to their governments. Singlaub tells North he will travel to Countries 3 and 5 in January 1985 to follow up. North "concurred in that suggestion, and gave it his blessing." North states the plan "certainly	

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		. . . appeared to be in keeping with the overall policy of the Administration to provide help to the" Contras, and asks Singlaub to brief him when he returns. North also discusses with Singlaub using a third country to conduct operations inside Nicaragua and mentions that he has hired a British agent ("a former member of the SAS") for that purpose. Singlaub recommends that the program "be approved and be expedited." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 190-93; id., 5/21/87, at 160-63; JHICI Ex. JKS 8 [North memo to McFarlane dated 12/4/84 recounting Singlaub's points about his visit and information on David Walker, a former SAS agent; also providing date of 11/28/84]. See Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 200-01, 205 [naming Col. Walker as the SAS member and describing an operation "to infiltrate a team of non-U.S. personnel into the vicinity of the airfield at Managua with a view of destroying the HIND D helicopters that were known to be located there"].)	
84/11/28-250 LATE NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER 1984		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION OF COUNTRY 3 NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified with regard, generally, to Singlaub's meeting with Country 3 officials: "I get the sense that somehow or other, we have tried to create the impression that Oliver North picked up his hat and wandered around Washington and foreign capitals begging for money. I didn't do that. I didn't have to do it.	

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		"Others were more willing to put up the money than the Congress, because they saw well what was happening to us in Central America and the devasting consequences of a contra wipeout and an American walkaway and write-off to what was going to happen to this country and to democracy elsewhere in the world. "I didn't have to wander around and beg. There were other countries in the world and other people in this country who were more willing to help the Nicaraguan resistance survive and cause democracy to prosper in Central America than this body here, and that is an important factor in all of what you do, counsel, and in what this committee is going to do. It has got to be part of your assessment as to why is it that other countries in the world were willing to step up and help in a desperate cause when we were not willing to do so ourselves? "That has got to be something that is debated not just by pulling people before this group and hammering at them and haranguing them and reducing it to pettiness. It has got to be something that the American people come to understand how desperately important it was, not just to us, not just to Ollie North, and not just to President Ronald Reagan. It was important to these other people who put forth that money, and I didn't beg them. They offered. "And that is important, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 203-04.)	
84/12/00-000		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES	

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SOMETIME IN DECEMBER 1984		SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord records in a memo to himself "that the President was informed of my participation in the contra and later in the Iranian operations." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 137.)	
84/12/00-700 DECEMBER 1984 OR JANUARY 1985	LEDEEN AT THE NSC LEDEEN ACCOUNT: Michael Ledeen becomes a consultant to the National Security Council. He leaves that job in December 1986. (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 5-6. See 83/00/00-200 [McFarlane gives a date in 1983].)		
84/12/00-701 FROM DECEMBER 1984 OR JANUARY 1985			U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAN LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . [A]s of January 1st, 1985, you became a consultant roughly at that time to the National Security Council. In your view was a reassessment of United States policy toward Iran . . . desirable? "A. I didn't believe we had a policy toward Iran, so there was nothing to reassess. We were doing nothing. We had no initiatives, no programs underway. We had not defined strategic objectives so far as I can tell. So there was nothing to reassess. When I discussed with McFarlane my notion that it was desirable to look for something to do to Khamenei [sic] before he died, he said we don't know enough about Iran to know if any such thing can be done. "I agreed with that. Level of knowledge was so poor that it was impossible to justify any

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			particular policy." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 144-45.)
84/12/02-100 DECEMBER 2, 1984		DAVID WALKER IN NICARAGUA CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Stokes. Let me refer you to another exhibit. DRC-28. This is also from Colonel North's notes. This one is dated December 2nd, 1984. It contains a reference to [redacted] who it notes is your Deputy, and says: 'Re: KMS' -- which is Mr. David Walker's firm. It goes on to say, 'active in [redacted] then Saladin,' which is another Walker firm. Are you familiar with these Walker firms? "Mr. Clarridge. No. The only light I can shed on this, from time to time Colonel North would call me about what I knew about -- I think it was partiuclarly some firms operating out of the Channel Islands. And I don't know whether this is the same group or not. And did I know anything about them as far as their reliability was concerned and that kind of thing. I suspect that that is what this refers to if indeed they are one of those British -- I don't know what you call them, mercenary companies, but they do training and that kind of thing. "Mr. Stokes. Now in this specific exhibit, is this as much light as you can shed on it for us? Mr. Clarridge. Yes." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 113. See 84/12/27-100 [Clarridge testifying further on David Walker].)	

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84/12/04-001 DECEMBER 4, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MEETING WITH A THIRD-COUNTRY OFFICIAL AND SIGUR NORTH MEMO, Part 1: North writes in a memo to McFarlane, titled "Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance": "In accord with prior understanding, I met on Wednesday, November 28, with [redacted], Defense Attache, Embassy of the [redacted.] Gaston Sigur arranged the luncheon meeting at the Cosmos Club and was present throughout. "As agreed, I explained to [redacted] our purpose in the meeting was to clarify questions which had been raised in Canada regarding an arms transaction destined [redacted.] I explained that an intermediary had advised that [redacted] apparently made a decision not to proceed with the Canadian-originated arms sale. This offer of purchase included 10 SA-7 missile launchers [redacted], 30 missiles, 1 training unit, and 10 tracking units. "[Redacted] professed to be unaware of the Canadian transaction. I advised him that the purchase was not really intended for use by [redacted] but rather for the Nicaraguan Resistance Forces. Further, the intermediary had indicated that the problem appeared to be the number [redacted] military officers who are graduates of the [redacted]. As a consequence of the apparent reluctance to proceed with the sale showing [redacted] end user certificate, the Canadian arms dealer is preparing to re-initiate discussions for a similar delivery [redacted] was	

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		advised that the FDN would prefer to have the delivery as soon as possible, since the Soviet HIND-D helicopters were being assembled as we spoke. "[Redacted] was further advised that Adolfo Calero, the Head of the FDN, was willing to commit to a recognition [redacted] once the Resistance Forces had succeed. [Redacted] indicated that he understood the message and would confer with the [redacted.] He observed, for the record, that [redacted] refused to become involved, in any way, in the internal affairs of another country. I indicated that we fully appreciated this position and noted that it was too bad that the Soviets, Bulgarians, and East Germans involved in Nicaragua did not feel the same way." (JHICI Ex. 32 [= Ex. GJS 1]. For Sigur account of the meeting, see 84/11/28-100. Text of North memo continues in next 2 entries.)	
84/12/04-002 DECEMBER 4, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MEETING WITH SINGLAUB NORTH MEMO, Part 2: [Text of memo continues from preceding entry:] "Later that afternoon, MGEN Jack Singlaub (U.S. Army, Retired) visited to advise of two meetings he had held early in the day regarding support for the Resistance. Singlaub passed on the following points: "Meeting with [Redacted] "--The FDN is in urgent need of anti-aircraft weapons and other crew-served weapons ammunition (particularly 60 and 81mm mortar rounds). Units	

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		in the field are also in need of large quantities of boots and clothing since the number of ralliers had exceeded expectations by 2,000. "--The Resistance Forces are also in urgent need of expertise in maritime operations. "--The USG is unaware of the Singlaub mission and he is making this request based on his long friendship [redacted.] Because of the law restricting USG involvement, no USG official can solicit on behalf the Resistance Forces. "--If [redacted] like to help, Singlaub can arrange a meeting with Adolfo Calero. If it is necessary for a USG official to verify Calero's bona fides, this can be arranged. "Meeting with [Redacted] "--By agreement with Calero, Singlaub advised [redacted] since [redacted] had turned down the earlier FDN request for assistance [redacted] the Resistance movement had approached [redacted.] "--The Resistance still is in need of financial support, munitions, and training assistance. "--[Redacted] this was a 'considerably different situation' than that which he had been aware of earlier. While not committing to support, he noted to Singlaub that this new information might make a difference [redacted.] "[Redacted.]" (JHICI Ex. 32 [= Ex. GJS 1]. Text of North memo continues in next entry.)	
84/12/04-003 DECEMBER 4,		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MEETING WITH DAVID WALKER	

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1984		NORTH MEMO, Part 3: [Text of memo continues from preceding entry:] "This weekend, at the request of Sec. John Lehman, I met with Mr. David Walker, a former British SAS officer who now heads two companies (KMS and SALADIN) which provide professional security services to foreign governments. Walker had been approached several months ago, prior to initiating the current financial arrangement for the FDN. In addition to the security services provided by KMS, this offshore (Jersey Islands) company also has professional military 'trainers' available. Walker suggested that he would be interested in establishing an arrangement with the FDN for certain special operations expertise aimed particularly at destroying HIND helicopters. Walker quite accurately points out that the helicopters are more easily destroyed on the ground than in the air. [Redacted.] Unless otherwise directed, Walker will be introduced to Calero and efforts will be made to defray the cost of Walker's operations from other than Calero's limited assets. "[Redacted.]" (JHICI Ex. 32 [= Ex. GJS 1].)	
84/12/04-005 DECEMBER 4, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES MCFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, I would like to take you through some of these other written reports that you received from Colonel North. Do you recall, and this is Exhibit 32, receiving a report from Colonel North that there was a hitch in the	

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		delivery of arms from one unnamed country? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I do. "Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall that Colonel North told you that the problem was that the exporting country thought that the arms were going to the country that had provided the end user certificates and didn't realize that the arms were going to the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And that Colonel North had straightened them out and told them that the arms were going to the contras, correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And he urged them therefore to complete the delivery. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And he indeed even told the representative of this country that if he did so, they might get recognition from the contras if the contras became a state? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you consider--this was on December 4, 1984, after the Boland amendment was adopted--did you consider this kind of activity by Colonel North in assisting the contras to get weapons that they had paid for or contracted for to be consistent with the Boland amendment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, at the time, if I got this, I expect that I received this memorandum out in California in December. It was the President's habit to go to the West Coast, and it was something after the date on the paper here.	

"But normally, what I did when I had a report of something that seemed to be, if not over the line of question, I would ask Admiral Poindexter to find out what is going on. I don't have any concrete recollection of how this one was resolved.

"Mr. LIMAN. This one, if you look at the cover page, has a[n] 'M' on the routing slip?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. I don't dispute having seen it.

"I don't recall precisely how it was resolved, but I believe my habit was whenever this, and one or two other memos of the same questioning in my mind came up, I would ask the Admiral to find out from Colonel North what had happened and how his actions squared with the law.

"Mr. LIMAN. My question[] isn't clear.

"I know this is--that we are talking about an event that is two and half years ago[.]

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Right.

"Mr. LIMAN. And a lot has happened since then, and there have been a lot of investigations and a lot of debate. I am asking you if you can put yourself back in December of 1984, and tell me whether at that time you consider[ed] this kind of activity, which Colonel North was reporting to you on, to be consistent with the restrictions that have been imposed by the Boland amendment?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, on the surface reading of it, it looks not to be inconformity [sic (in conformity?)], because I wanted to know precisely what had happened. I believe that I asked the Admiral to find out what had happened."

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		(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 67-69; JHICI Ex. 32 [North memo to McFarlane, "Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance, " 12/4/84]. See 85/08/16-201 [North's 12/4/84 memo and Congressional inquiries about North in 8/85].)	
84/12/04-006 DECEMBER 4, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever admonish North during this period for his efforts to help the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, yes. The discussion of what they were doing, what he was doing, and so forth, my guidance to other staff members were [sic] fairly frequent at this time. And I think perhaps we will get to it in other memoranda, that the awareness that was I was very concerned about staying within the lines as reflected in the fact that Colonel North's memo add a kind of preemptive explanation of why, what he was doing was within the law in other memos. [Sic.] "Mr. LIMAN. Mr. McFarlane, you undertand that Oliver North had a deep commitment to the contra cause; am I correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. [T]his was something that was not just an assignment for him, it was something in which he had a conviction? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And he had a conviction w[hic]h was a conviction shared by the President, by you, and by the administration?	

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		"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And he was also a person who brought enormous energy to what he was doing? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, he did. "Mr. LIMAN. And is it fair to say he was also a person who was difficult to control when he was in pursuit of an objective? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I think Colonel North always responded to firm guidance when it was given. "Mr. LIMAN. Was he a person who ran with the ball? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, he was. He was a very solid, determined, energetic, devoted officer. "Mr. LIMAN. Is there question, Mr. McFarlane, as to whether in giving him this task you gave it to a person who would run with the ball very, very far? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I thought surely that Ollie was probably the mission-oriented, can-do professional on the staff, and I believe that the interpretation of guidance I had given to him would probably be certainly carried out but that probably he would on occasion go beyond, and I could foresee that. "I think any professional as competent as Colonel North, when he went down to make a visit to the contras and was in the locale of their camps or something, and would observe how they were getting on in organizing themselves, and undoubtedly from time to time say, well, your truck part is vulnerable or you are not very well camouflaged, or this or that, the kind of thing	

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		that is almost an instinctive thing for a professional to do. [Sic.] "And quite honestly, because the comments of one single officer, resident in Washington most of the time, isn't going to have that dramatic affect on the outcome of the conflict. [Sic.] "I didn't think the Congress was talking about that kind of thing. I still don't." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 70-72; JHICI Ex. 32 [North memo to McFarlane, "Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 12/4/84]. See McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 83-84 [North's 12/4/84 memo].)	
84/12/04-007 DECEMBER 4, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES LIMAN CLARIFICATION: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . I have also been asked, because of the censorship in the declassification, to go over Exhibit 32 again, if you would take it out, Mr. McFarlane, and to review its import. "As you recall, that is the memorandum of December 4, 1984, that Colonel North sent to you when there was difficulty with a foreign country's willingness to ship arms that it thought w[ere] going to one Central American country, but w[ere] destined for the contras and you talked about it. "If you would look at it, North writes, 'As agreed, I explained to--' the foreign emissary, I will be adding the concept-- 'our purpose in the meeting was to clarify questions which had been raised in Canada regarding an arms transaction destined--' for a Central American country. "'I explained that an intermediary had advised	

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		that--' the country represented the emmisary-- 'apparently made the [original document reads "a," not "the"] decision not to proceed with the Canadian-originated arms sale.' "Then it describes what was in the arms sale. "It goes on to say the emmisary-- 'professed to be unaware of the Canadian transaction. I advised him that the approach [original document reads "purchase," not "approach"] was not really intended for use by--' this Central American country 'but rather for the Nicaraguan [R]esistance [F]orces. Further, the intermediary had indicated that the problem appeared to be the number--' of the Central American countries-- 'military officers who are graduates of the--' a certain military academy. "'As a consequence of the apparent reluctance of proceed with the sale showing--' the Central American country-- 'end-user certificate, the Canadian arms dealer is preparing to reinitiate discussions for a similar delivery--' via another country. "That is, in substance, what the document says, adding substitutes for what was deleted." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 78-80; JHICI Ex. 32 [North memo to McFarlane, "Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 12/4/84].)	
84/12/04-008 DECEMBER 4, 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Then there is another document on the numbered list [of problem memos; see 85/08/16-200 through -204], which is document	

numbered 401214. And it is Exhibit No. 32.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. NIELDS. And this document, again you testified about it yesterday--it comes in at least three parts. The first part, I think you said yesterday, reflects that North interceded with a third country in order to facilitate a shipment of arms to the contras.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And then the second page of the document makes reference to reports received from General Singlaub, or that he had given North, relating to his contacts with two other countries?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then the last page of the document reads as follows: 'This weekend, at the request of Secretary John Lehman, I met with David Walker, a former British SAS officer who now heads two companies, KMS and SALADIN, which provide professional security services to foreign governments. Walker had been approached several months ago prior to initiating the current financial arrangement for the FDN. In addition to the security services provided by KMS, this offshore (Jersey Islands) company also has professional military "trainers" available. Walker suggested that he would be interested in establishing an arrangement with the FDN for certain special operations expertise aimed particularly at destroying HIND helicopters. Walker quite accurately points out that the helicopters are more easily destroyed on the ground than in the air.

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		"'Unless otherwise directed, Walker will be introduced to Calero and efforts will be made to defray the cost of operations from other than Calero's limited assets.' "I have just read you a page from a document that North sent to you in December of 1984, and which you reviewed again in the late summer of 1985, and you marked as a problematic document. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 83-84; JHICI Exx. 32 [North memo to McFarlane, "Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 12/4/84], 40 [McFarlane's list of 6 problem memos].)	
84/12/04-010 AFTER OCTOBER 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MISSILES FROM COUNTRY 4 NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on his attempts to get Country 4 to aid the Contras: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you ever meet with officials of any other country for the purpose of discussing contributions to the contras? "Mr. NORTH. Oh, sure. Not just financial contributions. I mean, I met with the . . . person from Country Four to get surface-to-air missiles, and I did that with the full knowledge of the FBI and the National Security Adviser. "One of the things that kind of bothers me is that this wasn't all done as some terrible, nefarious thing; it was done as part of a covert operation. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Was that a meeting at which you	

were requesting a contribution of surface-to-air missiles or were you seeking to facilitate the transportation of surface-to-air missiles that had been purchased by somebody else?

"Mr. NORTH. I was actually seeking to facilitate the transportation, but I was hoping I could turn it enough [so that] they would like to make the contribution. I will admit that.

"Mr. NIELDS. So you discussed the possibility of a contribution with representatives of Country Four?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, when I say contribution, I'm speaking specifically of surface-to-air missiles, which at that point in time the resistance was being devastated by the Soviet-supplied, Cuban-flown Hind helicopters, and we were looking desperately for surface-to-air missiles that could be provided to the democratic resistance, and that country makes the kind that is useful for that purpose.

"Would you repeat the question, counsel?

"Mr. NIELDS. Yes. Did you ask representatives of Country Four at that time to contribute SA-7s?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't believe I actually, baldly asked them to contribute. I had a--if I can just back up on that whole thing just for a second.

"That particular place was a good source for these weapons. We were concerned, I was concerned, I went to Admiral Poindexter and told him my concerns about the meeting. We knew that that was a good source for those weapons. I was concerned about the meeting because I did not want anyone in our intelligence services or others to misunderstand the purpose of the meeting, and so what I did is, I asked Admiral Poindexter, and I believe Mr. McFarlane, too, to please make sure that the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI was [sic] aware that the meeting was going to take place, and I believe that they did so, for obvious reasons, and I think that's without saying more.

"Mr. NIELDS. My question is a very simple one. Did you ask for Country Four to make a contribution of--

"Mr. NORTH. Not in so many words. We had a long philosophical discussion over lunch about Soviet hegemony, the kinds of things I thought would be attractive and of concern to him. He shared my concerns. I made him aware there was a purchase under way, these things were desperately needed, and he then facilitated that. He didn't make a contribution.

"Mr. NIELDS. He never made a contribution?

"Mr. NORTH. Not that I'm aware of.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you have any other meetings with representatives of Country Four in which you sought a contribution?

"Mr. NORTH. Not that I recall, no.
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 218-20.)

84/12/04-011
AFTER OCTOBER
1984

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: INTERCEDING OTHER COUNTRIES FOR CONTRA AID

NORTH ACCOUNT:

North elaborated on his dealings with Country

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		4: "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that you have already testified to this, that you on one occasion interceded with country 4-- "Mr. NORTH. I have to have the list again. "Mr. NIELDS. --to facilitate a delivery of arms to the contras? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it-- "Mr. NORTH. Among others. I am willing to-- "Mr. NIELDS. Among other countries with whom you interceded in a similar way, I take it, is what you are saying? "Mr. NORTH. Exactly." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 145-46.)	
84/12/04-100 DECEMBER 4, 1984 AND NOVEMBER 21, 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS: CONTRA AID BELNICK SUMMARY: Mark Belnick, a Senate counsel, during Fawn Hall's testimony identified Ex. GJS 1 as one of the memos targeted as problematic by Robert McFarlane on the handwritten list of such memos that he gave to North [on the list, see 86/11/21-615]: "At the time the original System 4 documents were requested back in 1986 from the [White House] security officer, he could not locate a 1985 document that contained 401214 as the system number. He believed those documents had been destroyed and he so advised on his note. "Subsequently, during the course of this investigation, Mr. Chairman, a document bearing that number was located in the files of the NSC	

except it was a 1984 memorandum. When the documents had been requested, the security officer did not look in the 1984 files. That document is a December 4, 1984, memo from Colonel North to Mr. McFarlane which has been previously marked in this hearing as Gaston Sigur exhibit 1, and it is the memo in which Colonel North recounts a meeting at the Cosmos Club with a military representative of country number four.

"That accounts for all the documents, Ms. Hall, that were listed on McFarlane's handwritten note."

(Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 278; JHICI Ex. GJS 1 [North memo to McFarlane, "Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 12/4/84]; FH 1 [McFarlane's handwritten list of 6 System IV documents]. For Hall testimony on the documents listed by McFarlane on Ex. FH 1, see below at 86/11/21-615 and -616. For Hall testimony on the individual altered documents, see also 85/02/06-310 and -311; 85/03/05-215 and -216; 85/03/16-100; 85/04/11-230; and 85/05/31-100. See Iran-Contra Report, at 124 [12/4/84 memo], 123-26 [altered documents].)

84/12/04-250
1984-86

THIRD-COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONTRAS
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"MR. LIMAN: Would you mark as the next exhibit [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 23] a memorandum dated December 4, 1984, with a routing slip which shows your name on it.

". . . .

"Q. When you spoke of assistance from

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		[redacted] this what you were referring to? "A. That's correct. "Q. You weren't referring to anyone asking [redacted] to give its money to the contras, were you? "A. I don't honestly know what General Singlaub said to [redacted] I was never under the impression that they were willing to provide funds. I recognize there was a possibility of their selling arms. "Q. While we are on that subject, then, let me just go over country by country what you understood their contribution, if anything, was to the contras during this period when you were wrestling with Boland. "Israel? "A. Israel was considered several times and from the beginning, when Mr. McFarlane was still there, but we were frankly a little reluctant. It was the same sort of reasoning that the Vice President was concerned in that we frankly didn't need any more leverage from the Israelis on us. So -- "Q. Do you know whether you ever sent Teicher there to hit them up? "A. I don't think I am aware of that. Mr. McFarlane may have. He was -- he also was, Mr. McFarlane, you know, was initially very concerned about leaks and that's -- he handled [redacted] thing, although he did tell me about that at some point afterwards. "Q. He told you about the $25 million contribution from [redacted,] am I correct?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"A. Right. "Q. He did not tell you in the summer of 1984 that [redacted] were giving a million dollars a month or 7 million for the balance of '84? "A. Well, the 25 million -- my best recollection was being delivered over a period of time. It wasn't just one lump sum. "Q. Do you associate the $25 million with [redacted?] "A. Since November of '86, I have not associated it. It may have -- "Q. You talked about [reacted.] You talked about Israel. "A. I want to come back to Israel. That's related to your question earlier [redacted.] I thought that's what you were going to get off on at that point. "[Redacted.]" (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 214-16; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 23 [= JHICI Ex. 32; North memo to McFarlane, "Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 12/4/84].)	
84/12/21-200 DECEMBER 21, 1984		NORTH-RODRIGUEZ CONTACT RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Felix Rodriguez first meets Oliver North at the suggestion of Rodriguez' friend, Bill Boley, an Under Secretary of State for Science and Technology. At the time, Rodriguez is planning to go to a Central American country to implement a helicopter project he had devised in Vietnam. Rodriguez meets with Donald Gregg, then with North. He brings North "an album that I [sc.	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Rodriguez] had from my past experience sort of to show him my capabilities in that field, expecting that he could help me. Also, I would turn to any help that I could anywhere to be able to go and try my concept in Central America." "Mr. BARBADORO. Did he [North] appear to support you in your efforts in trying to go to this Central American country? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. In general terms, I would say he was very positive about it." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 223-24; id., 5/28/87, at 116-17 [naming Bill Boley]. See id., 5/27/87, at 220 [Rodriguez describing the helicopter concept: "First of all, intelligence was very important. It was very accurate, provided by the agency. We then ran a small Hughes-500 helicopter at tree-top level with a covering of two gunships and, of course, a good communication. The sooner we had an eyeball to eyeball contact with the enemy and took some fire, we were able to lob hand grenades and get immediate action from the gunships."].)	
84/12/21-210 DECEMBER 21, 1984		GREGG-RODRIGUEZ CONTACT GREGG ACCOUNT: Felix Rodriguez meets with Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser for the Vice President. Rodriguez "expresse[s] an interest in going down and helping El Salvador deal with the insurgency problem, which he [feels is] very similar to that . . . encountered in Vietnam." Gregg testified about the meeting: "Q. Did [Rodriguez] talk with you about the	

contras at all?

"A. No.

"Q. Did he say he had any interest in helping out with that operation?

"A. No.

"Q. You introduced him to various people in pursuit of his interest in helping out in El Salvador?

"A. That's right.

"Q. And one of those was General Gorman?

"A. No. I didn't know General Gorman well. I think it was through the introductions that I made to him, which were Tony Motley, Nest[o]r Sanchez, and others, that he got to Gorman. But Felix subsequently told me that he met with Gorman. Gorman was very impressed with him, and I arranged to have him flown down to El Salvador to talk directly with people there.

". . . .

"Q. Did General Gorman tell you that Felix had said his primary interest was in helping the FDN?

"A. No.

"Q. Have you ever seen a document in which General Gorman reported that to Colonel Steele?

"A. I have never seen such a document."
(Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 4-6.)

84/12/21-215
DECEMBER 21,
1984

GREGG-RODRIGUEZ CONTACT
GREGG CHRONOLOGY:

Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, describes his contact with Felix Rodriguez:

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		"On December 21, 1984, Mr. Rodriguez expressed an interest in going to El Salvador and working with the El Salvador Air Force to help them in their counterinsurgency effort which Mr. Rodriguez felt was very similar to that which he had assisted in Vietnam. Subsequent to this meeting, Mr. Gregg called Ambassador Pickering, Assistant Secretary of State Motley, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Sanchez to recommend that they meet and talk with Mr. Rodriguez to assist him in going to El Salvador. Mr. Rodriguez met with these officials and also subsequently met with General Paul Gorman, Commander of the Southern Command." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for start of Gregg chronology, see above at 83/11/03-100; chronology continues at 85/01/22-200].)	
84/12/27-100 DECEMBER 27, 1984		DAVID WALKER IN NICARAGUA CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Stokes. Let me refer you to another exhibit, DRC-30. That contains the December 27th, 1984 notes of Oliver North. You will see that it says there 'Discussion with Clarridge. Activities in Central America with the Brits.' "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. I think this probably refers -- he had a couple of discussions with me about whether they could get any -- and I think it goes back to this -- these companies, the Saladin [see 85/12/02-100] or whatever that is. I'm not specifically familiar with it. He was interested in what they could do in the way of helping train the Democratic Resistance.	

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		"And as I said before, he talked to me about their reliability and all of that. He did the same thing in connection with some boats that he was interested in and whether they should use those for some particular operations. I think that was Americans involved in that particular case, and I urged him not to have Americans be involved down in Central America doing that kind of thing. "Mr. Stokes. Let me ask you this specific question. Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter have testified that David Walker was an official of both KMS and Saladin and arranged certain sabotage operations in Nicaragua funded by either Mr. Calero or by General Secord. "And that authority for these operations was required by Colonel North and given by Admiral Poindexter. So now my question to you is, were you involved in any way with this type of action? "Mr. Clarridge. No, I was not." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 113-14. See above at 85/12/02-100 [Clarridge testimony on David Walker].)	
85/01/00-010 FROM JANUARY 1985		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ARMS TRANSACTIONS GADD ACCOUNT: Beginning around January 1985, Secord asks Richard Gadd to arrange for the charter of aircraft to deliver munitions from Europe to Central America. Secord tells Gadd the munitions are to be provided in support of the Contras. Gadd arranges for the charter through Southern Air Transport, which subcontracts this and a	

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		second flight to Arrow Air. In about March 1985, and about three more times during 1986, Gadd arranges for charters of ammunition ("7.62 explosives, 40 millimeter shells, and weapons") manufactured in eastern Europe, with loads of about 85-95,000 lbs. per charter. One charter is supplied by Transamerica Arms ("or something related to that name, from Canada.") Southern Air pays Gadd a commission. Gadd passes along price and bank transfer information to Secord. (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 8-12.)	
85/01/00-020 SOMETIME IN JANUARY 1985		McFARLANE-CALERO MEETING: BUILDING UP THE CONTRAS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane meets with Adolfo Calero and tells him the Contras must (1) "produce a political leadership promoting a program with authentic appeal to the general population," and (2) "demonstrat[e] sufficient competence on the battlefield to create a sense of threat within the Sandinista Government." McFarlane expresses his "uncertain[ty] that the contras would ever acquire these capabilities." McFarlane testified, "If they could not show these two critical qualities, I thought we owed it to them and to ourselves to cut both our losses and theirs and thereby changing our strategy to a more overt combination of U.S. force and U.S. diplomacy." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 12.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
85/01/00-300 SOMETIME IN JANUARY 1985		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION OF COUNTRY 3 SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Singlaub travels to Country 3 to solicit aid for the Contras. He meets with "ministers at the ministerial level equivalent to our Secretaries of the Departments of the Executive Branch." Singlaub "emphasize[s] . . . that I [sc. Singlaub] was not a member of the U.S. Government. They knew this." He proposes three alternatives for Country 3 to contribute to the Contras: (1) ". . . I could give them a foreign bank account into which they could deposit money." But Singlaub would be unable thereafter to tell them how the money was spent. (2) Singlaub would "meet with their representative[s] at any country in the free world and receive from them an instrument which I could then deposit in an overseas account." Singlaub could thereafter give "a detailed accounting of how the money was spent." (3) Singlaub offers, alternatively, to approach a private vendor through whom Country 3 is, at that time, "buying large quantities of expensive material from the United States." Singlaub proposes that he strike "an agreement where the commission could be shared" with the Contras. Singlaub also says that "we [antecedent unspecified] would be prepared to receive from them military supplies in kind if they preferred	

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		to do that." To clarify Singlaub's relationship with the U.S. Government, he tells the officials that he "believed it would be possible for me to have someone in the Administration send a signal to them . . . [to] indicate that I was not operating entirely on my own, without the knowledge of the Administration." The Country 3 officials "expressed interest [and] indicated that they would like to small incentive [sic] by somebody in the Administration." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 193-98. See id., 5/21/87, at 163-65 [Singlaub testifies he did not think of the signal in advance, but after he went abroad he perceived that country's officials "would want to have some assurance that I was not an unguided missile ricocheting around to that part of the world." Singlaub remains unaware whether a signal was ever sent.], 185-86 [on alternative 3].)	
85/01/00-400 SOMETIME [LATER] IN JANUARY 1985		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION OF COUNTRY 5 SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Singlaub travels to Country 5, makes "essentially the same" presentation as he has just finished with Country 3, "except that in Country Five all purchases of military materiel w[ere] handled on a government-to-government basis and therefore I did not present the third option [Secord's striking an agreement with a private vendor] there." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 199; see id., at 193-98 [Secord's	

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		proposal to Country 3].)	
85/01/08-810 JANUARY 8, 1985			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: Father Lawrence Jenco, Director of Catholic Relief Services in Beirut, is kidnapped in Lebanon. (CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 1.)
85/01/10-100 JANUARY 10 AND 15, 1985		McFARLANE TRIP TO CENTRAL AMERICA: DoS VIEW DoS CHRONOLOGY: "State Department learns that MCFARLANE had arranged a trip to Central America without knowledge of GPS. GPS insists that a State Department official accompany MCFARLANE. "MCFARLANE claims to GPS that NORTH had kept MOTLEY advised of MCFARLANE's travel plans. MOTLEY denies." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 85/09/04-070.)	
85/01/15-100 JANUARY 15 AND 28, 1985		NORTH RECOMMENDS INCREASED FUNDING TO ENSURE CONTRA VICTORY NORTH MEMO: North writes in a January 15, 1985 memo to McFarlane, titled "Nicaragua Options": "[R]esources available to the resistance from sympathetic government(s) and/or individuals will permit current small-scale operations to continue for at least another 6 to 8 months. A resumption of USG funding or additional alternative resources would be essential in order to bring the scale of activity to that which existed in the Spring of 1984 and, over time, to prevent an erosion of the	

will and determination of the FDN combatants."

In a second memo on January 28, 1985, North expresses his optimism that "[w]ith adequate support the resistance could be in Managua by the end of 1985."

(Iran-Contra Report, at 46; North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaragua Options," Tab E, "The Future of the Nicaraguan Resistance," 1/15/86 [Committee Documents N 45024 through 45100, at N 45083]; North memo to Poindexter, "Nicaraguan SNIE" [referring to Tab E of the memo just cited; Committee Documents N 32823 through 32828, at N 32824].)

85/01/15-150
JANUARY 15,
1985

NORTH RECOMMENDS INCREASED FUNDING TO ENSURE CONTRA VICTORY

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. Can we make the next Exhibit, [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 24, a document addressed to Mr. McFarlane by that famous author Oliver North, dated January 15, 1985. The cover page indicates that Mr. Poindexter, Admiral Poindexter was copied on it.

". . . .

"Q. Have you looked at it? Do you recall whether you saw it?

"A. I don't recall whether I've seen it. In fact, my guess would be that I probably didn't see it, even though it says I did.

"MR. BECKLER: You didn't read it?

"THE WITNESS: I probably didn't even see it. But anyway what it is, obviously it was in a notebook. See, this was the beginning of the

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		year, I guess, after the Boland Amendment passed, and as I recall Colonel North had convinced Mr. McFarlane that he ought to make a trip down through Central America, and this was the background paper which was no doubt included in a notebook with probably other tabs. "And the chances are, because it was not really an action document, it probably, the notebook probably went directly in to Mr. McFarlane. I probably got a copy and I may or may not have read it. I don't recall reading it. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. Well, if you look at page three -- "A. Numbered three? "Q. The page numbered three, at the top Colonel North wrote: [Redacted.] 'The resistance' refers to the contras; you are aware of that, correct? "A. Right. Correct. "Q. [Redacted.] And then he refers to six basic options. [Redacted,] which he puts a [sic] parenthes[i]s, Tab F, and the first one says [redacted.] "Do you see that? "A. Yes. "Q. If the understanding at the NSC was that Boland didn't prohibit obtaining third country support, do you know why Oliver North was discussing with McFarlane obtaining new legislation to authorize as such third country support? "A. I don't know what Colonel North was thinking about when he wrote that.	

"Q. And he also, as you go down, the fourth option is [redacted.] Do you remember any discussions about the fact that the NSC should not be soliciting funds for the contras?

"A. Mr. McFarlane was very sensitive about the issue. The sensitivity, as I understood it, was that he felt the same way I did, that the more people that knew about something the more likely it was to leak out, and especially in the case of [redacted.]

"So Mr. McFarlane's sensitivity, as I understood it, was about a wholesale effort to identify third countries to provide contributions unless it was a procedure that was agreed to by all concerned.

"Q. Who is 'all concerned'?

"A. I think including the Congress. I think, you know, he recognized that Congress wouldn't like it, the opponents of the program in Congress wouldn't like it.

"Q. Well, Admiral, did you listen to McFarlane's testimony?

"A. I did.

"Q. Do you recall McFarlane testifying that he stated on more than one occasion at staff meetings of the NSC that the NSC should not solicit, coerce, encourage, or broker contributions for the contras? [See 84/10/03-200.]

"A. I don't have any recollection of that.

"Q. Well, that's his testimony.

"A. I know. I heard him testify to that.

"Q. . . . Do you recall him ever saying that

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		at the NSC staff meetings? "A. I don't recall his saying that. That doesn't mean he didn't do it. I just simply don't recall it." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 247-52; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 24 [North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaragua Options," 1/15/85].)	
85/01/18-100 JANUARY 18, 1985	NSDD 159 TEXT EXTRACT: "COVERT ACTION POLICY APPROVAL AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES "Approval Procedures for Intelligence "1. Presidential Findings. The President shall approve all covert action Findings in writing. Under Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, all covert actions undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency must be authorized by a Presidential Finding that each such operation is important to US national security. E.O. 12333 [see 81/12/04-100] and this Directive establish that covert actions (intelligence 'special activities') undertaken by components other than CIA also require a Presidential Finding. Each covert action is also considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity under section 501 of the National Security Act and is subject to certain Congressional reporting procedures. The Congressional reporting procedures for significant intelligence activities apply to all agencies of the intelligence community. Findings shall remain valid until formally cancelled.		

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	"2. In accordance with Executive Order 12333, the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct covert actions unless the President specifically designates another agency of the government. When the provision of substantial support by one government component to another is essential to the conduct of a covert action, indication of the extent and nature of that support shall be included as part of the Finding or Memorandum of Notification. However, the provision of routine support in the form of personnel, funds, equipment, supplies, transportation, training, logistics, and facilities by Government components other than CIA to support a covert action shall not in itself be considered a separate covert action by the supplying agency." (JHICI Ex. JMP 101. See 81/12/04-100 [Exec. Order 12333]. See also Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 110-12 [Poindexter on NSDD 159].)		
85/01/22-100 JANUARY 22, 1985		NSC CONTRA ACTIVITIES FORTIER PROF: Fortier PROF to McFarlane, titled "Contra Project": ". . . . "Ollie believes we need to flag the possible option of a finding permitting us to seek third country support. John and I are both uneasy about raising this. . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 5.)	
85/01/22-130 JANUARY 22,		NSC CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE ISSUE OF A FINDING FOR THIRD-COUNTRY SUPPORT	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1985		POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Do you recall, Admiral, ever discussing with McFarlane in early 1985 whether or not you needed a new Presidential Finding in order to seek third country support for the contras? "A. I can't recall that. "Q. Let's mark as the next exhibit a PROFs note from Fortier to McFarlane, copy to you, Admiral, shown right on it. ". . . . "[Q.] Do you recall receiving this PROF note? "A. No, I don't recall it. "Q. You see that it says, toward the last third of the PROF note, 'Ollie believes we need to flag the possible option of a Finding permitting us to seek third country support. John and I are both uneasy about raising this.' Do you remember ever expressing any discomfort about seeking a new Presidential Finding with respect to third country support? "A. As I said, I don't recall the memo, but that would be consistent with my view. "Q. Which was? "A. Which is that I would have been uneasy about raising that because if we raised it we wouldn't have any assurance that we could get Congressional agreement on it, and I felt that it was better, we were in a better situation where we were of being able to quietly get third country support. If we raised it, we might be told specifically not to, and that would put us in a bind. "Q. Did you discuss this point of view with	

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		someone? "A. According to this note I discussed it with at least Don Fortier. I don't have -- I mean, I know how I felt about the issue, but I don't recall any conversations about this, about it. "Q. Did you discuss this with the President of the United States? "A. I don't have any recollection of it." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 262-64; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 25 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 5; Fortier PROF to McFarlane, "Contra Project," 1/22/85].)	
85/01/22-200 JANUARY 22, 1985		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH CONTACT GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, describes a meeting of the Vice President and Gregg with Felix Rodriguez on January 22, 1985: "On January 22, 1985, Mr. Rodriguez met with the Vice President and Mr. Gregg to inform the Vice President that Mr. Rodriguez wanted to work in El Salvador against the insurgency." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for start of Gregg chronology, see above at 83/11/03-100; chronology continues at 85/02/19-200]. See 85/01/29-100.)	
85/01/22-205 JANUARY 22, 1985		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH CONTACT GREGG ACCOUNT: Asked whether he arranged the January 22, 1985 meeting between the Vice President and Felix Rodriguez to inform the Vice President that Rodriguez was going to help with the insurgency in	

El Salvador, Gregg elaborated:

"And also to introduce him. The Vice President has said up to being Vice President the job he enjoyed most had been the year that he was Director of CIA. Felix is one of the really extraordinary human beings I know, and I knew how interested the Vice President was in El Salvador because of his trip there in December 1983 where he had spoken against the use of death squads. And I wanted to introduce Felix and I wanted to help in that situation."

(Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 7.)

85/01/29-100
JANUARY 29,
1985

RODRIGUEZ-BUSH CONTACT
RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT:

Donald Gregg arranges for Felix Rodriguez to meet with Vice President Bush. As Rodriguez describes the meeting, "It was not even recorded. I was just to go in and shake hands. . . . I show him my [photo] album [of past experiences], and he was very interested in my life story."

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you tell the Vice President that you intended to go to this Central American country to assist them with your helicopter concept?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, I did, sir.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you have any discussion with the Vice President at that time about the contras?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir. None whatsoever.

"Mr. BARBADORO. How long did the meeting last?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, it took probably a

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		little bit longer than we expected, because he was actually watching a TV program with his family. Actually, our conversation was specifically showing my album. I even have an album where I have a picture taken with Che Guevera and others, and I think it was very interesting for him to see it. After that, we shook hands, and I left." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 225-26; see id., 5/27/87, at 220 [the helicopter concept], 223-24 [Rodriguez showed North his album earlier on 12/24/84]. See also 85/01/22-200, -205.)	
85/02/00-390 FEBRUARY 1985		COUNTRY 2: SECOND CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS SUMMARY: On the second contribution of Country 2 to the Contras, see Iran-Contra Report, at 45, 120-21.	
85/02/00-400 SOMETIME IN [EARLY?] FEBRUARY 1985		COUNTRY 2: SECOND CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Country 2 doubles its contribution to the Contras: McFarlane, in preparing for the visit of the head of state of Country 2, meets with his Country 2 counterpart who had initially informed McFarlane of the $1 million per month contribution. The two discuss the Contras' situation "as we would translate it to . . . country 2's leader, that one of our problems would remain, as it had been before -- the situation in Central America and funding for the contras. "Again, I don't wish to pretend or be disingenuous. There was [some (sic) or no] solicitation per se [see next entry at *], but I	

think on the list of concerns of this administration going into this visit coming up, it was apparent that this was one of them."

After the President meets with the head of state, the President summarizes what has occurred "to the Secretary of State or to me or to both of us, and he did so. In that debriefing nothing came up on this subject, but within a day or so, I was advised by the resident official of country 2 that . . . they, country 2, had elected to carry on with the contributions they had made, but to be at about double the monthly level it had been in the previous year."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 50-51 [no date specified]. See id., 5/12/87, at 4 [date early 1985], 9 [date - "February or so of 1985"], id., 5/13/87, at 100 [Sen. Inouye's question gives date as "during the Boland-2 period, March of 1985." McFarlane's response does not address date.].)

85/02/00-410
SOMETIME IN
[EARLY?]
FEBRUARY 1985

COUNTRY 2: SECOND CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS
McFARLANE ACCOUNT (cont'd):

Nota bene bis.

(1) * "[SOME (sic) or NO] SOLICITATION PER SE . . . ." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 50 [see preceding entry at *].):

On May 13, 1987, Sen. Inouye questioned McFarlane further on his description two days earlier of the second contribution of Country 2:

"Chairman INOUYE. In fact would you say that Country Two was literally forced to make this contribution?

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		"Mr. MCFARLANE. In no sense, no, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. You described this as a solicitation per se, I believe. "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, I have not. "Chairman INOUYE. In your testimony I think you used that phrase, 'soliciation per se.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. I may be in error. I thought I said it was not per se a solicitation. "Chairman INOUYE. I ask you because in your statement you made it very clear to your staff that they shall not solicit, encourage, coerce or in any way broker financial arrangements with other countries. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. And your response was solicitation was illegal? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. I do think it's important, Mr. Chairman, first of all, to make clear that prior to October of 1984 it was not illegal, although I did not do it anyway. And when I instructed my staff not to solicit, encourage, coerce or broker was when it became illegal to do so, in October of '84. "Chairman INOUYE. Contribution number two was after October '84, wasn't it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes sir, it was. "Chairman INOUYE. So that was illegal? "Mr. MCFARLANE. If it had been solicited, it would have been. "Chairman INOUYE. And are you still maintaining even under those circumstances it was not a solicitation? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I do, sir, and I believe	

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		that were it feasible for the country to--officials to comment, that they would do so. "Chairman INOUYE. You, in response to my inquiry, used the word that the countries would be wise to ingratiate themselves. That's the word you used, didn't you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. What was the quid for the quo in this case? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't believe there was any quid, Mr. Chairman. We were vulnerable to the possibility that one day a quid pro quo would be asked or urged. But, to my knowledge, none occurred. "Chairman INOUYE. No special sale of certain weapon systems? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir . . . . ". . . . "Chairman INOUYE. . . . On line 1122 of your [May 11] testimony on page 50, 'Again I don't wish to pretend or be disingenuous. There was some solicitation per se.' "Thank you very much, sir. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I would like to take advantage of your mention of it, Mr. Chairman. That sounds to me like either I have not been very articulate or it was mistranscribed, but I appreciate your bringing it to my attention." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 103-05, 107-08.) (2) McFarlane became less clear in his second day of testifying at the congressional hearings	

about the circumstances of the doubling of Country 2's contribution: "[I]t isn't really clear in my mind that I had a meeting at all that preceded the second donation. I am willing to accept that because I am told that I should be as supplicatory as I can. I doubt that it happened." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 9-10.)

Later in his testimony, when questioned further about his second meeting with the Country 2 official, McFarlane was asked whether he "briefed him on the Contra problem and again did not solicit money from him but stated that it was your [sc. McFarlane's] impression he appreciated that you were hoping for a contribution." McFarlane responded, "I don't challenge that and I accept that and will let it lie. I don't believe I even did that, but I will take responsibility for it. . . . I do remember a number of meetings with him to arrange for the visit . . . and I do know that I learned after the visit that there was to be a doubling of the contribution. I think it is a distinction without a difference. I in fact was hopeful that it would happen and it did happen, and I learned that it happened, but I take your description as one I will accept." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 134-35; see id. at 137-38 [McFarlane accepts characterization that he "had not consciously determined before going into that meeting that" he would raise "the issue of the contras and [their funding] . . . in such a way as to imply that a gift would be appreciated."], and 139 ["At the time it did seem to be a clear case of a voluntary chipping in, of

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		a donation by this party."].)	
85/02/00-600 SOMETIME IN [EARLY?] FEBRUARY 1985		COUNTRY 2 CONTRIBUTION: WHO KNEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane again places a note card in the President's briefing book to inform him of the contribution, "and I [sc. McFarlane] recall getting his reaction as being . . . analogous to the earlier time, of gratitude and satisfaction, not of surprise." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 51-52.)	
		COUNTRY 2 CONTRIBUTION: WHO KNEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs tell McFarlane they have heard Country 2 would contribute $25 million. McFarlane -- "not of conscious choice" -- fails to tell the Secretary of State, however. The Secretary of State is not told of the increased contribution until June of 1986, after Adm. Poindexter asks McFarlane whether the Secretary knows. McFarlane does not tell DCI Casey. (McFarlane Testim. JHICI, 5/11/87, at 53-55; id., 5/12/87, at 189 [Secretary of State was unaware for "probably at least a year"]. See id., 5/12/87 at 182-84 [McFarlane unsure whether the President knew the Secretary of State had not been informed of Country 2's contribution; Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, however, were aware of the contribution.]. See also entries starting at 86/06/16-090 [Shultz learns of the Country 2 contribution in June 1986].)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
85/02/00-630 FROM FEBRUARY 1985		COUNTRY 2 CONTRIBUTION: PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Now you attended, as his [sc. McFarlane's] Deputy, staff meetings with the President, briefings with the President? "A. Yes, in general that's true. "Q. Was there any discussion in your presence with the President about whether third party solicitations, third country solicitations were appropriate during the period that you were Deputy? "A. I can't. I've tried to think about it and recall. I can't recall a specific incident. "Q. Did you ever hear the President discuss the [redacted] contribution? "A. I can't recall that, although I felt that he was aware of it. "Q. Well, when you said you felt he was aware of it, why? "A. Because I think, as I recall, Mr. McFarlane told me that he had told the President. "Q. But Mr. McFarlane never told the President in your presence, correct, so far as you recall? "A. As far as I recall, I can't remember it. So his explanation in his testimony that he included it as a note in the 9:30 briefing folder seems logical. "Q. Is there any reason that you can think of, having held the position of National Security Advisor, why Mr. McFarlane would not tell the President that [redacted] had contributed?	

"A. I don't see any reason why he wouldn't. I can understand why he did it by note, though.

"Q. Would you consider it to be a possibly embarrassing thing from a political point of view if the President had to acknowledge that he knew of a [redacted] contribution?

"A. I don't --

"(Counsel conferring with the witness.)

"MR. BECKLER: Repeat the question, Arthur. You've got a lot of negatives [sic] in there -- would it be possible, if not.

"MR. LIMAN: Mr. Beckler, we don't have to have speeches.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. You've already indicated that there were some things that you didn't tell the President because you wanted to spare him potential embarrassment if it came out; correct?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And you wanted to give him deniability; is that right?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. Now do you think that it would have been embarrassing to the President of the United States if it came out that he knew that [redacted] had contributed to the contras during the Boland period?

"A. I guess I would have to say that I don't think it would be particularly embarrassing. That was not my understanding of Mr. McFarlane's concerns.

"Q. Well, you understood that Mr. McFarlane didn't even want to discuss this in the presence

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		of the Chief of Staff, right? "MR. BECKLER: Objection. I don't know where that understanding comes from, what is the basis for your saying what this client of mine understood about what Mr. McFarlane said. Let me finish my objection, please. This is-a deposition. I have a right to put my objections on the record without having counsel cut me off. Now you either let me do it or we're not going to continue this deposition. "MR. LIMAN: Okay. You can make all the objections you want. "MR. BECKLER: Thank you, Counsel. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)" [almost 3 pages redacted in full] (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 252-57.)	
85/02/00-631 FROM FEBRUARY 1985		COUNTRY 2 CONTRIBUTION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing, after redacted material, from preceding entry:] "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. Did you have any discussions with any [redacted] officials about the importance of [redacted] assisting the United States in fighting communist incursions in Central America? "A. The only conversation that I recall was the one I think I testified about on the second of May, and that was a discussion with [redacted] at his residence and I don't know the time frame, but it was after some long period, as I recall, after [redacted] contribution in which I raised the issue with him as to how General Vessey knew about	

what I recall was $25 million.

"Q. Why were you disturbed that General Vessey knew?

"A. Only from the standpoint that that indicated one more person in the compartment that knew that that we frankly didn't think had a need to know.

"Q. Did you think that General Vessey could keep a secret?

"A. Yes, unless he made a mistake. And, you know, as you have detected, I guess, I am pretty close-mouthed in public. And I just don't believe that people need to know things if it's not essential.

"Q. Did you think that the Secretary of State needed to know this?

"A. I guess I would have to answer that that I think he probably should. And, frankly, I wasn't certain whether he knew or didn't know." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 257-58. See Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 308-10 [Poindexter on the second contribution from Country 2 to the Contras]. For Poindexter's earlier deposition testimony on Gen. Vessey's knowledge of the Country 2 contribution, see Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 53-54. For Poindexter's testimony on when the Secretary of State learned of the contribution, see below at 86/06/16-090 and -100.)

85/02/00-650
AROUND
FEBRUARY 1985

COUNTRY 2 CONTRIBUTION: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE
SHULTZ ACCOUNT:

"Mr. MITCHELL. . . . You talked yesterday about how information had been kept from you, primarily by Admiral Poindexter. I think there is more to it than that. In February of 1985, the President met with the Head of State of a country that has been identified by number here, and during the course of that meeting, the President was informed that nation was contributing $25 million to aid the contras.

"Mr. McFarlane testified that immediately after that meeting, you and he met with the President for a debriefing on the meeting . . . that the President had with the Chief of State. Am I correct that such a meeting occurred and in it, the President did not tell us [sic] that he had been informed during that meeting of the contribution?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I don't remember the details of that set of events, but I believe that the first that I heard of this contribution was in a telephone call in the middle of June in 1986." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 133-34. On Shultz' learning of the contribution, see entries starting at 86/06/16-090.)

85/02/00-800
JULY 1984 -
MARCH 1985

BANK DEPOSITS FOR CALERO; AND CONTACT WITH CHANNELL AND MILLER

CALERO ACCOUNT:

Starting in July 1984, Calero receives deposits of $1 million per month in his bank account. (See 84/07/00-080.) Starting in February 1985, the deposits increase:

"Mr. BARBADORO. What happened in February of 1985?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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		"Mr. CALERO. Then we received two substantial deposits, I believe, of $7.5 million or five million, and then in March we got $7.5 million. The thing is we got eight million and between February and March we got 24. "Mr. BARBADORO. Mr. Calero, could you look at Exhibit AC-2, which is a listing of deposits to your account by source, and by date, that was drawn from a bank account records [sic] that you provided us? "Does that refresh your memory about what deposits you received in February and March? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. Could you please tell us what those deposits were? "Mr. CALERO. One million between July 1984 and February 1984. In February 1984-- "Mr. BARBADORO. 1985, isn't that? "Mr. CALERO. 1985, excuse me. We received five million and four million. And in March of 1985, we received two deposits of 7.5 million each. "Mr. BARBADORO. So between July of 1984 and March of 1985, how much did you receive in total from this source? "Mr. CALERO. $32 million. "Mr. BARBADORO. After March did you get any additional money from this source? "Mr. CALERO. No, we did not. "Mr. BARBADORO. When the deposits increased dramatically in February, did Colonel North give you any prior warning that the deposits might be increasing?	

"Mr. CALERO. No, but he was happy when I told him that I had received them.

"Mr. BARBADORO. And even then he didn't tell you anything about where the money was coming from?

"Mr. CALERO. No.

"Mr. BARBADORO. In addition to the 32 million you received from this source, you received $1,045,000 from a company known as Intel Corporation, Inc.; is that correct?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. When did you receive that first deposit?

"Mr. CALERO. In November 1985.

"Mr. BARBADORO. And is it fair to say that those contributions continued on a sporadic basis until January of 1987?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes. That is correct.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Intel Corporation is a company with which Richard Miller is associated, correct?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. How did you come to receive these contributions from Intel Corporation, Inc.?

"Mr. CALERO. Through my participating in giving, in addressing groups of potential donors.

"Mr. BARBADORO. And who arranged those meetings where you addressed potential donors?

"Mr. CALERO. A man[] by the name of Channell.

"Mr. BARBADORO. That is Carl 'Spitz' Channell?

"Mr. CALERO. Carl 'Spitz' Channell, yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. How did you meet Mr.

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		Channell? "Mr. CALERO. I do not remember the circumstances, but it was after his participation in what was called the refugee--Nicaraguan refugee fund dinner, and he offered to help in raising funds." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 22-24; JHICI Ex. AC 2. See 85/10/00-040 [$200,000 to Calero from Lake Resources]; 85/04/01-699 [summary of money flow through Calero's bank account].)	
85/02/01-000 AROUND FEBRUARY 1, 1985		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION SECORD ACCOUNT: North again asks Secord to approach a foreign official to ask for a contribution to the Contras during the U.S. visit of the head of state of that particular country. As Secord relates the story, North told Secord "that Mr. McFarlane had mentioned this to the official, and Mr. McFarlane was asking if I would follow up. . . . I did speak to him. . . . He said, ['Y]ou can stop twisting my arm. . . . I have decided to take it up with the head of state,' and he was, however, noncommittal. That was the last time I talked to that individual and the only time that I approached any foreigners for a donation." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 154-56; see also id., at 154-55 [first request]; id., 5/7/87, at 102-04 [Secord submits name of official to Committee in sealed envelope].)	
85/02/06-100 FEBRUARY 6,		THE MONIMBO NORTH MEMO:	

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1985		North memo to McFarlane, dated Feb. 6, 1985, in which North asks permission to provide Calero with information on the Monimbo, a Nicaraguan merchant ship carrying weapons. The information would enable Calero to sink or seize the ship. McFarlane does not authorize any action to seize the ship: "The Nicaraguan merchant ship, MONIMBO, is now in port at Taichung, Taiwan, where it is unloading cargo. It is estimated for departure on tomorrow, February 7, enroute to Shikama, Japan, for main engine repairs. [Redacted.] "At this point, there appear to be three options: "-- The shipment could be seized and the weapons delivered to the FDN; "-- the ship could be sunk; or "-- the shipment and the [redacted] parties involved therein could be made public as a means of preventing the delivery. ". . . ." A handwritten note at the bottom of the memo, initialed by Poindexter (JP), reads: "We need to take action to make sure ship does not arrive in Nicaragua." Poindexter also writes a note to McFarlane in response to the memo: "Except for the prohibition of the intelligence community doing anything to assist the Freedom Fighters I would recommend I bring this up at CPPG at 2:00 today. Of course we could discuss it from the standpoint of keeping the arms away from Nicaragua without any involvement of Calero and Freedom Fighters." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 72-73;	

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		JHICI Ex. 33 [= Exx. JMP 6, OLN 143].)	
85/02/06-150 FEBRUARY 6, 1985		THE MONIMBO McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Now, Exhibit 33 is another system 4 document to you from Colonel North in which he asked your permission to provide Mr. Calero with information on a Nicaraguan merchant ship carrying weapons for the purpose of enabling Mr. Calero to either seize or sink the ship; do you recall that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I have seen it in the last weeks and may have seen it at the time. This is the category of things that I would have found out about by researching afterwards, myself, or with the Admiral. "Mr. LIMAN. And the Admiral indeed wrote, and it's in this exhibit, it's attached to the last page--he wrote on it, 'Except for the prohibition of the intelligence community doing anything to assist the Freedom Fighters, I would recommend I bring this up at the CPPG meeting at 2:00 today.' "And then he said, 'Of course, we could dispute it from the standpoint of keeping the arms arriving from Nicaragua without any involvement of Calero and Freedom Fighters. What do you think?' "In fact, you didn't authorize any action to seize this ship? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I did not. "Mr. LIMAN. Once again, was it within the assignment that you had given Colonel North that he propose action to seize ships carrying arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, it wasn't. But I don't	

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		fault him for it. I think that the job, my job, the job of any responsible commander, is to expect that the energetic people operating under an assignment to accomplish a given mission are going to try to be imaginative and to think up things that hopefully will be both prudent, feasible, successful, wise, but that many times they won't. "That's why you are the boss and they are the subordinate. And so to say, no, don't do that, as I would often do, and write on memos, 'This is illegal,' as we have seen--but that is my job and I don't fault him for having been an imaginative, aggressive, committed young officer." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 72-74; JHICI Ex. 33 [North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipments," 2/6/85].)	
85/02/06-200 FEBRUARY 6, 1985		THE MONIMBO NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you believe that you were complying with Boland when you made the recommendation to your superiors which included assisting in the sinking or seizure of the Monimbo? "Mr. NORTH. Indeed, I did." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 215.)	
85/02/06-300 FEBRUARY 6, 1985		THE MONIMBO POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, when you say that you always felt that the NSC staff wasn't covered by Boland, is it a fact, sir, that at a time when a proposal was made in 1985 by Colonel North to sink the	

Monimbo, you wrote a note that this couldn't be done because of Boland?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, that is not an accurate description of that note, Mr. Liman, and I think you know that.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. If you look at this memorandum [Ex. JMP 6], and I will give you a chance to make a statement, but I would like some questions answered first.

"Mr. BECKLER. I resent that remark. He has answered questions. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . This is a memorandum relating to a ship that was going to be delivering arms to the Sandinistas.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And Colonel North sent a memorandum to Mr. McFarlane and you were one of the people who got a copy of it, correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. Actually, it came through me, I believe.

"Mr. LIMAN. And Colonel North recommended under the recommendation, and I will read it, 'that you', referring to Mr. McFarlane, 'authorize Calero to be provided with the information on Monimbo and approached on the matter of seizing the ship.'

"Then there is a notation or a typing for approve or disapprove, which is not checked, and is the handwriting there yours?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is mine.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it says, 'we need to take action to make sure ship does not arrive in Nicaragua', and then that is your initials, 'J.P.'.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, on the first--if you will turn to the sheet that is the beginning of the exhibit, it has a date of February 7 on it, which is the day after the date of the memo.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Right.

"Mr. LIMAN. And is that a buck slip that you sent to Mr. McFarlane passing on this memorandum?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. That is correct. It is just a short cover note.

"Mr. LIMAN. And am I reading your writing correctly? 'Except for the prohibition of the intelligence community doing anything to assist the freedom fighters, I would readily recommend I bring this up at the CPPG meeting at two o'clock today. Of course, we could discuss it from the standpoint of keeping the arms from Nicaragua without any involvement of Calero and freedom fighters. What do you think? J.P.'

"Is that your writing?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. It is.

"Mr. LIMAN. In the sentence that says[,] 'Except for the prohibition of the intelligence community doing anything to assist the freedom fighters', was the prohibition that you were referring to the Boland Amendment?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. It was."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 26-29; JHICI Ex. JMP 6 [North memo to McFarlane, "Subject: Nicaraguan Arms Shipment," 2/6/85; with

Poindexter's handwritten cover note for McFarlane].)

85/02/06-301
FEBRUARY 6,
1985

THE MONIMBO
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2:

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you ever ask the Attorney General of the United States for his opinion on whether the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Now, wait a minute, Mr. Liman. You said you were going to give me an opportunity to make a statement on this note, and I think you are passing that by at this point. I would like to explain that note.

"I have answered your questions. I have answered them truthfully. Now I would like to provide an explanation as to what that note means.

"Mr. LIMAN. Please proceed.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. What that note means is exactly what I have been saying all along, that we were doing everything we could to make sure that we complied with the letter and spirit of the Boland Amendment. We did not want to--I did not want to discuss these issues with anybody to which the Boland Amendment applied. That was the State Department, the CIA and the Defense Department. The C[P]PG is a crisis, pre-planning group which I chaired as the Deputy Assistant Secretary or Secretary to the President for National Security Affairs.

"And on that group I had representatives from the CIA, from the State Department and from the Defense Department. So what I meant in that note, and I think it is very clear once you understand the background, is that I didn't--except for the Boland Amendment applying to these other guys, we could discuss it, but we couldn't discuss it in those terms because the Boland Amendment applied to them. It did not apply to the NSC staff.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did Colonel North ask the NSC to provide information to Calero on the Monimbo?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Would you repeat your last question?

"Mr. LIMAN. Was Colonel North seeking permission for him to provide information on the Monimbo to Calero? Isn't that what he was saying?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That was the request that he was making.

"There's some other points that I want to make, though, and that is that in that first sentence where I say, 'except for the prohibition of the Intelligence Community,' and what I'm referring to there is that's the Boland Amendment applying to the CIA, the State Department and the Defense Department. And because those people were going to be involved in the meeting, I didn't think it would be appropriate to discuss that issue.

"Now, one of our objectives in the Central American program, which was covered in very early findings that the President signed in '81 and '82, I think, one of our objectives was to stop the arms flow into Nicaragua so that we would reduce the arms flow into El Salvador and Honduras and the surrounding countries. And so from that standpoint of stopping the arms flow, I felt that

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		that was something that could be discussed. "Mr. LIMAN. I've just heard your testimony, which was that it would have been a violation of Boland for you to discuss this with the CIA and State Department and the Defense Department, correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. "Mr. LIMAN. But you considered it consistent with the letter and spirit of Boland for you to provide that information on the ship? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not have any problem with it. As it turns out, I can't remember exactly what happened here, but the plan was never executed." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 29-32; JHICI Ex. JMP 6 [North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipment," 2/6/85; with handwritten cover memo from Poindexter to McFarlane, 2/7/85].)	
85/02/06-310 FEBRUARY 6, 1985 AND NOVEMBER 21, 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS: THE MONIMBO HALL ACCOUNT, Part 1: [For Hall testimony preceding this entry, see 86/11/21-616.] "Mr. BELNICK. Now, I would like to go through the [altered] documents. Let's begin, if we may, Miss Hall, with Exhibit FH-2, which is a memorandum to Mr. McFarlane from Lieutenant Colonel North, dated February 6, 1985, and the subject is Nicaraguan arms shipments. "Do you have that document before you? "Ms. HALL. Yes, I do. "Mr. BELNICK. We also have a blow-up of the	

document on the wall to the right. You notice the System 4 number is S402003, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. And that is one of the numbers which appears on the handwritten list, FH Exhibit 1 [see 86/11/21-615]?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. Now, this document was prepared originally on or about February 6, 1985, as the date indicates, and you have no independent recollection, as we have established, of what the document contained then and what changes were made in the document on November 21, 1986.

"Ms. HALL. That's correct.

"Mr. BELNICK. Let's then review the document for the committee and let me explain the colors on the document as they were put up.

"On the original document material that's deleted is highlighted in blue ink on what we believe to be the altered version of the document. Material that was put in that did not appear on the original document is highlighted in orange.

"Now, going through Exhibit 2, Exhibit 2 in its original form where the blue highlighting occurs, was a memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel North to Mr. McFarlane, in which he advised that a Nicaraguan merchant ship was unloading cargo in Asia and, in the blacked-out portion, was taking on lethal cargo, weapons, for the contras at a certain other spot in the East.

"Colonel North then goes on, as you see at the bottom of page 1 of Exhibit 2, to present three options to Mr. McFarlane for dealing with that

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		vessel. He says that the shipment of weapons could be seized and the weapons could be delivered to the Nicaraguan resistance, or he says the ship could be sunk, or he says publicity could be given to the shipment and the parties involved in order to prevent the delivery that way. "If we then turn to the second page of Exhibit 2, Colonel North provides Mr. McFarlane additional details concerning the possibility of having Mr. Calero and his people assist in some way with preventing the delivery of those weapons to Nicaragua. And the memo concludes with a recommendation that Mr. McFarlane uthorize Mr. Calero to be provided with information on this ship and to be approached on the matter of seizing or sinking it. "Beneath that there is a handwritten notation and, Miss Hall, do you recognize that as Admiral Poindexter's writing? "Ms. HALL. Yes, I do. "Mr. BELNICK. And the notation in Admiral Poindexter's writing reads, 'We need to make sure the ship does not arrive in Nicaragua.'" (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 259-62; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's handwritten list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 2 [North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipments," 2/6/85], FH 2-A [other version of North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipments," 2/6/85]. For Hall testimony on the documents listed by McFarlane which she altered, see below at 86/11/21-615 and -616. For Hall testimony on the individual altered documents, see also 84/12/04-100;	

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		85/03/05-215 and -216; 85/03/16-100; 85/04/11-230; and 85/05/31-100. See also Iran-Contra Report, at 124 [Monimbo memo], 123-26 [altered documents].)	
85/02/06-311 FEBRUARY 6, 1985 AND NOVEMBER 21, 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS: THE MONIMBO HALL ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Belnick's question continues from his comment at the end of the preceding entry:] "[Mr. BELNICK.] Before we go to the other version of Exhibit [FH] 2, once you made the changes and you destroyed the marked-up originals, what were you going to do with the altered originals? "Ms. HALL. The altered originals I planned to Xerox and replace the chron copy and the subject file copy and then return the original altered document to the System 4 keeper. "Ms. BELNICK. At the time you recognized that you had your own copies in your subject and chron files in the office of the same documents that Colonel North was asking you to change, right? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. So to complete the alteration process and to make it effective, you knew you had to substitute the new, altered original for the copies that were in your files and get rid of those copies, right? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. And to complete the process finally, you understood that you had to then get the altered original back to Mr. Merchant's shop to be refiled, right? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.	

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you ever get past the step of destroying the originals that Colonel North had marked up?

"Ms. HALL. I restored the originals, made the changes, assembled the packages, began to Xerox them, and I was stopped in the process by what I now think is probably the shredding incident.

"Mr. BELNICK. Which we'll get to. [See 86/11/21-678 and -680.]

"In any event, you were interrupted while you were making copies or endeavoring to make copies of the documents, the altered originals, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Ms. BELNICK. So you never had the opportunity to get out of your files the copies of the unaltered documents.

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Or to get the altered originals back to the Security Office?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. Having gone through Exhibit 2, we will take a look at F.H. Exhibit 2A. You will notice that bears the same system four number as Exhibit 2, correct, 40203; right?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. But now that two-page memo concerning the ship Monimbo and its proposed weapons delivery to Nicaragua has been shrunk to a one-page memo, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. And that memo deletes all discussion of the three options that Colonel North had put to McFarlane, 'sink, seize or publicize';

right?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. And what is inserted in place of any of those options or any discussion of the contras' helping with an operation to seize the ship is a recommendation in effect to declassify the information that Colonel North had about the ship so it could be printed in the overseas[] news media?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. And we believe this to be one of the documents that you were asked to prepare on November 21, correct, Ms. Hall?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Ms. BELNICK. Again, it is on letterhead that you would not have been using for such a memo in 1985?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. And that appears to be your 'N' next to Oliver North's name?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Now, I notice that the approved box in Exhibit 2A is checked. There is no check on the approved line in Exhibit 2, the original memo. Do you have any recollection of whether you were asked specifically to check the approved box on 2A?

"Ms. HALL. I believe, I mean I don't have a specific recollection, I believe that I probably saw Admiral Poindexter's handwriting and realized I couldn't exactly redo that, and decided just to check the approved line, which is similar to his comment.

"Mr. BELNICK. And again, if you have been able to finish the process, what the files would have been left with is what we see as Exhibit 2A, there would have been no Exhibit 2, including no handwritten notation by Admiral Poindexter?

"Ms. HALL. That is correct."
(Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 262-65; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 2 [North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipments," 2/6/85], FH 2-A [other version of North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipments," 2/6/85]. For Hall testimony on the documents listed by McFarlane, see below at 86/11/21-615 and 616. For Hall testimony on the individual altered documents, see also 84/12/04-100; 85/03/05-215 and -216; 85/03/16-100; 85/04/11-230; and 85/05/31-100. See also Iran-Contra Report, at 124 [Monimbo memo], 123-26 [altered documents].)

85/02/06-320
FEBRUARY 6,
1985

THE MONIMBO
C/CATF ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Carome. Would you please turn to [C/CATF] Exhibit 3? Exhibit 3 is a memorandum dated February 6, 1985, from Oliver North to Robert McFarlane. This is one of the documents that Mr. North saw fit to alter in November 1986. It refers to efforts to seize or sink the Nicaraguan merchant ship, the Monimbo. Were you familiar with the plans to seize or sink that ship in February 1985?

"[C/CATF.] Yes. [Redacted.]

"Mr. Carome. This memorandum specifically refers to providing intelligence information to Calero so that he could take action to seize or sink the ship.

"Did you have knowledge of those plans?

"[C/CATF.] That was not my operation. I don't think I had knowledge of it. I would not have condoned it, because that was clearly something that I wouldn't have been involved witn at that point in time. [Redacted.]

"Mr. Carome. But you specifically do not recall discussing the provision of intelligence to Mr. Calero?

"[C/CATF.] No. If it would have come up, I would have told him we can't do that. That was clearly something that we could not do.

"Mr. Carome. Did you provide intelligence information to North on [redacted] the Monimbo during the month of February 1985?

"[C/CATF.] Not specifically that I can recall; but I would add to you that that intelligence is readily available [redacted.] It's around.

"[Redacted.]

"I didn't call and pass that intelligence and say, 'Now, Ollie, you can pass it to Calero and do the job.' You must remember -- and I know it's difficult to understand -- but you have got to remember that the key figure on policy in Central America during this period, I mean the key figure, was Oliver North.

"Let me take a minute and tell the committee why. There was -- the Central American Directorate in the National Security Council was

Constantine Menges. The Assistant Secretary of State for Latin -- Inter-American Affairs was Tony Motley. They fought like cats and dogs. Motley would not hold a meeting with Menges in the room. They couldn't talk to each other.

"Also, because of what had happened earlier at the negotiations -- the bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Nicaragua, there was tension at play in the system. And, essentially by default, Central American policy in its execution and to a large degree in its formulation fell to Oliver North. He was the person that filled the void and who dealt with these things by dint of the void and by dint of personality; and he did it, and he was the person who moved and formulated and pushed and cajoled; and I think the committee has seen enough of his personality [so that] they can understand how that happened and why that happened.

"When he called and asked me about that, the conversation probably went something like, ['Redacted] McFarlane wants to know is this and this and this happening? Where is this? How is this going down?'

"[Redacted.]

"But he knew. There is very little -- and you will hear this as the day goes on -- that happened in Central America that I didn't talk to Ollie about, particularly up through sometime in April of '86. I mean it was a very unabridged conversation, because he was the man on the National Security Council with the responsibility for the Administration for this program.

"So I might have done that. In fact, I probably did. But I didn't do it to somehow get the intelligence to Calero. Frankly, I don't do dumb things. It would have been a dumb thing to try to run this operation [redacted.]" (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 246-50; C/CATF Ex. 3 [North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipments," 2/6/85].)

85/02/07-100
FEBRUARY 7, 1985

SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION OF COUNTRIES 3 AND 5, AND CONTACT WITH NORTH

SINGLAUB ACCOUNT:

Singlaub returns to Washington and meets with North at North's office. He reports to North, as he had requested in December, the results of his trips to Countries 3 and 5. Singlaub reviews his "entire presentation" ("I believe at that time I still had my handwritten notes."). He tells North of the options that he has proposed to the Countries for contributing to the Contras, and that he had given a 3-by-5 card bearing the name of the bank and account number where the funds could be deposited directly.

He tells North that "it would be appropriate at the time for him to have someone who was recognized as a spokesman for the Administration to make contact with the representatives [of Countries 3 and 5] here in Washington, and to indicate that they knew of my trip and of my request, and that the Administration had no objections to that, and it would not get them in trouble with the Administration if they did that."

North tells Singlaub that he will "brief his superiors"; he will let Singlaub "know if there was to be any followup." Singlaub does not learn thereafter whether the solicitation was ever successful. (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 199-202. See JHICI Ex. 34 [North memo to McFarlane, "Cable to President Suazo of Honduras," 2/6/85: "Singlaub will be here to see me tomorrow. With your permission, I will ask him to approach [redacted] Embassy urging that they proceed with their offer. Singlaub would then put Calero in direct contact with each of these officers. No White House/NSC solicitation would be made." (For text of memo, see 85/02/07-101.)].)

"Mr. FOLEY. Did Colonel North ever tell you whether he reported to his superiors on your report to him?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. Yes, he did tell me that he had reported it."

"Mr. FOLEY. Did he say who those superiors were?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. No.

"Mr. FOLEY. Did you have any opinion as to who they were?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. I assumed it was Bud McFarlane who was at the time the adviser."

(Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 204.)

85/02/07-101
FEBRUARY 6-7,
1985

SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SOLICITATION OF COUNTRIES 3 AND 5, AND CONTACT WITH NORTH

NORTH MEMO:

North ends a memo to McFarlane, dated February 6, 1985 and titled "Cable to President Suazo of

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		Honduras": "Singlaub will be here to see me tomorrow. With your permission, I will ask him to approach [redacted] Embassy urging that they proceed with their offer. Singlaub would then put Calero in direct contact with each of these officers. No White House/NSC solicitation would be made." A handwritten last sentence reads: "Nor should Singlaub indicate any U.S. Gov. endorsement whatsoever." (JHICI Ex. 34.)	
85/02/07-200 SOMETIME IN 1985		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THIRD COUNTRY SOLICITATION, AND McFARLANE'S ANSWER POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "We were always on the lookout for private or third-party contributions. At one point, General Singlaub made a trip to Asia and I frankly am not certain of the origins of that trip, but as a result of his trip out there, I can recall that Colonel North reported to Mr. McFarlane and to me that a representative of the [redacted] had approached Colonel North and asked the question as to whether General Singlaub was out there representing the U.S. Government or whether this was a private effort, and did the United States want [redacted] to do anything. "The answer that Mr. McFarlane approved Colonel North's passing back to [redacted] representative was a very carefully crafted answer. It was something to the effect that General Singlaub was out there as a private U.S. citizen and with regard to their question as to	

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		whether the U.S. Government wanted them to support the contras, that -- the answer to that was that [redacted] clearly understands the President's policies with regard to Nicaragua and the Sandinista government and the democratic resistance; end of response. "At either about the same time or shortly thereafter that, I believe Colonel North also reported that a representative of [redacted], as a result of Singlaub's trip out there, came and asked a similar question. Colonel North was authorized to pass back [redacted] essentially the same answer. "Let me also, to put this in perspective, we were not completely naive about this in that on the one hand, we wanted to get support for the democratic resistance, but we didn't want to become obligated to a third country, and they could then use that as leverage. So our general position was if they wanted to contribute, fine; but we weren't going to directly put the arm on them to do that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 58-59.)	
85/02/15-000 MID-FEBRUARY 1985		NORTH'S AND OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: TRANSPORTING MAPS AND A WEAPONS LIST OWEN ACCOUNT: North meets with Owen at North's office in the OEOB to give him additional maps to take to Central America. North is to pass the maps "right outside the situation room" in the White House, but he finds the maps are mounted on poster board. Owen postpones his departure until the maps are	

put "in a size format so I could carry it [Owen refers to singular and plural map(s)] down somewhat surreptitiously."

Owen later meets with North at North's office in the OEOB to get "the maps." They discuss them briefly, and North expresses his concern over the "build up of Sandinista forces along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border." Probably on this occasion ("[i]f I did carry it" at all), Owen carries a letter to Calero from North describing over $20 million to be deposited "next week . . . in the usual account . . . to bridge the gap." (JHICI Ex. RWO 3 [= Ex. OLN 258].)

Owen brings back a weapons list from Calero to North: "small arms and munitions, light machine guns, AK-47s and ball ammunition." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 225-36.)

85/02/15-001
MID-FEBRUARY
1985

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES
NORTH'S "STEELHAMMER" LETTER:

The letter Owen "probably" carries to Calero is addressed to "my friend" and signed by "Steelhammer," a code name for North (see 85/04/01-100). The letter refers to the resupply operation, North's directing Contra locations, David Walker (see entries starting at 85/03/06-150), and secrecy:

"This brief letter is being delivered via a trusted courier who has no knowledge of the contents but who can help carry out some of what this letter is about. He should not be made aware of the specific details in this letter.

". . . .

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		"And now the best news of all: "Next week, a sum in excess of $20M will be deposited in the usual account. While this must be husbanded carefully, it should allow us to bridge the gap between now and when the vote is taken and the funds are turned on again. ". . . . "So that we have a plan, I propose the following steps as highest priority: "The forces in the northern part of Nicaragua need to be dispersed so that they are not caught in the firestorm as the Sandinistas intend. On the map, I have marked several areas in yellow where there are no Sandinistas and good protection from the helicopters and bombing raids. If the high ground can be be [sic] guarded, then those who harbor in those areas will be safe. . . . ". . . . ". . . Next week, I will try to convince [redacted] and the others that they should allow 2,000 FDN at a time in the border camps. If a regular resupply program can be established using what will be deposited next week, we can start a regular logistics program of one flight every 10-15 days and the steady movement of supplies and ammunition to the forward bases. "Most important is saving the force from what I believe will be a serious effort to destroy it in the next few weeks. While I know it hurts to hide, now is the time to do it. While they are hiding, the man who is carrying this message can start the regular resupply process. I believe it would be wise to dedicate as much as $9-10M for	

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		nothing but logistics. To coordinate a major effort such as this, I strongly urge that you bring aboard a logistics expert who is both knowledgeable and trusty. The courier should be able to help with this. "The battle plan for the near future should involve getting as many as possible out of the border camps and hiding them perhaps in the areas I have shown, while the logistics program is established. Once the regular resupply system is in place and the troops familiar with a rotation system of 1,500-2,000 being resupplied each week, attacks can be launched with great vigor against the Sandinista rear, hitting them hard as they phase down in frustration from their current operations and striking at selected strategic targets with your enhanced capability. "This new money will provide great flexibility we have not enjoyed to date. I would urge you to make use of some of it for my British friend and his services for special operations. I can produce him at the end of this month. . . . ". . . . "Request you advise me soonest regarding the deposit and destroy this letter after reading. The map can be passed Enrique [sic], with my best wishes. Please do NOT in any way make ANYONE aware of the deposit. Too much is becoming known by too many people. We need to make sure that this new financing does NOT become known. The Congress must believe that there continues to be an urgent need for funding." (JHICI Ex. OLN 258 [= Ex. RWO 3].)	

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DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
85/02/15-008 AROUND FEBRUARY 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: STEELHAMMER LETTER CALERO ACCOUNT:	

"Mr. COHEN. Could I turn your attention to a document that we received? It is addressed to 'My Friend,' and it is approximately February of 1985. Did you ever receive a document from Colonel North?

"Mr. CALERO. I have looked at that letter a number of times. The information it has I am familiar with, fairly familiar with. I saw a draft, as a matter of fact, where the $20 million had been scratched out, but I do not recall, and I have been really trying my memory on that one, I don't recall getting that letter.

"Mr. COHEN. If I were to tell you that that letter contained information pertaining to intelligence about the Sandinistas, you wouldn't disagree that you had that conversation, if not the memo itself, or the letter itself?

"Mr. CALERO. I don't know. I mean, I have seen the letter, but I don't remember--

"Mr. COHEN. No, I think that you have already indicated in your previous testimony that you have discussed intelligence matters before.

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. COHEN. And you also discussed military battle plans as such, as well, did you not?

"Mr. CALERO. I have said the information they gathered from conversations with Colonel North, we never planned nor carried out any operation.

"Mr. COHEN. Were you ever under the impression that you were controlled by the CIA?

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DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. CALERO. Controlled-- "Mr. COHEN. Under the control and direction of a CIA agent? "Mr. CALERO. Well, I don't feel that I could be controlled by-- "Mr. COHEN. Were you ever under the impression that you were being 'handled' by the Central Intelligence Agency, someone was there assisting you, directing you, carrying messages back and forth? "Mr. CALERO. No. Here again, my relationship with CIA people has been one of respect and mutual respect. "Mr. COHEN. And if Colonel North had ever said that you were being handled by an agent, that would be incorrect in your judgment? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, but I have heard the expression at times that someone is assigned to someone, that he is his something-- "Mr. COHEN. Was someone assigned to you? "Mr. CALERO. No. I never had one particular person assigned to me that I know of. "Mr. COHEN. You may have had a series of separate individuals assigned to you? "Mr. CALERO. I might have been trailed or tailed, or whatever you call it without realizing it." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 100-02. See JHICI Ex. RWO 3 [letter from "Steelhammer" to "My Friend"].)	
85/02/15-009 NOVEMBER 1984		MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS TO CALERO CALERO ACCOUNT:	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
- FEBRUARY 1985		"Mr. BARBADORO. Robert Owen testified that he was a courier for Colonel North, carrying maps and photographs of Sandinista military equipment to you in November of 1984 and February, 1985. Did you get such maps and photographs from Robert Owen? "Mr. CALERO. Well, I don't remember. I don't remember if he delivered them or not, or who delivered them, but I did see photographs in the region or here about these helicopters at the Managua airport, and I did see maps that showed Sandinista troop concentrations, but those could have been prepared by our people, too. And I saw maps-- "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you get them from Colonel North? "Mr. CALERO. Directly from Colonel North or through-- "Mr. BARBADORO. Well, either directly or indirectly, did you get them from Colonel North? "Mr. CALERO. They could have come, yes, from him. I remember maps with radar installations. "Mr. BARBADORO. You wouldn't have gotten these maps from the CIA directly, would you? "Mr. CALERO. No. The CIA sort of stayed away from us, yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. During the period the Boland amendment was in effect, what kind of support did you get from the CIA? "Mr. CALERO. They got support from us, I would say. We used to give them a lot of intelligence, a lot of information. They were always after us trying to find out what we were	

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		doing. "Mr. BARBADORO. In fact, you have characterized them as more snoopers than helpers during this period, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. I used that word before, yes." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 44-46.)	
85/02/15-010 SOMETIME IN FEBRUARY 1985		NORTH'S AND OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MAPS FOR THE CONTRAS C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Carome. In February '85 there came another occasion where according to the testimony of Robert Owen Oliver North gave him maps to take to the contra leaders for use in a military operation on the [redacted] Nicaraguan border. Mr. Owen has testified that the maps that were originally provided were too large for him to take down surreptitiously to Nicaragua and that he was in Oliver North's office when Oliver North called you to ask you to provide maps of a suitable size to take down to the Nicaraguan leadership. "Do you recall that event in February '85? "[C/CATF.] I am trying to[ ]recall what was happening with the resistance in February '85. I do not recall that specific event. I think I have testified to that 3 or 4 times in various depositions and such, and don't think that -- I don't recall that conversation having taken place, no. "Mr. Carome. If in February '85 Oliver North asked you for maps relating to activity on the Nicaraguan-[redacted] border, would you have provided it to him?	

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		"[C/CATF.] No. As a matter of fact I would have found some way to have avoided doing that if that is what it was for. "Mr. Carome. Would you please turn to [C/CATF] Exhibit 2. Exhibit 2 is an entry out of Oliver North's notebooks dated February 8, 1985, the time we were just talking about. At 7 o'clock there is an entry that says maps delivered by [redacted] and 15 minutes later at 7:15 it says meeting with Rob Owen. That appears to relate to the incident that Mr. Owen testified about. "[C/CATF.] No. There is another meeting, another entry there, they are two things. I am going to be a little bit particular here. The meeting with Rob Owen was 5 minutes after the map is alleged to have been delivered, meaning he was not in the room probably. "Secondly, there is a 9:30 meeting with Ronald Reagan and so on. If I had delivered a map to Oliver North and it looks like I did, [redacted] was a person who worked on my staff -- it would have been because Oliver North said I need this to brief the President, and that is the way he dealt, bombastically, and you would push and push and push and the decision I had to make each time a segment came in was whetner or not it was for his NSC job or something else. "At the time the resistance forces were withdrawing, the Nicaraguans were getting ready to make their first incursion at some point in time [redacted] and it is very likely that he pushed and said I need intelligence on this. He did that frequently and each time I had to respond in a way	

that I felt was in keeping with the law and in keeping with his position to work in the NSC. So if I did that and I don't recall that particularly, I vaguely recall in the back of my mind [redacted] carrying a map down or doing some work, it was not specific enough to be of any tactical use and was meant for briefings at the White House in his position with the NSC as far as I knew.

"Mr. Car[]ome. Did Oliver North tell you at that time that these maps were going to be produced to Robert Owen?

"[C/CATF.] No.

"Mr. Carome. Did you know at that time who Robert Owen was?

"[C/CATF.] I don't think at that early stage I knew who Robert Owen was. I would put my understanding of who Robert Owen was later in '85.

"Mr. Carome. Specifically do you recall Oliver North calling you and telling you that the maps that were provided for Owen were too large and that he needed smaller maps?

"[C/CATF.] I don't recall him doing that. I don't recall him calling me and telling me maps were too large or that he had given them to Robert Owen."

(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 243-45.)

85/02/19-200
FEBRUARY 19,
1985

GREGG-RODRIGUEZ CONTACT
GREGG CHRONOLOGY:

Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, describes Gregg's contact with Felix Rodriguez:

"On February 19, 1985, Mr. Rodriguez met with Mr. Gregg to report growing support for his work in El Salvador. In March, Rodriguez moved to El Salvador."
(Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for start of Gregg chronology, see above at 83/11/03-100; chronology continues at 85/06/05-200].)

85/03/00-100
SOMETIME IN
MARCH 1985

OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: TRAVELER'S CHECKS
OWEN ACCOUNT:

North asks Robert Owen "to change travelers checks into dollars" and then to convey the money to a Contra leader who had been receiving money from "an agency," but whose funds were about to be cut off. With Jonathan Miller present, North takes the traveler's checks from a safe in his office and gives them to Owen and Miller to cash separately:

"Mr. EGGLESTON. Where did he [North] get the travelers checks from?

"Mr. OWEN. Out of a safe in his office. Unfortunately, it must have been an unlucky safe. It was the safe where the thousand dollars for Richard Allen was found.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. I take it you know that because Colonel North told you that?

"Mr. OWEN. Yes.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. Indeed did Colonel North make a joke about that?

"Mr. OWEN. He did.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. Did he on several occasions joke about the fact that the safe where he was keeping these travelers checks was the same safe

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		Mr. Allen had used? "Mr. OWEN. He made some comments to that effect. "Mr. EGGLESTON. I take it you don't know whether that was the same safe Mr. Allen use[d]? "Mr. OWEN. It makes a nice story." Owen and Miller meet later back at North's office. (Owen testified he could not recall if North was present at the second meeting.) Owen takes the cash and passes the money -- "six or seven thousand dollars" -- later to the Contra leader in Owen's apartment with no one else present. Owen "believe[s] . . . the travelers checks [were] provided to [North] by Adolfo Calero. Came up to see him." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 237-43.)	
85/03/00-300 SOMETIME IN MARCH 1985		THE BERMUDEZ-SINGLAUB WEAPONS LIST SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Singlaub "personally undert[akes] to arrange a shipment of arms to" the Contras after he visits their base camps and has "many long conversations with Enrique Bermudez . . . as to the type of arms best suited for guerrilla war." He meets, as well, with Adolfo Calero and "other members of the FDN." Because of "a lot of transportation problems," Singlaub has "lots of time together" with Bermudez, and they compile a list over 3 to 4 days of a mix of small arms and ammunition, including AK-47s ("in fact, we bought the AKMS, which is a folding-stock type of AK-47"), RPG-7s, light machine guns, support	

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		weapons, air defense missiles, ground missiles, _and SA-7s. In April 1985, Singlaub presents the list to North "to get his concurrence." (Singlaub Testim., 5/20/87, at 186, 202-04.)	
85/03/01-200 SOMETIME IN EARLY MARCH 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SAN JOSE DECLARATION NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified he was present at the writing of the San Jose Declaration: "I don't want to take anything from the leaders of the Nicaraguan resistance. They are the drafters of this document. I was blessed to be with them and work on this, and with them in the course of time that this was being prepared and several other Americans assisted them. But this is their product, and I consider it an honor to have been invited to participate in assisting them. But it is their document." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 36; JHICI Ex. OLN 213 [unofficial translation of the San Jose Declaration].)	
85/03/04-100 MARCH 4, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PRIVATE FUNDRAISING FRASER ACCOUNT: Edie Fraser, of the public relations firm Miner and Fraser, writes a note to North: "OLLIE, Very Imp., Two people want to give major contribs_i.e. 300,000 and up if they might have one 'quiet' minute with the President." (Fraser Dep. Ex. 3. See Fraser Dep., 7/1/87, at 41-60. See also Iran-Contra Report, at 88.)	

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85/03/05-100 MARCH 5, 1985		KEEPING THE CONTRA OPERATION SECRET: CIA Director Casey receives briefing materials noting the depth of intelligence on how the Contras had managed to flourish: "Since the cutoff of official funds to the anti-Sandinistas in May 1984 they have been able to field a viable guerrilla fighting force, have increased their numbers, and improved their tactical efficiency. It is estimated that to maintain the level of activity that they have it would cost an estimated one and one half to two million dollars per month. There is, however, no intelligence on the source of this income, except that it comes from private groups, and possibly some U.S. business corporations." (Iran-Contra Report, at 48; CIA memo, "Outside Support to the FDN," 3/5/85 [Committee Document C 2470].)	
85/03/05-200 MARCH 5, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: END-USER CERTIFICATES NORTH MEMO: North memo to McFarlane, titled "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance": "Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Director Casey, and General Vessey asking for their views on increased U.S. assistance [redacted.] Your memo is cast as suggestion which derives from trip to the region. "The real purpose of your memo is to find a way by which we can compensate the [redacted] the extraordinary assistance they are providing to the	

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		Nicaraguan freedom fighters. At Tab II are end-user certificates which the [redacted] provided for the purchase of nearly $8M worth of munitions to be delivered to the FDN. These nine documents are a direct consequence of the informal liaison we have established [redacted] and your meeting with he [sic] and [redacted]. The ammunition and weapons identified in these documents will be delivered in several shipments (2 by aircraft and 1 by sea) starting on or about March 10, 1985. All shipments will be delivered [redacted] be receipted for [redacted], and turned over to FDN representatives at [redacted] on [redacted] arrival. Adolfo is convinced, and I agree, that [redacted] have NOT removed or withheld any equipment/munitions from the FDN deliveries which have occurred to date. "During one of the meetings [redacted] in which the process above was arranged, one of [redacted] presented a 'wish list' of items which they desperately need in order to prosecute their war against the Cuban-supported guerrillas. A copy of the list is attached at Tab III. Each of the items identified are [sic] in priority within four principal categories: Aircraft, Ground Forces Equipment, Weapons and Munitions, and Non-Tactical Military Equipment. "Your memo at Tab I does not refer to the arrangements which have been made for supporting the resistance through [redacted.] It does, however, urge that we take steps now to improve their situation. Once we have approval for at least some of what they have asked for, we can	

ensure that the right people in [redacted] understand that we are able to provide results from their cooperation on the resistance issue.

"RECOMMENDATION

"That you sign and transmit the memo at Tab I.

"Approve [followed by a handwritten check mark]"

Attached to North's memo are a series of end-user certificates, dated February 11, 1985 and addressed to Energy Resources International, Vienna, Va.
(JHICI Ex. 35. See Iran-Contra Report, at 46.)

85/03/05-210
MARCH 5, 1985

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: END-USER CERTIFICATES
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on his memo recommending compensation for the third-country provider of false end-user certificates for the Contras:

"Mr. NIELDS. And indeed I think you probably have seen a document in which you endeavored to reward a Central American country that had provided end-user certificates?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it--

"Mr. NORTH. I didn't see the document. I wrote it. I will stand up and take that.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I take it you had had communications with officials of that country in advance of writing that document?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you told them that you were going to try to get them some help as a way of

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		rewarding the[m] for the help they had given to the contras? "Mr. NORTH. Let me be very specific about that. I do not recall ever telling any country or representative of any country that if they did this that we would do that. What is very important--and I tried to articulate this yesterday--is that others in other countries and other Americans very clearly saw that help to the Nicaraguan Resistance was in the best interests of those countries and was in the best interest of the United States of America. Those other countries in almost every case, without even any prodding, stepped up and wanted to help. "So when I met with somebody, it didn't take a great deal of pushing. What I am saying to you, counsel, is that there was a very clear recognition, particularly in Central America, that there was a disaster at hand, that they saw, in the words of one head of state, that they were in the mouth of the lion. ". . . All I had to do was nod and say[,] 'We would be grateful', and indeed I believe we should be. "So when I met with the representatives of any one of those countries on that list for that purpose, it didn't take prodding. All it took was saying we would be grateful, and indeed I think we ought to be. "Mr. NIELDS. I think the question was, I take it that you sought to reward this country for the help that it had given in getting arms to the contras.	

"Mr. NORTH. I sought in the memorandum that I prepared to acknowledge what they had done. I also sought to point out in that memorandum that that country . . . was suffering fron a guerrilla war sponsored by the Soviet Union and Cuba and Nicaragua and that they were in desperate straits, and they needed help. They needed economic help. They needed security assistance. The memorandum that I attached also indicated that they had provided assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance in the form of end-user certificates, but I never told the representatives of that country that if they give us those, we would get something else to them. That is an important factor. I didn't make promises based on a quid pro quo."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 146-49; JHICI Ex. OLN 145 [= Ex. 35; North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/5/85].)

85/03/05-215
MARCH 5, 1985
AND NOVEMBER
21, 1986

ALTERED DOCUMENTS: END-USER CERTIFICATES
HALL ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. BELNICK. Let's turn if we may to the next [altered] document, which is F.H. Exhibit 3. That document bears the system 4, number 400215, and again, Ms. Hall, that is one of the numbers on the McFarlane handwritten list, Exhibit 1 [see 86/11/21-615, -616], is it not?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, it is.

"Mr. BELNICK. This was a document prepared originally on or about March 5, 1985. It is a memo from Colonel North to Mr. McFarlane and it pertains to the Nicaraguan resistance from a certain Central American country, the name of which has been deleted from the unclassified version of this memo.

"Now, i[n] this memo, as we see from reading it, Colonel North proposes to Mr. McFarlane that Mr. McFarlane send a memo to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Director of Central Intelligence and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking for their views on increased U.S. assistance to this Central American country and proposing that such increased assistance be given.

"Colonel North then goes on in Exhibit 3 to say to Mr. McFarlane that the real purpose of the proposed memo to the cabinet offices would be to find a way to compensate the Central American country for the extraordinary assistance that that country had been furnishing to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters by facilitating the delivery of lethal assistance, weapons, through the provision of false end-user certificates.

"And Colonel North goes on to point out to Mr. McFarlane on page 2 of Exhibit 3 that the proposed memo to the senior cabinet officials does not refer to any of those arrangements which had been made by the Central American country to help the freedom fighters.

"The recommendation is that Mr. McFarlane signed [sic (sign?)] the proposed memo to the senior cabinet officers and set [sic (send?)] it along, a memo which contained, as Colonel North put it, no reference to the real purpose of the recommendation.

"And then, as you will see, there were various attempts, the first being the proposed memo to the Secretaries, the DCI and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and second being copies of the false end-user certificates, and the third being a wish list of military equipment requirements for the contras which Colonel North also refers to in his memo to Mr. McFarlane.

"And again, as far as you know, Ms. Hall, you would have prepared this document that is typed for Colonel North back in March of 1985?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Now, let's look then at Exhibit FH-3A. It bears the same System 4 number as Exhibit 3, does it not, 400215?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Only it is on the letterhead that you wouldn't have used in 1985, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. That looks like your N next to Oliver North's name?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. This subject is the same subject as Exhibit 3 in its 1985 manifestation, namely aid to the Nicaraguan resistance by the same unidentified here Central American country, only now that two page memo has been reduced to two paragraphs, the first of which tells Mr. McFarlane that there is a proposed memo to the senior cabinet members, asking for their views on assistance--increased assistance to the Central American country and the second of which simply says that your memo, Mr. McFarlane, also urges

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		that we provide the assistance and the approved box is checked and again you recall it would have been you who checked the approved box on Exhibit 3A? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 265-69; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 3 [North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/5/85], FH 3-A [other version of North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/5/85]. For Hall testimony on the documents listed by McFarlane on Ex. FH 1, see below at 86/11/21-615 and -616. For Hall testimony on the individual altered documents, see also 84/12/04-100; 85/02/06-310 and -311; 85/03/16-100; 85/04/11-230; and 85/05/31-100. See also Iran-Contra Report, at 124-25 [end-user certificates memo], 123-26 [altered documents].)	
85/03/05-216 MARCH 5, 1985 AND NOVEMBER 21, 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS: END-USER CERTIFICATES HALL ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. BELNICK. Now I notice that Exhibit [FH] 3A although it no longer refers in text to the real purpose of the attached memo or to the end user certificates continues to attach or to indicate an attachment of end user certificates, and the wish list of weapons for the contras, all reference to which had been deleted from the memo itself; correct? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. We've talked about that. Can	

you account for why the end user certificates and the military equipment wish list were left in when the references to them were the object of Colonel North's deletions?

"Ms. HALL. All I can say is that--emphasize the fact that I didn't read the changes that were being made or else I would have realized to remove the attachments and also emphasize the fact that Colonel North to my recollection did not give me further instructions other than to change them.

"Mr. BELNICK. You were uneasy while you were making these changes, weren't you?

"Ms. HALL. I felt a little bit of uneasiness when he asked me to do it, but again as I stated, I believe in Colonel North as I know that there must have been a good reason what he was asking me to do this, and I--I did as I was told.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you know at the time that Colonel North asked you to do this that the President of the United States had asked the Attorney General to make an inquiry into the facts concerning the delivery and sale of American weapons to Iran?

"Ms. HALL. I do not recall that, no.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did Colonel North mention to you that he knew the Attorney General had been asked to undertake that assignment and would be coming to the office to review documents or that his representatives would be coming the very next morning?

"Ms. HALL. No, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. You did not know any of those things when you made the changes that Colonel

North requests; right?

"Mr. HALL. No, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. While you were making the changes, did anybody come over to your desk?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Who was that?

"Ms. HALL. Commander Craig Coy.

"Mr. BELNICK. What did you do when Commander Coy approached your desk while you were altering the documents?

"Mr. HALL. I turned the documents over, face down.

"Mr. BELNICK. Why?

"Ms. HALL. I felt that it was my policy not to expose or talk about what I was doing and I felt that I didn't know [whether] Colonel North shared with Colonel Coy what he was doing, and I felt that it wasn't my place to show Commander Coy what I was doing.

"Mr. BELNICK. You weren't totally comfortable with what you were doing, were you, Ms. Hall?

"Ms. HALL. I would say that I wasn't totally comfortable, yes. But as I've said before, I believe Colonel North had a good reason for doing what he was doing. I'm not going to question that.

"Mr. BELNICK. He didn't tell you what that reason was?

"Ms. HALL. No, he didn't."

(Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 269-71; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 3 [North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance,"

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		3/5/85], FH 3-A [other version of North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/5/85]. For Hall testimony on the documents listed by McFarlane on Ex. FH 1, see below at 86/11/21-615 and -616. For Hall testimony on the individual altered documents, see also 84/12/04-100; 85/02/06-310 and -311; 85/03/16-100; 85/04/11-230; and 85/05/31-100. See also Iran-Contra Report, at 124-25 [end-user certificates memo], 123-26 [altered documents].)	
85/03/05-220 MARCH 5, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: END-USER CERTIFICATES McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, would you look at Exhibit 35. That's a memo from Colonel North where he asks you to take some action and where you approved that action, correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And the action that he asked you to do was to send a memo to Secretary Shultz, Weinberger and Director Casey and General Vessey, asking for their view on an increased United States assistance to a Central American country, correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And you, in fact, sent the memorandum requested that recommended that this country be considered for increased assistance, correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Colonel North in his memo to you said, the real purpose of your memo is to find a way by which we can compensate the Central	

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		American country for the extraordinary assistance they are providing to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters, and he attached to this some end-users certificates which that country had provided to the Freedom Fighters that showed that the arms were going to that country, rather than to the contras. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. And am I correct you sent the memo? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And you did not, in sending the memo, indicate that the real purpose was to compensate this country for assisting the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, that wasn't its real purpose. "Mr. LIMAN. That was Colonel North's purpose. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is the way that he portrayed it. However, for a long time many members of Congress, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State had urged that we review and reconsider . . . [the Central American country's] eligibility for foreign assistance. So on its merits, . . . [the Central American country], having made some progress in the direction of improved human rights records and reduced number of unexplained murders and things like that, justified asking the community has the time come where . . . [the Central American country] deserves to have some support. "I don't say that disingenuously at all.	

Colonel North would obviously or occasionally write memorand[a] rather hurriedly in their portrayal of events. For example, in this one the description that this relationship and the end users certificates emerged as a direct consequence of my visit there is absolutely untrue. For example, I made that trip, landed at the airport in . . . [the Central American country], spent 20 minutes at the airport, got back on the plane and left.

"Now, in the space of that time, the total exchange consisted of sitting in a room with career officials, the CIA, Defense, my staff, the State Department and the resident Ambassador. Now, anyone with any gumption certainly is not going to sit there in the front of God and everyone and say, 'Will you please provide illegal end user certificates for me?' In short, this simply didn't happen. But I looked at the memo that was attached, and what it sought to achieve to evaluate whether or not . . . [the Central American country] was qualified to receive aid was a very legitimate purpose, and it was the only purpose.

"Mr. LIMAN. One last question . . . . Did you admonish Colonel North for sending this kind of memo and stating that the purpose was to compensate the country for assisting the freedom fighters?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I did not."
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 74-77; JHICI Ex. 35 [= Ex. OLN 145; North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan

Resistance," 3/5/85].)

85/03/05-225
MARCH 5, 1985

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: END-USER CERTIFICATES
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . [W]ould it be fair to say that in the summer of 1985, there were some news articles about the contras and the NSC?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And the news articles were on the subject of where the contras' funding was coming from and whether the NSC was giving them any support.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that you then received a letter or letters from several members of Congress and the Senate?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did.

"Mr. NIELDS. And one of them was from Congressman Barnes?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I think that has been marked as Exhibit 40-A.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he states, indeed in the very first paragraph, I am writing in response to recent press reports, and he indicates that they are on the subject of the NSC staff members providing advice and fund-raising support to the Nicaraguan resistance.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he asks you to supply information on that subject and also documents. Is that correct? That is the beginning of the second page of the letter.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I think you have testified that when you got the letter or learned that it had been received you asked Commander Thompson to pull the relevant documents?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think probably Admiral Poindexter, but it was ultimately done by Brenda Reger, the Freedom of Information Act professional, and given to Admiral Poindexter, and in turn, to Commander Thompson, is that correct? [Sic.]

"Mr. NIELDS. And Commander Thompson is a lawyer?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes sir, he is in the JAG Corps of the Navy.

"Mr. NIELDS. And when you[] returned to Washington, he gave you the documents that had been pulled?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And told you that some of them were problematic?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you then made a list of the ones that were problematic?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I went through and read them all and had my own judgments about which were of concern and I did make a list of those, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And the listing has been marked as exhibit 40 and I think you have testified that it is in your handwriting?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And it lists six documents by the number in which they were filed in NSC files?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes sir.

"Mr. NIELDS. And one of those documents is numbered 400213?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. I think that document has been marked exhibit 35.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And this is one of the ones which you found to be problematical?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And this is a memorandum from North to you, I take it?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Dated March 5, 1985?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes[,] sir.

"Mr. NIELDS. And . . . it was sent to you on or about March 5, 1985?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I expect so, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. So this is the second time that you were reading it? August of 1985 was the second time you were reading it?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Probably so."
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 67-71; JHICI Ex. 35 [North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/5/85], 40 [McFarlane's list of 6 problem documents]. See 85/08/16-200 through -204 [summer 1985 Congressional inquiries about the NSC staff, and the 6 problem documents]; 85/09/12-111 [further McFarlane testimony on Ex. 35].)

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NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: END-USER CERTIFICATES

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MARCH 5, 1985		MCFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. I take it what Mr. North is trying to do here [in Ex. 35] is to reward a certain Central American country for assistance that it had provided to the Contras in obtaining arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I think that any objective person would see it that way. I don't intend to what the Navy calls see a lawyer about it, but the fact that a country on its merits deserves foreign aid is a condition which Ollie could very well wrap into a more romantic portrayal of why they ought to be getting it. Now, it isn't worth arguing about. "Yes, for me, to ask Cabinet officers and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs whether they thought . . . [a Central American country] was deserving of foreign aid is a reasonable thing to do. On its merits it was worth endorsing. In March when it came across, I don't recall having gotten--paying attention to it at all. When it came up in August, I do recall saying that this is just one more kind of example of hyperbole where innocent propositions are given a rather lurid kind of cast that was just not true. "Mr. NIELDS. But North's purpose in this memo is to reward this Central American country for helping the Contras get arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That I think is correct, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And he says so here, and these are his words, I understand, not yours, 'the real purpose of your memo is to find a way by which we	

can compensate the Central American country for the extraordinary assistance they have provided the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters.'

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then he goes on to say, [']at tab 2 [a]re end user certificate[s which] the Central American country provided for the purchase of nearly $800 million [sic (exhibit reads "$8M")] worth of munitions to be delivered to the FDN.[']

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. [An] end user certificate, I take it, is a certificate that states the actual final user of munitions?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And in this case, this Central American country was not the final user of the munitions?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. So the end user certificates were false?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is right, in the normal course of CIA security of a movement the requirement is to identify a country and by working through intelligence sources, and sister services, to gain the cooperation of another country's intelligence service to provide end user certificates. And it isn't beyond imagination--in fact I assume that when the agency was authorized and took part in training the Contras that that was part of the training, how you do that.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that North's purpose here is to reward the Central American country for having these false end user certificates?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think that is true. It may be interesting to note that the U.S. was providing military assistance to other Central American countries, . . . in much lesser sums, but . . . [this Central American country] was the exception and it was because the Congress had understandable complaints about their human rights record and the killing of peasants and others by militia forces of internal security forces but that had begun to change for about a year's time and there had been a new government and for me raising the question--"

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 71-74; JHICI Ex. 35 [North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/5/85].)

85/03/05-227
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NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: END-USER CERTIFICATES
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . I take it . . . that Mr. North was in touch with people from that Central American country?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And, indeed, he had obtained what he refers to as a wish list from that country?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he has been in touch with them, would you not infer, in connection with their having provided these end user certificates?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I suppose.

"Mr. NIELDS. And the wish list is attached to

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		this document is it not, as an exhibit, in the document-- "Mr. GARMENT. Mr. McFarlane had not completed his answer to your previous question and I think he should have an opportunity. "Mr. NIELDS. I think he should, too. I had a reason for wanting to pose another question, but please if there is more information you want to give us as to a previous question, you may do so. "Mr. GARMENT. Never mind. "Mr. NIELDS. The wish list is attached, is it not, to Exhibit 35, it is the last document, and it is a list of various kinds of military equipment that this country wants. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And North had obtain[ed] that wish list? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it it is fair to infer from this document as I say and as you have testified that he has had some conversations with the people from that country? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. In connection with the memo that he is writing to you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And what he is writing--he is asking you if you will make a recommendation to the Secretaries of Defense and State that this Central American country be rewarded? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think it was quite accurate. He is asking that I ask them for their views on whether this country merits the aid, I	

believe.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, he is asking you to send a memorandum which recommends that they be given some aid?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, and I felt that way. I didn't feel that way because they were giving support to the contras alone, although, gosh, that certainly wouldn't disqualify them for me.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you did eventually send that memorandum?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. The one that Mr. North had recommended that you send?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he says in his memo to you at the top of page two, your memo does not refer to the arrangements which have been made for supporting the resistance, referring to the Nicaraguan resistance, I take it.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And in fact, your memorandum did not make any such reference?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you tell Mr. North at or about the time you got this memorandum that he should be careful to tell the Central American country that there was no connection between what you were doing and the fact that they had supplied end user certificates for the contras?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Did I tell him to say that there was no connection?

"Mr. NIELDS. Yes.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think I told him

anything"
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 74-77; JHICI Ex. 35 [North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/5/85].)

85/03/05-500
MARCH 5, 1985

NORTH'S AND SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES:
ARMS FOR THE CONTRAS
C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. Carome. [Redacted], when you provided intelligence information to Mr. North on these various occasions during the full Boland proscription [see 84/11/07-500, -501; 85/02/06-320; 85/02/15-010], did you take any steps to ensure that he would not pass that intelligence to the Nicaraguan leadership? The contra leadership?

"[C/CATF.] Not specifically, no. Except that I did at one point fairly early on -- and I would have had -- I had several times asked Ollie if he was sure everything he was doing was legal; and he assured me that he was doing everything legal and was within the law.

"Mr. Carome. By early 1985 -- let's say March 1985, I take it that you had a knowledge that Oliver North was playing a role in locating arms for the contras; is that right?

"[C/CATF.] By that time, I knew that Oliver North was playing a role in a -- in supporting the overall Nicaraguan -- in supporting or facilitating support to the overall Nicaraguan resistance.

"Mr. Carome. You knew he was playing a role in locating arms for the contras, didn't you?

"[C/CATF.] In seeing that arms were provided to the contras; I knew he was providing a role in seeing arms were provided or helping in facilitating provision of arms to the contras and that was causing -- and could affect -- and caused that to happen but not that he was playing a specific and direct role in doing it, in executing it at that point in time.

"Mr. Carome. You also knew at that time that Richard Secord was playing a role in getting arms to the Nicaraguan contras; is that correct?

"[C/CATF.] In a very narrow sense, yes. I think that --

"Mr. Carome. I refer you to [C/CATF] Exhibit 5.

"[C/CATF.] Exhibit 5?

"Mr. Carome. Exhibit 5 is a cable dated March 5, 1985 . . . .

". . . .

"[C/CATF.] Yes, I do.

"Mr. Carome. That cable refers to a purchase in, I believe [redacted,] of ammunition of various sorts by Richard Secord to be provided to the contras; is that correct?

"[C/CATF.] Yes, it is.

"Mr. Carome. And so by March of 1985, you were aware that Richard Secord was involved in the provision of arms to the contras; is that right?

"[C/CATF.] I must have known that. I do not recall that specific cable. What I recall is a much earlier -- I think earlier cable that talked about provision of SA-7s from [redacted] but, yes, I knew that.

"Mr. Carome. When you received an intelligence report such as this, is that the kind of thing that you would then go and talk to Oliver North about?

"[C/CATF.] We would disseminate it through sensitive channels, and I would not necessarily pick up the telephone and talk to Oliver North about it; but he would see it and from time to time we might talk about it. He might call me and ask me about it and want to know further details about it as was his wont to do."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 252-54; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 5.)

85/03/05-501
MARCH 5, 1985

NORTH'S AND SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES:
ARMS FOR THE CONTRAS
C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2:

"Mr. Carome. In your deposition before . . . one of these committees on May 1st, 198[7] . . . you were asked a question at page 28, 'Did you discuss with North whether Secord was working with him in getting arms for the contras?

"'Answer: No. Not to my recollection. I stayed away from it. I didn't want to get involved, and I must tell you that I knew that Ollie would see that intelligence report.'

"That is referring to [C/CATF] Exhibit 5 here.

"'I knew that Ollie would see that intelligence report, but I wouldn't just up and down and say, "Look at this."'

"Was that your testimony that day?

"[C/CATF.] That was my testimony. It is still my testimony to this date.

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		"Mr. Carome. Why would you not want to get involved in telling Oliver North about an intelligence report such as this? "[C/CATF.] It reflects back to my comments that I made in my -- earlier on in my testimony. I knew by -- certainly by March of 1985 that I was in a precarious position, and I had to make each decision I made based on the laws and based on staying with -- keeping the agency within the bounds of legality that I have discussed. I didn't want to get too close to dealing with Oliver North on something like that because -- as you said -- by that point in time, I knew that Oliver North or had suspicion that Oliver North was playing a role -- I thought at the point in time indirectly in facilitating support to the Nicaraguan Resistance, and I knew where I was legally, and I knew that I wanted to stay away from it and did not want to get involved with it and would have backed away from it unless confronted with the situation otherwise." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 254-56.)	
85/03/06-100 MARCH 6, 1985		DAVID WALKER AND THE MANAGUA ARMS DEPOT EXPLOSION NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. . . . [O]n March 6, 1985, an arms depot in Managua, Nicaragua, was destroyed by an explosion. "What was your role in arranging for the explosion? "Mr. NORTH. I personally had no role in it whatsoever. It is my understanding that foreign operatives were engaged in that activity and	

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		assisted therein. We talked to that in the executive session the other night, sir. "Mr. STOKES. I am not going to get into classified materials. This is different. "Was David Walker hired to conduct that operation? "Mr. NORTH. David Walker was not hired to conduct any specific operation--certainly not by me. Mr. Walker was engaged to provide operational support for certain activities in the region, as I understand it, and I do not know the contractual relationship he had with anyone in those activities. "Mr. STOKES. Who paid Mr. Walker for conducting that operation? "Mr. NORTH. It is my understanding--and I do not want to speak with absolute definity on it--you have seen the documents I provided to the committee, or that were provided to the committee from my files. It is my understanding that he was paid by the Nicaraguan resistance or by General Secord. "Mr. STOKES. Did you have to arrange any type of approval in conjunction with his work there? "Mr. NORTH. I am quite certain that I sought the approval of my superiors. I don't recall the specific events. But when Mr. Walker's advice and counsel was sought on those kinds of activities, I am sure that I informed my superiors "Mr. STOKES. And by your superiors, to whom do you refer? "Mr. NORTH. I am talking specifically--and do not recall when Mr. Walker was first engaged to	

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provide assistance--if it was 1984, it would have been Mr. McFarlane; if it was 1985, it would have been Admiral Poindexter.

"I would simply have advised him that he was being brought in as the person to provide that kind of assistance.

"Mr. STOKES. Did you seek approval beyond either Mr. McFarlane or Mr. Poindexter?

"Mr. NORTH. No. As I have testified throughout, those were the people to whom I reported. I am sure that I gave indication to Director Casy that this had been done. Other than that, no different than I have testified, sir.

"Mr. STOKES. Was there any discussion with your superiors about the possibility that this action might violate the Boland Amendment?

"Mr. NORTH. No. I don't recall any such discussion. And, furthermore, I don't recall any specific planning on my part for that specific activity, prior to the event."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 79-82.)

85/03/06-150
BETWEEN 1984
AND 1986

DAVID WALKER AND BLOWPIPES
McFARLANE REPONSE TO NORTH:

"Mr. FOLEY. Did you authorize Colonel North to discuss with David Walker activities inside Nicaragua?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. The name Walker rings a bell. I associate it with a separate matter I think that concerned Blowpipes after I left the Government. I don't know if that is what you refer to or not.

"Mr. FOLEY. Do you recall with Colonel North or otherwise attempting to assist the contras in

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		obtaining Blowpipes? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, I took no action on it. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you ever ask the President to intercede with any person for the obtaining of Blowpipes for the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 249.)	
85/03/06-160 SOMETIME BETWEEN 1984 AND 1986		DAVID WALKER IN NICARAGUA NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. Who is David Walker? "Mr. NORTH. David Walker is a British subject who runs a business in the Channel Islands. ". . . . "Mr. FOLEY. He is an international securities--or international specialist in insurgency and military matters? "Mr. NORTH. The firm that he represents runs, specializes in, a number of activities like security assistance and the like. ". . . . "Mr. FOLEY. David Walker is an international arms and securities specialist to his British subjects, is that right? "Mr. NORTH. That's my understanding, yes, sir. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you authorize or have any discussions with him regarding activities inside Nicaragua? "Mr. NORTH. I did. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you authorize him to perform military actions in Nicaragua?	

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		"Mr. NORTH. I did. "Mr. FOLEY. What were those actions? "Mr. NORTH. David Walker was involved, his organization, as I understand it, in support of the Nicaraguan Resistance with internal operations in Managua and elsewhere in an effort to improve the perception that the Nicaraguan Resistance could operate anywhere that it so desired. "Mr. FOLEY. Involved so-called policies of intimidation. Is that what we are talking about? "Mr. NORTH. No, those were other activities that we talked about. "Mr. FOLEY. We are talking about military actions, attacks on military aircraft of the Sandinista government? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you directly authorize that? "Mr. NORTH. I didn't directly authorize anything. I encouraged Mr. Walker to be in touch with the people who could benefit from that, the expertise that he had. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you report that recommendation to Admiral Poindexter? "Mr. NORTH. I did. "Mr. FOLEY. Did he approve it? "Mr. NORTH. I reported what I thought was a good idea for certain expertise that the Nicaraguan resistance did not have as a consequence of insufficient training, insufficient operational capability. "Mr. FOLEY. Did he ever tell you he approved it? "Mr. NORTH. He never told me not to.	

"Mr. FOLEY. He didn't tell you disapprove it?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. FOLEY. Do you know if the President was even informed of it?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not know, sir."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 136, 141-44.)

85/03/06-165
1985-86

DAVID WALKER IN NICARAGUA
NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION:

[2 sets of questions and answers redacted after the excerpt of testimony quoted at 84/03/27-120. North's testimony then continues:]

"Mr. Stokes. And was that something in which you were involved?

"Mr. North. I was.

"Mr. Stokes. Was it David Walker?

"Mr. North. It is my understanding Mr. Walker provided two technicians involved in that. Mr. Walker owns, manages, directs, I don't know what the right word is, a foreign country comprised of special air services and special boat services personnel who provide service [redacted.]

"Mr. Stokes. Can you tell us who approved that activity?

"Mr. North. I know I talked about the thing in detail with Director Casey, and I believe I have a memorandum or two going up the line to my superiors on it.

"Mr. Stokes. Those would be memorandums that we have here?

"Mr. North. I believe that you have them. I think -- it is stuff that came out of my file. It is not what I produced for you. I didn't take any

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		of those with me. "Mr. Liman. I don't know whether or not it survived. If it is a PROF note, we have a better chance than if it is a memo. "Mr. North. I think there are probably some PROF notes on it too. [Redacted.]" (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 57-59.)	
85/03/06-170 DURING 1985		DAVID WALKER IN NICARAGUA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. FOLEY. Colonel North testified that he had discussed with David Walker concerning certain military missions inside Nicaragua during 1985. Did you know about these activities? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I recall that Colonel North reported to me at one point--I have lost track of the time frame--but that a man named David Walker had come to town; and as I recall, Secretary John Lehman, who was the Secretary of the Navy at the time, had made it known that Walker was an interesting person that somebody ought to talk to. "Colonel North reported talking to David Walker and generally laid out who he was and what sort of assistance he might be able to provide the contra leadership. "Mr. FOLEY. You knew he was a former SAS officer? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe I did. "Mr. FOLEY. And that there was discussion under way about conducting military operations inside Nicaragua under David Walker's direction? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I recall my level of	

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		detailed knowledge on that was simply that he was an ex-SAS officer involved in an international security business and thought that he might be helpful to the contra leadership in their fight against the Sandinistas. "Mr. FOLEY. Do you know whether Colonel North directed him to the contra leadership and helped coordinate his activities? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall knowing that. I would not have been surprised. "Mr. FOLEY. You wouldn't have disapproved of that effort? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely not. "Mr. FOLEY. Were you concerned about the United States Government being involved through an intermediary security specialist in the performance of military operations inside Nicaragua? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that is inappropriate at all. As I have testified numerous times before this body, I did not feel as if the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC staff and there weren't any restrictions on our putting the contra leadership in contact with people that might be of assistance to them. "They needed help. We were trying to do everything we could to help them. "Mr. FOLEY. Well, you are familiar as the National Security Advisor with the usual standards of international conduct. Isn't it true that if the United States Government directly perpetrated acts of military violence inside a country with which we have diplomatic relations that that could	

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		be considered an act of war? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Foley, under the presidential findings that existed long before this, the United States policy was to do that very thing. "Mr. FOLEY. Commit acts of war against Nicaragua? "Mr. BECKLER. May I request, please, that the witness be allowed to continue his answer? "Mr. FOLEY. I am sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt the witness, counsel. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't consider that an act of war. The Sandinista government is exporting revolution to the surrounding countries of the area. I think that is a much more serious problem. All that we were doing was putting the contra leadership in contact with an expert that might be of assistance to them in training and in operations." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 12-15. See Poindexter Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 8/6/87, at 26-29 [David Walker].)	
85/03/06-171 DURING 1985		DAVID WALKER IN NICARAGUA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. FOLEY. Well, if I can review your answer, as I understood you to say, that under a previous finding, the President had approved this kind of thing, and the previous question to that was whether if it had been done directly by the United States, whether committing acts of military violence in Nicaragua could be considered an act	

of war.

"Now, I am still a little uncertain about what your answer is with respect to the activities. You say that they are not acts of war, but they are acts of military violence. Would you agree?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I am not saying that we were directly involved in that. What I am saying is that Colonel North talked to Mr. Walker to find out what his capabilities were and then I assumed that he put Walker in contact with the contra leadership.

"What the contra leadership decided to do with Mr. Walker is a decision for the contra leadership.

"Mr. FOLEY. You know what later happened in Nicaragua?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not know.

"Mr. FOLEY. We were, in effect, a sort of broker to bring David Walker together with the contra leadership for the purpose of what he proposed to do in the way of committing military acts within Nicaragua. We were at least in that role; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Foley, I don't see any difference between putting Mr. Walker in contact with the contra leadership than I do in encouraging private support to the contras to carry out their fight against the communist Sandinista government[.]

"Mr. FOLEY. Was the President informed of Mr. Walker's activity at any time?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, he was not.

"Mr. FOLEY. To your knowledge, has he ever been informed about it prior to these hearings?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Would you repeat the question, please?

"Mr. FOLEY. To you knowledge, has he ever been informed about it prior to the public disclosure of Mr. Walker's activities?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I doubt it. In fact, as I have just testified, I don't recall knowing if any results ever came out of the Walker connection." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 15-17.)

85/03/07-100
MARCH 7, 1985

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: C/CATF AWARENESS
C/CATF ACCOUNT:

[C/CATF testimony continuing from 85/03/05-501:]

"Mr. Carome. [C/CATF] Exhibit 6 is another entry out of Oliver North's notebooks. It is dated March 7, 1985. It is headed 'The Meeting With [Redacted]'. This exhibit appears to indicate that two days after receiving the intelligence which is Exhibit 6 you, in fact did meet with Oliver North and did discuss in precise detail the nature of that intelligence report. Does that refresh your recollection and indicate to you that you did have discussions with North about that intelligence? It is virtually verbatim out of the cable.

"[C/CATF.] It would appear that I did that. I don't recall having done it, but these notes would appear that I talked with him probably in responding to questions that he asked me.

"Mr. Carome. Let's turn to another subject.

"[C/CATF.] But, I must tell you that I did

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		not clearly sort of have the mental vision of that meeting having taken place and me doing that particular thing, and I must also tell you that it is not very likely that in a meeting with Oliver North that I would remember that kind of detail given the amount of traffic that was flowing over my desk. I mean this is a lot of recall with me ticking these things down. I have got a pretty good memory, but unless I annotate something, I wouldn't have one, two, three, four, five ticks like that." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 256-57.)	
85/03/08-100 MARCH 8, 1985		McFARLANE MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS ON THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING McFARLANE MEMO: In a memo drafted by North, McFarlane records: "Per you[r] memo of Februry 28, 1985, I met with the following members of the HPSCI on March 4, 1985: "Representative Robert Stump (R-AZ) "Representative Robert Livingston (R-LA) "Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) "Representative Robert McCollum (R-FL) ". . . . "Henry Hyde felt that we should expand private sector and third country assistance, such as [redacted] in the effort to support the resistance. I explained why these are just not tenable alternatives--for the freedom fighters or for us. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 105 [McFarlane memo to	

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		Friedersdorf, "Meeting with Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)," 3/8/85].)	
85/03/15-100 MARCH 15, 1985		RODRIGUEZ IN CENTRAL AMERICA RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Felix Rodriguez arrives in a Central American country and starts his helicopter concept: "I sort of set up my shop in a place that a friend of mine provided for me, . . . as a private individual . . . . I was not being paid. I was paid morally by my own feelings. . . . The beginning was very hard. I had a big break on April 18th, when we were able to capture a commandante alive, and that was my breaking [p]oint in introducing the concept and getting respect for the local people and the concept itself." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 226-27.)	
85/03/15-200 MARCH 15 - SEPTEMBER 1985		NORTH-RODRIGUEZ CONTACT RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Felix Rodriguez engages in over 100 helicopter missions in a counterinsurgency operation for a Central American government. During that period he meets with Oliver North on several occasions. (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 227-28.)	
85/03/15-400 SOMETIME IN THE SPRING 1985		COUNTRY 2 CONTRIBUTION: WEINBERGER'S KNOWLEDGE WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. . . . Mr. McFarlane testified that in the spring of 1985 there was a large contribution from country number two. . . .	

"Do you recall being aware?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. No. I was not aware."

". . . .

"Mr. EGGLESTON. . . . Exhibit [CWW] 39 is a memorandum for the record by John McMahon. It is dated March 15, 1985, and on the second page in paragraph 7 it refers to a meeting that you had with Director Casey at or about that time. It indicates, 'Question of the support to the contras came up.' . . .

"The last line reads, 'In closing, the Sec--' --meaning the Secretary of Defense-- '--stated that he had heard that--' --I will tell you what is under there is an official of country two-- '--had earmarked 25 million for the contras in $5 million increments.' Do you have any recollection of seeing--

"Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't really. These were regular breakfast meetings that I had every week with the CIA Director and they were very free-form discussions and meetings. The Director and his Deputy and Mr. Taft and I went to these breakfasts every week and there was a lot of discussion back and forth and reports passed on and this statement that I had heard that, I don't remember saying it, but I did frequently joke with Mr. Casey to the effect that I frequently picked up things from his rival intelligence agency, which was one of the morning radio stations, and I may have passed on that kind of report.

"I don't have any specific memory of it, but John McMahon is a good reporter so he probably heard this statement made.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. John McMahon was Deputy Director of the CIA at the time?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. He was indeed.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. But you don't have any recollection of being advised by Mr. McFarlane or--

"Secretary WEINBERGER. No.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. --the President or anyone else that there had been such a large contribution from country two?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. No. The reason I am quite sure about it is that we were all making major efforts at that time to get funding for the contras from the Congress and I think probably many of the gentlemen here remember that I made lots of calls in support of various bills and particularly trying to get the $100 million appropriation which ultimately was voted.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. Country two is a country with which the Department of Defense had some dealings; is that fair?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, we have dealings with a very large number of countries. Yes, this was one of those, surely."
(Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 133-35; JHICI Ex. CWW 39 [Memorandum for the Record signed by McMahon, "Breakfast with Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense," 3/15/85]. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 74-77.)

85/03/16-090
MARCH 16,
1985

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: FALLBACK PLAN
NORTH MEMO:

North proposes to McFarlane a fallback plan in case Congress should deny the Administration's funding request:

"The plan attached at Tab I has been developed, pursuant to our discussion on Friday regarding fallback options. It is premised on the assumption of a major Congressional budget battle and an assessment that the Congress will not rescind the restrictions in Section 8066 of the FY-85 C.R. (Tab A). . . .

"Secrecy for the plan is paramount. We could not implement such an option if it became known in advance and it also mandates that present donors continue their relationship with the resistance beyond the current funding figure. . . .

"[Tab I]

"FALLBACK OPTION PLAN FOR THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE

". . . .

". . . The current funding relationship which exists between the resistance and its donors is sufficient to purchase arms and munitions between now and October--if additional monies are provided for non-military supplies (e.g., food, clothing, medical items, etc.). The current donors will have to be convinced of the need to continue their funding for munitions after October 1, 1985. A commitment for another $25-30M from the donors will be necessary for munitions in 1986 in anticipation that the $28M requested in the intelligence budget is not approved.

"CONCEPT. In lieu of forwarding the report to the Congress required by Section 8066 of PL 98-473, the President would announce on or about

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		April 2 that the American people should contribute funds ('. . . send your check or money order to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters, Box 1776, Gettysburg, PA . . .') to support liberty and democracy in the Americas. He would note that the monies raised would be used to support the humanitarian needs of those struggling for freedom against Communist tyranny in Central America. By necessity, the speech must be dramatic and a surprise. It CANNOT be leaked in advance. [Handwritten note by McFarlane in right margin: "No"] "Prior to the speech, the following steps must be taken: "--Calero, Cruz, and Robelo (the principle [sic] leadership of the Nicaraguan armed and unarmed resistance) must be covertly advised to this plan and must assure of their support. [Handwritten by McFarlane in right margin: "Yes"] "--The Nicaraguan Freedom Fund, Inc., a 501(c)3 tax exempt corporation, must be established and obtain a Post Office Box 1776 in Gettysburg, Philadelphia, Valley Forge, or Yorktown. (This process is already underway.) [Handwritten by McFarlane in right margin: "Yes"] ". . . . "--The current donors must be apprised of the plan and agree to provide additional $25-30M to the resistance for the purchase of arms and munitions. [Handwritten by McFarlane in right margin: "doubt"] ". . . . "ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.	

"--Informal contact several months ago with a lawyer sympathetic to our cause indicated that such a procedure would be within the limits of the law. Fred Fielding should be asked to do conduct [sic] a very PRIVATE evaluation of the President's role in making such a request. [McFarlane notation unreadable.]

"--The name of one of several existing non-profit foundations, we have established in the course of the last year, will be changed to Nicaraguan Freedom Fund, Inc. Several reliable American citizens must be contacted to serve as its corporate leadership on its board of directors along with Cruz, Calero, and Robelo[.] [McFarlane notation unreadable.]

". . . ."

(JHICI Ex. 36 [= Exx. FH 4; OLN 147].)

85/03/16-095
MARCH 16,
1985

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: FALLBACK PLAN, AND PRIVATE DONORS

McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . Exhibit 36 purports to be, Mr. McFarlane, a memorandum sent to you by Oliver North dated [M]arch 16, 198[5], entitled 'Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance.'

"Am I correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it has notations on the margin and are those your notations?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, they are.

"Mr. LIMAN. It is fair to say that North was making proposals to you for means of obtaining funds in the event that . . . Congress did not appropriate funds; is that fair to say?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. He was expressing some ideas about it, yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you were writing on the margins your views, yes, no, doubtful, and so forth?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. If we look at this memorandum, Colonel North stated, as his assumption right at the beginning, that the Congress is unwilling to support release of $14 million in U.S. Government funds for the purpose of supporting directly or indirectly military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. That was the--what he assumed for the purpose of the memorandum?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Then he came up with different options. He goes on to say in the next paragraph, the second sentence, 'The current funding relationship which exists between the resistance and its donors is sufficient to purchase arms and munitions between now and October--if additional moneys are provided for non-military supplies, for example, food, clothing, medical items, et cetera. The current donors will have to be convinced of the need to continue their funding for munitions after October 1, 1985. A commitment for another 25 to 30 million from the donors will be necessary for munitions in 1986 in anticipation that the $28 million requested in the intelligence budget is not approved.'

"Am I correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

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		"Mr. LIMAN. Now, it is also correct that Congress did approve $27 million for fiscal year 1986; am I correct in that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. But that was not for munitions, but for humanitarian aid? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is right. "Mr. LIMAN. When Colonel North wrote here that the current donors will have to be convinced of the need to continue their funding for munitions, did you understand that he was referring to Country Two as the current donors? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And what was the reason, if any, that you know that he used the plural for one country? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I think in common parlance, whenever we talked about that country, we talked about a collective leadership, but it was always expressed in plural. It was just a common reference for Country Two. "Mr. LIMAN. Was it to camouflage that it was one country? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think so. "Mr. LIMAN. In any event, you did want to keep the identity of the country secret? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 80-82; JHICI Ex. 36 [North memo to McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/16/85].)	
85/03/16-096 MARCH 16,		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: FALLBACK PLAN, AND PRIVATE DONORS	

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1985		McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Now, you have testified that one of the rules that you laid down was that there should be no solicitation? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Would you tell me when Colonel North said the current donors will have to be convinced of the need to continue their funding, is that a distinction that you are drawing between solicitation and convincing, or that he is drawing? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, my reaction to this proposition was negative in any case, that it wasn't a matter of splitting hairs between soliciting and inducing, if you will, by circumlocution. It was a matter that we weren't going to rely on any foreign source again, in my judgment. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, when you say that you turned it down, you wrote on the second page where he gave his recommendations, he wrote, 'The current donors must be apprised of the plan and agree to provide additional $25 to $30 million to the resistance for the purchase of arms and munitions,' and you wrote, 'I doubt.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Why did you write doubt? Some you wrote no on, some you wrote yes. Why did you write doubt? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I don't know concretely at the time why I wrote that, but basically, it seemed to me that first of all, we could not. It	

was illegal. Secondly, that it should not, because it was getting ourselves, if we continued to rely on somebody else to sustain a policy, we couldn't. [Sic.]

"Mr. LIMAN. Did it strike you as unusual at all that after you told Colonel North that solicitation was out, and after you rejected his recommendations for solicitation on a number of occasions that he kept sending you memoranda saying, let's solicit, let's encourage?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it did.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did it occur to you that the message wan't getting through?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, at this particular time, it seemed a little odd, because things were looking better at this moment. We were about to have the San Jose Declaration, our own peace plan, and it seemed to me that our fortunes with the Congress were rising at that particular moment; plus it is still very close in time to the infusion of 25 million new dollars, so we didn't need the money anyway.

"Mr. LIMAN. As you sit here today, are you positive that you did give those instructions against solicitation? I know it was seven years ago. Are you positive that you gave those instructions?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. Absolutely.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, he also recommended that the President make an appeal to the American people to send money for the contras, and you wrote no on that?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that is correct."

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		(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/27, at 82-85; JHICI Ex. 36 [North memo to McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/16/85].)	
85/03/16-097 MARCH 16, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: FALLBACK PLAN, AND PRIVATE DONORS McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. And he [sc. North] recommended that there be a tax-exempt organization created for the freedom fighters, and that you wrote yes on? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Were you at all involved at all in the activities of the Channell group to obtain money for the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I wasn't. "Mr. LIMAND. Were you aware that that group was engaged in that endeavor? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I wasn't. I only learned of the group this past year. "Mr. LIMAN. You didn't speak at any of their functions? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you know that Colonel North was involved with them? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you know that he was involved with Mr. Miller in attempting to help the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you know Mr. Miller? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I don't. "Mr. LIMAN. And again, this is another thing	

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		that Colonel North didn't report to you on? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I didn't know anything about them; that is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Was there any sense that you had at the time that you had given Colonel North the idea that, intentionally or unintentionally, that there were just some things that he shouldn't bring to your attention? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think so. I didn't intend to; and yet, I think this: I think that I have to accept responsibility regardless of whether I provided explicit direction that le[]d to this, that as the person who set the tone, set the example, was in charge, I am responsible for what happened. "Mr. LIMAN. But, Mr. McFarlane, for example, you did not want to impose certain knowledge on the Secretary of State? [See 86/06/16-080.] "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And I am asking you whether on a lower level there was that same compartmentalization, namely, that as you think about what was happening then, that Colonel North was not briefing you on some things which would have been awkward for you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I understand what you mean, and I think that it is very possible that Colonel North would have done the other thing, and that is not tell me things in order to protect me. He was a very loyal officer, concerned for my own welfare, too. "So I can imagine that he may have undertaken things to do and not told me about it for my	

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		benefit, and not his. "Mr. LIMAN. Now that is the point that I was really asking you about. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Because when you didn't tell the Secretary of State, that was for his benefit, not for yours? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 85-87; JHICI Ex. 36 [North memo to McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/16/85].)	
85/03/16-100 MARCH 16, 1985 AND NOVEMBER 21, 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS: CONTRA FALL-BACK PLAN HALL ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [Exhibit] FH-4 is a memorandum dated March 16, 1985 from Colonel North to Mr. McFarlane. It contains the System 4 number 400426 and that again Ms. Hall is another one of the document numbers appearing on the McFarlane list. "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. This document was typed on or about March 16, 1985, and its subject is 'Fall-Back Plan for the Nicaraguan Rssistance.' "Now, the document as it appeared on March 16, 1985, or at least as we have it, consisted of three pages, the first page of which was a cover memorandum from Colonel North in which he said that a fall-back plan had been developed, that plan which is laid out on the second two pages, a fall-back plan to aid the Nicaraguan resistance on the assumption that the Congress decided not to rescind the restrictions on the contra aid that	

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		were then in force. "Colonel North goes on to tell Mr. McFarlane that secrecy for the plan, in his words, is paramount, and that the other key to the plan is that the present donors continue their relationship with the resistance beyond the current funding figure. "The recommendation that Colonel North makes to Mr. McFarlane is that if Senators Durenberger and Lugar indicate that there is an unwillingness on the part of Congress to support resumption of full United States Government aid to the Nicaraguan resistance, then Mr. McFarlane ought to discuss this fall-back plan with the Secretary of State. "Now, if you look at the second page of . . . Exhibit 4, Colonel North begins laying out there and continues on the page after precisely what he proposes as that fall-back option. "Very briefly, the Colonel tells Mr. McFarlane that the funding which is then being provided by the current donors would be sufficient to carry the resistance until October, provided that additional monies were raised for non-military supplies. "Colonel North's proposal to raise that money is that the President of the United States, instead of returning to the Congress for assistance as contemplated by the statute then in force, that instead of doing that, the President make a sudden and dramatic appeal over nationwide television to the citizens of the United States asking them to contribute to the Nicaraguan	

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		resistance; correct? "And he proposes that there be established a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization for that purpose, that the contra leaders be informed, and that the President's speech be conceived and put together in total secrecy. "Would you now take a look at Exhibit 4-A? Exhibit 4-A bears the same System 4 number as Exhibit 4--40046--only this one reduces what was a three-page memorandum to a one-paragraph memorandum. "In that paragraph, Colonel North had deleted all reference to any fall-back plan and says instead that Congress seems reluctant to rescind the aid restrictions and that there, therefore, is a need to develop a fall-back plan for supporting the resistance. "And he states that the best fall-back we have is to stress that while President Reagan is unwilling to use U.S troops in Nicaragua, all available intelligence supports the realization that we will have to in the 1990s, if there is not a democratic outcome now. "You have checked the approval boxes on that document, and this, too, is one of the documents that we believe you prepared at Colonel North's request on November 21, correct? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 271-74; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 4 [North memo to McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/16/85], FH 4-A [other version of North memo to	

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		McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/16/85]. For Hall testimony on the documents listed by McFarlane in Ex. FH 1, see below at 86/11/21-615 and -616. For Hall testimony on the individual altered documents, see 84/12/04-100; 85/02/06-310 and -311; 85/03/05-215 and -216; 85/04/11-230; and 85/05/31-100. See Iran-Contra Report, at 125 [Contra fall-back plan memo], 123-26 [altered documents].)	
85/03/16-810 MARCH 16, 1985			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: Terry Anderson, chief AP Middle East correspondent, is kidnapped in Lebanon. (CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 3.)
85/03/20-100 MARCH 20, 1985		TIMING AND THE CONTRA AID VOTE NORTH MEMO: In a memo to McFarlane, North lays out a schedule of events planned to prepare for the upcoming vote in Congress on Contra aid: "Attached at Tab A is the most recent version of the chronology of events aimed at securing Congressional approval for renewed support to the Nicaraguan Resistance Forces . . . . "In addition to the events depicted on the internal chronology at Tab A, other activities in the region continue as planned--including military operations and political action. Like the chronology, these events are also timed to influence the vote: "-- planned travel by Calero, Cruz, and Robelo; "-- various military resupply efforts timed to	

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		support significantly increased military operations immediately after the vote (we expect major Sandinista crossborder attacks in this timeframe--today's resupply to [redacted] from [redacted] went well); and "-- special operations attacks against highly visible military targets in Nicaragua. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 217 [North memo to Poindexter, "Timing and the Nicaraguan Resistance Vote," 3/20/85].)	
85/03/21-000 SOMETIME IN THE SPRING OF 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PASSING MONEY OWEN ACCOUNT: Robert Owen makes payments to a number of different Contra leaders. One is an Indian leader "who was having negotiations at one time with the Sandinistas. It was felt that if his negotiations were not successful that there was a need to unite all the factions of the Indian movement." Owen passes him several thousand dollars in cash or traveler's checks in Owen's parked car. "I said that the powers that be wanted to continue to support him as best we could." The deal is "in a way, a quid pro quo": "The feeling was that if he went to negotiations with the Sandinistas and he walked out of them, because he believed they would not be successful, that we would try and help him and help the other members of the Indian movement unite and work together in a united front against the Sandinistas." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 244-46.)	

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		Owen provides that Indian leader with more money "[o]n at least one or two other occasions." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 246.) Owen testified that he paid about $30,000 in total to six to ten Contra leaders at different times. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 2-3.)	
85/03/21-040 AT SOME UNSPECIFIED TIME DURING OR AFTER 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MONEY TO CONTRA LEADERS NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on payments to Contra leaders: "Mr. NIELDS. And in one case you sent a total of $225,000 to one leader. "Mr. NORTH. I give up. Who? "Mr. NIELDS. We have been avoiding mentioning particular names, but there is a particular leader who was sent $225,000 over approximately a year-and-a-half period out of the Swiss bank accounts under General Secord's control. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. . . . [T]he amount may be $225,000 or higher. But I don't think the committee ought to be left with the impression that he was bribed or she was bribed into joining this movement. These were people who felt deeply, perhaps even more so than I, because it was their country. And I don't know that anybody was ever bribed to join the Nicaraguan resistance, no matter who the person is or how much he got. I think that they fought as best they were able and they used the moneys that I provided for them to support the cause that they believe in.	

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		"In particular that man, who after all had been a part of the movement to throw out Somoza. That is important for you to understand. This man joined up with what he had hoped to be a democratic opposition, and he had the revolution that he worked for stolen from him. And, yes, I sent money to that man, and I know because I saw the product of it, that he helped form a southern front with that money, and if it helped him to live and to feed his family, good, and there is nothing wrong with that, Counsel, nothing." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 165-66.)	
85/03/21-050 EARLY THROUGH MID 1985		NORTH'S ACCESS TO MONEY FOR THE CONTRAS: C/CATF AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Carome. I take it you were aware by early 1985 Oliver North was assisting the contras by routing money to various contra leaders, is that right? "[C/CATF.] Yes. "Mr. Carome. In essence, correct me if I am wrong, Oliver North was in some ways picking up where the Central Intelligence Agency had left off at the time the Boland came into effect by way of providing this money to various leaders, is that right? "[C/CATF.] I wouldn't -- your statement is correct, in fact, but at the point in time, my level of knowledgeability, I wouldn't have put it that way. That was not my understanding. Ollie always maintained that he was the interface, the go-between between donors who were providing funds	

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		to the Resistance and left the impression that he was causing things to happen, but was not actually doing them himself. "What I thought he was doing, very frankly, until very late in the game, was facilitating donors, rich Americans, by and large, which was what most of the people around us thought, to donate funds to various individuals. But I did not know that he was actually paying the cash out himself or was controlling the accounts. "Mr. Carome. For instance, you learned at RIG meetings in the first quarter of 1985 that [redacted] was receiving payments arranged by Oliver North, is that right? "[C/CATF.] Not at RIG meetings. I think Oliver North told me that in phone conversations or some other discussions because we talked very clearly in RIG meetings and in phone conversations about the impact in the political context of the cutoff in funding [redacted.] "I think the memb[er]s of the House Intelligence Committee remember those discussions very, very clearly. We talked about the political impact of that, what it would do to the political side of the program, what it would do to where we were going. Ollie was fully aware of it, and I had discussions with Ollie talking about the sort of, 'Gees, this is just a terrible thing, isn't there some way this can be paid?' And Ollie said we can do that thing or it can be done, passive voice. "Mr. Carome. Around the same time you also learned that Calero was receiving substantial sums	

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		being arranged by Oliver North, is that correct? "[C/CATF.] No. I learned it earlier. I began to understand it earlier, and I think it is important to expand on that. As I said in my deposition, I began to see things happening with the Resistance Forces that were not explainable. They didn't withdraw from Nicaragua like they were supposed to. They were feeding their troops. They were doing things in December, particularly January, and that surprised me. "And I began to look around for where things were going. It became clear to me that they had access to money. And as it became clear to me that they had access to money, I suppose someplace in January, February of 1985, I began to develop an understanding that Oliver North was in and around and had some role in this and that was when I began to develop with Clair[] George, who will follow me, the very clear policies that would govern our operations and my particular behavior, and I thought the behavior of our various [redacted] employees for the next two-and-a-half years. "So the answer to your question is I knew it slightly earlier, but I didn't know that he was providing. I thought he was causing to be provided." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 257-59; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 6.)	
85/03/21-051 EARLY THROUGH MID 1985		NORTH'S ACCESS TO MONEY FOR THE CONTRAS: C/CATF AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2:	

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		[Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Carome. And you also learned around that same time, I take it, that [redacted] was receiving payments arranged by Oliver North, is that correct? "[C/CATF.] That is a difficult question. Because -- "Mr. Carome. Let me refer you to [C/CATF] Exhibit 9. Exhibit 9 is another item out of Oliver North's notebooks. The first part of Exhibit 9 is dated July 11. That is July 11, 1985. It says 10:00 o'clock, call from [redacted.] Get 25 K. to [redacted.] "Then it goes on. "[C/CATF.] Yes. "Mr. Carome. Were you talking in July of 1985 with Oliver North about getting money to [redacted]? "[C/CATF.] We had been talking about money to [redacted] throughout the spring of 1985. [Redacted.] "We discussed it extensively. We decided it was probably legal to provide funds [redacted], but politically controversial, and our guiding light in those days was we will do nothing that is politically controversial because we want to build credibility with the Congress and be as straightforward as we can be and try to reinstate and to rid ourselves of some of these restrictions. "So we didn't fund [redacted] and I would think, my recollection is, by the spring of 1986 or 1985, there was probably a lot of discussion	

about the impact of that.

"It is entirely possible that I would have said, 'Gee, [redacted] is telling us [redacted] needs $25,000 to do something', but I don't recall, A, making a specific request to Oliver North to give [redacted] $25,000. I remember later that he said he was paying [redacted.] This was after laws changed [redacted] but I was surprised in my own recollection when [redacted] told [redacted] had been receiving funds from Oliver North, because I really didn't have that in my psyche or in my mind.

"Mr. Carome. You don't deny that Exhibit 9 here reflects your making a phone call to Oliver North and saying 'Get $25,000'?

"[C/CATF.] I don't deny that is what it says. What I am telling you is that I don't recall having made that phone call in just those terms. I'm telling you it is entirely possible that I could have had that conversation with him, but I don't remember, and I would have not put it in those terms. It probably would have been in another sort of context.

". . . ."

(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 259-61; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 9. See C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 94-96 [further C/CATF testimony on C/CATF Ex. 9].)

85/03/21-400
SOMETIME IN
THE SPRING OF
1985

SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ARMS TRANSACTION
SECORD ACCOUNT:

Secord arranges the second of his four arms transactions for Calero. The initial 2 involve

Transworld Armament, a Canadian arms dealer, and consist of a small ship-load of munitions from the Far East in Nov. 1984, and a 90,000-pound load from Europe in the spring of 1985. The final 2 transactions are arranged through Tom Clines--a sea lift in May 1985, and a second (undated and unspecified) transaction. Clines uses the Portuguese arms company, Defex. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 143-46, 148; JHICI Ex. 2 [arms involved in the 4 shipments].)

85/03/21-500
MARCH 21,
1985

THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING OPTIONS FOR THE CONTRAS:
McFARLANE-CASEY MEETING

McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. Now . . . after you received this memorandum [Ex. 36; see above at 85/03/16-095 through -097] from Oliver North in which he proposed going back to . . . country two, for $20 to $30 million, do you recall that you discussed the subject of third-country funding with the CIA, Mr. Casey?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't believe I did, no.

"Mr. LIMAN. If you would look--maybe this will refresh your recollection--would you look at 36-A?

"That is a memorandum of a meeting that you had with the director prepared by his office. The meeting was March 21 and the North memorandum to you was dated March 16. So it was within a week.

"In it, the director says of a meeting with you, 'We then discussed the contra situation and what to do about funding. The Director' --that is Mr. Casey-- 'expressed some concern, based on his conversations with Poindexter earlier in the day that the Administration was going to be content to seek authorization for non-lethal aid to the contras, relying on third-countries to supply either arms or funds for arms.'

"I will stop there and say, in fact, the Administration ended up seeking the money for non-lethal aid?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Then Mr. Casey goes on to say, 'I noted to McFarlane that while this is the expediency of getting dollars to the contras quickly, I fear[ed] that the long-term program would be in jeopardy. That by doing it in this--' and its--

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Fashion, I believe.

"Mr. LIMAN. 'Fashion Congress is virtually left off the hook as far as commitment to Central America goes. The opponents next year will attempt to ferret out those countries providing arms for [original document reads "or," not "for"] dollars to the contras and will then seek to cut off any aid or arms sales we have with those countries.

"'Hence, we will not only lose support to the contras, but also ou[r] ability to help those third countries. Bud noted that was a good point and he felt that rather than have another meeting on this subject he would take the issue to the President and let him decide.'

"Do you recall that meeting at all?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't, but I can picture--I recall how the meetings normally took place, on

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		Wednesday afternoons and this one doesn't-- "Mr. LIMAN. Well, here you are being told by the director that if you rely on third countries for lethal support for the contras, and it gets out, Congress could penalize those countries as well as the contras; right? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you acknowledged that that was a serious issue? And that you would leave it to the President to decide? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you bring it to the President? Do you have any recollection of that, sir? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I know that I did not. "Mr. LIMAN. Then why did you tell the CIA that you were going to leave it to the President and not to do it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, first, you assume that this is an accurate record there. The first time I have seen this document, but the--two things here. "First of all, when the director would come to the meeting, he would carry a notebook about like this, with inserts such as this one, with the CIA overlay imprinted on it. Occasionally, when there was something he wanted me to follow up on after the meeting, he would give a clean memorandum, without he CIA lettering on it; and he didn't on this subject. "But concerning this one, over time I found that from the spring of 1984 through the summer, through 1985, in fact, as a consistent matter, I	

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		normally disagreed with the director on how a given matter ought to be taken on and promoted with the Congress. "And I also found--and it didn't do very much good to argue about it, and the easy way to resolve a given conflict was just to acknowledge that the only way you are going to solve this is elevate it to the boss. "Well, that would also at least get us on the next agenda item. "Mr. LIMAN. And on this one, as I understand your testimony, you made the decision that there was no point in seeking further third country assistance? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And in fact you didn't? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 87-92; JHICI Ex. 36-A [Casey, Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 21 March 1985," 3/22/85].)	
85/03/22-000 MARCH 22 [OR 20-24], 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PASSING MONEY OWEN ACCOUNT: Robert Owen travels (for at least the 6th time) to Central America. He carries several thousand dollars in cash or traveler's checks which he had previously obtained from North. He gives them to a Contra leader. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 246-47.)	

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85/03/25-100 MARCH 25, 1985		NSC LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY UNDER BOLAND II POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Well, let me mark as the next exhibit [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 31] some handwritten notes of yours dated March 25, 1985. ". . . . "A. Okay. This is what I was saying earlier. I can't recall that, but obviously he did discuss that. "Q. Now when you say he discussed it, the note says 'meeting with the President'. This is your handwriting, correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. 'Bud covered our plan'. "A. Right. "Q. 'Third country assistance, non-lethal aid, intelligence restrictions, private humanitarian aid.' What do you remember about 'our plan'? "A. I don't remember that. "Q. Do you remember that when you wrote it down you wrote 'non-lethal' aid, so you knew what non-lethal aid was? [See generally 85/04/11-265, -276.] "A. That's right. "Q. And you write 'private humanitarian aid', and you understood that that's not the same as arms? "A. As I told you before, I can't recall this conversation. I mean, my notes indicate that's what he discussed, but exactly what was said under third country assistance --	

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		"Q. Admiral, if we step back and try to take an overview of it this was a period in March of 1985 when you were seeking to get some relief from the Boland Amendment. You recall that, don't you? "A. Well, we were always trying to do that. That's correct. "Q. I mean, you couldn't go back to Congress a month after the amendment was passed, but there came a point when you concluded that yes, you'd try to do it, right? "A. Um-hum, correct. "Q. And you were trying to come up with a plan that would be attractive to Congress so that you could get the votes; is that correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. Now were you involved in the legislative planning? "A. Not really until I became National Security Advisor in January of '86. "Q. So that before that that would have been McFarlane? "A. And Don Fortier, and I worked on other issues. "Q. But did you understand that the package that they were trying to sell to Congress involved presenting it to Congress as what we'll do is we'll seek non-lethal aid, humanitarian aid, that that was the pitch? "A. It depends on the time frame. You see, before I became National Security Advisor my position was that we shouldn't make a distinction. "Q. You wanted to have Congress vote it up or down.	

"A. That's exactly right, and that's what we did in 1986. I wouldn't compromise.

"Q. But your predecessor did compromise?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And you thought it was a mistake?

"A. I thought it was a mistake.

"Q. But you understood that at the very least he and some of the others in the White House thought that Congress might be more receptive to something which was called humanitarian aid than something which said it was going to be for arms and munitions, right?

"A. That was a generally-held view.

"Q. And you concluded when you became National Security Advisor that this can't limp along like this?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And let's put Congress to the test?

"A. That's exactly right.

"Q. And they will either vote it up or down?

"A. That's right.

"Q. And that was a change in philosophy?

"A. That's correct."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 293-96; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 31 [Poindexter handwritten notes, 3/25/85 (Committee Document N 5364)].)

85/04/00-100
SOMETIME IN
APRIL 1985

THE BERMUDEZ-SINGLAUB(-NORTH) WEAPONS LIST

SINGLAUB ACCOUNT:

Singlaub presents to North the list of weapons and ammunition needed by the Contras, which he had compiled at the FDN base camps in March 1985 with Enrique Bermudez. Singlaub seeks North's

LEDEEN'S ROLE

McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

McFarlane testified that "in I think April of 1985" Michael Ledeen told him he had met with a European official "of considerable competence" who had "referred him [sc. Ledeen] to Israel as having

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		"concurrence and [to] make sure that we weren't doing something that was in conflict with what others were doing." North ("[t]o the best of my [sc. Singlaub's] recollection") makes "some additions and subtractions to the list, or change[s] the mix a little bit." (North's changes, according to Singlaub's testimony, "were insignificant, but we accepted his suggestions.") North and Singlaub reach an agreement on the final list. ("Yes," Singlaub testified, "we definitely did.") The list does not include surface-to-air missiles. (Singlaub Testim., 5/20/87, at 203-04; see JHICI Ex. JKS 1 ["one of the iterations" of the weapons list].)	the best information on what's going on in Iran." Ledeen then said "that he was going [to Israel] anyway on a visit and would I have any interest in knowing if such ties existed. I said of course I would." McFarlane's testimony continued: "I did not task him. He was not going for me or carrying instructions. He was there on his hook to get information, as he always was. But he went there determined that they did have some history of association in talking to Iranians -- came back and said so. "I had an exchange with the Secretary of State, [who] said forget it, turn it off, but as a consequence of his visit Mr. Kimche did then come to me in July. "I had another conversation by cable with the Secretary of State and he said let's show tentative interest and you, Mr. McFarlane, be in charge of it." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 37-38)
85/04/00-120 MARCH - APRIL 1985			LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL: PREPARATION LEDEEN ACCOUNT: In March or April 1985, Michael Ledeen speaks with an intelligence official of a West European country who has recently been to Iran. The official reports that the situation in Iran "was now much more fluid than it had been at any time since the revolution, that it was a moment when he believed the United States could profitably play a role in Iran." He tells Ledeen "that the Israelis had a terrific intelligence organization inside Iran, and that they undoubtedly knew more about

Iran than any other country in the Western world, and that we should talk to them."

Some time later, Ledeen tells McFarlane about these conversations. Because Ledeen has had past contact with Prime Minister Shimon Peres while Ledeen worked for Alexander Haig, Ledeen suggests to McFarlane that "it might be useful for me to talk to Peres about this subject."

Ledeen testified, "Now, this trip which I discussed also very briefly with Teicher and Covey simply to describe to them what it was about and why I thought it would be a useful trip to make, was fully approved by McFarlane before I went to the extent that before I left he and I had a conversation in which he told me specifically what to say and what tone of voice I was to use when I said it to Peres.

"Q. Was this trip paid for by the NSC?

"A. It was indeed. . . .

". . . .

"[A.] What you will find is that from the time this thing starts, from the time of the first trip to Israel in May to the end, with the exception of my July trip to Israel which was part of a long scheduled family vacation, all of my travel was paid for by the NSC and all of it was approved by the NSC before I did it.

"So we discussed what I would say to Peres, and the nature of the conversation was that it was a research project, and that while it was a project undertaken for the National Security Council on which I would report directly to McFarlane, it was nonetheless not a policy

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			initiative but simply a search for better information about Iran. . . ." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 9-14. Ledeen's testimony on McFarlane's approval and the trip to Israel continues at 85/05/04-100).
85/04/00-400 SOMETIME IN APRIL 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PASSING MONEY OWEN ACCOUNT: Robert Owen passes an envelope with "traveler's checks and cash, I believe" to another Indian leader in the street outside the OEOB. As Owen waits in the rain, a car drives up with the Indian and one or more Americans inside. "I knew who he was and who the American was that was with him." Owen gives the Indian the money. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 247-50. See id., 5/19/87, at 3-4 [The person in the car, Owen believed, was Peter Flaherty of "a conservative activist group in town, it was either Citizens for Reagan or Citizens for America."].)	
85/04/00-600 FROM 1984		NORTH'S TRAVELER'S CHECKS OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen testifying on how the traveler's checks got from Calero to North: "Mr. EGGLESTON. . . . [Y]our testimony was that you did not personally, as best that you knew, carry any money . . . or traveler's checks between Calero and Colonel North. "Are you certain about that testimony? "Mr. OWEN. . . . [T]here may have been one or two occasions when I did bring up an envelope. I did not necessarily know that there were	

traveler's checks in it, but there may well have been, and I just can't say one way or the other.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. And just one more question on this payment issue. Did Colonel North have a method by which he kept track of the amount of the traveler's checks that he was giving to you?

"Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. He had a ledger that he kept track of every traveler's check that he gave me, from the serial numbers to the amount and where it was going. . . . [B]ut Adolfo Calero, to the best of my knowledge, provided the traveler's checks to Oliver North; Oliver North then either had me or potentially someone else that I don't know about distribute it to contra leaders; so it was, if you will, contra money going from one leader to another with an intermediary."
(Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 4-5.)

85/04/00-605
1984-85

TRAVELER'S CHECKS AND LOCAL CURRENCY
CALERO ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BARBADORO. Mr. Calero, the records that you provided to the committee of your bank accounts show that you converted approximately $3 million of this money into traveler's checks.

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Why did you do that, and can you tell us what you used that money for?

"Mr. CALERO. Traveler's checks are a very handy way for people who are going to be traveling, and we converted that into traveler's checks in order to be used for many expenses that we had to give to our--for our family support and also at the beginning, we did not have the transfer connection, let's say, the money transfer connection had not been established.

"Mr. BARBADORO. That is the ability to get money from your bank accounts down to Central America, is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes. Yes. By wire transfers and that--so for the first months, we used to, all our expenses in the region, everything, food for the troops and everything, were also taken care of out of traveler's checks, yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Your records also show payments of approximately $1.8 million to a person named Aquilles Marin.

"Mr. CALERO. That was not a payment.

"Mr. BARBADORO. What was that used for?

"Mr. CALERO. That was not a payment. . . . [H]e was a money broker, and we would deposit it in his account in the States, and he would deliver local currency in the region.

"Mr. BARBADORO. So you would deposit dollars into his account, he would convert them . . . and deliver[] them to the FDN forces; is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Into local currencies.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Okay. And is that also the case for the 1.8 million that went to Eric Lacayo?

"Mr. CALERO. Eric Lacayo, yes, sort of a Deak-Perera."

(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 35-36.)

85/04/00-607
DURING 1985

NORTH'S TRAVELER'S CHECKS

CALERO ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. Mr. Calero, did there come a time when you gave traveler's checks to Colonel

NORTH'S TRAVELER'S CHECKS AND HOSTAGE RELEASE

CALERO ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. How did you come to give these checks to Colonel North?

North?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. When did you first give him these traveler's checks?

"Mr. CALERO. Early spring 1985.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. And in total how much did you give him?

"Mr. CALERO. We are still checking. There were figures of about $90,000.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. And did you give him these $90,000 worth of checks on one occasion or over the course of several occasions?

"Mr. CALERO. Over the course of several occasions.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. How did you come to give these checks to Colonel North?

"Mr. CALERO. In one of our meetings he brought out the fact that there was a private effort going to liberate the American hostages.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. Those are the hostages in Lebanon?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"And so I reacted immediately, saying that hostages, Nicaraguan hostages of the Sandinistas, American hostages of these groups in Lebanon, were one and the same, and I was happy to help, I would be happy to help in their liberation.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. What did he tell you about the private effort to get the hostages out?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, I mean aside from it being set up in a meeting support, nothing else.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. Did Colonel North ask you for money on that occasion?

"Mr. CALERO. In one of our meetings he brought out the fact that there was a private effort going to liberate the American hostages.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. Those are the hostages in Lebanon?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"And so I reacted immediately, saying that hostages, Nicaraguan hostages of the Sandinistas, American hostages of these groups in Lebanon, were one and the same, and I was happy to help, I would be happy to help in their liberation.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. What did he tell you about the private effort to get the hostages out?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, I mean aside from it being set up in a meeting support, nothing else.
(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 47-51.)

See col. 2.

"Mr. CALERO. He didn't say--he didn't say, 'Give me money,' but--

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. It was clear to you from the context that he was looking for money from you; is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, that I could help, and I gladly did it.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. How much did you give him on this first occasion?

"Mr. CALERO. I don't know if it was 15,000 or probably 25,000.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. These checks that you gave him, they were drawn on a Cayman Islands bank, correct?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. And the checks were in blank so that whoever signed them could cash them; is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. And on how many other occasions did you give Colonel North checks?

"Mr. CALERO. Maybe four other occasions--three, four other occasions.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. And would Colonel North tell you that he needed more money and you would bring it up to him; is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, yes.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. Did you ever use Robert Owen as a courier to deliver checks to Colonel North?

"Mr. CALERO. Not that I remember.

"Mr. BARBADOR[O]. Did Colonel North ever give you any other reason why he wanted these traveler's checks?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, he didn't give me any other reason, but I must say that at one point we discussed my passing money to other leaders of other factions of the resistance. And we came to the conclusion that it was not politically sound to do that and at a later meeting he told me that I would not have to do it, that another way had been found.

"Mr. BARBADORO. He never told you that the travelers' checks were going to be used to pay other contra leaders, though; correct?

"Mr. CALERO. No, but I sort of imagined it.

"Mr. BARBADORO. And he didn't give you any other reason why you might, he might need these checks, is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. No, no, no.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Is it fair to say that once you gave him these checks you had no way of accounting for how we spent the money?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, I didn't ask him to sign a receipt for them and I didn't ask him how they had been used. I had trust that he would use that for the furthering of freedom's cause."
(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 47-51.)

85/04/00-610
FROM 1984

NORTH'S TRAVELER'S CHECKS AND CASH: SOURCES
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"When I began the covert operation in 1986--excuse me--1984 in support of the resistance, we had enormous problems trying to solve near time, real time, what I call operational problems. The end result of that was

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		that I talked to Director Casey about the difficulties. "He had suggested establishing an operational account and I did so. There were two sources of monies for that operational account. One was traveler's checks from Adolfo Calero and the other one was cash eventually from General Secord. "My recollection is that the very first traveler's checks came either very late '84 or certainly early 1985 and that the sum total of traveler's checks was probably in excess of $100,000 or thereabouts. "I also had cash which I estimated to be somewhere in the neighborhood of 50 to 75 thousand dollars in cash, so we are talking about an operational account that went from somewhere around 150 to 175 thousand dollars. At various points in time there would be considerable sums in it and at various points in time there would be none in it. "My recollection is that I got the traveler's checks in packages of less than $10,000. I understand that others have remembered elsewise, but that is how I remember it. "Those funds were used to support the operations that we were conducting. They were used to support the covert operation in Nicaragua, and then eventually were used to support other activities as well. "The fact that I had those funds available was known to Mr. McFarlane, to Admiral Poindexter, to Director Casey, and eventually to Admiral Art Moreau over at the Pentagon. It also came to be	

known to others, some of whom you have had testimony here.

"The funds were used initially only to support the Nicaraguan program, but eventually it was broadened to include other activities as well. Let me give you some examples.

"In the Nicaragua program, operational support was provided to a whole host of Nicaraguan Resistance leaders either directly by me from the fund or through couriers that I used to carry it out. Other resistance activities inside Nicaragua were supported of a less military nature in some cases. Europeans who helped us with both the public affairs aspect and the acquisition of other arms through a separate channel outside that, you have already heard about from General Secord or General Singlaub, were paid for out of this account.

"Money was mailed from this account to addresses in Caracas, San Jose, at the Tegucigalpa and San Salvador, among other places, to support activities inside Managua.

"The Indian movement, the Atlantic Coast Indian movement was supported from this account and meetings with the Atlantic Coast Indians, both the Misurasata and the Miskito movement itself, were supported from this account.

"And eventually the fund was used to support other activities, such as the DEA hostage recovery activity and the assistance of another European who[m] we have agreed not to talk about.

"What is important that you realize is that meticulous records were kept on all of this. I

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		kept a detailed account of every single penny that came into that account and that left that account. All of the transactions were recorded on a ledger that Director Casey gave me for that purpose. Every time I got a group of traveler's checks in, I would report them, and I would report them when they went out, even going so far as to record the traveler's check numbers themselves." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 105-07.)	
85/04/00-611 FROM 1984		NORTH'S TRAVELER'S CHECKS NORTH ACCOUNT (cont'd): North elaborated on the sources of the funds he stored: "The two sources that I remember very vividly were Mr. Calero by traveler's checks, sometimes given by him to me directly or couriered to me, and then also cash from General Secord. " (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 113.)	
85/04/00-614 1985-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MONEY IN HIS OFFICE SAFE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Were you aware that Colonel North was keeping any cash in his office? "A. Yes. There are a few instances of that. My best recollection is the first time I became aware of that was back shortly after [redacted] agreed to provide the $25 million. "My recollection is that Colonel North told me one day that the contra leaders had made some of that money that they were getting from [redacted] available to him to handle miscellaneous expenses	PEROT MONEY IN NORTH'S CARE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		that the contras had or anticipated in Washington. I told Colonel North I didn't think that was a good idea and that he should make arrangements to return the funds, and I prefer that he did not have any cash. "At some point after that, he informed me that he had returned the funds or that he didn't have any more cash. I recall at the time being relieved that he had gotten rid of the cash. "Then later on, in relation to the hostages -- and I don't remember whether it was the DEA project or maybe another one -- but Mr. Ross Perot had indicated to us -- I don't think to me directly, I think maybe first to Mr. McFarlane and then Colonel North got in the practice of often communicating with Mr. Perot -- but anyway, Mr. Perot indicated that if we ever arrived at a situation where we needed private funds on the hostage situation, that he would be willing to provide some. "At some point, you know, we went through many, many schemes and plans trying to figure out a way to get the hostages out, and in one of those, at some point, my recollection is that Colonel North did have some of Mr. Perot's funds, but I was always uneasy about directly handling funds and tried to make the point to Colonel North that I didn't want him to." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 210-11.)	
85/04/00-615 1984-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MONEY IN HIS OFFICE SAFE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:	

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		"Mr. LIMAN. And is it correct that you became aware at some point that Colonel North was keeping money in his safe for disbursement to the contras and that you told him that that you didn't want him to do and he should give it back to the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. At some point, and I believe it was 1984--it could have been later, but it was associated with the first contribution of Country Two, I think--it came to my attention, by Colonel North reporting to me, that Mr. Calero had provided some funds to him, and it was my understanding it was cash--at least that's my recollection of my understanding. "And probably not in the first conversation with me on that point, but shortly thereafter, after thinking about this, I realized that although I didn't see anything illegal about it, any time you handle cash there are perception problems that can certainly develop, and I think that's been demonstrated here in these hearings, and I also lived through a previous event on the NSC staff of-- "Mr. LIMAN. Richard Allen? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Richard Allen. "And I did not want that repeated. And so I told Colonel North that he should get rid of the money by returning it or whatever, that I didn't think that was a good idea." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 188-89.)	
85/04/00-616 FROM 1984		NORTH'S TRAVELER'S CHECKS AND LEDGER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:	

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		"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . Colonel North testified that he handled fairly large sums of money, some traveler's checks, some cash. We thought it was in the vicinity of 90 or 100 thousand dollars. I don't recollect his exact testimony. I thought it was $150,000. Certainly it was a great deal more. "He said there were times when it ran out and he had to use his own funds to pay for some of his expenses in relation to that. "Question number one: Were you aware from the beginning as his superior, when you became his superior, that he was put in the position of spending his own funds to defray some of his expenses? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I have a recollection of at various times where there w[ere] last-minute arrangements, last-minute arrangements were being made after the White House Administrative Office would be closed or however the tickets were prepared and so forth, that I can recall his saying that he would go ahead and pay with his credit card and be reimbursed later. "Mr. RUDMAN. This, of course, was not reimbursement by the United States Government. This was reimbursement from these funds. You were aware of that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe I was. You know, it is a detail that I wouldn't have been heavily involved with. "Mr. RUDMAN. You were aware of the fact there was a ledger being kept of all these funds? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe I was aware of that.	

"Mr. RUDMAN. Were you aware of the fact that Director Casey told him the ledger ought to be destroyed?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I was unaware of that.

"Mr. RUDMAN. ~~And I~~ understand your testimony that when you learned of these funds, you asked Colonel North to return them to who[m]ever--whatever the source[.] We know the source of some was Mr. Calero, and he advised you that he did return them at that point?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 147-48.)

85/04/00-617
1984-86

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MONEY IN HIS OFFICE SAFE

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. COHEN. You also told Colonel North it was unwise to keep cash in the safe. Did you determine whether or not he had ever returned the cash?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. My recollection is some weeks after he told me that or after I told him that I didn't think it was a good idea because of the perception problems that it created, my recollection is that he informed me that he had gotten rid of it.

"Mr. COHEN. Did that apply to traveler's checks as well?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. There was no distinction in my conversation with him between cash and traveler's checks. I would have considered them the same."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 69.)

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85/04/00-618 FROM 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MONEY TO CONTRA LEADERS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you know that he [sc. North] was disbursing cash to the contra leaders? "A. I would depend on the time frame. As I've testified on the second of May, I realized, he informed me at one point that he had cash. I told him either in that conversation or one shortly thereafter that I didn't think that was a good idea, there were perception problems involved in handling cash and that he should make arrangements some other way. "So if it was during that time period I would have known it. "Q. Did you know that that cash that he had was being used for contra leaders? "A. I don't think I specifically knew that. My understanding was it was being used for contra expenses and to the extent that that was a contra expense then yes, I would have known that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 329-30. On Poindexter's knowledge of North's Contra activities, see below at 86/00/09-195, -196.)	
85/04/00-690 FROM APRIL 1985		CALERO'S MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. Mr. Calero, did you ever meet with the President of the United States? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir, a number of--three, four times, I believe. "Mr. BARBADORO. When did you meet with him?	

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		"Mr. CALERO. The first time in April of 1985, I think. "Mr. BARBADORO. What was the purpose of that meeting? "Mr. CALERO. We--the UNO directorate was introduced to him and we met in the office of Mr. McFarlane. "Mr. BARBADORO. How long was the meeting? "Mr. CALERO. I don't know, ten minutes or so. It was more of a protocol meeting, I would say. "Mr. BARBADOR[O]. In general, what did you discuss? "Mr. CALERO. I don't think we came to a discussion. It was just a matter of meeting the President, thanking him for what he has done for us, and telling him about our decision, about our intent, about our coincidences. "Mr. BARBADOR[O]. Did you discuss the contributions you had been receiving with the President? "Mr. CALERO. No, no, no. "Mr. BARBADOR[O]. You weren't thanking him for the contributions that you had received? "Mr. CALERO. No. I was thanking him for his position vis-a-vis our situation. "Mr. BARBADOR[O]. Did you discuss with the President the assistance that Colonel North had been giving you? "Mr. CALERO. No, no, no. "Mr. BARBADOR[O]. In any of the meetings with the President that you had, did you discuss either the contributions you had received or the support that Colonel North was giving you?	

"Mr. CALERO. No, sir. No."
(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 46-47.)

85/04/01-100
APRIL 1, 1985

OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: 4/1/85 REPORT
OWEN MEMO:

In a memo dated April 1, 1985 from "T.C." (The Courier) to "The Hammer" (North), Owen relates plans of Contra leaders to organize a Southern Front:

". . . .

"Sparkplug has decided to go with [redacted] as the military commander of the South. There will be a political/military council which will have supervisory capacity over [redacted]. This will be made up of:

"[Redacted.]

"[Redacted] has broken down the camp that was under him into 4 small camps and thus spread the men around. He is waiting for equipment to start coming in from [redacted]. Moral [sic] is good and the men will start working in small teams.

"The concern about [redacted] is that he drinks a fair amount and may surround himself with people who are in the war not only to fight, but to make money. People who are questionable because of past indiscrestions [sic] include:

"[Redacted.]

"These are just some of the people Sparkplug and others should be wary about.

"Whatever structure is established for the South, tight control must be kept on the money and resources. In the past it has been too easy to sell goods and too many people have learned how to make a good living off of the war. Money and equipment must be accounted for and when there are differences, examples should be made.

". . . ."

(JHICI Ex. RWO 7. See Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 231 [Owen identifies the code names TC or The Courier as his, and Steelhammer as North's]. See also Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 205 [Fawn Hall identifies the code name Steelhammer as North's].)

85/04/01-200
APRIL 1, 1985

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: TIMING THE CONTRA AID VOTE

NORTH MEMO:

In preparing for submission of the Administration's aid proposal to Congress in April 1985, North seeks to coordinate the legislative initiative with the Contras' military activities so that successful and "visible" Contra military activities might favorably influence the decision by Congress on Contra aid. The military activities are timed to follow expiration of a peace proposal deadline set forth in the San Jose Declaration, a Contra peace initiative drafted by North and Contra leaders in a Miami hotel room (see 85/03/01-200).

When the Administration considers delaying submission of the aid proposal, North strongly recommends to McFarlane that the vote take place as originally scheduled. North writes:

"The deadline for substantive negotiations [in the San Jose Declaration] . . . was carefully chosen to ensure that the internal opposition

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		would have a specific date for their own planning purposes. Military operations were planned based on the expiration of the offer on April 20. . . . [A]n attack is scheduled for April 25. Based on my request Calero has agreed to postpone the attack for five days. The force which is being inserted to conduct this operation cannot be logistically supported in this area after May 5. The resupply situation will require that they be withdrawn after that date. ". . . . "It is my belief that urging the resistance leaders (particularly Calero) to accept a major delay . . . will result in a breakdown of the unity we have achieved. [Calero] has only cooperated to date in the unity effort because he trusts the only persons in the U.S. Government who have supported the movement since October 1984--North and McFarlane." (North memo to McFarlane, "Using the March 1 San Jose Declaration to Support the Vote on the Funding for the Nicaraguan Resistance," 4/1/85 [Committee Document N 40317]; Iran-Contra Report, at 48-49.)	
85/04/01-699 1984-87		CALERO'S BANK ACCOUNTS: MONEY FLOW SUMMARY: "Mr. BARBADORO. . . . The first chart [and Ex. AC 1] explains the flow of money through the Calero bank account. . . . Mr. Calero received a total of approximately $33,600,000 in contributions. Of that $33,600,000, $32,000,000 was received from a foreign government which has	

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		been identified in other testimony as Country Number Two. [See 85/02/00-800.] "Mr. Calero also received $200,000 from Lake Resources [see 85/10/00-040], $1,045,000 from Intel Corporation, Inc. [see 85/02/00-800], and $417,000 in miscellaneous deposits that the Committee has not yet been able to identify. "[] Mr. Calero earned $248,000 in interest on these deposits, and spent all but $96,000 by January 1987. Approximately $19,178,000 was spent on arms and ammunition, as Mr. Calero testified today [see 85/06/01-205], he paid roughly $2 million to Gretch World and R&M Supply, costs associated with Ron Martin and James McCoy [see 85/04/11-220]; approximately $11,350,000 was paid to Energy Resources, Mr. Secord's company [see 84/11/00-050]; and $432,000 was paid to another arms company directly for one of the purchases made through General Secord. "Finally, $5.3 million was paid to associates of General Singlaub for arms and ammunition. [See 85/06/01-205.] Of the remaining money, the records show that approximately $670,000 was paid to other contra factions by the FDN, and approximately $14 million was paid for non-lethal supplies. [See 85/06/01-205.] "The major recipient[s] of these non-lethal supplies have been testified about by Mr. Calero, and they are listed on the chart." (JHICI, 5/20/87, at 53-54 [Barbadoro summary during Calero testimony]; JHICI Ex. AC 1.)	
85/04/01-700		NORTH'S TRAVELER'S CHECKS: CASHED BY NORTH	

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APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1985		SUMMARY: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "[Mr. BARBADORO.] Mr. Chairman, the second chart I would like to explain concerns the traveler's checks that were cashed by Colonel North. Of the $90,000 in blank traveler's checks that Mr. Calero testified he delivered to Colonel North, we have been able to identify approximately $25,000 worth that were cashed by DEA agents or their associates. "In addition, we have been able to identify $2,440 worth of traveler's checks that were endorsed and cashed by Colonel North himself. . . . "Of the checks cashed by Colonel North, 340 were cashed at food stores between April 21, 1985 and July 2, 1985 for purchase totaling $118.15. "The balance was returned to Colonel North in cash. Another $220 in traveler's checks were cashed by Colonel North at other retail establishments between May 7 and November 30, 1985. Since most stores do not retain receipts for more than a year, we were able to identify only what was purchased at National Tire Wholesalers. "That $100 traveler's check was applied towards a $101 purchase of snow tires. The balance of the checks cashed by Colonel North, $1,180 worth, were cashed and used at the businesses listed in the chart. There again, most of the institutions don't keep receipts for more than a year. "Mr. Owen testified that Colonel North kept a	

ledger in which he recorded that traveler's checks and their disposition. That ledger was not found at the NSC, nor is there any other record of which we are aware which provides an accounting for the traveler's checks that Colonel North received from Mr. Calero.

"Therefore, we have no information with respect to the reason for the use of the checks by Colonel North other than what appears on the checks themselves and in one case, the receipt from National Tire Wholesalers."
(JHICI, 5/20/87, at 54-56 [Barbadoro summary].)

85/04/01-710
APRIL 1985
THROUGH
NOVEMBER 1986

NORTH'S TRAVELER'S CHECKS: CASHED BY NORTH
NORTH ACCOUNT (THE OLD BUFFOON AT
PARKLANE HOSIERY):

"Every single one of those traveler's checks which bore my name [was] used by me to defray an actual operational expense as it happened. . . .

". . . .

"Unlike the CIA, the NSC travel voucher system doesn't have a covert cover. We had one dickens of a time trying to protect my travel, and, as you undoubtedly know, gentlemen, I made an enormous amount of travel. The schedule was brutal, much of it was paid for out of that operational account.

"There were times when that account was down to zero. No money in it, I didn't have any traveler's checks, and I had handed out all the cash--not to myself, but to others. Under those circumstances, I would use my own money, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's paycheck money, his own money that he had earned, and I would use it for an operational expense. I would, therefore, make a notation in the ledger, 'Spent $250 on going to Atlanta to meet with somebody', and the next time I got cash or traveler's checks, I would use these checks to reimburse myself every single penny, and the checks that you saw that came to me [were] used to pay an operational expense on the scene or to reimburse myself. I never took a penny that didn't belong to me.

"Every single one of those checks--and I would also point out to you, Counsel, that you don't have them all, because by my own recognition and memory there were checks used in 1986, and the ones that you depicted earlier were only 1985. I used those traveler's checks right up until shortly before I was fired, but only for the purpose that you saw.

"I realize that this hearing is a difficult thing. Believe me, gentlemen, it is not as difficult for you as it is for a guy that has got to come up here and tell the truth, and that is what I am trying to do. I want to make it very clear that when you put up things like Parklane Hosiery--and you all snicker at it--and you know that I have got a beautiful secretary and the good Lord gave her the gift of beauty, and that people snicker that Ollie North might have been doing a little hanky-panky with his secretary, Ollie North has been loyal to his wife since the day he married her, and the fact is I went to my best friend, and I asked her, 'Did I ever go to Parklane Hosiery?' And you know what she told me?

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		'Of course, you did, you old buffoon, you went there to buy leotards for our two little girls.' And the reason I wrote the check, Parklane Hosiery, just like the checks at Giant, is because I was owed my money for what I had spent in pursuing that cover [sic] operation." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 108-10.)	
85/04/11-200 APRIL 11, 1985		CONTRA FUNDING: SUMMARY NORTH MEMO: North memo McFarlane, titled "FDN Military Operations," summarizes Contra funding from July 1984 through April 9, 1985: "Attached at Tab A is a summary analysis of how the FDN has expended funds which have been made available since USG funding expired in May 1984. From July 1984 through February 1985, the FDN received $1M per month for a total of $8M. From February 22 to April 9, 1985, an additional $16.5M has been received for a grand total of $24.5M[.] Of this, $17,145,594 has been expended for arms, munitions, combat operations, and support activities: "--most expenditures have been for purchases of arms, ammunition, and other ordnance items; ". . . . "Summary of Operations to Date "The FDN has grown nearly twofold since the cut-off of USG funding. In this period, they have reoriented from conventional to guerrilla warfare tactics. Despite the lack of ANY internal staff organization (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) when the USG withdrew, the FDN has responded well to guidance	

on how to build a staff. Although there was a basic lack of familiarity with how to conduct guerrilla-type operations, since July, all FDN commanders have been schooled in these techniques and all new recruits are now initiated in guerrilla warfare tactics before being committed to combat. In short, the FDN has well used the funds provided and has become an effective guerrilla army in less than a year.

"Future Operations

"Plans call for remaining resources ($7,354,000) to be used as follows:

"--increasing the force to a total of 25,000 by mid-Summer;

"--a major special operations attack against Sandino airport with the purpose of destroying the MI-24 helicopters and the Sandinista Air Force maintenance capability;

"--a major ground operation against the mines complex in the vicinty of Siuna, Bonanza, and La Rosita (Nicaragua)--the purpose of the operation is to secure the principal lines of communication in and out of Puerto Cabezas; and

"--the opening of a southern front along the [redacted] border which will distract EPS units currently committed to the northern front.

"It is apparent that the $7M remaining will be insufficient to allow the resistance to advance beyond these limited objectives, unless there is a commitment for additional funds. The $14M which the USG may be able to provide will help to defray base camp, training, and support expenses but will not significantly affect combat operations until

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early Autumn due to lead-time requirements. Efforts should, therefore, be made to seek additional funds from the current donors ($15-20M) which will allow the force to grow to 30-35,000. If a commitment for these funds is made between now and June 1985, supplies could be ordered in July, allowing the force to reach these levels by the end of October 1985.

"RECOMMENDATION

"That the current donors be approached to provide $15-20M additional between now and June 1, 1985."

[Approve/Disapprove boxes not checked]

(JHICI Ex. 37. See above at 84/07/00-200.)

85/04/11-205
APRIL 11,
1985

CONTRA FUNDING: SUMMARY
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, did Colonel North report to you how the money that was received from Country Two was spent?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I recall at least one report of that nature, and I believe other oral reports.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Did he say to you at some point that he thought that Country Two might want to know how its money was being spent?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is familiar. I believe so.

"Mr. LIMAN. And he gave you then a written report, and is that written report--would you look at Exhibit 37?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, this document which has been marked as Exhibit 37 is a systems 4 document, and it is from Colonel North to you dated April 11, 1985; correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. He says, 'Attached to Tab A is a summary analysis of how the FDN has expended funds which have been made available since the United States Government funding expired in May of 1984.'

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And the FDN was the Calero organization of the Nicaraguan resistance forces?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. It says, 'From July of 1984 through February 1985, the FDN received a million dollars per month for a total of $8 million. From February 22 to April 9, 1985, . . . an additional $16.5 million has been received for a grand total of $25.5 million.'

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that was before he received that last installment from Country Two. And then, it goes on to say that of this, of the $24.5 million, [']$17,145,594 has been expended for arms, munitions, combat operations and support activities.[']

"Correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it then lists the various expenditures in tab A of what kinds of munitions were bought.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it does.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you share this

information with anyone else?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you report it to your Commander-in-Chief?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell the President how the contras were faring?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. I gave him any significant information that I got. We had a strong interest in the status of the moment and its plans and how it was faring, and yet he didn't, nor should he in my judgment, have worried about whether specific kinds of things were being purchased more than general conclusion, are they or are they not satisfactorily equipped, which I would report to him."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 60-63; JHICI Ex. 37 [North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Military Operations," 4/11/85].)

85/04/11-206
APRIL 11,
1985

CONTRA FUNDING: SUMMARY; AND THIRD-COUNTRY SEIZURE OF CONTRA ARMS SHIPMENT

MCFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Did there come a time, Mr. McFarlane, when you were told that one of these shipments of arms to the contras was seized by a military official in a neighboring Central American country? Do you recall that, sir?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe so, yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall that that was after a vote in Congress which had rejected an effort to resume funding for the contras?

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		"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And you received a report that this military commander of a neighboring country had concluded that that was a license for him to take the contras' arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask the President of the United States to speak to the Head of State of that country to make sure that the contras' arms were released to them? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And was that successful? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes; it was a matter coordinated with the Cabinet officers, too, but I would have said it was a message, but it may have been oral. "Mr. LIMAN. And the arms then were released to the contras; an I correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe so, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, if you look at this memo that we are on, which is Exhibit 37, and page 2 at the bottom, Colonel North reported to you, and I will quote, 'It is apparent that the $7 million remaining will be insufficient to allow the resistance to advance beyond these limited objectives unless there is a commitment for additional funds. "'The $14 million which the United States Government may be able to provide will help to defray base camp, training and support expenses, but will not sufficiently affect combat--but will not significantly affect combat operations until autumn, due to lead time requirements.'	

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		"Am I right that the $14 million was money that you had contemplated that you might be able to obtain from Congress at that time? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Then it goes on to say, and this is Colonel North's recommendation to you, 'Efforts should therefore be made to seek additional funds from the current donors (15 to 20 million) which will allow the force to grow to 30 to 35,000.' "Now, were the current donors Colonel North's term for Country Two? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And the memorandum at the end had a recommendation for action, if you will turn the page. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And the recommendation was that the current donors be approached to provide $15 to $20 million additional between now and June 1, 1985. Correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And there is no indication as to whether you approved or disapproved that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I did not approve it. "Mr. LIMAN. Why did you not approve that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, bear in mind we are within two weeks of when this lump sum, $25 million, albeit in two or three deliveries I think had been received, so as a practical matter, there wasn't any need for any money. "And, furthermore, even if there had been a need for money, I felt strongly that this had to be a matter which the Administration could sustain	

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		through the Congress and the American people and that we couldn't continue to rely upon foreign sources for it. "Mr. LIMAN. And so, you turned down that request? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you know that General Secord was supplying some of the munitions that are referred to on this list that Colonel North sent to you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he discuss that with you at all as to where the contras were getting their arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. I had assumed that as the day came, the fall of 1984, when all of us could see the CIA's authority was going to be ended, that they would have made clear that in order to continue, the contra leadership was put in touch with the appropriate people to continue to make orders for whatever they might need. "But I hadn't been specifically advised of that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 64-67; JHICI Ex. 37 [North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Military Operations," 4/11/85]. See McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 81-83 [North's 4/11/85 memo].)	
85/04/11-210 APRIL 11, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTRA FUNDING NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you believe that you found a way of complying with Boland when you were	

recommending to your superiors that they solicit money from the current donors?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't believe I recommended that my superiors solicit money.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. [Exhibit] One-hundred-forty-nine.

"Mr. NORTH. I remember the memo.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel North, if you look at your recommendation, it says that the current donors be approached to provide 15 to 20 million additional between now and June 1, 1985.

"Mr. NORTH. It does indeed read that way, and I did indeed write the memo.

"Mr. LIMAN. And did you believe that you were complying with Boland when you made that recommendation?

"Mr. NORTH. Absolutely, Counsel. I see nothing in section 8066 of the Joint Resolution that in any way deters, prevents, stops or prohibits me, Mr. McFarlane, or anyone else in the Executive Branch from going to a current donor or a future donor and doing just exactly what is suggested there. If it had prohibited it, I wouldn't have recommended it."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 216-17; JHICI Ex. OLN 149 [North memo to McFarlane, re FDN Military Operations].)

85/04/11-220
APRIL 11,
1985

FDN EXPENDITURES AND OUTLAYS
CALERO ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BARBADORO. Mr. Calero, could you please turn to Exhibit AC-3, which is a memorandum from Colonel North to Robert McFarlane, dated April 11,

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		1985, and turn to the back of that exhibit to a chart that is headed 'FDN Expenditures and Outlays.' "Have you seen that chart before? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. That chart contains a listing of arms and ammunition and some of the purchase prices that were paid, correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you give Colonel North the information that was used to prepare this chart? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. From whom did you buy your first weapons? "Mr. CALERO. From Gretch World. "Mr. BARBADORO. And when did you buy those weapons? "Mr. CALERO. Fall of 1984. "Mr. BARBADORO. And how did you come to buy from Gretch World? "Mr. CALERO. Well, I knew a retired U.S. colonel by the name of McCoy whom I had met in Nicaragua back in 1981--excuse me, back in 1978, 1977, 1978, 1979 maybe, and through him, he approached me and said he would be of service, and when I needed him, I called him. "Mr. BARBADORO. And did Colonel McCoy suggest he could get weapons for you? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. Colonel McCoy is associated with Gretch World, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes.	

"Mr. BARBADORO. And a man named Ronald Martin is also?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes. His card read R&M Equipment Company; Colonel McCoy's calling card read that way, yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Take a look at Exhibit AC-3. Are the weapons that you bought from Gretch World and R&M supply listed under the heading 'Independent Acquisition' on this chart?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. How much did you pay for those weapons?

"Mr. CALERO. About $2 million, a little over $2 million.

"Mr. BARBADORO. The phrase 'Independent Acquisition' on this chart, is that your phrase or is that Colonel North's?

"Mr. CALERO. No, I do not remember labeling 'independent.'

"Mr. BARBADORO. The remaining arms listed on this chart were all purchased from General Secord, correct?

"Mr. CALERO. The remaining? Yes. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Do you know why Colonel North decided to characterize the arms from Gretch World as 'Independent Acquisition' and not to characterize the arms purchase from General Secord that way?

"Mr. CALERO. No, sir."

(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 28-30; JHICI Ex. AC-3 [= Ex. 37; North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Military Operations," 4/11/85]. See 85/04/25-232, 86/04/07-259 [North executive session testimony on the Martin-McCoy operation].)

85/04/11-230
APRIL 11,
1985 AND
NOVEMBER 21,
1986

ALTERED DOCUMENTS: SEEKING ADDITIONAL FUNDS FROM THE CURRENT DONORS

HALL ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . Exhibit [FH] 5 bears the System 4 number 402007, which you recognize as another of the numbers on Mr. McFarlane's list, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. That document is prepared on April 11, 1985, and contained a discussion of FDN military operations which had been made possible by funding that had been provided through the donors after the cut-off of American aid by Congress.

"On page 2, Colonel North concludes that the money on hand will be insufficient to enable the resistance to grow to a larger force than it achieved unless efforts were made to seek additional funds of $15 to $20 million from the current donors.

"By the way, Ms. Hall, did Colonel North ever identify to you or describe to you who[m] he meant by the 'present donors' or the 'current donors' in these memorand[a]?

"Ms. HALL. No, he didn't.

"Mr. BELNICK. In any event, Colonel North recommends that those donors be approached for more aid and on page 3 of the memo, that recommendation is stated succinctly.

"He attaches to the memo a list of expenditures and outlays by the resistance. Let's compare that document, Exhibit 5, with Exhibit FH-5-A. And as we look at those pages, in general information that seems to have been acquired actively by Colonel North has been deleted and instead there are phrases such as according to information, they, the resistance, have given us, there is a more passive tense used when describing the type of knowledge that Colonel North had, but the most dramatic change on the document comes at the end. All references to the present donors or funding by the present donors have been deleted from the document and instead of making a recommendation that the current donors be approached for increased aid, the recommendation is that Congress be approached for increased aid.

"The specific recommendation then at the very end of the memo on page 3 is 'that you brief the President on the current situation and urge concerted action on immediate Congressional approval of a $14 million CIA supplemental and a $75- to $100 million for the next fiscal year.'

"Again, you have checked the approval box on page 3 of that memo?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Now, . . . Exhibit [FH] 5-B is a memo dated May 1, 1985, containing the System 4 number 400453, which is another number that was on the McFarlane list; correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. And from comparing it, although it is dated May 1, 1985, it appears to be the same as the altered version of the April document, namely Exhibit 4-A, correct? Or 5-A, I am sorry.

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. And do you have any recollection of why the document was prepared with a date of May 1 as well as a date of April 11?

"Ms. HALL. I think--there's a possibility the memorandum went across the street and was revised or asked to be redone in May.

"Mr. BELNICK. But you have no specific recollection?

"Ms. HALL. No, I don't.

"Mr. BELNICK. And I should advise you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that we have not at this point located a May 1, 1985, unaltered document. The only document we have been able to find so far is the one which appears as Exhibit FH 5-B, which is the same as the altered April document.

". . . ."

(Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 274-78; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 5 [North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Military Operations," 4/11/85], FH 5-A [other version of North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Military Operations," 4/11/85], FH 5-B [same version of North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Military Operations, but dated 5/1/85]. For Hall testimony on the documents listed by McFarlane on Ex. FH 1, see below at 86/11/21-615 and -616. For Hall testimony on the individual altered documents, see also 84/12/04-100; 85/02/06-310 and -311; 85/03/05-215 and -216; 85/03/16-100; and 85/05/31-100. See Iran-Contra Report, at 125 [current donors memo], 123-26 [altered

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		documents].)	
85/04/11-260 1984-85		CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "But in '84 or '85 -- I am sure it was '84, but again, I can't place the time exactly -- but we looked at what sort of ways that we could support the democratic resistance through nonappropriated funds. By that, I mean funds from private parties, from third countries. I can't recall specifically conversations with the President. . . . "But let me just say that the President, I've always felt[,] was generally aware of the fact that the contras were receiving private sources of funds and funds from third countries." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 52-53.)	
85/04/11-265 1984-86		CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES; AND NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "At some point in this early time period, when we were faced with how to support them [the contras], there was a concerted effort on the NSC staff and in other offices in the White House such as the Office of Public Liaison, Pat Buchanan's Communications Office, the -- probably the Legislative Affairs Office would have been involved in some of the discussions about how to energize private support in the United States for the contras. This was how to get the information about what was happening in Nicaragua out to the American people, get private groups organized to	

contribute funds.

"I, frankly, don't recall that we really made any big distinction about how the funds would be used, whether they would be used for military assistance or humanitarian aid. I wasn't directly involved in many of those early discussions that took place; but in terms of hearing reports and secondhand information, my recollection at this point is not strong that we made a real distinction between how the assistance from private sources would be used.

"The President's view in general was that private support to the contras was an appropriate thing. I can recall conversations with him in which he recalled the other times in the history of the United States when private individuals had supported foreign conflicts before the U.S. Government would get involved. I can recall he would recall the Lincoln Brigade, the Lafayette Escadrille and other examples of where private American citizens provided support for a foreign conflict. He felt that that was entirely appropriate.

"So we worked on in that time period a general plan on how to energize the private sector. Various events were planned and set up where you would have private groups come into the White House. The Office of Public Liaison usually set these up. They would be briefed by a series of administration spokesmen and members of the NSC staff would often participate. Colonel North would talk to these groups sometimes. Constantine Menges, who worked in the NSC [r]egional [a]ffairs

[o]ffice, would talk to them. We would get speakers from the State Department, the Defense Department, generally speaking, that were expert in the Latin American area.

"At one point we planned and executed the President's participation in a dinner for one of the outside organizations that was working to provide support to the democratic resistance.

"Then Colonel North often would go out and speak to assemblages of people that were pulled together; and as I generally understand -- I never participated in one of those groups just simply because[,] my whole time on the NSC staff, I have tried to maintain a low profile and also the press of other business.

"To put all this in context, of course, and I am sure you are aware, I was working on hundreds of other issues. This was an important part of the President's priorities, but not the only one. But anyway, the best I can explain what would happen in these outside private groups is that, for instance, with Colonel North's involvement, is that a group would be assembled by a private organization of some kind. He would go speak to them in terms of what was happening in Nicaragua, who the contras were, what their objectives were, and generally try to develop support and -- at least as reported by Colonel North to me -- I don't believe he ever directly solicited, but he would leave the podium and then the organizers of the private organization would do whatever soliciting took place.

"Now, since I have never attended any of

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		those, I can't be sure, but I think Colonel North, you will find, hopefully at some point, is a very honest, straightforward person. So I don't have any reason to question what he told me." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 55-58. See 85/03/25-100 [Poindexter's knowledge of distinctions in types of aid for the Contras].)	
85/04/11-270 1984-85		CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. . . . Do you recall any Presidential addresses in which the President described Nicaragua as his number one priority at the time? "A. I don't recall one specifically. I don't doubt that he did. It would be consistent with his position. "Q. And is it fair to say that in your working with the President it was a matter of great interest of his, the support of the contras? "A. I would phrase it a little differently. "Q. Well, I'd like your phrasing. "A. He felt that getting a democratic government in Nicaragua was a very important issue in terms of the long-term national security of the United States. He also felt that the way to do that was to keep pressure on the Sandinista government to do that. He felt the contras ought to be supported. But I would describe his priority as getting a democratic government in Nicaragua. "Q. Are you aware that when legislative votes would come up on the subject of funding for the contras that the President would call the Members	

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of Congress?

"A. Absolutely.

"Q. And he would even take the time to make notations of what their reactions were to his appeals?

"A. That was his standard procedure in terms of his conversations with Members of Congress.

"Q. Then can you tell me, given this concern of the President, whether you recall any discussions with the President of the United States during the period that you were the Deputy National Security Advisor about third country support?

"A. Well, as I testified on the second of May, I recall one specific incident, and that was while I was technically still the Deputy, when I came back from the one-day trip I made through Central America and my memory, of course, was refreshed because of my notes. But I did discuss with him then [redacted] support.

"Q. You mean --

"A. The air strip.

"Q. You discussed that?

"A. Yes. [See 85/12/09-040, -045, -050, -051, -060.] But, you see, normally in the 9:30 meetings with the President when I was the Deputy, I listened and seldom interjected anything of my own unless Mr. McFarlane specifically turned to me.

"Q. Well, let me make it clear I'm not asking you whether you said we ought to get third country support. I was asking you any conversations. Do you recall the President discussing it, McFarlane

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		discussing it in that period? "A. There no doubt was. I simply don't have a recollection of it. We conceivably could have had an NSC or NSPG meeting on the subject. "Q. Do you recall at any time during that period, which is a period when there was a total cutoff of aid by Congress, any position that the President expressed on whether aid should be sought from third countries? "A. I just, Mr. Liman, simply don't have a recollection of it. That doesn't mean that it didn't come up. I just don't recall it. Conceivably my previous notes that I suppose you have access to could indicate that, but I don't remember. I haven't seen those notes. "Q. I can assure you, Admiral Poindexter, I'm not holding back pieces of paper from you and that if your notes indicated I would show them to you []now. That's why I'm asking you for your recollection. "A. No, I don't. As I said, it doesn't mean that they didn't occur, and just because they don't appear in my notes doesn't mean it doesn't occur. "Q. But essentially from June of 1984, when money ran out, until August of 1985, when NHAO money was made available to the contras, the funding was coming from third countries? "A. Um-hum. "Q. Can you not recall a single occasion in which you were present where the President was told that? "A. I'm sorry. I just can't recall it."	

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		(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 264-67.)	
85/04/11-271 1984-85		CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Was the President interested in how the contras were doing from a financial point of view? "A. You see, that was not characteristic of the President. That was a level of detail that as long as he knew that they were being supported he depended on us to follow, you know, how much money they had, where it was coming from, and so that's not something that, for instance, that I would particularly raise with him as National Security Advisor. "Mr. McFarlane may have discussed it. I simply don't recall it. "Q. Well, how did you think he knew that they were being supported? "A. Well, as I said earlier, I was aware because Mr. McFarlane told me that he had informed the President of [redacted] contribution, and so my understanding was that the President knew that. And again because of the great sensitivity that we attached to that, for the reasons that I have described, it was important that it not be discussed in front of a lot of people. In the 9:30 meetings that I attended as Deputy there were always several people there. "And at one point, as Mr. McFarlane has testified, when Jim Baker was the Chief of Staff there would usually be a total of, myself included, about seven people in the office, and	

sensitive issues like that Mr. McFarlane didn't like to discuss in such a large group. And I certainly understood that and, frankly, agreed with it.

"Q. You testified last time that in approving the use of some of the proceeds of the Iranian arms sale for the contras you believed that you were acting consistent with the President's policies and the precedents of third country support; correct?

"A. Correct.

"Q. And you said that you believed that if the President had been told about this he would have concurred?

"A. That is my belief."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 267-68.)

85/04/11-275
1984-86

CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES;
AND DISTINCTIONS IN TYPES OF AID
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Q. You testified last time that from time to time Colonel North would be invited to the briefings of the President when there was something involving Central America that he would have some input on.

"A. That's correct.

"Q. Did Colonel North ever report to the President in your presence on contributions from third countries?

"A. I don't recall that.

"Q. Was the President ever told in your presence that any monies were being solicited for lethal aid for the contras from private citizens?

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"A. As I testified on the second of May, I don't recall great distinctions being made in terms of private contributions and third country contributions between lethal and non-lethal aid. [See 85/04/11-265.] You know, frankly that is a real semantic exercise.

"Q. But the President of the United States said that he understood that the money that was being solicited from American citizens was being used for ad campaigns to encourage support for the contras. That's what he just said. Now were you ever present when he was told something to the contrary?

"A. As I've said, I can't recall that.

"Q. You can't recall what?

"A. Being in his presence when he was told something contrary to that. That's his recollection.

"Q. Now there is a distinction between lethal aid and ad campaigns to solicit support for contra aid legislation, isn't there? You'd agree with that?

"A. Well, in the end they both have the same effect.

"Q. Admiral, there's a difference in your mind, isn't there, between spending money for hand grenades and weapons and for an ad campaign?

"A. Well, if an ad campaign leads to a change in a Congressional vote, it accomplishes the same purpose.

"Q. But did the President of the United States ever approve a solicitation of funds for anything other than ad campaigns so far as you

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		know? "A. As I testified earlier, he often talked in generic terms about how he thought it was appropriate for private individuals to support the contras. As I said, I don't recall a distinction being made between lethal and non-lethal aid. As I've said, he often quoted or discussed the precedents of the organizations like Lafayette Escadrille and other efforts of U.S. citizens on a private basis helping in the insurgencies in foreign countries. "So, you know, my impression at this point, recalling the time period, there's not a big distinction in my mind between lethal and non-lethal aid. I was convinced that the President was in favor of private support to the democratic resistance." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 270-72.)	
85/04/11-276 1984-86		CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES; AND DISTINCTIONS IN TYPES OF AID POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Was there distinction in your mind between lethal and non-lethal aid when Congress passed the law that said that third country assistance could be solicited for humanitarian purposes? "A. I frankly don't recall that distinction. I do recall when NHAO was in existence that there were various controversies about what was lethal and non-lethal when I became the National Security Advisor and it involved at that point, in	

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		consultations with Congress I can recall discussions with various members about the distinction, and I recall that my thinking at the time was that this is a real uncertain division. "Q. Admiral, do you not recall discussions when you were National Security Advisor and Deputy about the fact that one option was to get legislation permitting you to seek from third countries humanitarian aid? "A. I recall that there were discussions about that that eventually led to the modification of the legislation. "Q. And do you recall that there were discussions in which at least Members of Congress drew a distinction between humanitarian aid and lethal aid? "A. Yes. "Q. And do you recall that the President of the United States signed a bill that came from Congress that drew that distinction between humanitarian aid and lethal aid? "A. Yes. "Q. And so whether you think that there's a difference between humanitarian aid and lethal aid, do you recall any discussions with the President of the United States in which there was a distinction drawn for him between lethal and non-lethal aid? "A. The only discussions that I can recall were with regard to the legislation that would appropriate U.S. Government funds. I don't recall those discussions in connection with third country and private support.	

"Q. Now when Congress passed the law in December of 1985 permitting the State Department to solicit humanitarian aid, were you aware of the passage of that law?

"A. In general terms I was.

"Q. Did you consider that you were free at that point to seek lethal aid from third countries?

"A. I don't recall focusing on that particular distinction. Frankly, if we were able to get third country contributions to go to the contras it was going to be very difficult for us to have any sort of control over how the money was spent.

"Q. Well, Admiral, did you feel after that law was passed that you were free to go to a third country and say we want money for munitions?

"MR. BECKLER: I'm going to object to this line of questioning. This really is getting into the area of whether or not Admiral Poindexter, what his interpretation of various laws was, what he did, what he did not do. You can ask him what he did, what he remembers, who[m] he spoke to, but he is not qualified to be expounding on what the meaning of a particular law is or whatever everybody else felt the meaning of the law was. Let's just get on with the facts of what happened."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 272-75. See 85/03/25-100 [Poindexter on distinctions in types of Contra aid].)

85/04/11-277 CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES; DIVERSION: USE OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE IRAN

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1984-86		AND DISTINCTIONS IN TYPES OF AID POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Admiral, did you understand that when the Secretary of State was approaching Brunei through his Assistant Secretary of State that he was seeking humanitarian aid? "A. As I said, I don't recall that distinction. "Q. Did you believe that when you approved the use of the proceeds from the Iranian arms sale that it was going to be used only for non-lethal support? "A. Absolutely not. "Q. Did McFarlane ever tell you whether he told the President of the United States what [redacted] money was going to be used for? "A. I simply can't recall that. "Q. Did [redacted] when you met with him, tell you that the contribution was for humanitarian aid? "A. I don't recall that distinction being made. "Q. But you had an understanding that they were using that money for guns and ammunition, didn't you? "A. That's correct. "Q. Were you involved at all in any of the preparatory sessions for the meeting [redacted?] "A. I probably was. Our general procedure was to have at least one pre-briefing [redacted.] I don't recall this one, but no doubt there was one and I was probably there.	ARMS SALES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you believe that when you approved the use of the proceeds from the Iranian arms sale that it was going to be used only for non-lethal support? "A. Absolutely not." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 275-77.) See col. 2.

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		"Q. Do you recall any discussion with the President of the United States about the fact that the money that had previously been pledged by [redacted] was inadequate and was running out and that we needed more money for the contras? "A. I don't recall that. "Q. Was there any discussion prior [redacted] that we had to find some increased source of funding for the contras? "MR. BECKLER: Discussion with whom? "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. Any discussion that you are aware of? "A. I do have some recollection that Colonel North reported that the contras were running out of money, and my recollection is that he went back to Mr. McFarlane and asked him to reapproach [redacted] about increasing their contribution. I can't remember what time frame that was. "Q. Was that discussed with the President in your presence? "A. Again I don't recall it, because again, you know, I can't, for instance, recall a time that I met with the President and Mr. McFarlane, just the three of us. Now conceivably there may have been an occasion, but I can't recall it. But it would only have been under that kind of limited participation, at least my belief today i[s] that it would have only been under that kind of situation, that Mr. McFarlane would have raised that issue. "Q. Why? "A. Again because we felt the fewer people that knew about this the less chance there was for	

leakage, and for the reasons I have described we were concerned about leakage.

"Q. But here you had the President of the United States who you acknowledge was deeply concerned about the fate of the contras during this funding cutoff.

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And you are being told by Colonel North, who is the point man on this, that they are running out of money; correct?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And you're being told by Colonel North that we ought to go back to [redacted;] is that so?

"A. That's correct."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 275-77. See also 85/03/25-100 [Poindexter's notation on "non-lethal aid"].)

85/04/11-278
1984-1986

CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES; AND DISTINCTIONS IN TYPES OF AID

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. I mean, if you don't bring something like that to the attention of the President, what is brought to the attention of the President of the United States?

"MR. BECKLER: Does he have to answer that question?

"MR. LIMAN: Yes, it's a serious question. I don't know what issue is elevated to the attention of the President if something like this isn't.

"MR. BECKLER: If you have an issue that you want to ask if it's elevated to the President, you ask him, but he's not going to sit here and answer what is elevated to the President during the five years he worked in the White House.

"Now we have had asked and answered at least fifteen times about what he recalls about what he spoke to the President about about [redacted.] Now we're not going to sit here and answer it over and over and over again.

"MR. LIMAN: You can make all the speeches you want.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. What are the criteria for deciding what issues to elevate to the President of the United States?

"A. It's a very hard thing to define. It's very subjective. It depends on a lot of personal judgment. Certainly untoward incidents against U.S. property and personnel any place in the world, the status of legislation, the status of the -- with regard to Central America, the status of our negotiating track, the status of the contras in terms of how many there are, how many are armed, whether they are in country or in one of the surrounding countries, arms control. An awful lot of time is spent on arms control.

"You have presumably my 9:30 file, although I guess maybe you've got redacted versions of it. There are [sic] a whole range of things. But going back to your earlier questions, I'm not saying the President wasn't told about those things; it's simply that I don't have a recollection of it.

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		"You know, in that position you really get into a situation of overload on your memory. There are so many issues. You know, we're talking about a time period that I was involved in the White House of five and a half years. You know, without something that tickles my memory or that I can refer to, I simply don't have a recollection of it." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 277-79.)	
85/04/11-279 1984-86		CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS OF SOURCES; AND DISTINCTIONS IN TYPES OF AID POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 5: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Admiral, you have mentioned that one of the concerns about talking about [redacted] with the President was that there was a desire to keep this information closely held; correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. And that the more people who know, the greater the risk of leak, I suppose. "A. Inadvertent leakage, too, not intentional necessarily. "Q. But isn't it a fact that very, very sensitive secrets of state were discussed at these early morning briefings of the President? "A. That's correct. "Q. And without getting into what they were, I mean, can you not recall occasions when matters of even greater sensitivity than the fact that [redacted] is giving some money to the contras was discussed with the President in the presence of this little family group he has there?	

"A. Now what's the specific question again?

"Q. Weren't there matters of even great[er] national sensitivity than [redacted] contribution discussed with the President at this security briefing he got every morning in the presence of his chief of staff?

"A. Well, again, you know, to answer that question you need to think about the philosophy as to why or the theory as to why leaks occur. If an issue is clearly of national security concern of the United States, like, oh, let's say, that we have a spy in [redacted] or something -- I'm not saying we do -- now that would clearly be recognized by everybody in that meeting as something that they should never say anything about.

"An issue like [redacted] contributing funds for Central America doesn't fall in that category. It's sensitive because of the sensitivity [redacted] have about it. It's sensitive from the standpoint that we don't want more restrictive legislation. But it's more a political issue, and those are the things that people sometimes like to reveal either intentionally or they do it unintentionally to indicate how in the know they are. And those things are very susceptible to leakage.

"And so that's why there was a big distinction, at least in my mind. I can't speak for Mr. McFarlane.

"Q. And when you say in your mind, that's why you assumed that he never discussed it insofar as you recall in your presence with the President?

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		"A. That's correct. It was a tidbit that could easily leak out." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 279-81.)	
85/04/19-100 APRIL 19, 1985	COVERT ACTION: PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION SCIARONI MEMO: Draft memorandum of Bretton Sciaroni entitled "The Legal Basis for Covert Action." Memo concludes the President, by virtue of his constitutional powers and caselaw precedent, can authorize covert action (including covert paramilitary operations). In cover note on the memo, Sciaroni requests that North review the draft and give his comments. (JHICI Ex. BS 18; Sciaroni Testim., JHICI, 5/8/87.)		
85/04/25-200 LATE APRIL 1985		THE BERMUDEZ-SINGLAUB(-NORTH) WEAPONS LIST SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: After North approves Singlaub's weapons list, Singlaub and Calero meet with an arms dealer at the Sheraton-Carlton Hotel in Washington, D.C. Singlaub assures the dealer "that this list had the blessing of my contacts in the National Security Council." (Singlaub doesn't remember "whether I actually used Colonel North's name.") The arms dealer gives prices which Calero considers "unusually low" for the arms. After the list "had been approved," Singlaub submits it to the arms dealer. He and Calero then meet with North and Secord at North's office. "[T]he primary subject was the need for air defense missiles ["SA-7, that is	

right."] and how we were going to get them, where we would get them, and how we would get them quickly to the democratic resistance. . . . We would have liked . . . some U.S. redeyes or stingers . . . [or] blowpipes . . ., but this appeared to be the best way to go at this time."

They also discuss prices in North's office. Secord's price for a set of SA-7s is $180,000; Singlaub's arms dealer would charge $165,000. Calero and North decide to go with Secord since Singlaub is "unable to produce trainers to train in the use of these." Secord's package is to include training as well as "find[ing] out what was going wrong with the missiles they already had in their possession."

Either at this meeting or at a later one with North, "we [antecedent unspecified] were asked if it would be possible to divert our ship to make a stop in another country to pick up some arms [previously purchased for the Contras by Secord] that were hung up there." (Unprodded for the follow-up, Singlaub did not testify whether his ship diverted for Secord's arms.)

Singlaub, at some unspecified time later, learns that, besides the SA-7s, Secord has supplied other arms for the Contras. Secord's prices, Calero tells Singlaub, are much higher than those of Singlaub's arms dealer. (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 206-18. See id., 5/21/87, at 207-09 ["Adolfo Calero went in and found to our surprise General Secord was in the office with Colonel North."]; JHICI Exx. JKS 1 ["one of the iterations" of the Singlaub-Bermudez

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		weapons list], JKS 2 [final weapons list, initialed by Calero].)	
85/04/25-230 AFTER OCTOBER 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WEAPONS PROCUREMENT NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on his efforts to get arms for the Contras after Boland II came into effect in October 1984: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . Did you also endeavor to procure arms for the contras? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you receive, for example, lists of arms from Mr. Calero? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it you contacted General Secord and asked him whether he would be willing to endeavor to purchase the arms and sell them to the contras? "Mr. NORTH. And others. I mean, I contacted a number of people to include General Singlaub, and others. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it you made in some instances specific efforts to obtain particular kinds of arms, such as blow-pipe missiles, for example?" "Mr. NORTH. Yes, I did." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 145.)	
85/04/25-232 1985-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WEAPONS PROCUREMENT NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: "Mr. Cohen. . . . [W]ere you aware Mr. Hakim and Secord had paid a substantial amount of money to [redacted.]	

"Mr. North. No.

"Mr. Cohen. For the purchase of arms?

"Mr. North. I was not. The only strictures I put on who[m] to buy arms from was that you couldn't deal with the people Director Casey told me about. That was the Martin[-]McCoy operation [see 86/04/07-259], the warehouse [redacted] and -- and I went back to General Singlaub and tried to get him to get away from [redacted] because Director Casey told me [redacted] was involved in reverse technology transfers to the East bloc. Those are the only two people I told them they could not deal with. The exposure of [redacted] occurred relatively late in this activity.

"It may be they had already dealt with him. It was in 1986, late 1986 I worked on that exposure [redacted.]"
(North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 55.)

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AFTER OCTOBER
1984

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WEAPONS PROCUREMENT
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. Did you know, as testified by General Singlaub, that North actually approved weapons purchases for the contras? [See above at 85/04/25-200.]

"A. I was aware that he was working with the contra leadership and with Secord on what weapons they needed. I'm not sure -- I would not characterize what I knew about it as knowing he made the decision, but that--

"Q. Did you know the he was making decisions as to where contributions should be sent for the

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		contras? "A. Well, in effect I knew that, and that's why when Secretary Abrams called me I told him to talk to Colonel North. [See 86/06/10-100, -101.] "Q. And did you authorize him to do the things that I have just reviewed with you except for the keeping of the cash? "A. Again, depending on time frame, when I was Deputy that would not have been my role to approve that or disapprove it, because Mr. McFarlane was following that more closely than I. I was aware of it. I agreed with it. I didn't have any problem with it. And when I became National Security Advisor I told Colonel North to continue on course." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 330. On Poindexter's knowledge of North's Contra activities, see below at 86/00/09-195, -196.)	
85/04/25-400 SOMETIME IN THE SPRING OF 1985		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PUBLICITY SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: At around the same time as their meetings with Calero and Secord over arms purchases for the Contras, Singlaub and North discuss the news media. North says he is concerned that he might be connected with Singlaub's Contra work. Singlaub is unyielding: "In addition to the advantage of increasing the fund raising activity, I [sc. Singlaub] found that it was a great boost to the morale of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters to have an old soldier who was openly expressing concern for their cause and trying to help them. That was a benefit."	

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		North is persuaded. He agrees Singlaub should "maintain a high profile" and serve as "the lightening rod and take the attention away from himself [sc. North] and others who were involved in the covert side of support." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 218-20.)	
85/04/25-420 1984 - PRESENT		NSC STAFF CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MEDIA INQUIRIES SUMMARY: On news media inquiries into Contra-related activities of Oliver North and others on the NSC staff, see Iran-Contra Report, at 121-22.	
85/04/30-800 SOMETIME AFTER APRIL 1985		CONTRA FUNDING: NETWORK ORGANIZATIONAL CHART MILLER ACCOUNT: North shows Richard Miller a flow chart which includes NEPL, IBC, and I.C., Inc. -- entities created by the Channell/Miller group. The chart is similar to one found in North's safe and reproduced in the Tower Report, at C-17. (Miller Dep., 8/20/87, at 110-13; Iran-Contra Report, at 91. On NEPL, IBC, and I.C., Inc., see Iran-Contra Report, at 85-91. On private fund-raising for the Contras, see generally 85/08/01-410, 85/11/01-420.)	
85/05/01-400 SOMETIME IN MAY 1985		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ARMS TRANSACTIONS SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord arranges the third of his four arms transactions for Calero. The final 2 transactions are arranged through Tom Clines--a sea lift in May 1985, and a second (undated and unspecified)	

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		transaction. Clines uses the Portuguese arms company, Defex. The initial 2 transactions had involved Transworld Armament, a Canadian arms dealer, and consisted of a small ship-load of munitions from the Far East in Nov. 1984, and a 90,000-pound load from Europe in the spring of 1985. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 143-46, 148; JHICI Ex. 2 [arms involved in the 4 shipments].)	
85/05/01-500 MAY 1, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THIRD-COUNTRY SOLICITATION NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. And, Colonel, if you look at Exhibit 261, which is another of your memos, this one dated May 1, 1985, you will see that there it says 'Recommendation: that the current donors be approached to provide the remainder of their $25 million pledge', and then Mr. McFarlane crossed out an additional $15 to $20 million between now and June 1, 1985. You wrote that, to[o], correct? "Mr. NORTH. Certainly. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. But again, Counsel, what I am saying is there is nothing in what you have so graciously put up on the wall [the text of Boland] that prohibits that action. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, isn't it a fact, Colonel, that you and your colleagues in the NSC spent a good deal of time formulating a legislative policy that would get permission from the Congress to solicit third countries to support the contras? "Is that correct?	

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall that you wrote memos on that subject reviewing the options for getting congressional legislation?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall that after these memos recommending going back to the current donors were written, Congress in December 1985 amended Boland to permit solicitation of humanitarian aid; do you remember that, sir?

"Mr. NORTH. If you say it was in December 1985, I am sure that it must be.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, you remember that the bill was passed?

"Mr. NORTH. I do.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it was, I believe, in December of 1985, well after this.

"[You do] remember that, don't you?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And so is what you are telling us now that this legislation that you fought to get was superfluous?

"Mr. NORTH. No.

"Mr. LIMAN. Was this legislation legislation that was intended to restrict what you already had the power to do?

"Mr. NORTH. Not at all.

"Mr. LIMAN. You sought this legislation to get authorization for something that somebody in the Administration thought they didn't have the power to do; correct?

"Mr. NORTH. Not necessarily.

"As I recall the entire process of trying to restore what became $100 million worth of aid to the Nicaragua resistance is we took it step by step by step.

"As I recall, the instructions were to bite off a little at a time and start moving back toward full support. And the next step in that was to get appropriated $27 million worth of humanitarian assistance and the permission to get full intelligence support and finally, we got back to full $100 million worth of military and political support. Going step by step by step.

"Mr. LIMAN. Right.

"Colonel, this was an additional bite getting the permission from Congress to solicit the humanitarian aid; correct? Using your term, a bite at a time?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes. And to have people besides the National Security Council be able to do those things. But quite honestly, Counsel, I see nothing in either that section of the continuing resolution appropriations nor the Constitution of the United States that in any way prohibits the President or his personal staff from interacting with foreign heads of state as I did, as Mr. McFarlane did, or their representatives to this end."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 217-21; JHICI Ex. OLN 261 [North memo to McFarlane, re FDN Military Operations].)

85/05/04-100
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LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL
LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1:

Michael Ledeen testified on his trip to Israel in May 1985 (for Ledeen's account of events leading up to the trip, see 85/04/00-120):

"A. . . . McFarlane told me formally to go and I informed him when the appointment had been scheduled and so forth. I strongly disagreed with the line in the Tower Commission that says Ledeen on his own initiative scheduled the meeting with Peres [see Tower Report, at B-5], since it was decidedly not on my own initiative; it was a result of an explicit approval from McFarlane down to the last detail of the conversation.

"So I went to Israel and met with Peres on the 4th, 5th, 6th of May, in this period. Just the two of us. No one else present in the room.

"Q. How long was your meeting with him?

"A. About 40, 45 minutes.

"Q. Was it a single meeting or did you meet with him on more than one occasion?

"A. On that trip, a single meeting. I met with him again on a later trip.

"Q. If you could just describe the substance then of your conversation with Mr. Peres?

"A. I said to him that we were interested in Iran and in Iran's role in international terrorism, and we felt frankly that our information was quite unsatisfactory. We did not have a good picture of these subjects and we did not have a good understanding of the Iranian situation over all. We had a poor picture of the internal situation and a poor picture of the way in which it operated internationally and that some people had suggested to us that Israel might be better informed.

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			"So my questions were two and a half in number: Number one was, do you people know anything about Iran, Iran's role in terrorism? Are you happy with you -- the state of your own information and understanding? If you are, is there some chance that you might be willing to share some or all of it with us so that we too could have a better understanding of it? And finally, sort of half a question: If at some date in the future we manage to understand these things better, do you have any bright ideas about useful things one could do with regard to Iran in a general sort of way? "This was what I put to him. Now, I want to stress in light of most of what has been written that in that conversation, various subjects were never discussed. Contacts with Iran were not discussed. American hostages in Lebanon were not discussed. These were not on my agenda. They were not things we were looking for. Neither he nor I raised them. They never happened at all. "His answer was a bit disappointing as to basically that he didn't think their information on Iran was particularly outstanding. He was unhappy with it. That while it might very well be better than ours and that would be understandable because they were a lot closer and they had been more active in all of this, basically they didn't have any great understanding of the situation. But that he thought it was important and that he would be delighted to work more closely with us to try to develop better information and better understanding and that, in fact, he would appoint

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			Shlomo Gazit, a former director of military intelligence who was then the president of the Ben-Gurion University in Be'er Sheva, to head a group which would lia[i]se with us. They would try to pull together whatever information they could about Iran and that I should work with Gazit and develop a relationship with him and the thing would go forward." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 16-18.)
85/05/04-101 MAY 4-6, 1985			LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Go ahead. "A. And at the end of the conversation, when we talked a bit more about Iran, what did they know, what did they think. "(Discussion off the record.) "The Witness. He [sc. Prime Minister Peres] asked me if I would be willing to carry a private message from him to McFarlane and he said that they had -- had received a request from the Government of Iran to sell a certain quantity of artillery shells or artillery pieces, I don't remember which, to Iran and that Peres would not do this unless he had explicit American approval for it. "And I asked him please not to ask me to carry that message since it was an awkward message for me to carry and it was not a subject on which I worked at all and I did not particularly wish to be involved in discussions of this kind of subject. Could he please find somebody else.

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			"He said, Look, it was kind of pressing and it wasn't so easy for him to find someone who would be able to speak personally and privately to McFarlane and would I please just ask him. "So I said, Okay, but I'd rather he didn't do this, and that I would do it this one time and that was that. "When I came back and reported to McFarlane on the meeting with Peres, I reported this as well, and just to close this parenthetical, when I told this to McFarlane, he said he would have to check and get back to me. "About a week later he called me in and asked me to inform the Israelis that that was okay, but just that one shipment and nothing else. "BY MR. EGGLESTON: "Q. Now we are referring to your conversation with Mr. Peres. Did Mr. Peres tell you how many shells he wanted to sell? "A. Yes. "Q. How many? "A. I don't remember. "Q. Was it -- is it your recollection it was a substantial quantity? "A. It wasn't a particularly huge quantity. "Q. Do you have any recollection at all? "A. No. "Q. Did he tell you who[m] in Iran he was dealing with wanted to sell it to, anything like that? "A. The answer has been no. "Q. Did he indicate to you whether Israel had made other arms sales to Iran?

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			"A. No. "Q. And now jumping ahead to your conversation with McFarlane about this issue about the arms sales, did . . . Mr. McFarlane tell you who[m] he would have to check with? "A. No. ". . . . "Q. Then when he called you back a week or so later to tell you that you should inform the Israelis that the one shipment was okay, did he indicate to you who[m] he had checked with? "A. No." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 18-21. See id. at 160 [Ledeen: "Wait a minute. Let's get this straight again, because there tends to be some confusion about the chronology. The question of arms is not discussed prior to July, 1985. There was no discussion of arms betwen me and Peres in May, except for the request that America authorize that one discrete sale."]. See also Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 16-18 [Ledeen was on a mission from McFarlane in Israel]. See generally Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 153-62; Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 40; Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/22/87, at 283-85 [all on Ledeen's trip to Israel].)
85/05/04-102 MAY - JUNE 1985			LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE, AND PREPARATIONS FOR A SECOND TRIP LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. When you went to Israel in early May of 1985, to your knowledge had the State Department

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			been notified of your trip? "A. I had no knowledge about that. McFarlane had told me before the trip that he would inform Shultz of it. So that there would be no glitch with Shultz. So my impression as of the time I went was -- and I believe I told Peres this -- was that Shultz knew about the trip. "When I subsequently discovered that Shultz had not been told about the trip, I was surprised. "Q. I assume you are going to get to that? "A. So I -- after the meeting with Peres, he arranged a meeting with Gazit. Gazit and I met and talked about how we would proceed. We agreed that he would try to find out what Israel knew about Iran and I would try to find out what the United States knew about Iran and we would get together and compare notes and see what we needed to know and see if we could figure out some way that we could advance that. "Then he arranged to have me talk to a couple of [redacted] and so I had conversations with several of these people as well, and talked to some of the -- a variety of Israelis, some of them who were knowledgeable about Iran and some who weren't, particularly. "Then I came back to the United States and reported on the conversation [to] McFarlane. ". . . . "[A.] . . . And I believe that that report provided the basic incentive for the tasking of CIA to produce the special national intelligence estimate on Iran in that period, the May-June period. [See 85/05/20-100.]

"BY MR. EGGLESTON:

"Q. Did you deal with anybody at the CIA in order to develop that report?

"A. No. In fact, I did not know anything about the report, did not know that it was in the works until it was actually produced and Fortier gave me a copy to read.

"Q. At this time, did you prepare anything written?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you report to anybody other than McFarlane?

"A. I reported -- I briefly told Fortier that I had had the meeting and it was quite successful.

"Q. Fortier at this time was McFarlane's deputy?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Okay.

"A. And I may have discussed it with either Teicher or Covey but I don't have any recollection of that.

"Q. Up to this time in 1985, had you had any dealings with Colonel North?

"A. Well, we had chatted. I worked out of his office, after all. I was administratively assigned to Colonel North's office. So that was the place where I went to read the intelligence reports that I was supposed to read and I don't remember at what point he started to sign my time chits [sic (sheets?)].

"Q. Did you keep him advised of what was going on, what you were doing?

"A. No. I did not.

"Q. I should say as of this time.

"A. No. North does not enter the story until September as far as I can recall.

"Q. Okay. So now I have taken you to about the middle of May, I think?

"A. Right. If I can just put a tag on your last question, I did not inform him of my Iranian-related activities and he did not inform me of his Central American-related activities. The discussions that he had invariably concerned the things on which we were both engaged." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 21-24. See Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 44-45 [Shultz' reaction to Ledeen's trip]. See also 85/06/05-100, 85/06/07-100 [Shultz' knowledge of Ledeen's trip]. See also 85/05/20-100 [SNIE on Iran].)

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LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE, AND PREPARATIONS FOR A SECOND TRIP

LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Ledeen's response continues from preceding entry:]

"[A.] So my notion was to return to Israel fairly quickly and talk to Gazit. I was particularly keen to hear from him what Israel knew and to compare it with the picture that we had in Washington. However, it was about this time, late May, early June, when I was planning to go to Israel when Shultz got angry upon learning that I had been there.

"Q. How did you learn that he had gotten angry?

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			"A. McFarlane told me. Told me that there had been a leak and that the embassy in Tel Aviv had found out about it and that Shultz was angry. "Q. Did you ask McFarlane about his earlier representation to you that Shultz knew all about it? "A. No. It was clear that he hadn't when he told me that Shultz was angry at not having been told. It didn't seem appropriate to say, You mean you didn't tell him? "Q. Okay. "A. But he said that he was -- he would talk to Shultz and that he would calm him down and that it would work out and that I would eventually go back, but that for the moment, there would be no trips to Israel and no further conversations with Gazit. "Q. You think these conversations with McFarlane about the flap involving Shultz took place in early June? "A. That's what I think. Late May, early June. I think in the Tower Commission [Tower Report, at B-12], the cables from Shultz are in this period also, as I recall. "Q. My recollection is that they are around May 30 or so. "A. Yes. "So I waited and I had originally remembered a June trip to Israel. However -- and I must tell you that I still think that I remember having been to Israel an additional time. However, there are no Israel stamps on my passport for June. There are no NSC travel records, and I am compelled to

believe that my memory has added a trip there where there was none.

"However, I note for you in the Tower Commission Report, there is someone else -- Shultz talks about trips and there is someone else who talks about, talks as if there is another trip in the[re] someplace. Anyway --

"Q. Do you recall anything significant happening on this trip?

"A. No. All I remember is conversations with Gazit which could have taken place in July.

"Anyway, the next documented trip is July. This comes as a result of a meeting with Schwimmer in the middle of the month. In the first half of July, I got a call from David Kimche, the director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Given the structure of their Foreign Service, he is in essence the Deputy Foreign Minister of Israel.

"Mr. Woolsey. Is or was?

"The Witness. Was. He re[tir]ed a couple of months ago.

"I had known him for some years. I had gotten to know him, I guess, just before Reagan's election, or immediately thereafter, and he was the person to whom I reported in Israel when I traveled to Israel on behalf of [Alexander] Haig because my practice when dealing with the Socialist Parties in other countries was to talk to them and report generally on my conversations to a senior person at the Foreign Ministry in that country so the government wouldn't think the United States was somehow going behind its back in supporting or favoring their opponents in one

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			manner or another. "Kimche was the person to whom I typically reported on these meetings at the Foreign Ministry in Israel." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 24-27.)
85/05/04-104 MAY - JUNE 1985			LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL: PREPARATIONS FOR A SECOND TRIP LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 5: [Continuing from preceeding entry:] ". . . . "Q. If you could tell us about that conversation you had with him [sc. Kimche] in early July? "A. He called from Israel and said that a friend of his name[d] Al Schwimmer was coming to Washington and he would appreciate it if I could listen to what Al Schwimmer had to say. And a few days later, a person named Al Schwimmer did indeed call. "Q. I take it you did not know Al Schwimmer prior to this time? "A. I did not, no. He invited me to lunch. "Q. I am sorry. Did Mr. Kimche tell you who Al Schwimmer was? Why he would be calling? "A. No. "Q. Just that he would be getting in touch with you and you should respond? "A. Yes. "Q. Okay. "A. So Schwimmer came to Washington. This is the first half of July. And we had lunch together [see 85/07/11-010, -011] and Schwimmer told me

that he was a close friend of Shimon Peres, that he had been the president of Israel Aircraft Industries, now retired, but that he still was active in some matters on behalf of the Prime Minister and that in that connection, he had been introduced a short time before by Adnan Khashoggi to a very interesting Iranian by the name of Ghorbanifar, and that Ghorbanifar had a lot of very interesting things to say both about Iran and about the intentions of leading figures in the Government of Iran, and that he thought under the circumstances it was worthwhile for me to come as quickly as could possibly be managed to meet with Ghorbanifar and that this could be done either in Europe or in Israel.

"Q. Had you met -- just so the record is clear, I take it as of this time you had never met Mr. Ghorbanifar?

"A. Had never met him. That was the first I heard of him by name.

"Q. Mr. Khashoggi, had you met him before?

"A. I had run into Mr. Khashoggi before. I believe we had been introduced but I had not met him per se. I had no relationship with him.

"Q. When you say it was the first time you had heard of Mr. Ghorbanifar by name, had you heard of him in some other context, not by name?

"A. It turns out that I had, although I did not know it then. In fact, I did not know it until long after all these events -- I had ceased to be involved in these events.

"Ted Shackley had approached me a couple of months before this conversation with Schwimmer.

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			Shackley and I typically tended to meet for lunch once every two to three months or thereabouts, and at one of these luncheon meetings, he told me about a meeting that he had had with an Iranian in Europe at the end of 1984 and said that this Iranian he found to be very interesting and very well connected in Iran and had in essence offered his services to arrange the ransom[] of Buckley and possibly other American hostages, and Shackley told me that he had reported this to General Walters at the State Department and that there had been no response of any sort and that he would like to try one more time simply to indicate -- call the attention of the American Government to this conversation in case anyone was interested, and he gave me -- subsequent to this conversation, he came over to my house and gave me a memorandum dealing with the subject, which I passed on to Colonel North without reading. And -- ". . . . "The Witness. I think the way it worked, the luncheon was a month or so before my trip to Israel. I think he probably gave me the memorandum either just before I went or just after I returned in May. But it is all in this sort of spring period." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 27-30.)
85/05/04-105 MAY - JULY 1985			LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL: PREPARATIONS FOR A SECOND TRIP LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 6: [Continuing for preceding entry:] ". . . .

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			"A. In any case, the memorandum which I read for the first time when the Tower Commission was kind enough to show me a copy of it, had, in fact, Ghorbanifar's name in it and had I realized that at the time, I undoubtedly would have talked at some length to Shackley about Ghorbanifar when I got to know Ghorbanifar; but I didn't, and I didn't. Didn't read it, didn't realize it. And never discussed it with Shackley. So that's the answer to your question. "It turns out I had heard something about Ghorbanifar, but wasn't aware it was Ghorbanifar about whom I had heard. "Q. Right. "A. So Schwimmer told me all these things about Ghorbanifar. He gave to me what I believe is called the Khashoggi document, that is the -- as I read it, about a 40-page report in three or more sections, of which one section dealt with Iran. The section on Iran, Schwimmer told me had been written by Ghorbanifar and that he and other Israelis found that section particularly interesting. "So I reported on this luncheon meeting to McFarlane and gave him that middle section, the section that Ghorbanifar had written about Iran after reading it several times quite carefully. "Q. Let me make sure I am clear. Did Mr. Schwimmer have an official position in the Israeli Government at this time? "A. No, he didn't. He had -- well, maybe I shouldn't be so quick to say no. He had some kind of advisory position to Peres. That is, he had a

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			title of some sort but he certainly did not have a line position in the Israeli Government, a formal position. "Q. Okay. "A. So I gave this document to McFarlane and asked him if he wanted me to meet with Ghorbanifar and pointed out to him that we were going to be going to Israel in any case within a few weeks and spending three-and-a-half weeks there on vacation and that if we wished, I could meet with Ghorbanifar in Israel during this period, and he approved it and told me to meet with Ghorbanifar while I was there, so this was arranged. I informed -- I don't remember whether it was Kimche or Schwimmer that I called to tell this to. "Now, Schwimmer had mentioned that Ghorbanifar was interested in discussing the subject of hostages and had indicated that he believed the Government or [sic (of)] Iran could be helpful in obtaining the release of American hostages from Lebanon. I reported this also to McFarlane. "When I got to Israel, I met first with Gazit -- "Q. Let me stop you at this point. "When you got approval from Mr. McFarlane to meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar when you were on your own vacation in Israel, was there any discussion about the nature of the conversation that you were supposed to be having with Mr. Ghorbanifar, as there had been on the Peres meeting [see 85/04/00-120]? Did you discuss with him the purpose, the kinds of messages you should send, anything along those lines?

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			"A. No. My instructions were simply to attend this meeting and to report back on it, to learn whatever I could. "Q. Okay." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 30-33. On Ledeen's lunch with Schwimmer, see also 85/07/11-010, -011.)
85/05/04-106 MAY - JULY 1985			LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL: PREPARATIONS FOR A SECOND TRIP LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 7: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "A. In general, the one general estimate that can be made about my participation in that meeting and in all subsequent meetings was that at no time was I ever authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Government of the United States or to make decisions on behalf of the Government of the United States. My role was always that of someone who was supposed to attend meetings, listen, ask questions, find out as much as I could, and then report back. "I was not on that occasion or any other occasion part of a decision-making loop or process. My conversations about the whole subject were almost exclusively with McFarlane and occasionally with North and other persons, but they were always in the manner of one-on-one conversations. "I never attended general meetings. I was never at a National Security Council meeting on this subject, never at a cabinet meeting on this subject. So that mine was a talkative,

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			fly-on-the-wall role, if you like. Watch, listen, ask, but could never do. Never authorized to do anything nor did I ever do anything. This was clear to the other people, too. "I expect that it will be discovered at a certain point that the Israelis had a very clear definition of my role from McFarlane as well as from me. I expect this will also be borne out in time when they finally respond to all these questions. "Q. Did you report on the luncheon with Schwimmer to anyone other than McFarlane? "A. No, I don't think so. There is a thing in the Tower Commission which says that I gave a short note on it to Wilma Ha[]ll, who was McFarlane's secretary, and that she may have given it to Admiral Poindexter, so it may have gone originally from Wilma to Admiral Poindexter to McFarlane, but the note in any case, if it was a note, which I don't remember but could very well have taken place, the note would have been addressed to McFarlane and she would have passed it to Poindexter. [See Tower Report, at B-16 n.10.] "In any case, McFarlane said, Go ahead and talk to this guy and let's see what happens. I got to Israel around about the 16th or 17th or 18th of July, and met fairly quickly with Kimche and discovered at that point that Gazit's basic working group was Gazit, Kimche, Schwimmer and a chap named Jacob [sic (Yaacov)] Nimrodi, who had been for many years the Israeli military attache in Teheran and who spoke Farsi, which was handy

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because as things developed, we had the need for someone who spoke Farsi, and Nimrodi served as the Farsi speaker and was able to check on the way Ghorbanifar was translating conversations, conversations he would hold on the telephone in Farsi and so forth.

"Q. Had you met Nimrodi before?

"A. Never met him before.

"Q. Did he have a position inside the government?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you know what his position was at the time?

"A. No. I found out that he was an arms dealer and that he was politically and personally a close friend of General Sharon's.

"Q. When did you find that[ ]out? Approximately? Was it after this whole thing was over?

"A. No. No. It was during that vacation trip."

(Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 33-35. See Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 25-28 [McFarlane's report of meeting with the President in the hospital in 7/85 about the Iran Initiative; also Wilma Hall's message]. See generally id. at 25-30, 35-37 [summer 1985 TOW transactions, generally].)

85/05/04-110
EARLY MAY
1985

LEDEEN'S TRIP TO ISRAEL: DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL
LEDEEN ACCOUNT:

"Q. . . . Let me start with a trip that your travel records show that you made to Israel on May

1, 1985. Do you recall that trip?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Who[m] did you meet with in Israel?

"A. I met with Prime Minister Peres, and I met subsequently with Shlomo Gazit.

"Q. In general terms, would you just describe what you discussed in your meeting with Mr. Peres.

"A. I discussed the inadequate information that the Government of the United States had about Iran, and about Iran's role in international terrorism. And I asked him if he felt that Israel had a satisfactory understanding of that situation. He said no, but that he agreed that it was an important matter and he proposed to create a study group, or whatever you care to call it, who would try to pull together what Israel knew about Iran, so that we could compare notes and try to achieve a better understanding together.

"Q. Did he ask you to convey a message to Mr. McFarlane?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was that message?

"A. Said that they, Israel, had been asked by the Government of Iran to sell to Iran a certain quantity of--I think it was artillery shells, but it could have been artillery pieces--I don't recall--and that they would not do this without explicit American approval, and would I ask McFarlane if the United States approved.

"Q. Did he mention a specific kind of artillery shell, or artillery?

"A. I don't recall.

"Q. And you can't recall the quantity that he was talking about shipping to Iran?

"A. There was a quantity but I don't remember it.

"Q. Was this shipment linked in any way to the potential release of hostages?

"A. No.

"Q. Was there any discussion at your meeting with Mr. Peres about getting hostages released?

"A. No.

"Q. Were TOW missiles discussed at that meeting?

"A. No.

"Q. Was Ghorbanifar's name mentioned at that meeting?

"A. No.

"Q. Was there any discussion at the meeting about improving U.S. relations with Iran by shipping weapons to Iran?

"A. No. There was no discussion of the relationship between the United States and Iran at all.

"Q. Did Mr. Peres explain why he wanted to ship this artillery or artillery shells to Iran?

"A. He said that Israel had found it useful to have channels into Iran, that if we were interested in getting maximum information out of Iran, that this was one way. Those sort of channels helped them get information.

"[Redacted.]

"Q. And is it also fair to say that at this meeting, he expressed a willingness to try to cooperate with the United States in improving the quality of the intelligence that was available on

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			Iran? "A. Yes. "Q. After this meeting in May, you returned and briefed Mr. McFarlane on what Mr. Peres had to say, correct? "A. Correct." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 40-43.)
85/05/16-000 MAY 16-19, 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MONEY AND WEAPONS OWEN ACCOUNT: Robert Owen again travels to Central America (for at least the 7th time). He brings along several thousand dollars. On his return journey, be brings back a "Priority List" of weapons wanted by a Contra leader. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, 250-53; JHICI Ex. RWO 6.)	
85/05/20-100 MAY 20, 1985			SNIE RECOMMENDATION: IRAN ARMS SALES A Special National Intelligence Estimate is circulated within the Executive branch. Among its recommendations is a proposal to sell arms to Iran through an ally as a means of pursuing an opening to Iran. (Iran-Contra Report, at 165 [citing Fuller memo to the DCI and DDCI, "Toward a Policy on Iran," 5/17/85 (Committee Documents D 570-75); Fortier PROF to McFarlane, "Iran," 5/28/85 (Committee Documents N 16394-95)]. See generally Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 156-57 [Ledeen on the connection between his 5/85 trip to Israel (see 85/05/04-102) and the SNIE on Iran: "[T]he most I would say is that I think it was in part produced in that connection. . . . [The timing c]ould have been fortuitous, or coincidence."];

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			Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 58-60 [state of intelligence on Iran at the time of the SNIE in 1985].)
85/05/24-100 MAY 24, 1985		CONTRA FUNDING CIA MEMO: CIA memo on McFarlane meeting the previous day: "We then discussed the $14 million for the Contras . . . . McFarlane wanted to know if we were plugged into the private efforts to raise the $14 million. The DCI indicated that we had heard something on that but had no details." (JHICI Ex. 37-A.)	
85/05/24-110 MAY 24, 1985		CONTRA FUNDING: CASEY-McFARLANE MEETING; PRIVATE DONORS, AND THE FAKE SAUDI PRINCE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now would you look then at Exhibit 37 A, which is another one of these weekly meetings with the DCI. [See also 85/03/21-500.] Paragraph 6, which is the only thing that was left in after the declassification says, 'We then discussed the $14 million for the contras and there seem[] to be more bills and proposals around than the administration can handle.' "It then goes on to say--do you see where I am reading? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I do. "Mr. LIMAN. 'McFarlane wanted to know if we were plugged into the private efforts to raise the $14 million. The DCI indicated that we had heard something on that, but had no details.'	

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		"What was he referring to, if you know, about the private efforts to raise the $14 million? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, what I was referring to was whether or not the director was conscious of any efforts in the United States to raise money from private individuals, and I didn't assume that the CIA in its official capacity would be penetrating or otherwise collecting on them. It was against the law. "But I just wanted to know whether Bill Casey was awa[r]e of any such efforts or not. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you have a goal then of raising $14 million from private donors in the United States? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. The apparent or alleged efforts of outside groups raising money was well-known, or at least it was well-rumored in public. "Mr. LIMAN. I mean this is not your memorandum. I appreciate it. "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. "Mr. LIMAN. It is the memorandum of the CIA. But it says, 'McFarlane wanted to know if we were plugged into the private efforts to raise the $14 million.' "What were the private efforts that you were talking about? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, the rumored efforts that were well-known. I simply wanted to know was Bill Casey witting of any such efforts. I was not, but I didn't know whether or not he was plugged into something that I was not. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, who was handling, who was	

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		in charge of the private efforts to raise the $14 million. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I didn't know, and I didn't purport to know. I wanted to know really if he knew. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, if one of your tasks was within the law to keep the contras going, did it not seem to you that it was appropriate for you to inquire as to who was raising the money? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it would have been, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask North? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Repeatedly Colonel North and I had exchanges about who was doing it; are you involved, and so forth. "Mr. LIMAN. And what were the responses? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That he believed that there were well-meaning, patriotic Americans that were joined together to donate money and who were working with the contras, but that he wasn't personally party to it. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall who[m] he told you was organizing the effort? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't believe that he did. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Broadly, yes, who is getting this money together, what does it involve, what does it amount to, are you party to it? "Mr. LIMAN. His answer was he didn't know? "Mr. MCFARLANE. He said that he suspected that there were several that were operating on their own independently and that he wasn't plugged into it, though.	

"Mr. LIMAN. Did he ever tell you that he was trying to raise the money from the so-called phony Saudi princip[al]s? You have read a lot about that Iranian who was parading himself as a Saudi prince.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. He never mentioned that and I have never heard of it before.

"Mr. LIMAN. Until it recently has been written about?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And he didn't tell you that he was arranging to have Miller meet with this man?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No.

"Mr. LIMAN. He didn't tell you that he was in contact with the FBI to ask that they not proceed with any indictment of this man for fraud until he came up with this money?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, he didn't."
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 92-96; JHICI Ex. 37-A [CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 23 May 1985," 5/24/85]. On the Fake Saudi Prince, see JHICI Exx. 61-62 [= Exx. OLN 264-65; Cables to Director, FBI, 7/30/85, 7/18/85, on Richard Miller and the Saudi Prince]. See also 85/06/07-051, -052 [North executive session testimony on the Fake Saudi Prince].)

85/05/25-300
AT AN
UNSPECIFIED
TIME AFTER

OVERCHARGING THE CONTRAS: SECORD'S PRICES
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testifying on reports the Contras were being overcharged by Secord for weapons:

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JULY 1984		"Mr. NIELDS. Just to make it clear, I am asking you about did you ever hear adverse reports or did you ever entertain suspicions that you weren't getting the straight facts from General Secord about the way he was handling the pricing of arms to the contras? "Mr. NORTH. No. I did hear a report from someone in Central America that General Secord was overcharging on the arms that he delivered to the resistance, and I sought at that point in time a price list from him and compared those prices to those that others had gotten. Some were higher, some were lower, and I believe at the time I talked to Adolfo Calero about it, who was at that time the principal recipient of the arms from General Secord. "I don't recall--you had a very competitive environment down there. Once the U.S. Government withdrew in '84 from directly supporting the resistance, you ended up with a lot of folks out there running a very cut-throat business. "There were two particular transactions or dealers that raised great concerns with Director Casey. One of them was a transaction of some five to six million dollars from a broker who he was concerned had also been involved in reverse technology transfer to the Eastern Bloc, and he told me to do everything possible to discourage further purchases. "The other one was a so-called warehouse operation that was being run in a Central American country that the agency and Director Casey in particular [were] very concerned about the source	

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		of their monies and the fact that this enormous warehouse of several millions of dollars worth of ordnance had been stocked up in that Central American country and the potential adverse consequences, and at one point he apprised me that he was concerned that that Central American country might have diverted USF monies, U.S. economic support funds, to the military to purchase the arms that went in that warehouse. "So he told me that there shouldn't be any further transactions with that broker until such time as he resolved or they were able to resolve where those came from. "I then talked to Mr. Calero and I talked to General Secord, that they should avoid those transactions. "My sense is that as a consequence of the advice I got from the Director to withdraw from dealing with those two dealers, that a lot of people started putting out very hard words about General Secord, and I think a lot of that was brought up here to Washington, I think it was made available to certain Members of Cognress, and I think that is where a lot of the adverse publicity came from." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 83-84.)	
85/05/28-810 MAY 28, 1985			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: David Jacobsen, Director of the American University Hospital, is kidnapped in Lebanon (CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 1.)

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85/05/30-100 MAY 30, 1985			LEDEEN IN ISRAEL: DoS NOTICE DoS CHRONOLOGY: "Ambassador to Israel SAMUEL LEWIS reports that MICHAEL LEDEEN is in Israel talking to Israeli officials to obtain intelligence about Iran, without notice to the U.S. Embassy." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/06/03-100.)
85/05/31-090 MAY 31, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: "NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK" NORTH MEMO: North writes in a memo to McFarlane, titled "The Nicaraguan Resistance: Near-Term Outlook": "During the month of May, the Nicaraguan Resistance recorded significant advances in their struggle against the Sandinistas. Despite the adversity caused by the [redacted] closure of [redacted] there are today more combatants actively in the field than at any time in the last 12 months. Militarily, there was heavy action throughout Nicaragua and on all three fronts: north, south, and Atlantic. ". . . . "In short, the political and military situation for the resistance now appears better than at any point in the last 12 months. Plans are underway to transition from current arrangements to a consultative capacity by the CIA for all political matters and intelligence, once Congressional approval is granted on lifting	

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		Section 8066 restrictions. The only portion of current activity which will be sustained as it has since last June, will be the delivery of lethal supplies. "RECOMMENDATION "That you brief the President on the above." [Approve/Disapprove lines not checked.] (JHICI Ex. 38 [= Exx. FH 6; OLN 152].)	
85/05/31-100 MAY 31, 1985 AND SOMETIME IN THE FALL 1985		ALTERED DOCUMENTS: OUTLOOK FOR THE CONTRAS HALL ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . During the course of our work, however, we came upon another document you will recall that we showed you which appears also to have been altered; is that correct? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Would you look then at Exhibit [FH] 6? "Exhibit 6 is a document dated May 31, 1985, system number 400564, which does not appear on the McFarlane handwritten list entitled 'The Nicaraguan resistance: Near term outlook,' from North to McFarlane. It contains a description by North of how the Nicaraguan resistance is doing at that time and what its prospects are. "On the last page of the document, directly before the recommendation, the sentence appears, 'The only portion of current activity which will be sustained as it has since last June, will be the delivery of lethal supplies.' "You see that on the documents? "Ms. HALL. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. Would you now turn to Exhibit	

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		[FH] 6-A?	

"It bears the same System 4 security number, the same date, and you will notice that the first page is on the letterhead that was in use in 1985 but not in 1986, correct, Miss Hall?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. We have compared it. The first two pages of Exhibit 6-A are identical to the first two pages of Exhibit 6. The changes come on the last page, and the striking change on the last page is that the sentence which I read which refers to lethal assistance has been deleted, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. And there is also a sentence higher on the page in the first full paragraph which has been changed. On the original of the document, that sentence refers to a series of meetings with Rivera and his representatives and subsequent meetings with another contra leader named Steadman Fagoth.

"In 6-A the reference is simply to a series of meetings with Steadman Fagoth, but nothing to do with the meeting with Rivera, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you have any recollection, Miss Hall, when you revised this document?

"Ms. HALL. I don't have an independent recollection, but I know from our talks that I think we have determined that it was probably done in '85 when the letterhead was still in existence.

"Mr. BELNICK. And I've refreshed you with Mr. McFarlane's testimony, the May 11 transcript, in which he described reviewing various documents with Colonel North in the late fall or--the late summer or early fall of 1985 in connection with the Congressional inquiries, right?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. And he was describing, talking to Colonel North about the documents being unclear and Colonel North's intent might be misread, and Mr. McFarlane testified that he--Colonel North--just said you are misreading my intent and I can make it reflect what I have said if this is ambiguous to you, and I--that is, Mr. McFarlane--said all right, do that. Continuing, within the matter of a day or two, he--Colonel North--returned to my office and he had two single pages. One of them was the same text, or close to it, of the first page of the memorandum. [See 85/08/16-200.]

"As far as we have been able to tell, Miss Hall, the first page of 6-A is the same as the first page of 6?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. Mr. McFarlane continued that the other piece of paper Mr. North returned with was the last page of a memorandum and the last page of 6A is where we found the changes; correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. So from hearing that testimony, your general recollection, although you don't recall independently, is that this document probably was changed around the fall of 1985 or sometime thereafter?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

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		"Mr. BELNICK. But not on November 21, 1986? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 278-83; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 6 [North memo to McFarlane, "The Nicaraguan Resistance: Near-Term Outlook," 5/31/85], FH 6-A [other version of North memo to McFarlane, "The Nicaraguan Resistance: Near-Term Outlook," 5/31/85]. For Hall testimony on the documents listed by McFarlane on Ex. FH 1, see below at 86/11/21-615 and -616. For Hall testimony on the individual altered documents, see 84/12/04-100; 85/0206-310 and -311; 85/03/05-215 and -216; 85/03/16-100; and 85/04/11-230. See Iran-Contra Report, at 125 [Contra near-term outlook memo], 123-26 [altered documents].)	
85/06/01-200 SOMETIME IN EARLY JUNE 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WEAPONS PROCUREMENT OWEN ACCOUNT: Robert Owen flies to Denver and drives to Tabernash to meet with Gen. Singlaub. Owen is unsure whether North requested that he go; Owen did discuss the trip in advance with North, however. The day after Owen arrives, he meets for most of a day at Singlaub's home with 4 or 5 people, including "Robert K. Brown, a soldier of fortune, Ed Deerborne, and several other people from Soldier of Fortune." Barbara Studley, "basically acting as a facilitator," is also present. They discuss weapons procurement for the Contras. "They were talking about over $5 million to be purchased and [Singlaub] wanted to be sure that he	

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		was purchasing exactly what Adolfo Calero needed. . . . They were talking about purchasing 10,000 AK-47s, a million rounds of AK ammunition, hand grenades, mortar rounds, things like that. . . . General Singlaub thought that he had an opportunity to buy some SA-7s, ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 253-57.)	
85/06/01-201 SOMETIME IN EARLY JUNE 1985		OWEN'S AND NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WEAPONS PROCUREMENT OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen goes directly from the Singlaub meeting near Denver to San Francisco to meet Calero. Calero has several meetings and speaking engagements and is very busy. He meets with Owen in the back seat of his car while Calero is making a delivery. Owen has a yellow pad with a munitions list he has brought from the Singlaub meeting. They review it to verify for Singlaub precisely what is needed. About 20 minutes into the ride, they pull over at a pay phone. Owen calls North at (Owen believes) his OEOB office. Owen speaks with North for about a minute, and then Calero and North "in guarded language without going into specifics . . . over an open line" discuss the weapons purchases. Owen (apparently later) calls Singlaub and gives him a coded list of the final figures. A day or 2 later, Owen discusses with North what is to be purchased. North agrees with Calero's view: Blowpipes, if they can be acquired from a third country, would be preferable to	

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		SA-7s. (Owen testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 257-62.)	
85/06/01-205 FALL 1984 - JULY 1985		SINGLAUB'S WEAPONS PROCUREMENT FOR CALERO CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. You also purchased some arms through General Singlaub, correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. BARBADORO. Could you turn to Exhibit AC-4. "Mr. BARBADORO. Have you seen that document before? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, and I can see my initials on it. "Mr. BARBADORO. Mr. Calero, we obtained this document from Barbara Studley, an associate of General Singlaub, can you tell us what it is? "Mr. CALERO. I understand she is not an associate, but a friend of General Singlaub and friend of mine, too, and a real--for our cause, a big booster of our cause. "This is a list of what we acquired from Eastern Europe. "Mr. BARBADORO. So these are the arms that you bought through General Singlaub, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. When did these arms arrive in Central America? "Mr. CALERO. They must have arrived in July, I believe, of-- "Mr. BARBADORO. Of 1985? "Mr. CALERO. 1985, yes.	

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		"Mr. BARBADORO. After this shipment in July of 1985, did the FDN by any more arms? "Mr. CALERO. No, we did not buy more arms. "Mr. BARBADORO. What happened to all these arms and ammunition that you purchased between the fall of 1984 and July of 1985? "Mr. CALERO. Well, they were stocked, given out to our men as needed, and to this day, we are fighting with the rifles that we obtained in this shipment, 10,000, and we still have a few million rounds of ammunition left. "Mr. BARBADORO. You have testified to approximately 19 million worth of arms purchases. "Mr. CALERO. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. We know you raised more than $32 million in contributions. Can you tell us what you spent the rest of the money on? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, the rest of the money was--the rest of the money was spent for uniforms, gear, wet gear, boots, food, medicines, administrative, travel, family support of our organization, for 13 months. This comes to $32 per man, per fighting man, per month for a period of 13 months." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 33-35; JHICI Ex. AC 4.)	
85/06/03-100 JUNE 3, 1985			SHULTZ LEARNS OF McFARLANE-RABIN MEETING DoS CHRONOLOGY: "McFarlane reports to GPS, who is in Lisbon, on meeting with RABIN; does not mention LEDEEN visit to Israel." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see

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			above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/06/05-100.)
85/06/03-300 JUNE 3, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: "Mr. Liman. I have just shown the Colonel an entry in his diary of June 3, '85, which is hard to read, but it seems to refer to a hand-off, and looks to me at least as if it was talking in contemplation of easing the intelligence sharing restrictions on the CIA, and it has CIA to do [redacted] and some other word which I can't read, Nicaraguan, and it says, North to handle logistics supply--- "Mr. North. Support. Indians. "Mr. Liman. I wonder if you can explain what that was? Were you meeting with someone at the CIA and talking about how you continued to handle logistics support after the new law came in? "Mr. North. I think that is what it is. I am trying to remember where we stood in legislation at the time, counsel, but it also looks like it says, 'meeting with Moreau.' "Moreau would be Admiral Moreau, and these were probably the subjects of our discussions. It looks to me like we are talking about the legislation we were expecting or just had passed, whatever would allow the CIA to get back in the game. "As you can see from my PROFS notes, I was very anxious for that to happen." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 38-39.)	

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85/06/04-100 JUNE 4, 1985	SECORD BACKGROUND: Secord becomes a director of Stanford Technology Corporation. (Ex. 18.)		
85/06/05-100 JUNE 5, 1985			SHULTZ PROTESTS LEDEEN'S VISIT TO ISRAEL DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS cables MCFARLANE objecting to LEDEEN visit to Israel, to an intelligence relationship with Israel concerning Iran, and to bypass of State and Embassy." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/06/07-100. See 85/05/04-102, -103 [Ledeen account of Shultz' reaction].)
85/06/05-200 JUNE 5, 1985		GREGG-RODRIGUEZ-STEELE CONTACT GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, notes a meeting among Gregg, Felix Rodriguez and Col. Steele: "On June 5, 1985, Mr. Gregg met with Mr. Rodriguez and Colonel Steele to discuss the situation in El Salvador." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for start of Gregg chronology, see above at 83/11/03-100; chronology continues at 85/12/20-100].)	
85/06/07-000 1985-86			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the DEA Operation, see Iran-Contra Report, at 361-66.

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85/06/07-001 JUNE 7, 1985		DIVERSION: THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION NORTH MEMO: ". . . Travel arrangements and operational costs are currently being financed from funds normally available to the Nicaraguan resistance. . . ." (JHICI Ex. 38-A [= Ex. OLN 263].) See col. 3.	THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION NORTH MEMO: North memo to McFarlane, "Subject: Status of Hostage Recovery Efforts": ". . . . "Once contact has been established and a meeting arranged, the two DEA officers will depart for Cyprus via Vienna where they will deposit the $200K and establish an account for the $2M ($500K of which will be available immediately in U.S. dollars cash for use in Lebanon) . . . . "The primary DEA contact [redacted] believes that the hostages can be bribed free for $1M a piece as follows: "--The $200K will be sufficient to bribe [redacted]. . . . ". . . . "--Transport [redacted] will cost in excess of $250K apiece in order to bribe [redacted] believes that the $200K will be sufficient to establish bona fides to [redacted] to agree to passage of at least 2 hostages. Once the operation is underway and the hostages are through [redacted] will be provided with $500K in cash. ". . . . "--The remaining $1.5M made available by the donor will be released from the account in Vienna as soon as the hostages are aboard the yacht and at sea [redacted.] These funds will be used to pay the [redacted.] "It is assumed that the price cannot be negotiated down given the number of people

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			requiring bribes. Both the DEA and [redacted] believe that this effort will produce two hostages and that additional hostages will be released for $1M apiece. . . . The donor is aware that the price being asked is $1M each. He is unaware that we are proceeding with a plan to release only two if the price does not come down. ". . . Travel arrangements and operational costs are currently being financed from funds normally available to the Nicaraguan resistance. . . . ". . . . "RECOMMENDATIONS[:] "1. That you approve proceeding with the plans outlined above. "[Approve box initialed 'RCM'] "2. That you contact the Attorney General and ask that the two DEA officers [redacted] be placed on temporary detail to the NSC for a period of 30 days. "[Approve box marked 'Done 6/9 RCM[,] North follow up 6/10 w/AG']." (JHICI Ex. 38-A [= Ex. OLN 263].)
85/06/07-005 JUNE 7, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NOTICE TO McFARLANE NORTH MEMO: North memo to McFarlane mentions use of Contra funds for a plan to ransom the hostages in Lebanon: see col. 3.	THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH MEMO: North memorandum to McFarlane on a plan to use DEA agents and H. Ross Perot to ransom the hostages in Lebanon for a million dollars apiece: "Mr. LIMAN. And if you look at Exhibit 38-A, which is a memorandum of June 7, 1985, from Mr. North to you, he discussed that operation, correct?

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. And then he [North] said in the last paragraph, 'The DEA officers are prepared to take leave as soon as they are contaced by Mr. X. Travel arrangements and operational costs are currently being financed from funds normally available to the Nicaraguan resistance. "Am I correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you initial this document? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, you understood then that North was telling you that the walk-around money, the expenses of the DEA agents, were being paid from money that was available normally to the contras, right? "Mr. MCFARLANE. To tell you the truth, I didn't. But it is my own oversight I didn't. . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever ask him [North] whether he was getting money from Calero to assist in the release of the hostages? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I didn't, but I should have, and I just missed this. That's all. I thought it was all coming from a private U.S. citizen. "Mr. LIMAN. So your testimony is you did not know that the contra funds were being used for the release of the hostages? "Mr. McFARLANE. No, not at the time. . . ." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 106-08; JHICI Ex. 38-A.)

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85/06/07-006 AROUND JUNE 1985			DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: AUTHORIZATION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "I discussed [it] with the President in the presence of the Vice President, probably Mr. Regan, and I provided to them the fact that the Attorney General was supportive of it and had taken the steps to make the liason between the DEA people and the people in the field." McFarlane does not recall "the extent of involvement of the Secretary of State." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 32-33.) McFarlane on authorization for the DEA operation: "Mr. JENKINS. . . . Whose idea was it for the DEA hostage ransom plan, Mr. McFarlane? "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . [I]t was a matter of consensus between [sic] the Attorney General, the President and myself." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 88-91.)
85/06/07-007 JUNE 7, 1985			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. Mr. McFarlane, you testified before that the Attorney General was briefed by Colonel North regarding the use of DEA agents to locate and extricate the hostages held in Lebanon. You also found that this plan included the use of large sums of private money to bribe foreign officials and others to gain information and ultimately the release of the hostages. "What I would like to know is, was the Attorney General aware of this plan?

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I think he was, and I say that because when Ollie brought the proposal to me, he proposed that because the DEA people were under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, Colonel North said, 'Why don't I go to the Attorney General and brief him on this and get his judgment and support?' "I said, 'Yes, please do that.' And later, Colonel North came back to report that, 'Yes, I have done that.' "Mr. RODINO. He had briefed the Attorney General? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is what he said, and I think, Mr. Chairman, that--I may be wrong--but I believe that later in a coincidental passing between myself and the Attorney General that he said, 'I have talked to Ollie and I have absorbed the proposal and everything, and I believe we can do it.' I believe I am almost certain about that. "Mr. RODINO. That the Attorney General did tell him? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think so, yes, sir. "Mr. RODINO. Now, did he make a distinction as to the use of private monies to bribe as against money that had come from the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, because I don't know what the briefing consisted of, it may have consisted simply of how Colonel North proposed the DEA agents be involved, which was to exploit their connection to a Lebanese that was close to the captors. "Whether or not Colonel North told him about the bribes and the funding required and so forth,

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			I don't know. If he did, the Attorney General did not mention it to me. "Mr. RODINO. In other words, the Attorney General did not make a distinction between the use of private monies and government monies to bribe these foreign officials? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, again, I am not absolutely certain that the Attorney General has said this, but Colonel North did, in fact, draw a distinction between those two sources of money. "Mr. RODINO. And you are saying that Colonel North was told by the Attorney General about the distinction? Is that what you are saying? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. I am only saying that Colonel North told me that he drew a distinction between public and private funding for it. I don't know if he communicated that on to the Attorney General. "Mr. RODINO. He didn't tell you that he was informed by the Attorney General; is that what you are saying? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. He did not." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 224-27.)
85/06/07-008 STARTING IN JUNE 1985			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . [I]s it fair to say that concern about the hostages led to the DEA project earlier in the year in 1985? "A. Oh, absolutely. "Q. That was approved by the President? "A. Yes. "Q. And approved by the Attorney General?

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			"A. Yes. "Q. In connection with that project -- "A. Now, you need -- I need to be a little careful there. I am not sure that the Attorney General had general knowledge of that project and had authorized the DEA people to work with us. "Q. Was there any consideration given in connection with that project to getting a finding? "A. No. Well, now wait a minute. There may be -- we may -- I forget exactly the rationale on that. There may very well be a general enough finding to cover that particular -- "Q. Was there a rationale or was it that it just wasn't thought of? You can think of something and decide you don't need it, or you can just not think of it. What was it in that case? "A. I did not think in terms of a finding on the DEA business. It was part of our general effort. "Since the first hostage -- after the first hostage was taken, we really had a very concerted effort to locate the hostages. [2-1/2 lines redacted] Our problem was lack of intelligence, a timely and accurate intelligence. "Q. There was even a discussion about the possibility of ransoming them, wasn't there? "A. Yes, using -- "Q. Private money? "A. Well, ransoming. I wouldn't describe it that way. ". . . . "Q. This tended to be considered a bribe rather than ransom?

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			"A. That's exactly right. "Q. You felt better when you called it that? "A. That's right." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 130-31.)
85/06/07-010 SOMETIME IN 1985			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: AUTHORIZATION NORTH ACCOUNT: "[T]he DEA officers who assisted in a hostage recovery operation, we went specifically to the head of the DEA, and if I recall correctly the Attorney General, and sought his permission, and I did not see at that point in time, nor do I see now, the need for a finding, specifically that you would have to have a written finding. I am quite sure that if we had seen that you needed a finding, we would have done one." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 187.)
85/06/07-012 1985-86			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: "Mr. Liman. Colonel, why don't you take us through that DEA operation, some of which is unclassified and some of which is not, how it originated and what it was all about. "Mr. North. I am going on unrefreshed recollection. ". . . . "Mr. North. . . . After the President met with the hostage families, he even talked to people like Ed Hickey, who was his Director of Special Support Service and the head of the White House Military Office. "At some point, I can't recall exactly when,

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			there is probably a note in my files about it-- Ed Hickey came to me. I don't know who told him. Ed came to me and said, 'I want you to meet with some DEA officers because they have some leads on the hostages.' I did so. After two or three meetings with DEA officer and corroborating their information back through DEA, the FBI and CIA, they did indeed have contacts in Lebanon [redacted.] We then proceeded with permission and with the Attorney General's consent, to set up an operation using DEA assets to collect information and if possible to bribe hostages free. "We used several hundred thousands out of the account to my recollection. When I say the account, the operational account I managed, as well as separate funds directly from General Secord. General Secord met with them, provided operational support to them overseas. I provided funds to them under the operational account I described to you yesterday. "The operation culminated, the first phase of it, if you will, culminated in an effort at about the time we were in Tehran, and it fell apart at the last minute. It also involved the use of up to $2 million worth of money, $2 million -- money appeared from Mr. Perot. I contacted Mr. Perot for that purpose. "He volunteered it, was willing to put up more, and that money was to be used as bribes. Some wish to call it ransom -- there is no point in my lodging debate here with you tonight. I will tell you the President felt very strongly about it.

"I believed I had Presidential authority to proceed with it. The Attorney General had released those agents to work on this operation. [Redacted.] That operation was never taken in culmination.

"The last of the operations that we were supporting was a FBI/CIA operation [redacted.]

"That operation was terminated [redacted.]

"Mr. Liman. Did you deal with the Attorney General directly on the DEA matter?

"Mr. North. It is my recollection that I did. I cannot put a specific kind of date. There is a memo in my file that shows I did. I don't recall the conversation.

"Mr. Liman. Was there a discussion of whether there should be a finding? I am not trying to make you a lawyer.

"Mr. North. No.

"Mr. Liman. It just was a subject that did not come up.

"Mr. North. It did not come up."
(North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 19-24.)

85/06/07-013
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THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: AUTHORIZATION
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . I have a last question which I have about two and a half more minutes. So I am going to go through it rather quickly. But it is important. So I will just make statements here and ask if you would agree they are right.

"You are familiar with Exhibit 38-A involving

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			the DEA caper? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. That describes a plan to bribe some people to free two hostages for a million dollars apiece? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. You approved it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. The Attorney General approved it. "Mr. RUDMAN. And the Attorney General approved it. You both approved it. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. Did it involve the use of a couple of agents and ransom money to be supplied by Ross Perot, if he was willing to provide it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. Was that an intelligence activity? And if it wasn't, what kind of an activity was it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it wasn't intelligence in the context of gathering intelligence. It was within the scope of the 1947 Act concerning the CIA. "Mr. RUDMAN. It was within that scope, was it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think it was. "Mr. RUDMAN. In fact, Oliver North tried to carry this out, which was a policy that had been approved by you. In fact, there was $200,000 used to try to start the process? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That's correct. "Mr. RUDMAN. On the face of that memorand[um], there is an acknowledgement that the

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			Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Meese, whom you probably discussed it with since DEA was under his jurisdiction, approved it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. To your knowledge, was a finding ever signed for this activity? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. Were congressional committees, House or Senate Intelligence Committees ever notified of this activity? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. Should they have been? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. Tell me why. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I will. It is more than passing strange to me that we cannot aspire to a policy which is more effective to deal with terrorism. "Now, it is undeniable that some countries are good at it and they are good because terrorists know that whenever they commit terrorism against Israel, something, somehow, somewhere is going to happen. Now, it may not always be arms. It may not be pre-emptive attack. It may be negotiation. It may be bribing, but you can be goddam[n]ed sure if any Israeli is caught, he's going to have his government going after people who did it. Now, that is to be a differentiated approach. "Now, I don't pretend that in the United States we can pursue that. The reason we cannot is because we must have a policy at all times compatible with American values. And I agree to that. But I believe that our government must have

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			the gumption enough to be able to differentiate between those terrorist events which are susceptible to violence and those which are not." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 119-21; JHICI Ex. 38-A [North memo to McFarlane, "Status of Hostage Recovery Efforts," 6/7/85].)
85/06/07-014 JUNE 7, 1985			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: AUTHORIZATION McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. RUDMAN. So if I understand your answer, it fell within the parameters of the act. There was no finding, but you believe it was so sensitive that there should not have been a notification, though the law might have required it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. I don't feel that way at all. You are distorting what I said. "Mr. RUDMAN. I am just repeating your answer. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think you are. My answer was the kind of activity the DEA people undertook normally would also fit the description of activities the CIA undertakes or the FBI or the Army on occasion with special trained units. "None of those others opt to report to the Congress either. My point was simply to say-- "Mr. RUDMAN. So your suggestion was if there is ambiguity in that law, the law ought to be changed? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That wasn't my point. "Mr. RUDMAN. Your point was that a finding was required. There was no finding. There was no notification.

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			"Mr. McFarlane, I am not being critical. I am trying to find out-- "Mr. MCFARLANE. It was handled by the CIA. "Mr. RUDMAN. There was a finding? "Mr. MCFARLANE. There was no finding. "Mr. RUDMAN. I think we have your answer. "Mr. MCFARLANE. A finding was not appropriate. The CIA did not undertake to do anything. "Mr. RUDMAN. Of course, that would always give rise to the possibility that things that the CIA might normally do might be delegated to some other part of the government by people who are unscrupulous. Certainly not you, Mr. McFarlane, but others who might be unscrupulous might delegate it to someone, and therefore evade the reporting requirements. "I am sure that is something that concerns you as much as it does us. "Mr. MCFARLANE. It does, yes, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 122-23; JHICI Ex. 38-A [North memo to McFarlane, "Status of Hostage Recovery Efforts," 6/7/85].)
85/06/07-020 DURING 1985 AND 1986			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S KNOWLEDGE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. RUDMAN. I want to turn to the matter of the DEA agents. "I believe in May or June--and I might say, I wonder, have you seen Mr. Lawn's interview given to this committee? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I have not.

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			"Mr. RUDMAN. Are you aware of the interview? "Attorney General MEESE. I am aware he had an interview. I have not had a chance to read the transcript of that interview. "Mr. RUDMAN. Was it furnished to you, do you know? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe it has been furnished to me. No. I have seen it in Mr. Lawn's hand. I haven't had a chance to actually read it. "Mr. RUDMAN. But the Department does have a copy of it? "Attorney General MEESE. I think the DEA does have a copy. I am not sure, Senator, exactly. What I saw were notes that were taken--what I saw in someone's hands as they were discussing this with me were notes taken by someone who was with Mr. Lawn. I have never seen a transcript of Mr. Lawn's interview. I don't know whether the Department has one. "Mr. RUDMAN. I would simply observe there are no major inconsistencies between his interview and your statement. The reason I want to say that if you haven't seen it, as I understand your natural caution in making statements not having seen other people's recollections. [Sic.] I just want to go through that. Obviously what this committee was told is somewhat different from, I think, the circumstances as they were related to you. "My understanding is in May or June of 1985, you approved a request from the National Security Council to detail two DEA agents to NSC for a mission relating to the hostages; is that correct?

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			"Attorney General MEESE. What was the year? "Mr. RUDMAN. May or June of 1985, I believe. Am I wrong? Do I have the date wrong here? I think that is right. It is 1985. "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall--I recall Mr. Lawn talking to me in the latter part of 1985 and early 1986 about DEA agents assisting with providing information to those who were involved in trying to obtain the release of the hostages. I don't have any particular basis to fix the date earlier than that. "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you have a recollection of a discussion with either Mr. McFarlane, while he was the National Security Adviser, or Oliver North regarding this issue? "Attorney General MEESE. I do remember--I just don't--I am not sure about the date. That's what's troubling me. "I do remember very vaguely that there was a discussion at one time with I believe Colonel North relating to his desire to have DEA agents, who were working in the Middle East, provide what assistance they might to the group that was interested in trying to obtain the release of the hostages. "Mr. RUDMAN. Well, did you get the impression from that briefing that, as I believe I understand your previous statements, that this was an intelligence matter that they were dealing with as opposed to an operational matter? "Attorney General MEESE. It was primarily intelligence and support utilizing assets which DEA agents had in the Middle East.

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			"Mr. RUDMAN. Were you informed at the time of your briefing on this, either by Colonel North or Mr. McFarlane, that, in fact, there would be extensive operational aspects of this and there would be private funds involved in the implementation of the plan? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe that I was ever informed that the DEA agents would be involved in what I would describe as operations. It was my understanding they would be involved in intelligence and support functions rather than operational functions. "Mr. RUDMAN. I believe that is consistent with Mr. Lawn's statements to the committee." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 6-9. For interview of DEA Administrator John Lawn, see Senate Committee interview memoranda file at IM 0051.)
85/06/07-021 DURING 1985 AND 1986			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S KNOWLEDGE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Sen. Rudman's question continues from his comment ending the preceding entry:] "[Mr. RUDMAN.] Now, in light of that, we would have to conclude that the information that you were furnished concerning their activities did not accurately or fully describe what in fact they were going to do and in fact did; is that not correct? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, I am not acquainted with what precisely they did. I might also say that this gets into a very sensitive

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			area, even at the present time. There are still activities ongoing in regard to our hostages, and yesterday morning, as a precaution, I talked with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to verify that fact. "So anything that would relate to details of operations that were previously conducted which may be still continuing or which may be comparable to things still continuing I believe should be taken up in executive session. "Mr. RUDMAN. I agree fully. I have no intentions of discussing the operations whatsoever. I was just asking whether or not you were aware these were operational in nature. I think your answer is no. "Attorney General MEESE. Not what I would define as operational. "Mr. RUDMAN. There was an executive order in existence at that time, 12333, and directive 159 under 12333 that were issued by the President, both of them. I assume you would agree that if in fact this was operational, as this committee has evidence that it was, that someone--certainly not you, you didn't, were not in a position to have the facts from our evidence--but someone should have sought a Presidential finding or approval from the President; am I correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. There should have been a finding. Indeed, there may have been one. I am not sure. "Mr. RUDMAN. We have no evidence that there was. "Did you ever give any instructions to Mr.

Lawn of the DEA or the agents pertaining to the use of appropriated or non-appropriated funds? Were you present at any time when that might have been discussed?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall any occasion on which the subject of appropriated or non-appropriated funds was discussed. It could have been discussed in my presence, although I don't recall at this time, or it could have been discussed perhaps in documents I saw; but in any event, I don't have any recollection of that becoming an issue at any time or being presented to me as an issue.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Well, I think what we can observe--since the committee is largely involved in process, that is what the hearings are truly about--is there are some lessons to be learned in terms of the kind of information that the nation's chief law enforcement officer was receiving from people in the National Security Council and that the head of the DEA was receiving from the head [sic], and one of the deputies at the National Security Council, referring to Colonel North, as to things they wished you to do that you were not fully briefed on?

"Attorney General MEESE. I agree, Senator. As a matter of fact, when the committee makes its recommendations, I have a number of thoughts along these lines that I would be happy to share with the committee at the appropriate time.

"I think one of the things that would contribute a great deal to what I talked about in my opening statement as far as improving the

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			cooperation between the branches and improving generally the way in which sensitive projects are carried out is if there were a more rigorous set of procedures which would provide for Department of Justice participation in the formulation as well as in the approval of any covert activity and particularly one, of course, as you suggest in which DEA, a branch of the Department of Justice, might be involved. "I also think that there are other techniques, including a clear provision, in case there's anybody--anybody is in doubt that findings should be in writing and that findings should be circulated to the necessary members of the NSC, obviously in a way which would protect their classified nature so that these could be reviewed with the kind of research you discussed earlier prior to a meeting in which a person is going to be required to give an opinion on that." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 9-12.)
85/06/07-030 1985-86			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S KNOWLEDGE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. STOKES. Mr. Attorney General, this morning in response to Senator Rudman's questions, you said that you were not aware of the operational role of the DEA agents in locating and extricating the hostages in Lebanon [see 85/06/07-025, -026]; do you recall that? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Mr. STOKES. Now, also when you testified before the House Judiciary Committee, you

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			testified that you were not aware of a plan to use private money to bribe people in foreign countries. "You recall that testimony? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe the testimony was that I was not aware of a plan to use private funds to ransom people in foreign countries. I believe it was the word ransom. "Mr. STOKES. All right. We will accept that. "I want now to direct your attention to Exhibit [EM] 2 which is NSC memorandum drafted by Oliver North some time around May or June 1985 that reads in part: 'Once contact has been established and a meeting arranged, two DEA officers would depart for Cyprus via a European city where they would deposit $200,000 and establish an account for the 2,500,000, of which [transcript garbled; Ex. EM 2 reads: "and establish an account for the $2M ($500K of which . . .)"; sentence then continues in parentheses as written here:] will be available immediately in U.S. dollars cash for use in Lebanon.' "The memo goes on then to explain how the bribes will be paid and transportation for the hostages arranged. "The next page explains the DEA officers will rent a safe house and as soon as the hostages are released, the remaining $1.5 million made available by the donor will be released. "The financing of the operations is described as follows: 'Travel arrangements and operation costs are currently being financed from funds from private sources.'

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			"Mr. Attorney General, this memorandum from which I have just read was provided to us from your files. "My question is, is it still your position that you did not know the operational activities of the DEA agents or of the fact that this operation was financed from private money? "Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Stokes, I am a little constrained as I mentioned earlier about doing too much talking about this because there are still activities going on in which this information may be relevant. "Let me only say this: that the statement that I made earlier not knowing about operational activities DEA agents would still stand and that nothing I know in this memo that DEA agents would do would be operational. [Sic.] "It would be intelligence and support activities. It would not be operational activities within my definition of operational activities. "Mr. STOKES. DEA agents do not become involved in intelligence activities in other countries, do they? "Attorney General MEESE. Oh, yes. They become involved in intelligence activities relating to narcotics certainly. "Mr. STOKES. Yes, but in non-narcotic matters? "Attorney General MEESE. Only in exceptional circumstances such as this. They do not get involved in normal espionage, counterintelligence, foreign espionage or the type of things that would

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			be done by the Central Intelligence Agency. "This was an unusual situation in which permission was sought to use assets of the DEA to attempt to assist in release of hostages and since this was a major priority of the Administration, it was judged by the Administrator of the DEA and myself that assistance should be provided within the general parameters that DEA agents would not be involved in operational activities." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 222-25; JHICI Ex. EM 2 [Memo titled "DEA Support for Recovery of American Hostages Seized in Beirut"].)
85/06/07-031 1985-86			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S KNOWLEDGE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. STOKES. Is it proper to finance the expenses of U.S. Government agents with private funds? "Attorney General MEESE. Actually, I am not sure. It would depend on the circumstances and I am not sure of all the circumstances that are involved here. "As a general rule, our DEA agents are financed usually directly by appropriated funds, although many of the activities that our DEA agents are involved in are ultimately financed by the funds of the drug traffickers themselves because we confiscate funds, again we are getting into some very classified areas, but for the most part private funds are not used in their financing.

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			"Mr. STOKES. Turn for a moment to Exhibit [EM] 3, Mr. Attorney General. "Your telephone log reflects three telephone calls from Ross Perot, the private donor of the funds used to pay off these foreigners. "My question is did Mr. Perot tell you that he had donated this money for this purpose? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall any conversations with Mr. Perot or [sic (on)] that subject or anything relating to that matter. I was talking with him on another matter which was of considerable difference and which is also a classified matter. "Mr. STOKES. Was the President of the United States briefed about this operation that we are talking about? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe he was by NSC staff members. I can't tell you for sure. We are talking now about the activities that included some DEA support and assistance in attempting to obtain the release of hostages? "Mr. STOKES. That is correct. "Attorney General MEESE. I believe that he was. "Mr. STOKES. Do you think it was by some NSC personnel? "Attorney General MEESE. I did not brief him. It may have been discussed with me or in my presence with him, but I can't recall it. "Mr. STOKES. Directing your attention to Exhibit [EM] 4, a letter from the President to Ross Perot on January 11, 1986, in which the President says he has been briefed on Mr. Perot's

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			efforts and thanking him for his discre[et] assistance in this regard; do you know the purpose for which the President sent this letter? "Attorney General MEESE. I had not seen this letter until it was shown to me or referred to in preparation for these hearings. I don't know the purpose of the details of the letter. "I can speculate, but I have no personal knowledge. "Mr. STOKES. Did you want to speculate? "Attorney General MEESE. No. Thank you for the opportunity." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 225-27; JHICI Exx. EM 3 [Attorney General's telephone logs noting the following phone calls: "Perow [sic], Ross" - 11/01/85 . . . "He returned your call"; "Ross Perow [sic]," 11/5/85; "Ross Perot," 11/26/86], EM 4 [Memo from the President to H. Ross Perot, 6/11/86: "I have been briefed on your effort over the past several weeks on behalf of our Americans abducted in Beirut. . . ."].)
85/06/07-050 SOMETIME IN 1985			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: CIA ASSESSMENT GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Courter. Lastly, could you tell us what you know about the DEA proposed operation for the release of the hostages in '85, whether Ross Perot was involved -- what do you know about that operation? "Mr. George. Let me give you a brief introduction. My approach to hostage handling, and I have been in and out of the game since '75

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			[redacted] and I am not an expert, but I guess I know a little bit, is what you have read. You open a dialogue with the hostage holders no matter how rotten they are. You find the bad guys, and you start talking to them. It was evident in the early '70s and became accepted and called by us, who were in the government, the Kissinger position, that you would never trade for hostages, but you would always talk and talk and talk. "Beginning in 1984, when the great burst of early hostages were taken, Mr. Levin, Mr. Anders[o]n, Mr. Jacobsen, Mr. Sutherland, Bill Buckley, the original hostage crowd, we began to receive feelers. It is a brutal, ugly story, but people were selling information, selling hostages, selling their rings, selling their clothes, selling letters from them trying to make money out of the hostage business. "Our position was, is, and I think should be to follow up on everything. This does not mean ransoming hostages, this means trying to find out who[m] you are dealing with, does this person know something? This was sort of a hit and miss activity inside the United States Government and everybody was running around doing their thing until late '84 when it was decided to establish the hostage locating, location task force. "The only purpose -- other than the CIA, the State Department, the Defense Department, let's bring in a lot of guys who might know something, Customs, INS, Commerce, DEA, let's get a band of guys representing all the government agencies and make sure anybody who has any possibility of

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			knowledge about the hostages sit[s] down together. "Mr. George. In the springs of '84, '85 -- counsel, correct me. Is it '85, the DEA affair? "Mr. Kerr. Yes. "Mr. George. In '85, the Drug Enforcement Agency notified the Hostage Location Task Force that they had sources [redacted] who might also have information and/or [redacted] the American hostages. The right answer to that is okay, what have you got? "So the discussion which again is very typical of all these operations is well, I can get you the ring, the photo, the letter, the picture of the man with today's paper, but it will cost money. And I make the difference in my own mind that this is different than ransoming, $2 million and I will deliver the body. [Redacted.] And the DEA assured me or they assured us that they had been successful in [redacted] that they would go [redacted] and bring back evidence that they could get in touch with the hostages. [Redacted.] "Well, this was hocus pocus. I asked my experts [redacted] and we came to the decision that they were -- it was a scam. No big surprise. There was nothing to get excited about. We were scammed regularly on the hostage business and others. This was a scam. [Redacted.] This is life. "I now know, that that decision was not agreed to by other people. I think -- at the time I remember talking to a man called He [sic] Hickey who was head of the President's security inside the White House, very hot on this operation. I

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			know Mr. Hickey continued to believe it was a good idea. I know, of course, now that Oliver North thought it was a good idea. I know Oliver North got the two DEA men to him, I believe he claims he had $2 million from where? I'm sorry. Ross Perot, I don't know. I was gone. I had left it. I had declared it a fake." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 85-88. See id. at 139-40.)
85/06/07-051 DURING 1985		THE FAKE SAUDI PRINCE, RICHARD MILLER, THE DEA, AND THE FBI NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: See col. 3.	THE FAKE SAUDI PRINCE, RICHARD MILLER, THE DEA, AND THE FBI NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION, Part 1: "Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever ask the DEA agents who were detailed to participate in the hostages from Lebanon to do anything other than that? "Mr. North. Well, they were also engaged with [redacted,] as I indicated. After the initial activity fell through -- "Mr. Mitchell. Not including that. Specifically, did you ask one of the DEA agents to go to England with Richard Miller and a fake Saudi prince to facilitate the entry of the prince -- the alleged prince into England? "Mr. North. Yes. Into England? I think we were trying to get him back here. "Mr. Mitchell. England to here? "Mr. North. Yes. "Mr. Mitchell. This was someone who came to you initially offering to contribute money to aid the contra effort through an oil contract mechanism and that you had then referred to

Richard Miller, is that correct?

"Mr. North. If I recall correctly, Senator, the guy came up on the net. His name showed up as a consequence of a call from a character in New York and there were two things that this guy indicated he could help with. One was the American hostages and second of all, was funding for the Nicaraguan resistance.

"I put him in touch with Miller. I had never met with the man, but Miller was basically his case officer.

"Mr. Mitchell. My first question is, did his initial offer of assistance include both contributions to the contra effort and assistance with the hostage effort or were those sequential so that the initial request was merely to aid the contras and the suggested assistance with respect to hostages occurred at some later point in time?

"Mr. North. I honestly don't recall. My recollection at this moment, Senator, is they were simultaneous uses, but I honestly don't remember. I know both became a big fuzzed up mess, with this guy whom[] we eventually turned over the FBI, I would point out. I did.

"Mr. Mitchell. But you did request one of them to go to London to facilitate the travel of the fake prince?

"Mr. North. Yes, I did. And I -- again, I don't want to be too specific, because I don't want to be wrong, but I know that I asked one of them to meet with this guy and he did. I think on a number of occasions. And I believe that at one point they facilitated his movement in, I think,

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			to the United States. "Mr. Mitchell. At some later point in time did you speak with an FBI agent in an effort to defer a then ongoing investigation of the fake Saudi prince? "Mr. North. I don't know so much as that it was a matter of deferring. I didn't want to interfere with the FBI investigation. In fact, I described what this guy -- again I am trying to remember something that was a long time ago, but my recollection is that we talked. I told the FBI who[m] I had in touch with him, what the guy -- Miller in this case -- what his real role was. "Mr. Mitchell. What was the purpose of your calling the FBI in connection with that? "Mr. North. I was concerned about this guy. I had called the FBI several times as I often did. When a name would show up on my scanner as somebody who could do something to help the Government of the United States, and I didn't know who he was, almost inevitably I called the FBI and I asked for what is euphemistically referred to as a name check. Does this guy show up as a bad guy?" (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 66-68. On the fake Prince, see Iran-Contra Report, at 110-12. See also 85/05/24-110 [McFarlane on the Fake Saudi Prince].)
85/06/07-052 DURING 1985		THE FAKE SAUDI PRINCE, RICHARD MILLER, THE DEA, AND THE FBI NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: See col. 3.	THE FAKE SAUDI PRINCE, RICHARD MILLER, THE DEA, AND THE FBI NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION, Part 2: "Mr. Mitchell. So what you are saying is that

your contact with the FBI was merely for the purpose of acquiring information about this person as opposed to asking the FBI to deter or delay an investigation of that person?

"Mr. North. At some point along the line, it became evident that this man was the subject of a criminal investigation. I told Miller to get away from him and I told the FBI what we knew about where he was and, in fact, offered to assist in luring him back to the United States for prosecution, which eventually he was prosecuted and I believe is still in jail.

"Mr. Mitchell. So you did not then, indeed, as you suggested, you facilitated the investigation. You did not seek to delay an investigation of this man in any way?

"Mr. North. I am not saying I didn't, I am not saying I didn't at some point ask the FBI to at least wait until something happens. If this guy was able to produce a hostage or millions of dollars for the contras, but at some point along the line, when it was very obvious this guy was a fraud, I asked the DEA and I think Miller, for that matter, to assist in luring him back to the United States for prosecution.

"Mr. Mitchell. That was my precise question. Did you in fact call the FBI and ask that there be a delay in the investigation of this fake Saudi prince, because you were trying to receive a contribution to the contra effort from him and you wanted the investigation delayed until such time as you get that contribution?

"Mr. North. I believe I did.

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			"Mr. Mitchell. In the course of the conversation, did you tell the FBI agent that you had spoken personally with President Reagan about this matter? "Mr. North. I don't believe I would have told him it was about the resistance. I think I would have told him about the hostage recovery, because I prepared a number of reports to the President, sent up the line to the President, and on occasion, I did brief the President on the status of various hostage recovery actions. "So, if I said that to the FBI agent, I was not referring, I don't think, to the contra effort. "Mr. Mitchell. Did you tell the FBI agent you had spoken personally to the President in an effort to lend weight to your request to get the FBI to delay the investigation of the fake Saudi prince? "Mr. North. I don't think so. I mean -- I really -- again, I am having a difficult time recollecting the events. There were several discussions I had with the FBI about this guy. One of them may well have been designed to at least defer or delay the investigation. I did the same thing as I admitted yesterday with Southern Air Transport to delay that investigation, not as an effort to cover anything up, but simply to allow other things to happen before the prosecution commenced. "Mr. Mitchell. Just so I can understand your answer -- "Mr. Sullivan. Excuse me, sir. I think this

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			is far afield from the subject matter requiring an executive session. I think it is a matter you can go into publicly. I can't for the life of me figure out what it has to do with this. "Mr. Mitchell. Because it -- the initial inquiry related to the DEA agents who were the subject of the executive session and were then used for other purposes. "Mr. Sullivan. The DEA agents of course, were mentioned in the public session. I think this is a public session matter. "Chairman Inouye. Mr. Courter." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 68-71.)
85/06/07-100 JUNE 7, 1985			McFARLANE RESPONSE TO SHULTZ ABOUT LEDEEN DoS CHRONOLOGY: "MCFARLANE cables response to GPS insisting that LEDEEN had been in Israel 'on his own hook,' and that MCFARLANE was 'turning it off entirely.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/06/29-100. See Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 59-64 [Ledeen trip]; JHICI Exx. GPS 5 [Shultz cable to McFarlane on Ledeen visit to Israel, 6/5/85], GPS 6 [McFarlane cable to Shultz on Ledeen visit, 6/7/85]. See 85/05/04-102, -103 [Ledeen account].)
85/06/09-810 JUNE 9, 1985			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: Thomas Sutherland, the Dean of Agriculture at the American University in Beirut, is kidnapped in Lebanon. (CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 3.)

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85/06/17-000 JUNE 17, 1985			DRAFT NSDD ON IRAN McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Draft NSDD is circulated which proposes a new opening to Iran which might involve arms sales. The Secretaries of Defense and State both reject the proposal. (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 102-03. See 85/06/17-100, and 85/06/29-100, -101 [Weinberger's and Shultz' reactions].)
85/06/17-100 JUNE 17, 1985			DRAFT NSDD ON IRAN WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. Let me direct your attention to Exhibit [CWW] 4, which is the draft NSDD. Let me ask you to tell us generally what a National Security Decision Directive is. What is its purpose? "Secretary WEINBERGER. This is a document of some formality and it is issued by the President and it covers rather detailed description of our policy, our strategy, our plans that we will be pursuing in connection with usually a broad issue of some national significance. "Mr. EGGLESTON. And this is a NSDD draft that related to a change in the U.S. Government policy relating to Iran; is that correct? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Your comments about it are reflected on the front page. I think this indicates that you saw it on or about June 18, 1985. "Secretary WEINBERGER. This was submitted in draft form for our comments. It was not at that

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			time issued. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Could you read from the front page what . . . your comments are? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I commented that, 'this is almost too absurd to comment on. By all means, pass it on to Rich.' "This was a note to General Powell, who had sent the memorandum to me. He said, '[S]hould I send it to Rich Armitage for analysis?' "I said, '[I]t is almost too absurd to comment on, but by all means pass it on to Rich.' "The assumption here is that Iran is about to fall, and two, that we can deal with them on a rational basis. It is like asking Qadhafi over for a cozy lunch. "Mr. EGGLESTON. With that as your conclusion, could you describe what you perceived as the purpose of this NSDD and what your specific objections to it were? "Secretary WEINBERGER. The NSDD contemplated, as you said, a shift in the policy that would have us favor Iran rather than trying to maintain a neutral position. It talked about the desirability of an opening to Iran. "It talked about a time after Khomeini was no longer leading the country, and it talked about numbers of ways in which this might be done. "And I put in first that comment that I have just read at your request, and then later on a memorandum, a somewhat more formal memorandum back constituting the comments of mine that had been requested and-- "Mr. EGGLESTON. I think your formal

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			memorandum response is in there as Exhibit [CWW] 5. "Secretary WEINBERGER. All right, sir. Yes, sir. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Could you describe for us specifically what you thought was wrong about this NSDD? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, the fact that it discussed the possibility of sending arms to Iran at a time when our efforts were being made all around the world to try to prevent other nations from shipping arms to Iran. I think I said in my response here that under no circumstances should we now ease our restrictions on sales to Iran, attempting to cut off arms while remaining neutral on sales to either belligerent--is one of the few ways we have to protect our longer range interests in both Iran and Iraq. A policy reversal would be seen as inexplicably inconsistent by those nations whom we have urged to refrain from such sales and would likely lead to increased arms sales by them and a possible alteration of the strategic balance in favor of Iran while Khamenei [sic] is still the controlling influence. There were other reasons, of course, too. "I didn't think that the assumptions on which the proposed NSDD were based were valid. I didn't think there were any moderates still alive in Iran, and I thought that it would be not possible to work out an arrangement with the present government there, and I still think that is correct. "Mr. EGGLESTON. I take it then, Mr.

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			Secretary, that you rejected both the assumptions and conclusions out of this draft NSDD? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. EGGLESTON. Did you discuss this NSDD with Secretary Shultz at or about the time that you saw it? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Very likely, yes. We meet regularly, and I think that I did express a rather pungent opinion about it, yes. "Mr. EGGLESTON. And at that time, did he share your view as you recall? "Secretary WEINBERGER. It seemed to me that he did completely, and that was obviously borne out later." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 85-88; JHICI Exx. CWW 4 [McFarlane memo to Shultz and Weinberger, "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," 6/17/85; with Draft NSDD, "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," attached. Weinberger handwritten comments ("almost too absurd to comment on") also attached.], CWW 5 [Weinberger memo to McFarlane, "US Policy Toward Iran"]. See Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 226-28; Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 4-12 [the draft NSDD on Iran].)
85/06/18-500 JUNE 18, 1985		THE PRIVATE DONORS: COORS' MAULE COORS ACCOUNT: Joseph Coors contacts his friend William Casey when he decides he wants to do something to help the Contras. The two meet on June 18, 1985 at Casey's OEOB office. Coors tells Casey he is interested in giving	

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		money to the Contas. Casey's "response was that he doesn't do anything . . . along those lines, but that he knew a person . . . a mutual person that we knew that could help me, and that was Colonel Oliver North. . . . Just point blank, he said Ollie North is the guy to see." Casey has his assistant call North's office to arrange a meeting. Coors goes right from the meeting with Casey over to meet with North. Coors tells North he is interested in contributing to the Contras. Coors testified, "He was very anxious to provide me with an area where he thought I could be of most help." North tells Coors the Contras need a Maule airplane. He shows Coors a Maule brochure and tells him the price "with all spare parts and special implementation" is $65,000. He tells Coors he can make the payment "in any number of ways, but he suggested the possibility of a bank transfer to a Swiss bank account." Coors takes the suggestion. North gives Coors a paper with the number of a Swiss bank account -- a Lake Resources Inc. account, number 386 430-22-1 at Credit Suisse Bank. On August 20, 1985, Coors arranges for the transfer of $65,000 to the Lake Resources account. Coors later contacts North to inform him of the contribution: "I had made it quite clear to him that I didn't want to get involved in any military assistance to the Freedom Fighters, that I wanted to do it on a humanitarian, non-military basis, and he indicated that this plane would fit into that pattern, and so we went ahead on that	

basis. And I feel very confident that the moneys were used for that purpose. He told me they were; I trusted him." (Coors Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 45-56; JHICI Exx. JC 1 [Coors's letter ordering transfer of $65,000], 2 [paper bearing name and number of a bank account in Geneva]. See Coors Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 92-93 [Coors approached Casey and did not tell him the topic of their meeting in advance.], 100-01 [Coors: "Colonel North has shown me a picture of what he said was my plane . . . [d]own in the jungles of Honduras . . . last fall."], 114-15 [Asked to comment on Secord's testimony "essentially . . . that those assets have belonged to Lake Resources and not to the contras," Coors responded, "I didn't give this money to General Secord. I gave it to the freedom fighters . . . ."], 127-29.)

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THE PRIVATE DONORS: COORS' MAULE
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on the circumstances leading up to Coors' decision to buy a Maule airplane for the Contras:

"Mr. NIELDS. You asked Joseph Coors for $65,000 --

"Mr. NORTH. Wrong.

"Mr. NIELDS. -- to buy a Maule airplane, didn't you?

"Mr. NORTH. Not so. He offered the money, and I told him where to send it, and an airplane was bought with it, and it flies today in support of the Nicaraguan Resistance unless the Sandinistas shot it down.

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		"Mr. NIELDS. Did you call him? "Mr. NORTH. No. He arrived in my office one afteroon. "Mr. NIELDS. Would you describe that event? "Mr. NORTH. . . . It is my recollection that Mr. Coors arrived in my office one afternoon, I got a telephone call from Director Casey, maybe I went down and met Mr. Coors in Mr. Casey's office, or maybe he walked into my office, I don't recall specifically. "He offered to help, asked what he could do. I suggested various things, showed him an airplane that was desperately needed, a STAL airplane that would take off, short takeoff and land. And he said, 'Good. How much is it?' Or words to that effect. I said[,] 'Here is the price list from the company[,'] and Mr. Coors then made available that sum, and it was put in an account and an airplane was bought with it. But I didn't ask him for that money, he offered it." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 234-35.)	
85/06/19-100 JUNE 19, 1986			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: TOWs PROPOSED SUMMARY: Ghorbanifar, accompanied by Roy Furmark, meets in Israel with a team of Israelis. Ghorbanifar proposes that the Israelis sell 100 TOWs to Iran through him. He also agrees to set up a meeting with an Iranian official. (Iran-Contra Report, at 166 [citing Israeli Historical Chronology].)
85/06/20-000		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WEAPONS	

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JUNE 20 - JULY 8, 1985		PROCUREMENT SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: On June 20, 1985, the arms shipment agreed upon by North, Singlaub and Calero (from the list put together by Singlaub and Bermudez, with North's changes) "leave[s] for international waters" carrying "East Bloc manufactured weapons." Calero has by then indicated to Singlaub that he has $5.3 million available to pay for the weapons. The order list, then, was "tailored . . . to fit within those parameters," including shipping and insurance costs. Calero is to have the funds transferred "to an account designated by the arms dealer in Switzerland, and when those were received in that bank, then action was taken by the shipper to load the ship and send it to the destination we designated." On July 8, 1985, the shipment arrives for the FDN at a designated port, consigned to a senior military official in that country. The official had been designated by his government "to be the official point of contact in that country with the Nicaraguan democratic resistance." In his place, he sends Mario Delamico. (Asked whether he knows that for a fact, Singlaub testified, "He held himself out . . . . Somebody had to tell him when the ship was arriving."). (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 221-24; see id., at 224-27 [Singlaub's subsequent meeting with Delamico in Sept. 1985. Afterwards, North and Singlaub agree Delamico is threatening Singlaub.]; id., at 229 [shipment handled by GeoMiliTech]. See also Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 21-23, 59-60	

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		[Rodriguez' contact with Mario Delamico].)	
85/06/21-000 SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER OF 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 5 SIGUR ACCOUNT: Oliver North asks Gaston Sigur to introduce him to an official of an Asian country, Country 5, to discuss "the situation in Central America." Sigur tries to set up a meeting at his office between the two; it falls through. Sigur then gives North and the individual from Country 5 each other's phone number. "I [sc. Sigur] have no idea whether they got together. Neither one of them spoke to me about it again." (Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 123-24.)	NORTH-KIMCHE CONTACT HALL ACCOUNT: David Kimche meets with North. At about this time Fawn Hall first learns of the Iran initiative. North does not brief her formally on the project. She picks up information from typing memoranda. She learns that sale of U.S. weapons to Iran is involved and that one objective is the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Hall does not know at the time that proceeds from the Iran arms sales are to go to the Contras. (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87.)
85/06/21-090 SUMMER 1985		CONTRA FUNDING: LAKE RESOURCES OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen discusses with Secord the latter's participation in soliciting Country 2. Secord says "he thought that [Country 2] had given $15 million." Secord also tells Owen about the decision he and North had made in the summer of 1985 to take away Calero's funding. "It was potentially inappropriate," Secord explained, "that Adolfo Calero be using his brother, Mario Calero, to purchase goods." Secord also mentions rumors that the money was not going where it was intended and was being wasted. North and Secord therefore have decided to use Lake Resources for channeling funds to the Contras. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at	

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85/06/21-100 SOMETIME IN JUNE 1985			LEDEEN'S ROLE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: At about the same time as the NSDD on Iran is circulated (see 85/06/17-000), McFarlane asks Michael Ledeen, who is going to visit Israel, to find out what intelligence Israel has on events in Iran. Ledeen reports back "that the Israelis had some contacts in Iran and thought there was a possibility of an initiative." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 102-03. But see id., 5/13/87, at 37-38 [dating Ledeen visit to April 1985; see above at 85/04/00-100].)
85/06/21-101 SUMMER 1985			SHAHEEN CONTACT WITH HASHEMI GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. . . . Let me take you to the summer of '85 and set the stage. We have as [George] Exhibit 22 an Agency document that reflects a contact of Director Casey by John Shaheen, who is a former client of Director Casey's and friend and business associate, and Mr. Shaheen in that memorandum relates a contact he had from Cyrus Hashemi, an Iranian expatriate who was at that time a fugitive from U.S. indictment. Shaheen relates that the Iranians may be prepared to arrange for the release of hostages and Mr. Hashemi is prepared to intervene in those matters if he gets a nol[le] pros[equi] from his pending prosecution. "Can you tell me, using that as a starting

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			point, what the operations directorate was doing in the June, July, August, '85, period with regard to this Shaheen contact and the Hashemi connection as it related back to Ghorbanifar? "Mr. George. Yes. John Shaheen was described to me as a personal business acquaintance of Director Casey from New York City. [Redacted.] "Now, to this issue, Shaheen, if I understand it and I've reviewed it, told Bill Casey that his friend or acquaintance, Mr. Cyrus Hashemi, whom I don't know of, had fled the country after an indictment for, if I understand, arms sales -- correct me if I'm wrong on that. Mr. Hashemi had a record of being on the edge of the law, the international arms market. "All that aside, Mr. Hashemi said that he could produce [redacted] and please correct me if I'm wrong, two very significant Iranian officials who could help release the hostages. This is at a moment, and I'm sure we will get into this as time goes by, and I think all of you heard me say and other of my colleagues, that within the limits of the law, I try not to leave any stone unturned to look for any hostage. "Mr. George. In a nutshell, Mr. Hashemi said if he could produce some Iranians who could in turn release the hostages would the United States of America give him a nolle prosequi. "We went to the State Department and we went to the Department of Justice and we asked both of those agencies what they might know about Mr. Hashemi, what was the charge, what was the indictment, and felt them out on what their

feeling would be if there were to be an individual under indictment for illegal arms activity who could actually get the American hostages out of Beirut. There is a series of papers on our discussions with these people, and there was an agreement informally, if Mr. Hashemi did bring [redacted] I guess senior Iranian officials who in turn would be able to help us release the hostages, the Department of Justice, the Department of State would consider such a possibility.

"Three things happened. The first thing happened, which happens in our business so often, is that he did not pro[duc]e the Iranians, they never showed up, so it was never a question of what can we do about them.

"Secondly, we found out at some point, counsel, and I don't know when, and I couldn't find, I was told this earlier and I couldn't find the paper and maybe you have it here, that the famous Iranians[] he was to bring to [redacted] who were to release the hostages were nonetheless than Mr. Ghorbanifar and [redacted] who become only too famous in the fall. The entire affair drifted off, and if I recall correctly, there was some contact with Mr. Hashemi's American lawyer, Mr. Elliott Richardson, who had made several contacts with the CIA. We told him to get in touch with the Department of Justice and I believe that sometime in 1986 this affair, having died out, Mr. Hashemi died."
(George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 264-68; JHICI Ex. CG 22.)

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85/06/21-105 SUMMER 1985 - NOVEMBER 1986			CIA CONCERN ABOUT GHORBANIFAR GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. . . . [G]iven your familiarity with Director Casey's approach, is it likely that Casey would have advised McFarlane of the concerns that the Agency had for Mr. Manucher Ghorbanifar? "Mr. George. Yes. "Mr. Kerr. We have -- "Mr. George. If all those things had happened. "Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir, I understand. "One point of interest is Secretary Shultz' recollection, as he has previously testified to, that he knew about Manucher Ghorbanifar and the Agency's concerns about Ghorbanifar in July of 1985. So that was something that would have been shared by CIA with State at the time? "Mr. George. I know we shared it with State because Secretary Armacost with whom I do a great deal of business is sort of my normal contact at State Department[. A]t some point last fall, in November of '86, as this thing unwound, Mike said, hey, give me a copy of that burn notice I know is out on Ghorbanifar. When Mike first learned that I don't know but yes, I would think if there was an operation that involved Manucher Ghorbanifar and dealt with the hostages, we would have told Casey and Casey if he were to urge higher ups than he or his equals would have told them." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 272-73. On the CIA burn notice on Ghorbanifar, see 84/07/25-100.)

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85/06/21-110 JULY - AUGUST 1985			LEDEEN'S CONTACT WITH GHORBANIFAR GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. . . . Do you have any recall or knowledge from another source that the Agency was made privy to the conversations Mr. Ledeen was having in the period of July, August, 1985 with Manucher Ghorbanifar? "Mr. George. I cannot speak for Mr. Casey and I cannot speak for the Deputy Director, Mr. McMahon. But in my directorate there was no one I knew who knew anything about that. "Mr. Kerr. So in terms of your understanding of what was going on in your directorate, [redacted] was not apprised there were discussions going on by other American officials with Manucher Ghorbanifar during the same period of time? "Mr. George. Well, you will take me there, but let me put it, frame it as I see it. Ghorbanifar was the agent of Israel. It was the Government of Israel that said, we have got one hot cookie here that can help us make contacts with Iran, release the hostages. Michael Ledeen, and I think as we walk through Ghorbanifar, seems to be playing a variety of roles in this. But back to your question, and I'm sure we'll get through all of this, in the summer of 1985 when Cyrus Hashemi had his scheme which we know involved Ghorbanifar [see 85/06/21-101], I cannot believe anyone in my directorate[] knew about the Ledeen-Israel-Ghorbanifar connection." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 273-74.)

85/06/21-111
1985-86

LEDEEN'S CONTACT WITH GHORBANIFAR
LEDEEN RESPONSE TO GEORGE:

"THE WITNESS: On pages 273, 274 [on 8/5/87; see preceding entry], Mr. George says 'G[h]orbanifar was the agent to Israel. It was the Government of Israel that said we have got one hot cookie here that can help us make contacts with Iran to release the hostages. Michael Ledeen seems to be playing a variety of roles in this.'

"I doubt that G[h]orbanifar was the agent to Israel. And I wish that Mr. George has been asked for concrete evidence. I noted before that the Israeli Intelligence Service, Mossad, was opposed to this operation, and that the executive branch of the Israeli Government was sharply divided.

"Moreover, I resent Mr. George's suggestion that I was 'playing a variety of roles.' My role was precisely assigned to me by the National Security Advisor to attend meetings and to report on them to him.

"Somewhat later, in his second day of testimony [8/6/87], Mr. George said, on page 146, 'We were asked in December 1985 by Michael Ledeen, Bill Casey, and the Administration to make contacts with Manuch[e]r G[h]orbanifar because he was an outstanding source of intelligence on Iran. It now becomes evident after the fact that we were being asked to meet with G[h]orbanifar and learn to love him because they were about ready to put us in touch with him in the Iran initiative.'

"I cannot speak for Director Casey or 'the Administration.' But when I informed the CIA

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			about my contacts with G[h]orbanifar, I was convinced that the Iran initiative was over. My purpose was to enable CIA to get better information about Iran's role in international terrorism, and I note that two of CIA's most knowledgeable experts on terrorism, Messrs. Allen and Clarridge, believed as I did that it was a worthwhile undertaking. ". . . ." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 10-11. See id. at 21-22, 31-33. For further Ledeen testimony on Ghorbanifar, see 86/01/11-113.)
85/06/21-300 DURING THE SUMMER OF 1985			LEDEEN'S ROLE: WEINBERGER'S UNAWARENESS WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. . . . [T]his committee has heard testimony from Mr. McFarlane and others that in the late spring and summer of 1985, Mr. Ledeen was making various contacts with Israelis and others in order to pursue an opening or an initiative into Iran. I take it that as of the summer of 1985 you were not aware of the activities of Mr. Ledeen? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No. I never heard of him and wasn't aware of it. "Mr. EGGLESTON. So Mr. McFarlane has not briefed you on whatever it was Mr. Ledeen was doing? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 84.)
85/06/28-350 JUNE 28, 1985		MIAMI MEETING SUMMARY:	

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		On the meeting in Miami attended by North, Secord, Clines, Quintero, Calero, and Bermudez to discuss the air resupply of lethal material for the Contra forces inside Nicaragua, see Iran-Contra Report, at 60, and entries starting below at 85/07/01-000.	
85/06/29-100 JUNE 29, 1985			DRAFT NSDD ON IRAN: SHULTZ' RESPONSE DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS submits comments to MCFARLANE on the draft NSDD, opposing the proposal regarding arms transfers and stating 'I cannot agree that the NSDD as drafted should be signed by the President.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/07/14-100. See 85/06/17-000 on the Draft NSDD.)
85/06/29-101 JUNE 29, 1985			DRAFT NSDD ON IRAN: SHULTZ' RESPONSE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [T]here was a draft National Security Decision Directive circulated by Mr. McFarlane in June of 1985, . . . which among other things provided for a change in American policy toward Iran, such that there would be provision of military equipment on a selected case-by-case basis. "Your comments on that draft NSDD appear at [Ex. GPS] 7, dated June 29, 1985, and in those comments you objected certainly to that portion of the proposed NSDD that dealt with loosening the restrictions on arms sales to Iran, and you

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			recommended that the President not sign the NSDD as drafted. "And I take it, as far as you know, that NSDD was not signed by the President; am I correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct. "There were two things that I objected to. One was the intelligence analysis that was stated in it, because I thought they were not reading the Iran situation right, and the other was the suggestion that basically flowed from the intelligence estimate that it was desirable to change our policy on arms sales. "So the two things were connected." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 64-65; JHICI Ex. GPS 7 [Shultz' comments for McFarlane on draft NSDD on Iran, 6/29/85]. See Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 216-18 [Shultz' reaction to the draft NSDD].)
85/06/30-100 LATE JUNE OR JULY 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 3 SIGUR ACCOUNT: Oliver North asks Gaston Sigur to contact the U.S. resident representative of Country 3 to ask whether his Far Eastern country would contribute to the Contras. North says that he and McFarlane understand that this country might be interested in giving some "financial assistance in the humanitarian area to the contras." Sigur asks North, "[N]ow, everything here is quite legal?" North replies, "[O]h yes, we have checked all that out and there is no question about that." North says he has checked with lawyers, but he does not	

specify which ones, nor does Sigur ask. Sigur takes North's assurance "on face value." The conversation occurs at the NSC offices with no one else present.

Sigur later meets over breakfast with the Country 3 representative to relay the request. Sigur does not mention any specific amount of money. The representative says "he would have to go back to his home government on it. He gave . . . some indication that perhaps there had been perhaps some conversation of some kind about this sometime in the past, that his government would only be able to do this by providing funds directly to the United States Government."

Sigur goes to see McFarlane "probably the same day." He tells McFarlane about his meeting with the Country 3 official, and that the official "had said that any funds would have to be channeled, he thought, channeled through the United States Government. Mr. McFarlane's response to that was that this is not possible, that that cannot be done, and so I [sc. Sigur] saw that as the end of that, and I told Colonel North about it." North doesn't "say much of anything at the time. But then a week or ten days or two weeks later he came back to me [sc. Sigur] and asked if I would arrange for him to meet with that particular individual from Country [3]." (Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 104-14; see also id., at 114-16 [later meeting between North and the Country 3 official, and Sigur's awareness, weeks later, that Country 3 had decided to give $1 million in humanitarian assistance to the Contras]; id., at

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		119-21 [Sigur seeks additional funds from the same official].)	
85/06/30-101 DURING 1985		CONTRA FUND-RAISING: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 3 McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane testified on his reaction to the Country 2 contributions (see entries starting at 84/05/00-200, 85/02/00-390), and on Gaston Sigur's report to him of Country 3's interest in aiding the Contas: "Mr. LIMAN. Were you uncomfortable about receiving the money from a third country? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I believe strongly that we could not and should not expect to sustain the policy with this kind of support and that this had to be the last time. "Mr. LIMAN. Were you uncomfortable that you might be creating some implicit guid for a quo? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. You always have to consider what is it that you may invite by way of reciprocal gesture or concession, what obligation do you incur for having had some contribution of this kind. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And as I understand the line that you were drawing, you couldn't come right out and say, 'I want a contribution.' Am I correct? That would be a solicitation. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. But you could express the concerns about the fact that the contras were running out of funds? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And if in response to those	

concerns the foreign leader offered the money, you could tell him where to deposit it?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, of course, when it was legal the previous summer, he would have known that.

"Mr. LIMAN. But you could tell him thank you when he offered it in February?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it was that kind of line that you found you had to walk in order to keep the contras going?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, apart from the money that you received, or the contras received, from Country Two, did you have any discussion with any member of your staff about their efforts to receive or raise contributions from any other countries?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I have seen a memorandum which makes an account of a report to me by one of my subordinate staff officers of a conversation he had had with a Country Three official, and apparently the issue of any interest on Country Three's part for contributing to the contras came up, and that he reported this to me, and I am a little hazy on the results, but I do know that I was very firm in saying to him absolutely no participation by you or any other staff member in any kind of approach to this country.

"If they want to make a gift, that is their business and they must do it bilaterally themselves, not with us.

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		"Mr. LIMAN. Did he tell you--is this staff member Mr. Sigur? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he tell you Colonel North had asked him to be in touch with, let's call it Country Three? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And am I correct that your response was that if Country Three wanted to make a contribution, it should make it directly, but not through the NSC? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And do you know, sir, whether or not Country Three actually made a contribution? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I do not. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember that the conversation with Mr. Sigur occurred toward the end of your tenure as national Security Adviser? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe that is correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 57-60.)	
85/07/00-000 SOMETIME IN JULY OR AUGUST 1985	LAKE RESOURCES SECORD ACCOUNT: Lake Resources replaces Energy Resources. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 151.)		
85/07/00-001 SOMETIME IN JULY OR AUGUST 1985	SECORD'S FORSWORN PROFITS SECORD ACCOUNT: Richard Secord forswears share of profits in Lake Resources (Energy Resources). (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 152; id., 5/6/87, at 118; id., 5/7/87, at 6, 31; id., 5/8/87, at		

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	157-58.)		
85/07/00-010 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1986 (NOT MID-1985)	SECORD'S FORSWORN PROFITS HAKIM ACCOUNT: Hakim dated Secord's renunciation of his enterprise profits months after the mid-1985 date asserted by Secord: "Mr. NIELDS. Your capital account is in your own name and General Secord's is in the name of Korel Assets. What was the reason for that? "Mr. HAKIM. Actually, two reasons. Once you have the money in a corporation, it is easier for a fiduciary company such as CSF to manage it. "They have--the directors of the companies are close to them and they can move the monies for higher profits as the occasion arises. "And the second reason is to eliminate personal contact to those funds. "Mr. NIELDS. So that General Secord's name would not be connected with the money? "Mr. HAKIM. That was my recommendation and he accepted that. "Mr. NIELDS. Did there come a time when General Secord . . . in some fashion or another renounced his interest in the profits from the contra arms sales? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, it did occur. "Mr. NIELDS. When was that? "Mr. HAKIM. To the best of my recollection it was during the first half of 1986, if I am not mistaken. "Mr. NIELDS. And what did he say?		

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	"Mr. HAKIM. I should explain--it occurred at a time that we were caught between both projects. That is why I think it was in early 1986, both the Nicaraguan and the Iranian projects were going through very tense moments, and General Secord was not happy with the efficiency of the support that he was getting from the government, and he had never, in my opinion, even through to this date, divorced himself from the government, and he said that he still got energy left and he should go back to the government and try to straighten things out. "Therefore he doesn't want to have any attachment to this money that may make it difficult for him to go back to the government. "Mr. NIELDS. But I take it you continued nonetheless to put the money in the Korel capital account for him? "Mr. HAKIM. I continued to do that basically with the rationale that I knew there was no offer to General Secord at least as much as I knew, to go back to the government, and I was not quite sure if that would occur or not, so I did not change my pattern. I continued as before. "Mr. NIELDS. I think the record should reflect that unlike some of these other accounts we have been able to determine no withdrawals from the Korel assets account as of this date." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 261-62.)		
85/07/00-030 AFTER 1983 AND UNTIL	SECORD'S PROFITS: KOREL ASSETS HAKIM ACCOUNT: "Mr. HAKIM. Korel Assets is a company that		

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AUGUST 1986	was available at CSF for a different purpose that I used to accumulate the portions of the profits that were intended for General Secord. So this effectively reflects the portions of the commissions that were set aside for General Secord. "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. Hakim, did you continue to make deposits, so to speak, into the Korel Assets Capital account through August of 1986? "Mr. HAKIM. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Did there ever come a time when you stopped making deposits into that account? "Mr. HAKIM. When we had no more income." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 256-57.)		
85/07/00-100 SOMETIME IN JULY 1985		ABRAMS BACKGROUND ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Elliott Abrams, then Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, becomes Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. His general responsibilities include the entire Latin American and Caribbean region, and he becomes the senior diplomat under the Secretary of State responsible for U.S. diplomacy in those areas. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 6-7.)	
85/07/00-200 JULY 1985 AND THEREAFTER		BOLAND COMPLIANCE: DoS ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams was asked whether he thought that "a hands-off policy was the best way of complying with Boland and whether he didn't want to know certain things. Abrams responded, "Well, the	

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		Boland Amendment, I believe[,] perversely and against the intention of the drafters, had that impact, at least part of the time. That is, I knew that nothing the State Department was doing--or thought I knew nothing the S[t]ate Department was doing--could possibly be considered a violation of the Boland Amendment. That was my main concern." The people whom Abrams supervised were to report to him in detail what they were doing. "With respect to people in other agencies"--including North--"as long as I was sure they were not violating the law, that was what I needed to know, and I didn't need to know the details beyond that." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 32-33.)	
85/07/00-201 JULY 1985 AND THEREAFTER		BOLAND COMPLIANCE: ABRAMS AT THE DoS ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testified generally on his attention to the Boland Amendment: (1) "[W]hen I found out about something that I considered to be un-kosher or potentially violative of the Boland amendment, I went straight to the Secretary." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 257.) (2) "I think the Iran-contra connection was being withheld from us, by which I mean the Department of State, from the Secretary to me and others, because if we had found out about it, we would have stopped it instantly." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 257.) (3) "The first thing I would have done about	

it would be to go straight to the Secretary." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 258.)

85/07/00-410
JULY 1985
THROUGH
OCTOBER 1986

ABRAMS ON NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CAREFUL NOT TO QUESTION

ABRAMS ACCOUNT:

Abrams testifying on his knowledge of North's fund-raising efforts on the Contras' behalf:

"Mr. BELNICK. Now, during your period from July 1985 through October[] 1986, what did you know concerning the nature of Colonel North's efforts regarding fund raising in this country on behalf of the contras?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I knew that he knew more about it than we in the Department did and that he seemed to know more about it than the CIA did.

"He once told me, for example, that there was a big network out there of people and companies and bank accounts which nobody else ever said to me. So I mean that is the kind of thing that led to my having the view that he knew more about it than others did.

"Mr. BELNICK. By the way, when he said that, did you ask him for details about that big network?

"Mr. ABRAMS. No.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you ask him about the bank accounts or how he knew about them?

"Mr. ABRAMS. No.

"Mr. BELNICK. Why not?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I was not his supervisor. He worked for a different agency. I was supervising my people.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"I did ask him at a couple of occasions, and I cannot place the exact dates, whether he was abiding by the law. And on one occasion in particular, I remember he said, 'I have never solicited a nickel' -- he may have said a dime. 'I am not breaking a law. I have checked with White House counsel.' Or, 'I have' -- I'm not quoting, but words to that effect. 'I have run this by White House counsel.' "It was not my practice, is not my practice, has not been except now when I am authorized and really compelled to do so by law, to try to reach out and supervise the activities of these coordinate agencies, least of all the White House. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. Sir, you were aware, as you have testified in the pa[s]t, of constant rumors and reports that Colonel North was engaged in fund-raising for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, correct? "Mr. ABRAMS. That is correct. "Mr. BELNICK. And as you also have testified, everybody involved in the RIG, according to your testimony, knew that North was somehow connected with the private fund-raising, but did not know exactly how, correct? "Mr. ABRAMS. Correct. "Mr. BELNICK. And you have also said that with that knowledge of those reports -- and I am quoting -- 'most of us were careful not to ask North lots of questions.' Correct? "Mr. ABRAMS. Correct. "Mr. BELNICK. That was your position?	

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		"Mr. ABRAMS. That is correct. "Mr. BELNICK. Why were you careful not to ask Lt. Colonel North lots of questions, or any questions about what he was doing to support the contras? "Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I gave two responses really. First of all, I thought, especially after Mr. McFarlane had flatly so stated to Congress and after Colonel North had flatly so stated to me, that he was not soliciting funds, nor was he kind of directing the solicitation of funds. He had said that straight to me, and Mr. McFarlane had said it in pretty categorical terms to Congress. So that was out. "Secondly, it has been my experience in this program that whenever I reached out, I paid a price for it . . . ." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 27-28, 30-31.)	
85/07/01-000 AROUND JULY 1, 1985		MIAMI MEETING: CONTRA SUPPORT SECORD ACCOUNT: North arranges a meeting at the Miami Airport Hotel among North, Calero, Secord, Rafael Quintero, Tom Clines, and Col. Bermudez. Agenda: program review of the Contra effort. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 158-60; see also id., 5/6/87, at 142.)	
85/07/01-010 SOMETIME IN JULY 1985		MIAMI MEETING: CONTRA SUPPORT CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. . . . The 32 million that you received from the foreign government [see 85/02/00-800], you received that money prior to	

July of 1985; correct?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. You have already testified that you bought no arms after July 1985, is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Right.

"Mr. BARBADORO. General Secord testified a couple of weeks ago to a meeting that he had with you in July of 1985. Do you remember that meeting?

"Mr. CALERO. I have met with General Secord many, many, many times.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Do you remember meeting him in Miami with Colonel North and General Secord and Henrico (sic [Enrique]) Bermudez?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. That was in the summer of 1985?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, sir. I remember, yes, I heard about that testimony, yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. What was the purpose of that meeting?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, it was just another meeting, and I do not recall exactly what came about. We must have discussed the resupply situation and the general aspects of what was going on. Our future needs for weapons and ammunition.

"Mr. BARBADORO. General Secord testified that the inadequacy of the FDN airlift air support operation was the subject that was discussed at that meeting. Do you recall that being discussed?

"Mr. CALERO. It could have been, yes.

Because we only had the DC-3 and we had very difficult--many difficulties in resupplying our troops by air.

"Mr. BARBADORO. General Secord also recalls discussions about the need to build up the southern front fighting force. Do you remember that being discussed?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, that was a discussion that--that was a subject that entered almost every time that I met with Colonel North and with others.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Was there any discussion that you can recall at that meeting about corruption in the FDN ranks?

"Mr. CALERO. No, and much less the way that General Secord put it, because I would have been very much upset by something like that.

"Mr. BARBADORO. That is something you would have remembered, correct?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. And you don't remember any discussion like that?

"Mr. CALERO. I do not remember it, no.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did anyone tell you at this meeting that General Secord and Colonel North were going to establish an airlift operation of their own?

"Mr. CALERO. No. Not a word on that.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Robert Owen testified yesterday that Colonel North and General Secord made a decision in the summer of 1985 to take the funding away from you and put it in the hands of General Secord. Did anyone tell you about that kind of decision?

"Mr. CALERO. No, I was not told.

"Mr. BARBADORO. When did you learn that Colonel North and General Secord were operating this airlift operation in Central America?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, I never learned for sure that it was, this gentleman [sic] running the operation. The meeting was in July, so they say, and I remember that this airlift operation began almost a year later in April of 1986."
(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 37-40.)

85/07/01-039
AROUND JULY
1, 1985

MIAMI MEETING: McFARLANE'S KNOWLEDGE OF NORTH'S INVOLVEMENT

McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

McFarlane on the Miami meeting:

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, the committee has heard testimony that in July of 1985, North flew down on a government plane to Florida and met with Mr. Calero, Colonel Bermudez, and Mr. Secord to discuss the organization of an airlift for the contras.

". . . .

"[Mr. LIMAN.] Were you aware, sir, that Colonel North was holding that meeting or attending that meeting?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I wasn't. I could imagine that Colonel North kept that from me for my benefit, not his.

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [D]id you ever discuss with Colonel North that the contras needed an airlift?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No. The fact that occasionally deliveries were made by air was

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		reported by Colonel North to me, but we never talked about the need to expand it nor contract it nor get involved. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he ever tell you that he was turning to General Secord to undertake that mission? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, he didn't." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 96-97.)	
85/07/01-040 SOMETIME IN JULY 1985		MIAMI MEETING: McFARLANE'S KNOWLEDGE OF NORTH'S INVOLVEMENT NORTH RESPONSE TO McFARLANE: "Mr. NUNN. . . . Mr. McFarlane testified that he did not know that you went to Florida in July of 1985 on a government plane to meet with Calero, Bermudez and Secord concerning the airlift. "The specific testimony, Mr. Liman says: 'Were you aware Colonel North was holding that meeting or attending that meeting?['] "'Mr. McFarlane: No, I wasn't.' "Do you remember getting authority from Mr. McFarlane on that or informing him of that? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, I do. "Mr. NUNN. So that statement is in error? "Mr. NORTH. 1985? "Mr. NUNN. July of '85. "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. "Mr. NUNN. So you had authority on that? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 94 [quoting McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 96-97].)	
85/07/01-045		MIAMI MEETING: NORTH'S AUTHORIZATION	

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SOMETIME IN JULY 1985		McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. NUNN. . . . Testimony from Colonel North this morning indicated that you did authorize, as I recall, a July flight by Colonel North to meet with Calero, Bermudez and Secord, concerning the airlift. Do you recall having authorized or having known about that, July 1985, and that was to Florida? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I heard that today, I believe, and I am not familiar with it. I don't recall that my permission or North's was asked. It is true that I was conscious that Colonel North did travel periodically to Miami for meetings with the contras. "In fact, I think that is probably where the San Jose Declaration was written, and that is good. Whether or not one of those was cast as a meeting for political topics in June 1985, I don't know, but a request to me for authorization to go down and to organize the contras on resupply efforts, I do not recall whatsoever." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 220-21.)	
85/07/01-050 FROM JULY 1985		SECORD'S CONTRA SUPPORT ROLE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . There was testimony by General Secord of a meeting in July 1985 with North and Calero, after which General Secord said he was asked by North to take over the logistics operation for the contras. Did North ever tell you that? "A. He did at some point. I can't place the time frame. But I realized, based on reports from	

Colonel North, that he was a little concerned about the way the contras were handling funds and the wiseness of some of their decisions.

"Q. Did he mention any?

"A. I can't recall anything specific. The thing, I guess, that stands out the biggest was that there was still a lot of internal disagreement with the contra leadership amongst themselves and Colonel North worked very hard to bring them around to a consolidated viewpoint.

"Q. Did he tell you that as a result of his concern about how the contras were husbanding their money that he had asked Secord to step in?

"A. As I said, at some point -- and I assume it was '85 but I can't really place it in a time frame connected with any other event -- I was aware that Dick Secord was going to essentially set up and run a private logistics organization.

"Q. And did you realize that money that was being raised for the contras by North or with his assistance would then be channeled to Secord's organization?

"A. I don't think I really understood that. It would not have been surprising or inconsistent, but, you know, trying to recall that time period I don't think that was absolutely clear.

"Q. For example, Admiral, you testified last time that --

"A. See, I never really got involved much in the details of the financing or how the money was moving.

"Q. Well, you testified last time that when the Secretary of State was to approach Brunei

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		Abrams had a discussion with you as to how the money should be channeled. "A. That's my recollection. "Q. And you told him to speak to North? "A. That's my recollection. "Q. Did you have an understanding as to whether North was going to have them send the money to Calero or to this private network headed by Secord? "A. I don't think I really made that kind of distinction. "Q. Did you ever tell the President of the United States that Secord, at the request of North, had undertaken this logistics operation for the contras? "A. As I think I testified on the second of May, I can recall at one point a specific conversation with the President in which I told him that Dick Secord was a great patriot and had been very helpful. I can't recall whether when I said that that it was in both the context of contra support and Iran or whether it was just Iran. [See 85/12/09-040.] "But again that would have been a level of detail that I really wouldn't have bothered the President with. "Q. But there had to be some context to even that remark to the President. I mean, you wouldn't just say to the President X is a patriot. "A. But, see, what I can't remember, Mr. Liman, is whether that was in the context of briefing him on contras or on Iran. I just don't remember."	

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		(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 318-21. For Poindexter deposition testimony on his contact with Shultz about the Brunei contribution, see Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 39-41. For testimony on Secord's role, generally, see entries starting at 84/07/00-160; for other Poindexter testimony on Secord's role, see above at 84/07/00-170, -185.)	
85/07/01-100 EARLY JULY 1985 - MID-JANUARY 1987		TAMBS IN COSTA RICA TAMBS ACCOUNT: Lewis Tambs serves as U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica. (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 127.)	
85/07/01-101 SOMETIME IN EARLY JULY 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NORTH'S DIRECTIVE TAMBS ACCOUNT: Before Tambs leaves for Costa Rica in early July 1985, he and Oliver North discuss his assignment alone at North's office. North asks Tambs to undertake an assignment: "Colonel North asked me to go down and open up the southern front. . . . I don't recall my exact words, but I said, if that is what they want that is what we will try and do, in effect." North says nothing more. Tambs understands North to be speaking for the Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) chaired by (then not yet confirmed) Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, and also including a member of the CIA Central American Task Force and an NSC member (Oliver North). (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 130-34.)	

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85/07/01-110 EARLY JULY 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NORTH'S DIRECTIVE NORTH ACCOUNT: In response to the question whether he "had asked Ambassador Tambs to help open a Southern Front," North testified, "That is correct." He then elaborated on Tambs' role in the resupply operation: "I don't know that I asked him to specifically help on the resupply operation. I did ask for his help and received it in trying to obtain the use by virtue of a lease of planned sale or real estate in that country for purposes of building an airfield that would be used for supporting the Nicaraguan resistance, yes." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 153.)	
85/07/01-112 EARLY JULY 1985		TAMB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NORTH'S AUTHORITY TO GIVE THE DIRECTIVE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NUNN. Mr. McFarlane testified that he did not know that you had instructed Ambassador Tambs to open up the southern front. Did you inform Mr. McFarlane that you were asking Ambassador Tambs to open up the southern front? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. "Mr. NUNN. So you had specific authority from Mr. McFarlane in respect to the airlift and General Secord's participation therein? "Mr. NORTH. Everything that I have testified to, Senator Nunn, is exactly the way it happened. Everything." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 95.)	

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85/07/01-114 EARLY JULY 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NORTH'S AUTHORITY TO GIVE THE DIRECTIVE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . From whom had you received the instructions you gave to Ambassador Tambs? "Mr. NORTH. As I believe I testified at the time this first came up, Mr. Chairman, I did not refer to that specifically as an instruction. I don't believe I said to the ambassador, 'You are hereby instructed.' "I certainly did encourage him in every way possible to support an open, active Southern Front, both politically and militarily. That had been widely discussed by the Restricted Interagency Group. The need for that was very obvious. "The documents that I have turned over and those of others, and those documents that were provided to the committee, clearly indicate that. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. It is my recollection that I discussed this activitiy with Mr. McFarlane and that he gave the go-ahead for opening those kinds of activities in the South. "Mr. BOLAND. Was there anyone in the Department of State from whom you had permission to so instruct a United States ambassador?" "Mr. NORTH. No, sir. (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 125-26.)	
85/07/01-115 DURING 1985		NORTH, THE SOUTHERN FRONT, THE RIG, AND NORTH'S DIRECTIVE TO TAMBS	

McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you have any discussions with North about the need to open the Southern front?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think we did, yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did North tell you that he was taking any steps to do this?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I recall a conversation, and in fact, a time when Eden Pastora, who had a rather stormy relationship with the CIA, was seeking support and assistance, guidance to start up once more the faction of the Sandinista forces in the south, and I couldn't put a time on it, but I would imagine it was spring or summer of 1985, and it was discussed but dropped, I believe.

"I don't remember, but I think Pastora no longer had an interest.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did North ever tell you that he had given any kind of instructions to the Ambassador to Costa Rica to assist in opening the Southern front?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. North sat on something called the RIG.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. That is a restricted interagency group?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. There was a representative from State and from the CIA, from Defense on that group?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, there were.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did North report to you on the meetings of the RIG?

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		"Mr. MCFARLANE. Occasionally when something was going to be proposed that required a decision, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Did the RIG have the authority to instruct ambassadors to open a Southern front? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. Of course, it depends on the timing, but never would that kind of decision be taken at the Assistant Secretary level or lower." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 98-99.)	
85/07/01-116 EARLY JULY 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NORTH'S AUTHORITY TO GIVE THE DIRECTIVE McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. NUNN. . . . [D]id you authorize or did you know that Colonel North was asking Ambassador Tambs to open a Southern Front? "Mr. MCFARLANE. When I heard that testimony I did recall that Colonel North discussed with me whether or not it would be worth[]while for a Southern Front to be opened by the contras. That was manifestly in the interest of the contras, if they could do it and bring it off to do that, so there wasn't a serious matter of argument on that score. "With regard to having Ambassador Tambs involved with it, I am not sure what that would be. Surely Ambassador Tambs was not to be the man in the field that somehow organized the effort and supported it. My recollection is that the limit of the exchange was on whether or not the contras opening a Southern Front was a good idea, and I said if they can do it that's fine.	

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		"Mr. NUNN. Well, that could have implied, could it not, to Colonel North, that he had the authority in that case? It seems to me that based on what you have said he would be entitled to assume that he had authority when you said that what he had proposed was a good idea. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, to say that it is useful for a Southern Front to be opened seems to me a long lead, but I think certainly I am not perfect and I can be misunderstood. I am only saying that with regard to directing Ambassador Tambs to become involved in anything, I just don't believe that occurred." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 218-19.)	
85/07/01-117 AFTER JULY 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Is it true that you were aware that Ambassador Tambs was working on the Southern Front with Colonel North? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 189-90.)	
85/07/01-118 FROM JULY 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Now, Admiral, did North ever tell you that he had discussions with Ambassador Tambs before Tambs took up his post in Costa Rica? "A. I can't recall specifically that he told me that. I probably, you know, was aware in general. It was pretty much routine for new Ambassadors going out to most areas of the world would pay a call on the responsible officer on the	

NSC staff, and that's not just true with Central America but it's true in other places in the world.

"Q. Did you know Tambs?

"A. Yes. Ambassador Tambs, as he testified, was on the NSC staff for a period of time before he was confirmed.

"Q. Did North ever tell you that he had asked Ambassador Tambs to open up a southern front in Nicaragua?

"A. By my recollection that's a little too explicit. I knew that Ambassador Tambs was working in order to make the southern front more viable, [redacted.] But I don't think I ever put it in my mind or heard it described before these hearings in the terms of opening a southern front. I'm not saying that's not inconsistent, but I just didn't hear it in those terms.

"Q. How did you hear that? From whom?

"A. Well, for example, as I recall we discussed that briefly when I was down in San Jose in December of '85.

"Q. Did you ever discuss it with North other than during your trip to Central America?

"A. I may have. I don't have a recollection."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 326-27.)

85/07/01-200
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TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ABRAMS' UNAWARENESS

ABRAMS ACCOUNT:

Abrams testifying on his instructions to Tambs about his duties as U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica:

"Mr. BELNICK . . . . Did you have any

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		conversations with Ambassador Tambs before he took up his post as Ambassador to Costa Rica in the summer of 1985? "Mr. ABRAMS. Yes, sir. It is customary, when an ambassador is going out to his post, . . . to meet with his assistant secretary. And at some point in the stream I had such a meeting with him. It took place in my office, as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. "Mr. BELNICK. What did you discuss on that occasion? "Mr. ABRAMS. We discussed Costa Rica. . . . "So we talked more about the regional issues. "Mr. BELNICK. Did you ever tell Ambassador Tambs, either on that occasion or any time subsequently, that one of his missions as Ambassador to Costa Rica was to assist the opening of a Southern Military Front in Nicaragua against the Sandinista regime? "Mr. ABRAMS. At no time whatsoever. "Mr. BELNICK. Did Ambassador Tambs ever tell you that any such instruction had been given to him by Colonel North or anyone else? Mr. ABRAMS. He did not. However, the circumstances of Ambassador Tambs' departure w[ere] somewhat bizarre. In the fall of 1986, President Arias came to the U.S. for an official visit. The morning of, or perhaps the day before--I don't recall exactly--the visit, and without any notice to the Department of State, none whatsoever, Ambassador Tambs announced to his staff in San Jose at the embassy, 'I quit. My mission was to found a Southern Front. I was sent	

here to set up a Southern Front. I have completed that mission and therefore it is time for me to go.'

"We found out about it because a member of the staff telephoned the Department and said, hey, do you know that Ambassador Tambs just resigned, and we said, no.

"In fact, we don't have an ambassador in Costa Rica today, in part because of having no lead time, we haven't been able to get somebody in place and confirmed and so forth. We are still working on that."

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. Did Colonel North ever tell you that he had discussed opening a Southern Military Front with Ambassador Tambs?

"Mr. ABRAMS. No, sir."

(Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 40-43.)

85/07/01-210
EARLY JULY
1985

TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: C/CATF UNAWARENESS OF NORTH'S DIRECTIVE

C/CATF ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Carome. . . . Ambassador Tambs testified to this committee that before he took up his post as Ambassador to Costa Rica in July, 1985, Oliver North told him[,] 'We want to open a Southern Front', and he took that 'we', that instruction to open up the Southern Front, as coming from, emanating from the RIG on which you sat.

"Tambs and [redacted] both have testified to this committee that Tambs told [redacted] of this instruction to open up the Southern Front and that Tambs encouraged [redacted] to go out and speak to

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		the commandants in the South. "My question to you, [redacted,] you talked to Ambassador Tambs before he left Washington to take up his post, didn't you? "[C/CATF.] Yes, I did. "Mr. Carome. Is it your testimony that you neither gave him an instruction to open up a southern front or that you had no knowledge that anyone else was giving him an instruction to open up a southern front? "[C/CATF.] My testimony is that I did not give him instructions to open up a southern front. What I think I said is -- mine is not to instruct an ambassador. My deposition is very clear about that meeting. "It was a bizarre meeting at a transit apartment on 14th Street in Northwest Washington. Ambassador Tambs was in his underpants. His wife was in her petticoat. The baby was crying. They were 20 minutes from going to catch their airplane. I said to myself, frankly, my God, I've never seen an ambassador quite like this. We talked about Costa Rica. We talked about the contras. But an instruction, no. I didn't give him an instruction. It was a first encounter. I don't know why he thought I was an authority figure that would have done that. No. I did not give him an instruction to go down and open the southern front. "Mr. Carome. To your knowledge, did anyone else give him such an instruction including Oliver North or anyone else on the RIG, Elliott Abrams? "[C/CATF.] I don't know the substance of	

discussions Elliott Abrams or Oliver North might have had with Ambassador Tambs prior to his departure for Costa Rica."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 262-63.)

85/07/01-300
EARLY JULY
1985 -
MID-JANUARY
1987

TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: RIG INVOLVEMENT
TAMBS ACCOUNT:

Tambs testifying on the RIG:

"Mr. TAMBS. It was my understanding that the function of this RIG was to carry out United States foreign policy in Central America.

"Mr. BELNICK. Was it your understanding, sir, also, as you have testified before, that this RIG was supposed to help the freedom fighters against the Sandinistas?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . Who was it that informed you that there was this three-member RIG?

"Mr. TAMBS. Oh, I don't really recall. It was just general knowledge as far as I knew.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you ever receive a written instruction that there was a RIG composed of Assistant Secretary Abrams, Colonel North and the CIA representative?

"Mr. TAMBS. No, I never did.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did the Secretary of State ever tell you that?

"Mr. TAMBS. No.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did Assistant Secretary Abrams ever tell you that there was just a three-person Restricted Interagency Group that was running U.S. Central American policy?

"Mr. TAMBS. Not to my knowledge. Not as far

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		as I recall. "Mr. BELNICK. Did Colonel North ever tell you that? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes, I believe he did. "Mr. BELNICK. On that occasion? "Mr. TAMBS. Well, I saw him a few times between -- what -- April or May and July of 1985, and on one of those occasions, if I recall correctly, is that [sic] he advised me of that. "Mr. BELNICK. What, as best you recall it, did he say? "Mr. TAMBS. Well, he noticed that there was a RIG and that he was a member of it, and there were at least two other members. That was the only other people he ever mentioned. "Mr. BELNICK. Well, did he say this after the conversation in which he said, we want you to open a southern front? "Mr. TAMBS. No, . . . he had told me this earlier, and when Ollie told me that that was what they wished me to do, I assumed that, in fact, was a RIG instruction." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 133-37.)	
85/07/01-400 EARLY JULY 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE KING'S SHILLING TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testifying on his assignment, given by North, to open up the southern front in Nicaragua while he serves as U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [D]idn't the instruction coming from North seem a bit odd to you? "Mr. TAMBS. Well, not really. "Mr. BELNICK. Why not?	

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, since I assumed that he was speaking for the RIG, I didn't see that particularly out of line.

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . And so you understand that Colonel North, when he said, 'We want you to open a southern front down in Nicaragua,' that Colonel North was speaking for the Administration?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. And you didn't question that instruction?

"Mr. TAMBS. No.

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. Didn't you consider that this position was in some conflict with the Boland Amendment then in force?

"Mr. TAMBS. They have a saying in the Foreign Service, is [sic] 'When you take the king's s[]hilling, you do the king's bidding.'

"To my knowledge, the Boland Amendment was very limited. It had been passed when I was ambassador in Col[o]mbia, and I have never read it. . . . [T]he assumption is on my part . . . that if these were instructions that had been cleared, obviously with legal counsel or White House staff, you can't really expect people in the field to be constitutional lawyers [sic] . . . .

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. You did understand at the time, sir, that the Boland Amendment prohibited military assistance, direct or indirect, by the United States Government to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters; you understand that?

"Mr. TAMBS. As it is my understanding of the Boland Amendment, it forbade use of appropriated U.S. Government funds to aid the freedom fighters, and any aid in opening a southern front would come from what we casually called 'private, patriotic Americans,' and obviously, neither I nor anyone in that mission, as far as I was concerned, was going to violate the law.

"But if private individuals were going to aid the freedom fighters, that certainly was their business."
(Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 139-43. See id., 5/28/87, at 199, 259-62 [Tambs elaborating on "the king's shilling"], 269 [Tambs: "My instructions were not to run the southern front. My instructions were to open it."], 280-84 [the Boland Amendment].)

"PRIVATE PATRIOTIC AMERICANS"
TAMBS ACCOUNT:

Tambs elaborated on the term "private patriotic Americans": "That is Ollie's term. He liked that one." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 151. See id., 5/28/87, at 231.)

85/07/01-401
FROM JULY
1985

TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CIA AWARENESS
TAMBS ACCOUNT:

Tambs testified further on his directive to open up the southern front:

"Mr. DEWINE. . . . Was there anybody else that you talked to prior to going down there who told you, gave you any kind of instructions about opening a southern front? Was there anybody else in the U.S. Government that you can recall?

"Mr. TAMBS. Not that I recall. Briefly I met the Chairman of the CIA Central American task force. We touched peripherally on this.

"Mr. DEWINE. But not instructions from him about that?

"Mr. TAMBS. No.

"Mr. DEWINE. All right.

"Mr. TAMBS. It was obvious that he knew what had been discussed."
(Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 219-20.)

85/07/01-500
EARLY JULY
1985

TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PRESIDENT'S UNAWARENESS
TAMBS ACCOUNT:

Tambs testifying on his chain of command with regard to opening up the southern front:

"Mr. BROOKS. . . . Who did you think you were working for?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, ambassadors have a President Commission [sic]. Ultimately you work with the President of the United States. The line of authority is with the State Department. In this particular case it included, as far as I am concerned, it included the RIG, which included my direct superior in the State Department.

"Mr. BROOKS. Abrams?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes.

"Mr. BROOKS. And Bill Casey in the CIA and Colonel North in the White House on the RIG?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BROOKS. That is what you interpreted the chain of command to be?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir. On this particular issue.

"Mr. BROOKS. And you worked for all of them?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, the Assistant Secretary of State is Chairman of that RIG.

"Mr. BROOKS. That is who you really worked for?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes. Well, I really worked for the Secretary of State and the President. Obviously, you have an immediate superior, right.

"Mr. BROOKS. Colonel North told you what to do?

"Mr. TAMBS. No, no. When he spoke through Castillo, I assumed, sir, that he was talking for the RIG.

". . . .

"Mr. BROOKS. Did you think the President supported that effort that you were working on, you having been appointed by him working for the Secretary of State?

"Mr. TAMBS. I have no knowledge whether the President knew or supported it. You know, I can't tell you. I don't know."
(Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 270-73.)

85/07/01-595
JULY 1985 AND
THEREAFTER

RIG INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CONTRAS
TAMBS ACCOUNT:

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . People are kind of suggesting in their testimony that old Tambs did it all by himself. Does that outrage you?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, it is very complimentary in a way, isn't it? At the same time, when we discussed the RIG, I thought they were doing a

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		splendid job, and I was delighted to be working with them because they wanted to win." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 230.)	
85/07/01-596 FROM EARLY JULY 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: RIG AWARENESS TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testified further on the September 1986 meeting in Florida: ". . . I noted today that in September of 1986, when we had the Chief of Missions meeting in Homestead Air Force Base, all of the princip[al]s of the RIG were there and, you know, the Chairman of the CIA, Central American Task Force, went through the entire situation in Central America, including the airfield and the southern front. ". . . . "What I am suggesting . . . is that everything which we had tried to do or had done was well known to what I considered to be the principals of the RIG." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 223-24.)	
85/07/01-599 JULY 1985 - DECEMBER 1986		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: RIG AWARENESS TAMBS ACCOUNT: During his eighteen months as Ambassador, his contact with the RIG in Washington about his airstrip and southern front activities had consisted of two to three cables and "a limited number of phone calls . . . [.] Mr. Castillo was the channel which went back to the RIG." No one in the State Department instructed him to use Castillo as a channel, however. (Tambs Testim.,	

JHICI, 5/28/87, at 191-93.)

85/07/01-600
EARLY JULY
1985 -
MID-JANUARY
1987

RIG INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CONTRAS
ABRAMS ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . From whom did the RIG get its direction on policy towards Central America, Mr. Abrams?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Well, the RIG, as I said, was not a decision-making or policy-making body. It was a coordinating body. Policy was made as usual in the sense by the President, by the NSC, by the NSPG, by the Secretary of State.

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. You're aware . . . that there has been testimony . . . that the true RIG, true policy implementing group on Central America was a three-person RIG, consisting of you, Lieutenant North, and the Chief of the CIA Central American task force. Ambassador Tambs, among others, was a witness who testified here that that was the true RIG and that it was the source of instructions that he was receiving. How do you respond to those claims and those assertions?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Well, he doesn't know what he's talking about and he never attended a RIG meeting.

"Mr. BELNICK. Was there a three-person RIG consisting of you, North, and the Chief of the Central American task force

"Mr. ABRAMS. There was not.

"Mr. BELNICK. Was there a de facto working group consisting of those three persons who effectively were the action-oriented persons on Central American policy?

"Mr. ABRAMS. No, there was not. There were meetings among the three of us, as there were meetings among virtually any combination of two or three or four people within the RIG that you could find. But there was no sub-RIG or something like that."

(Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 15-17. See 86/01/00-500 [Abrams on the 3-member RIG].)

85/07/01-610
JUNE 16, 1987

THE 3-PERSON RIG
WATSON ACCOUNT:

Col. Samuel Watson, Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, testified on a 3-person RIG.

"Q. Let's talk about the RIG for a moment. Who chaired the RIG on Central America?

"A. My understanding was Elliott Abrams.

"Q. And you said you had been refused entry into that RIG?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Who had refused you entry?

"A. Well, I think Elliott.

". . . .

"Q. Did there come a time, then, that you or Don Gregg went to the Vice President and said: We, the senior advisors to the Vice President, are being refused admission to the RIG on Central America?

"A. I never thought of going to the Vice President. I prefer to deal with things that I can deal with, and I don't have to go tattling to the Vice President to tell him my problems that I can't solve. So the way I dealt with it was to continue to try, to listen at the SIG's on Nicaraguan humanitarian assistance.

". . . .

"Q. Let's go back to the RIG. Elliott Abrams chaired the RIG. Who did you understand was on the RIG aside from Chairman Abrams?

"A. I got the impression that it was [redacted] and Ollie North.

"Q. Anyone else?

"A. Not that I know of.

"Q. From where did you get the information that it was the three of them?

"A. Because it was at a SIG on Nicaraguan humanitarian assistance, Elliott would say to, or [redacted] would say, we'll talk about it at the RIG, to [redacted] or to Ollie North, something like that. So I knew that at least they were on it.

"Q. Did anyone ever tell you that it was the three of those persons who comprised the RIG?

"A. No.

"Q. Who chaired the SIG meetings?

"A. Usually Mike Armacost.

"Q. Did you ever complain to Armacost that Abrams wasn't letting you into the RIG meetings?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you ever tell anyone on the seventh floor of the State Department that that was happening to you?

"A. No.

"Q. And you never got into the RIG meetings?

"A. Never got in.

"Q. Did you ever confront Elliott Abrams and

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		say, why the hell are you keeping me out of these meetings, in words or substance? "A. I think I did on one occasion. "Q. And what did he say? "A. He said, well, we'll think about it. "Q. Did you tell him that was unacceptable, that you as the Vice President's deputy wanted to be at those meetings? "A. I think I did. "Q. And what did he say? "A. I'm not sure if I ever heard anything back on it or whether, when I checked later in the week -- I think they were on Fridays -- he might have said no. "Q. In any event -- "A. I never got there." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 84-87. See id., 6/16/87, at 87-90. See also 85/07/01-600 and 86/01/00-500 [Abrams on the RIG generally and answering claims that a 3-member RIG existed].)	
85/07/01-620 1985-86		THE 3-PERSON RIG MELTON ACCOUNT: "Q. During the time you were director of the Office of Central American Affairs, there was an interagency group, restricted interagency group referred to as the RIG, which met periodically and included several people, representatives from the NSC, the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, and State Department. During your tenure as Director of Central American Affairs, such an organization existed; is that correct? "A. Yes. An informal organization. True.	

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		It did exist, and continues to exist. "Q. Okay. To your recollection, during the period of time from late 1985 and throughout most of 1986, was there a smaller informal working group that, within the RIG, that dealt with matters concerning the Contras composed of Oliver North from the NSC usually, Secretary Abrams from State Department, and the Central American Task Force director for the CIA; do you recall such an informal subgrouping meeting off and on during that time period to discuss-- "A. It is true that those individuals and often one or two others would meet on various issues on an informal basis, not a scheduled kind of meeting. But they did meet, those three plus others on an informal basis periodically, that is true. "Q. There were several times it was in fact just those three that would meet; isn't that correct? "A. That would be true, too. "Q. All right. And when you say a few others on occasions, who would be the others that might join this particular informal grouping? "A. Occasionally Deputy Assistant Secretary Walker, occasionally Deputy Assistant Secretary James Mich[]el. "Q. Okay. But usually those three in particular would be present; isn't that correct? "A. Yes, maybe -- that is right, yes. I would say generally, Ray Burghardt from the NSC might be there sometimes. "Q. But again more often than not, it was the	

first three I mentioned that would usually be present for such an informal gathering?

"A. Oliver North was traveling frequently and there, to my knowledge, there were informal sessions where others would be present but he wouldn't.

"Q. I understand that. But usually North, Secretary Abrams, and the Central American Task Force director were the three that more often met concerning these matters than the others; isn't that correct?

"A. Yes, I would say that is true. The other members of the RIG, you mean?

"Q. Yes.

"A. Yes, that is true.

". . . .

"[A.] Could I add one thing. I was not a member of these groups, so I am giving you information based on my observations, but not as a participant in the meetings, either the meetings of the RIG or the informal meeting.

"Q. Right. I understand that. You were not personally present at these meetings but . . . you would know when meetings were being held and you could see generally who was participating in those meetings?

"A. In a general sense, my office is on the fourth floor and Assistant Secretary Abrams' office is on the sixth floor. And very often a meeting might take place before or after a regularly scheduled RIG meeting, so since I was not participating in the RIG, I wouldn't be in a position to know how frequently these meetings

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		took place, but they did take place. "Q. Did you ever hear this informal group referred to as a mini-RIG or a RIGlet? "A. A RIGlet. That strikes a bell, but it has no, that rings a bell but -- "Q. But what? "A. But no more than that. "Q. Okay. "A. That is just an impression." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 65-68.)	
85/07/01-630 UNTIL NOVEMBER 1986		RIG ON CENTRAL AMERICA: MEMBERSHIP POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Now there's been testimony at the hearings about the RIG. Are you familiar with the RIG on Central America? "A. Yes. "Q. Would you tell us who were the members of the RIG, as you understood it? "MR. BECKLER: What is a RIG? "MR. LIMAN: Restricted Interagency Group. "THE WITNESS: The RIG was established, by my recollection, anyway, sometime probably in '82, and I think it was established by an NSDD. "Q. Who were the -- I'm asking you not to tell me what's in a written constitution but, as you understood it, sitting there as National Security Advisor, who[m] did you consider to be the members of the RIG on Central America. "A. It, in my mind, consisted of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs as the Chairman, from the NSC staff usually Colonel North -- well, Colonel North and	

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		then usually also Ray Burghardt or his predecessor, Constantine Menges, [Redacted] and from the CIA it would have been the Director of the Central American Task Force, and I would not necessarily have limited it just to him. There were probably other members of the CIA, some representative from the Under Secretary of Defense's office. My understanding is that was usually Nestor Sanchez. And the Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS. "Q. So did you have any understanding that within this RIG there was a -- "A. No. "Q. Super-RIG of North [Redacted] and Abrams? "A. No." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 334-35.)	
85/07/01-640 1985-86		RIG INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CONTRAS SHULTZ RESPONSE TO TAMBS: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . Now, Ambassador Tambs testified that he received instructions from Colonel North to open a southern military front in Nicaragua. He said, Ambassador Tambs, that he complied with those instructions because he assumed that they came from the Restricted Interagency Group, the RIG, on Central America. "What is your understanding of the limitations on the ability of a RIG to make policy decisions? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, that interagency group was basically a coordinating group on the conduct of our Central American policy chaired by Elliot[t] Abrams, and it was more of a tactful sort. There were other potential meetings,	

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		groups, including, of course, the National Security Council Group with the President as the ultimate authority. "Mr. BOLAND. Now, if the RIG had reached any conclusion on the advisability of opening a southern military front in Nicaragua, would you have expected to have been informed about it by your representative on the RIG? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, major policy changes or developments would presumably be discussed either in the course of the normal activity and interaction or in somewhat more formal meetings. "Mr. BOLAND. And, to your knowledge, did Ambassador Tambs ever question a representative of your Department about the authorization for the instructions given to him by Colonel North? "Secretary SHULTZ. Not to my knowledge. I write a letter to each ambassador, and I have been particularly conscious of doing so for the last few years, that has an explicit paragraph in it about the chain of command, and who it is that an ambassador should take his instructions from. And that goes from the President to me and through the assistant Secretary of the region involved to the ambassador." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 205-07.)	
85/07/01-650 1985-86		THE RIG AND U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE CONTRAS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Leon. In this very compacted period of time, you had had a number of conversations with Colonel North, some of which indicated your displeasure with things he was doing, yet you	

couldn't order him what to do. In a RIG setting like that, what is it you are supposed to do? Are you your brother's keeper?

"[C/CATF.] I think Elliott Abrams testified to his frustration at the RIG not being able to order things around. I could not be my brother's keeper. As I said yesterday, I did what I could to influence events, to cause things to happen that I thought were appropriate.

"I did what I could to stop things where I thought they were inappropriate, but the major thing on which I was inflexible was keeping the agency within the bounds of legality and propriety. That was my task. That is what I tried to do.

"Mr. Leon. You told Colonel North you were against the whole airstrip idea at some point?

"[C/CATF.] I told him as time wore on, particularly in the spring of 1986, as clearly we were running towards problems, we were defining our operations thinking about things, we didn't need the airstrip, not to worry about it, not to hassle with it, it was not something that was necessary for us, and I particularly was there in [redacted] I believe it was in May or thereabouts, when [redacted] went to a meeting [redacted] and was told officially they could not use the airstrip.

"I was not at the meeting. I was at a meeting with another person. And then came back the next day [redacted] and in a meeting with Ambassador [redacted] and [redacted] said don't worry about it, forget it, let it go, it is not a big thing.

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		That airstrip was not -- is not integral to the plan we developed in the spring of 1986. "Mr. Leon. Is there any lesson that can be learned, do you think, [redacted] from the experience you have been through here in this RIG setting in a situation where you have a political dynamic like you have described and you have various RIG members with varying opinions on how to handle things and differences of opinions on how to protect, particularly, and risks to be taken politically, is there a lesson to be learned either by yourselves or by others in a similar situation in the agency on how to best handle these for the future? "[C/CATF.] There is a lesson to be learned for us all in that. I think the lesson for me to have learned was to have been a little bit more cautious in the first two months of 1986 when I said I let the reins out and then had to pull myself back in -- that is my lesson. I have asked myself a hundred times if I could go back and do it over again what would I do differently? And I put that thought out of my mind, because I couldn't, and so there is not a lot of sense in thinking about it. "But the major lesson, and I wish Chairman Hamilton were here to hear this, comes out of the summer of 1985 in which we had intensive meetings with Chairman Whitten, Chairman Hamilton and with Chairman Boland and anybody else who would listen and pleaded, pleaded not to write CIA out of managing the $27 million, not to do it. And then in December, November, again at my urging, Bud	

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		McFarlane convened a meeting in the White House. At that meeting was Chairman Hamilton, Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee -- his name hs gone out of my mind -- last year from the -- Congressman Cheney, Congressman McCurdy and later Senator Durenberger, and Mr. McFarlane asked, almost pleaded for four things. He said, please in the Intelligence Authorization Act give us intelligence sharing, give us communications equipment, give us logistics, and give us air defense." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 83-86.)	
85/07/01-651 1985-86		THE RIG AND U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE CONTRAS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2: [C/CATF's response continues from preceding entry:] "[C/CATF.] We said air defense is negotiable. We probably can get along without it. These are the three things we need for this resistance to survive until we resolve the divisions in Congress. "We didn't get that. The lesson to have been learned was not to have been vindictive, not to be a house divided against ourselves, not to write out DOD, CIA, two entities in the government that could have run that program and run it right and force State Department to put the RIG unit together with bubblegum and ba[]ling wire to try to do something they weren't prepared to do, and not to stiff the Administration when they pleaded to give them something so they could avoid a problem.	

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JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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		"That was an attempt by me to work with Congress. I, in large measure, caused that meeting to happen and I was the one that said please give us logistic advice and I think if Chairman Hamilton were here he would remember some of the comments I made at that meeting describing the problems. "I did it because I knew the nutcracker I was in and I could see the problem over the horizon and I was trying to solve it. "The lesson is not to be a house divided against yourself. And the lesson for me for two months was I should have been a little more cautious, and the lesson for all of us is we are going to have more problems like this if we are divided, if we fight with each other and if we can't find consensus and we ought to learn them because the future is not bright if we don't." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 86-87.)	
85/07/03-100 SOMETIME IN JULY 1985 [JULY 3, 1985]			McFARLANE-KIMCHE CONTACT McFARLANE ACCOUNT: David Kimche, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, meets with McFarlane "to report the existence of contacts with Israeli officials and Iranian officials that had gone on for some time, and through these contacts the interest on the part of Iranian officials in establishing contact with the United States." The Iranians, Kimche says, "stated that they had thought it through and with some confidence only wanted to know two things: Were we interested in talking to them; and how would we prefer that they

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			release the hostages." Kimche mentions hostages, but not arms. (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 103-06; id., 5/13/87, at 21.)
85/07/03-101 EARLY JULY 1985			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: At the same time as McFarlane's contact with Kimche, a plan to ransom the hostages is underway: "Mr. LIMAN. And, in fact, did you have a concurrent operation going to seek the release of the hostages through ransom being raised from Mr. Perot? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Within a year of that time there was an operation involving DEA agents, with the cooperation of the Attorney General, that was underway. "Mr. LIMAN. That was underway at this very time, wasn't it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And that had been approved by the President? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And am I correct that this involved ransoming the hostages for a million dollars a hostage? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It involved no Government funds, but it did involve bribes . . . . ". . . ." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 106-08.)
85/07/03-105 DURING JULY 1985			McFARLANE-KIMCHE CONTACT LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. There is a public report in the Tower

Commission [at B-16 to -17] or somewhere there was a meeting, I think, in Washington in early July of 1985 between Kimche and McFarlane.

"A. I have read that. I was not aware of it.

"Q. You were not aware of it?

"A. No.

"Q. Did McFarlane ever tell you such a meeting took place?

"A. No.

"Q. And you obviously did not attend that meeting?

"A. No.

"Q. Please continue.

"A. If you want to guess, I will be glad to give you a guess as to what I think that meeting was about.

"Q. An informed guess would be fine. A raw speculation, I am not too interested in. I would be interested in what your view is.

"A. I would say it is sort of a 65 percent informed and 35 percent raw. I don't want to overstate it.

"Q. All right.

"A. It is a guess but it is probably pretty close to right.

"I think Kimche came to talk to McFarlane to say basically we have met this fellow Ghorbanifar, he is an interesting fellow, we are thinking of pursuing this. A, what do you think about this? B, is Ledeen the channel through which we should go?

"They could have gone any way they wanted. There was no obvious reason for them to go through me. My guess is that McFarlane in essence said, Let's see how it goes, and, yes, that is as good as any.

"Again, I don't know that, but that's my guess, because one of the questions that occurred to me was, why were they doing this through me when they had so many other ways that they could do it and when I saw this meeting had taken place, my guess was that they had asked him.

"Q. When did you first learn that that meeting had taken place? Not until you read the Tower Commission Report?

"A. No. It was in the Senate Select Committee Report. I think that's the first time.

"Q. Okay.

"A. Or maybe it was in McFarlane's public testimony. I didn't know about it until then.

"Q. I was well after the event?

"A. Oh, yes.

". . . ."

(Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 35-37. See id., at 163 [Ledeen was unaware that Kimche told McFarlane in Washington that Israel had established a dialogue with Iran]; Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 36. For Ledeen's testimony on the events of May through July 1985, see 85/05/04-100 through -106, 85/07/29-100 through -102; 85/07/30-100.)

85/07/04-000
EARLY JULY
1985

SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: SUMMARY
McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

McFarlane reconstructed the points at which the President reviewed the various proposals for

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			contact with Iran in July and August 1985: "After the first meeting [with Kimche, c. July 3, 1985], I reported to him [the President] the proposal of Mr. Kimche that we initiate a dialogue and he approved doing that. Two weeks later, [c. July 13, 1985], Iran introduced the requirement for 100 TOWs, and I reported that to him [c. July 16-17, 1985] and he said the United States will not do that. Two weeks after that, approximately [c. July 30, 1985], Israel proposed that Israel sell the arms, but stipulated that it had to be able to come to the United States to buy replacements. "The President considered that, talked it over with the NSC prinicpal [sic] and later approved it." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 24. For estimates of dates, see McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 103-05; id., 5/13/87, at 21 [both on Kimche's first approach]; id., 5/11/87, at 109-10 [Schwimmer first mentions arms, c. July 13, 1985; McFarlane relays that to the President, c. July 16 or 17, 1985]; id., 5/11/87, at 114-16 [NSC meetings on the proposals between July 21 and Aug. 8, 1985]; id., 5/11/87, at 116-17 [Kimche proposes Israel sell the weapons two weeks later, in late July - early August 1985]
85/07/04-002 SUMMER 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS SUMMARY: For additional discussion of the sequence of events of the summer 1985 Iran proposals and the TOW shipments in August and September 1985, see

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			Iran-Contra Report, at 165-69; Tower, at B-11 through -28.
85/07/04-005 DURING JULY 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: PRESIDENT'S DECISION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. Mr. McFarlane has testified that he brought the Israeli proposal to ship TOW missiles to Iran to President Reagan's attention in July of 1985, the TOW missiles; but that the President needed a few days to consider the proposal before he approved it. "Is it your testimony that during the time he was considering the Israeli proposal, he did not ask for your legal or personal advice on it? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "I might also say there was probably a good reason for that. I think I was either in--well, I was not asked for my advice at any time, but probably even if he had wanted to, he couldn't because I was in Europe during most of that time." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 264.)
85/07/08-100 JULY 8, 1985			THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH CRITICIZING IRAN NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you and the other persons meeting with the President on this matter were aware, weren't you, that the President had been highly critical of the Iranian Government. In a widely reported speech in July of 1985--just a month before the first shipment of arms from Israel to Iran--which the President agreed to--the President described Iran as an outlaw state run by

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			the strangest collection of misfits, lunatics and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich. "To you recollection, during the meetings you attended with the President, with others, did anyone in your presence specifically point out to him that his representatives were dealing with officials of that same Government of Iran, point out that statement to him, and point out at least the apparent[] inconsistency in the two and the problems that might cause for him? "Mr. NORTH. That particular issue was not addressed in the meetings that I attended with the President on this matter. But what I think is important is that we clearly attempted to establish contact and ultimately the objective of a strategic dialogue with pragmatic or moderate or less unreasonable elements of the Iranian Government; and even, if we could have, people who were willing to bring about a cessation of terrorism, a more pro-Western view of the world, an end to Shiah-sponsored revolutionary fundamentalism, and ultimately secure the relationship between the United States and Iran to the point where we could bring about an end to the Iran-Iraq war. "The characterization of the Iranian Government I don't take any issue with; but the fact is that there are people in their government of differing political philosophies who see the long-term benefit to their country as well as to the rest of the world in achieving the kinds of things that we set out to ultimately achieve.

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			"The problem that is created is matching one set of words with another set of policy goals that were not publicly stated. And yet, I see nothing inconsistent with the fact that the characterization of the Iranian Government as the President made it vividly clear does not in any way prevent trying to establish contact with a more reasonable channel within it. ". . . . "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . [T]he President's publicly-stated policy at that time was not to provide arms to Iran and to work actively to keep other nations from doing so. As you recall, in 1984, the Secretary of State had branded Iran a country which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; and by his action, he placed Iran on a list of countries to which American arms could not be shipped. "And the President's publicly-stated policy on terrorism was that there would be no negotiation, no payments, no ransom of any kind to obtain the release of terrorists. In fact, I think in about that same time as he made the speech on Iran, the President said, and I quote, 'America will never make concessions to terrorists. To do so would only invite more terrorism. Once we head down that path, there will be no end to it.' ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. . . . I would also take issue, Senator, with one of your comments. To my knowledge, we have never said nor should we say that we will not negotiate. We have a policy of no concessions. We have a policy that is very

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			clear and I still do not to this day believe that we made concessions to terrorist[s]. We were dealing again in hopes of establishing a dialogue, a strategic dialogue, with elements within Iran that could bring about a more pro-American, pro-Western, anti-terrorist philosophy within that country. "Mr. MITCHELL. And I understand and appreciate your point of view, as I'm sure you understand and appreciate that there are others who would characterize these events different[ly] from [how] you do." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 5-9.)
85/07/08-500 JULY 8, 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: HAMBURG MEETING SUMMARY: Israeli officials meet in Hamburg with Ghorbanifar, Khashoggi, Khashoggi's son-in-law, and an Iranian representative. Before the meeting, Ghorbanifar tells the Israelis that the sale of 100 TOWs is essential to enhance his credibility with Iran, and claims that the sale will be followed by the release of U.S. hostages. (Iran-Contra Report, at 166 [citing Israeli Historical Chronology].)
85/07/11-000 AROUND JULY 10 OR 11 [OR EARLIER IN JULY], 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: INFORMING THE PRESIDENT McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane reports to the President David Kimche's message about Iranian willingness to make contact with the U.S.: "Mr. MCFARLANE. I reported that to the

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			President within a day or so before he went into the hospital in July of '85, and the sum and substance of the proposal was: Is the United States interested in talking to these people; and secondly, what is your preference if they are able to influence the release of the hostages? "And the President, in sum, said that yes, there is no harm in listening to the Iranians, and it was a very sensible thing to do, and that was conveyed to Mr. Kimche. "Mr. LIMAN. What was the next step, then? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Within two weeks, on about July 13 or so, Israel sent a private Israeli citizen to this country. "Mr. LIMAN. Was that Schwimmer? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. And he reported to Mr. Ledeen basically they had conveyed our response to the Iranians and the Iranians had introduced a requirement that before they could take any action, they would require the delivery of 100 TOW missiles from our side. "I conveyed that to the President, talked through the -- "Mr. LIMAN. When did you convey it to the President? Was it when he was in the hospital? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. It is -- it isn't precisely clear. I believe that it was the 16th or the 17th of July. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Now, for the first time you had been told that the Iranians wanted a trade, 100 TOWs for the hostages. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct."

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			(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 109-10.)
			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: INFORMING SHULTZ McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane also testified he informed the Secretary of State of the proposal to communicate with the Iranians: "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . It is perhaps useful that I note that I cabled a summary of the proposal to the Secretary of State, who was out of the country at the time. "Mr. LIMAN. And at the time that you spoke to the President had you received the response from Secretary of State? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. He had responsed and said that the pros and cons and risks, as I had laid them out in my message, he agreed with, and yet on balance thought that a tentative show of interest ought to be made and that I should take charge of the channel on the United States end, and I don't want to imply, however, that he supported the idea of an arms sale. "But the idea of talking to Iranians and to include the ultimate release of hostages was a matter in which he said on balance it was worth a try." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 111.)
			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now when you presented this to the President in the hospital, what was his reaction?

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, the President said that he could understand how Iranians who wanted to achieve a change in policy would be vulnerable to the more radical Iranians affiliated with [Khomeini], and so the idea of strengthening this by giving them the means to rally the Army or revolutionary guards to them was not an outrageous negotiation, but that we hadn't met them and we didn't know them and their bona fides w[as] very uncertain, and so at the time there could not be any U.S. owned items from the United [S]tates properly shipped to them in this kind of an arrangement, and I conveyed that back to Mr. Kimche. "Mr. LIMAN. You said U.S. owned weapons from the United States sold to them. Was there an implication that the Israelis could ship if they wanted? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That distinction is mine, not his, but he said, I believe, we couldn't do that, and I conveyed that back to Mr. Kimche." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 111-12.) SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: WHO KNEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, let's take us to what happened after your meeting with the President in the hospital. Was Don Regan the only other person present at the meeting? ". . . . "Mr. MCFARLANE. He was there, and then within the matter of a day or so, the [S]ecretary of State returned to the United States, and together

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			we had a session with the President on this." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 113-14.)
85/07/11-010 JULY 11, 1985			LEDEEN-SCHWIMMER MEETING LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. And do you recall a luncheon meeting with Mr. Schwimmer in July of 1985? [See 85/05/04-104 through -106.] "A. Yes. "Q. How was that meeting arranged? "A. Mr. Kimche called me from Israel and said that a friend of his was coming to Washington and would like to see me. "Q. Did Mr. Kimche tell you why Mr. Schwimmer wanted to see you? "A. No. "Q. According to . . . a memorandum that Wilma Hall sent to McFarlane, your meeting with Mr. Schwimmer was on July 11, 1985. Does that strike you as the approximate time when the meeting occurred? "A. Yes. I would have--I must say, I would have said a bit earlier in the month. "Q. Okay. "A. Are you sure that she said July 11th? "Q. I'll tell you that the message is dated July 11. It is to Robert McFarlane from Wilma Hall, and the message says: 'Schwimmer has flown down here and had lunch today with Michael Ledeen, and Ledeen called back with the following'. Do you recall telling Wilma Hall that you'd met with Schwimmer? "A. Oh, yes.

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			"Q. And passing a message through her to Mr. McFarlane? "A. Yes. "Q. Wilma Hall has described the message you relayed in this way, and I'll quote it to you. Quote: 'It is indeed a message from Prime Minister of Israel. It is a follow-on to the private conversation he had last week when David Kimche was here. It is extremely urgent and extremely sensitive, and it regards the matter he told David he was going to raise with the President. The situation has fundamentally changed for the better, and that I must explain to him because it will affect his decision. It is very important, it won't keep more than a day or two, but could keep until Saturday morning. This is the real thing and it is just wonderful news.' "Do you recall giving that message to Wilma Hall to relay to Mr. McFarlane? "A. Yes. "Q. Let me ask you some questions about it. Did Mr. Schwimmer say to you that he was giving you a message from the prime minister of Israel? "A. Yes. "Q. Did he say that it is 'a follow-on to the private conversation that had been had last week when David Kimche was here'? "A. I don't remember that, but I don't have any reason to doubt it. "Q. And it says that 'It is extremely urgent and extremely sensitive and it regards the matter he told David he was going to raise with the President'.

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			"Do you know what that sentence means? "A. Yes. I think that what happened was that the Israelis had met Ghorbanifar some time before, and my impression at the time was that they had very recently, only very recently met him, but it may be that they had met him a couple months earlier, as now appears, and had just taken a while to figure out whether he was someone that they wanted to put forward in this role. "In any event, as I understand it, what McFarlane had been told was that they had met an extremely interesting Iranian, and the question was whether--and this Iranian wanted to talk to the Government of the United States, and it was a question of whether the United States was interested in picking up this contact and pursuing it." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 46-49. See Tower Report, at B-16 n.10 [Wilma Hall's message to McFarlane].)
85/07/11-011 JULY 11, 1985			LEDEEN-SCHWIMMER MEETING LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. I refer specifically to the reference to 'the matter he told David he was going to raise with the President'. Does that mean that it relates to something that Kimche had told McFarlane and McFarlane had told Kimche he was going to raise with the President? Is that what that sentence means? "A. I'm going to have to guess as to what that sentence means because I don't remember what

I had in mind.

"Q. Well, who did you think was talking to the President about this initiative?

"A. McFarlane.

"Q. And what did you think McFarlane was telling the President about the initiative prior to your meeting with Schwimmer?

"A. I doubted that McFarlane had told the President anything about this initiative before then, because so far as I knew, there was nothing of any significance to report.

"Q. Was it your understanding that Kimche had met with McFarlane to discuss the initiative, prior to your meeting with Schwimmer on July 11th?

"A. I hadn't known about that. And in fact I must confess to you that I had forgotten that Schwimmer had told me about it until you just read me Wilma's note here.

"Q. Well, Wilma quotes you a saying it is 'a follow-on to the private conversation he had last week when David Kimche was here'. Does that refresh your memory as to whether Kimche had met with McFarlane prior to your luncheon meeting with Schwimmer?

"A. As I told you, I had not remembered Schwimmer telling me that until you just read that to me.

"Q. Do you remember it now?

"A. No. I don't particularly remember it now. But I have every confidence in Wilma's accuracy, so I'm quite sure it's right.

"Q. And do you have any present recollection of Mr. McFarlane telling you that he had been discussing your meetings with the Israelis with the President, prior to July 11, 1985?

"A. No.

"Q. And my reading you this note from Wilma Hall doesn't refresh your recollection about that?

"A. No. I would guess that the reference of David discussing something with the President would refer to a matter that Bud was going to take to the President as a result of his conversations with David Kimche, and not because of anything I had done. A new subject. There was nothing in what I had done that had to go to the President.

"Q. Let me ask you about the luncheon meeting with Mr. Schwimmer. That meeting was the first time where anyone had mentioned Ghorbanifar's name to you, correct?

"A. Correct.

"Q. And in the meeting, Mr. Schwimmer explained that he had had contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar, and that Mr. Ghorbanifar might be able to help us in establishing better relationships with Iran?

"A. Mr. Ghorbanifar could be helpful to us in a variety of ways with regard to Iran. He had exceptional contacts in Iran, in many different sectors of Iranian life, and with very high-ranking government officials. And in addition, Mr. Ghorbanifar said there was a possibility that the American hostages in Lebanon could be sprung in exchange for a ce[]rtain number of TOW missiles."

(Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 49-51. See id. at 51-54 [further testimony on the

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			Schwimmer-Ledeen meeting, and McFarlane's subsequent contact with Shultz (partly excerpted at 85/07/13-250)].)
85/07/13-000 JULY 13, 1985	PRESIDENT'S SURGERY: The President undergoes surgery at Bethesda Naval Hospital.		
85/07/13-100 MID-JULY 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: BEGINNING REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . Your first knowledge of any initiative being attempted in connection with the government of Iran took place in July of 1985 when Mr. McFarlane wanted to see the President, who was recovering in the hospital from an operation? "Mr. REGAN. That's right, at Bethesda Naval Hospital. "Mr. SMILJANICH. At that time, Mr. McFarlane presented to the President the possibility of an opening to Iran that the Israelis were working on? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . .[D]o you recall him mentioning anything in connection with arms as being a part of this process? "Mr. REGAN. I don't remember arms being discussed at the time in the hospital. The doctors had warned me and had warned Bud McFarlane that he couldn't stay long with the President, that we should get in and get out. "It was only the--I guess the third day after his operation. So accordingly, the discussion was kept to a minimum.

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			"What McFarlane was trying to do was to find or get permission from the President to initiate such discussions in order to have authority to continue or rather to undertake in accordance with what the Israelis had suggested some openings to these Iranian persons who at that point were unknown factors. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, before that session in the hospital, on July 13, 1985, there is an exhibit, Exhibit No. [DTR] 2 in your book, which is a cable that Mr. McFarlane sent to the Secretary of State. I realize it doesn't show that you received a copy of this or that you ever saw it. "At any rate, in mid-July of 1985, Mr. McFarlane was advising the Secretary of State that part of this plan involving the Government of Iran contemplated the delivery of 100 TOW missiles to Iran and that in connection with that, the hostages might be released. "Your recollection is this was not brought to the President's attention at this first meeting in the hospital? "Mr. REGAN. Not at the first meeting. I believe that was at the second meeting which would have been after the President returned from the hospital to his quarters." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 25-27. JHICI Ex. DTR 2 [McFarlane Cable to Shultz, 7/13/85].)
85/07/13-250 JULY 13, 1985			McFARLANE CONVEYS IRAN PROPOSALS TO SHULTZ LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. In a message that Mr. McFarlane sent to

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			Secretary of State Shultz two days later [following the Schwimmer-Ledeen meeting; see 85/07/11-010, -011], on July 13, he describes a proposal by an Iranian official, which was endorsed by the Government of Israel. He doesn't name Mr. Ghorbanifar, but by reading the message, it's clear that the proposal he's talking about is Mr. Ghorbanifar's proposal as relayed to you through Mr. Schwimmer. "And he describes the proposal as having both 'short-term and long-term dimensions' to it. The short-term dimension concerns the seven hostages; the long-term dimension involves the establishment of a private dialogue with Iranian officials on the broader relationship. "Is that consistent with your recollection about what Mr. Schwimmer described to you in this luncheon meeting? "A. Yes. "Q. And the short-term dimension involved a proposal that concerned the exchange of U.S. arms for hostages, correct? "A. I think it's not correct. "Q. How would you describe it? "A. I would describe it differently, and I would say that I think in Schwimmer's original presentation--it was given to us in an excessively compressed form--and when I met with Ghorbanifar and he explained what was involved, the linkage between what McFarlane calls short-term and long-term was much clearer, and I think that McFarlane may have gotten a better picture of it from Kimche than I had gotten from Schwimmer.

"The notion was that there were people in Iran, some in very high positions in the government, who were interested in a better relationship between Iran and the United States.

"And they were interested in taking steps in that direction. That they were prepared, on their part, for their part, to make a series of gestures which would demonstrate to us two things. First, their willingness to move Iran in that direction, and second, their capacity to bring about changes in Iran that would move the country in a more moderate direction, the one case in which I think the word moderate is used directly.

"And that as they made these gestures, among which one would be obtaining the release of hostages in Southern Lebanon, the United States would be expected to make a gesture also. And that the one gesture which would convince the Iranians that the United States was also willing and able to move in the direction of this better relationship, would be if Iran could obtain weapons which the Americans had denied them because of our arms embargo. That's the way I would describe it.

"Q. In this message to Secretary of State Shultz, McFarlane specifically mentions TOWs and specifically mentions a quantity of 100 TOWs.

"Do you recall Mr. Schwimmer telling you that in the luncheon meeting in July?

"A. Yes. I think that's right.

"Q. Was there any discussion about pricing, at what price these TOWs would be sold to Iran, in this July meeting with Mr. Schwimmer?

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			"A. No. "Q. Was there any discussion about U.S. replenishment of Israeli TOWs in this July luncheon meeting with Mr. Schwimmer? "A. No." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 51-54.)
85/07/14-100 JULY 14, 1985			SHULTZ INFORMED OF ISRAELI CONTACT WITH IRAN DoS CHRONOLOGY: "MCFARLANE cables GPS discussing Israeli contacts with Iranians and Israeli/Iranian interest in U.S.-Iranian dialogue, commencing with Israeli delivery of TOWS and Iranian attempts to release hostages. MCFARLANE offers analysis, favors U.S. expressing interest. "GPS cables MCFARLANE proposing 'positive but passive reply,' involving U.S. willingness to listen to Iranians, without commitment, on opening a dialogue and reinforcing MCFARLANE'S expressed cautions against being drawn into arms transfers. GPS tells McFarlane to manage the issue personally and inform Israeli emissary that GPS and MCFARLANE are 'in close contact and full agreement every step of the way.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/07/16-100.)
85/07/14-110 JULY 14, 1985			SHULTZ INFORMED OF ISRAELI CONTACT WITH IRAN SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [I]n July of 1985, July 14, . . . you received a cable from Mr. McFarlane [Ex. GPS 9] in which he discussed with you

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			proposed Israeli-Iranian contacts which might include a delivery of TOWs from Israel. . . . "You cabled back, Exhibit GPS-10, saying that if anything Mr. McFarlane ought to express a positive but passive reply, that we ought not to get actively involved, and that Mr. McFarlane ought to inform the Israeli emissary who had brought this proposal to him that you and Mr. McFarlane would be in close contact every step of the way on that matter. "Is that a fair summary? If not, feel free to add. "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think what took place was an emissary to Mr. McFarlane that came from the Prime Minister, and the burden of it was that they thought there was a way in which the relationship with Iran might change and that at the same time we might be able to get our hostages out but that it might very well involve some sales of arms by Country One to Iran. "Now, you get something from the Prime Minister that has that kind of suggestion in it, and having marched up that hill and thought it was stopped at least two times by now, it seemed to me, well, he is probably going to explore this anyway so let us try--I wanted to be sure I had some kind of control over it or association with it. "So I said, well, all right, let us give a passive reply, without commitment, let's find out more, what exactly is it that they have in mind--that was the idea--without commitment, and also that I expected to be kept fully informed at

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			each step. That was explicit in the cable." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 65-66; JHICI Exx. GPS 9 [McFarlane message to Shultz, re Israeli-Iranian Contact, 7/13/85], GPS 10 [Shultz cable in response to McFarlane, 7/14/85].)
85/07/16-100 JULY 16, 1985			GHORBANIFAR'S CHARACTER DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS sees intelligence report calling GHORBANIFAR a 'talented fabricator.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/07/19-100.)
85/07/19-100 JULY 19, 1985			SHULTZ VISITS THE PRESIDENT AT BETHESDA DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS visits the PRESIDENT in the hospital upon return from ASEAN meeting. MCFARLANE present. No discussion of the proposed Iran initiative." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/07/24-100.)
85/07/21-110 JULY - AUGUST 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOMFIELD. Did you or any officer or employee of the United States Government receive instructions from the President or anyone purporting to act on his behalf not to inform Congress or congressional committees of the secret Iran Initiative or related activities?

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. It seems to me that at the July and August meetings in 1985 with the President and his Cabinet officers that Mr. Casey expressed the view that Congress should not be adviseu, and the President agreed with him, that--I don't recall any dissent from that position at the time." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 243-44.)
85/07/24-100 JULY 24, 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS is reminded by his Executive Assistant, CHARLES HILL, to ask MCFARLANE for a status report on Iran proposal." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the Dos Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/08/06-120.)
85/07/25-200 SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER [LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST] 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: TAMBS' AND CASTILLO'S INVOLVEMENT TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testifying on his role in the construction of the airfield in Costa Rica: "Mr. BELNICK. Did there come a time in the summer of 1985 when you were specifically asked to obtain the Costa Rican Government's permission for the construction of an airfield at Santa Elena to be used in connection with resupply of the Freedom Fighters? "Mr. TAMBS. I was asked to approach the Costa Rican Government in regards to the construction of an airfield by private hands for use by private facilities. I did that.	

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		"Mr. BELNICK. Who asked you to do that? "Mr. TAMBS. That came[,] as far as I recall, directly from North through Tomas Castillo. "Mr. BELNICK. Once again you assumed that this request to you was authorized by the United States Government? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes, indeed. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. Did you agree also that the airstrip would be deeded to the Costa Rican Government? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 150-51. See id., 5/28/87, at 242-43, 291-94, 297 [Tambs testifed he believes Castillo first approached him about the airstrip, and "the original suggestion came from private patriotic Americans." Date: "very, very late July 1985, the first week of August of 1985."].)	
85/07/25-201 SUMMER 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: U.S. EMBASSY AWARENESS TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testified further on the airstrip: "Mr. DEWINE. . . . It is my understanding that there were no appropriated funds used for the construction of this airstrip; is that correct? "Mr. TAMBS. To my knowledge, it was all private funds. "Mr. DEWINE. The materials were not in any way paid for by the U.S. Government? "Mr. TAMBS. No, sir, not to my knowledge. "Mr. DEWINE. The laborers out there, who actually did the physical work, they were not paid	

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		for in any way, to your knowledge, by U.S. funds? "Mr. TAMBS. No, sir. That's correct. "Mr. DEWINE. How many people in your embassy, just give me the number, actually knew what was going on as the construction was taking place? ". . . . "Mr. TAMBS. Probably about four." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 217-18.)	
85/07/25-230 SUMMER 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: AUTHORIZATION NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. Ambassador Tambs also testified that later in the summer of 1985 he received instructions from you to approach the Government of Costa Rica about constructing an airfield in that country for the benefit of the contras. "Who directed you to give those instructions to Ambassador Tambs? "Mr. NORTH. My recollection is that that had also been widely discussed within the Restricted Interagency Group, that I certainly made it clear we needed that kind of activity in the South, and I apprised my superiors of the need for that construction. "I don't recall specifying the location, but I even provided photographs, at some point, of the airfield. ". . . . "Mr. BOLAND. All right. Was there anyone in the State Department that had approved this kind of instruction being given to Ambassador Tambs? "Mr. NORTH. Again I do not recall ever addressing the issue specifically as a request for	

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		approval from the State Department, but I certainly apprised them of the fact the airfield was under construction, as part of that process within the Restricted Interagency Group." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 126-27.)	
85/07/25-300 SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: CASTILLO'S NON-INVOLVEMENT CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Castillo testifying on the construction of the Costa Rican airstrip: "Mr. Barbadoro. Ambassador Tambs has testified . . . that he got his instructions from you to go to the president of Costa Rica and get permission to have the airstrip built. "Did you ever give such instructions to Ambassador Tambs? "Mr. Castillo. Regretfully, I must disagree with Ambassador Tambs . . . ." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 33-34.)	
85/07/25-305 SUMMER OR FALL 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: C/CATF NON-INVOLVEMENT C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Carome. Ambassador Tambs also testified to this committee that in the summer of 1985, he was asked by Oliver North through your [redacted] to approach [redacted] regarding the construction of an airfield to -- for use in support of the contra resistance. Do you recall that occurring at that time? "[C/CATF.] No. I don't recall that	

occurring. I don't recall having discussed that with [redacted] in the summer of 1985."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 264. See id., 8/4/87, at 264-67. See also id., 8/5/87, at 139-40 [Costa Rican Airstrip, generally].)

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SOMETIME IN
THE FALL OF
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THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: THE ORIGINAL IDEA
CASTILLO ACCOUNT:

Castillo testifying on the source of the airstrip idea:

"Mr. McCollum. One last question . . .

"Whose idea was the air strip anyway? I asked that question yesterday of Ambassador Tambs, and you have beat around the bush with it today; [redacted;] whose idea was it?

"Mr. Castillo. In consideration of the needs of the southern front resistance, under an ideal situation, in other words, full funding by the Congress, an air strip would be an essential or integral part of any supply effort.

"Mr. McCollum. I understand that, but who came up with the idea? Do you know? Was it you, Ambassador Tambs, [(redacted)? If] you know, I would like to know. Maybe you don't know.

"Mr. Castillo. I think I was probably the first to express it."
(Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 145. See id., at 205.)

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THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: THE ORIGINAL IDEA
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BOLAND. So, in effect, you really were the originator of that [airstrip] suggestion; is

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		that correct? "Mr. NORTH. No. Actually I think the originator was probably General Secord, who knew more about the requirements for those kinds of abort bases in order to support the resupply operation." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 127.)	
85/07/29-100 JULY 19, 1985			LEDEEN'S MEETING WITH GHORBANIFAR LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "A. . . . So I met with Ghorbanifar. We had a meeting towards the end of July, the 29th, I think it was, in Tel Aviv. And it went all day. We met in the morning and then we had lunch and then we met some more in the afternoon. We talked well into the evening. ". . . . "Q. . . . Who else was present? "A. It is the basic group, as it would remain throughout. That is to say, Kimche, Nimrodi, Schwimmer, me, and Ghorbanifar. "Q. What language did you speak? "A. English. "Q. How is his English? "A. Good, not perfect, but good. "Q. But good? "A. Good. "The basic message that Mr. Ghorbanifar brought was that there were powerful persons -- well, two stages. First, that the internal situation in Iran was considerably worse, more stressful, and more potentially explosive than we had generally imagined. He told us stories of

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			armed conflict in the streets of Iran, of movements of large numbers of people, for example, at night because Iran had no night radar and the Iraqis could bomb cities at night, so the people were moving out to the countryside at night to avoid being bombed. "He described to us a model of internal political conflict which over time I think basically checked out. And he said that under these circumstances, there were several of the most powerful figures in the government who were interested in achieving better relations with the West and that they recognized that Iran's policies up til then, primarily the policy of using terror as an integral part of Iranian foreign policy and using terror to export the Shia revolution was alienating them with the Western world and they were willing to work to moderate Iranian policies in order to achieve better relationships with the West, above all better relationships with the United States. "That, therefore, it was possible, working with these people, to achieve a change in the nature of the Iranian regime and in the policies that it would carry out and that in order to show their good will, their desire to make these changes come about, and their capacity to, influence the course of events in Iran, they would undertake to have a series of gestures occur which included a change in the public rhetoric towards the United States, an end to terrorist attacks against American targets, and an effort to convince the hostage holders in South Lebanon to

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			release one or more American hostages; and that in return, if the United States was, in fact, interested in working toward a better relationship with such in Iran, that they would expect a similar gesture from the United States which would demonstrate the legitimacy of the channel and the desire and capacity of the President to move towards a better relationship with Iran and that the only thing that would meet all those requirements would be if the President of the United States enabled Iran to obtain the weapons that it so desperately needed to defend itself against the Iraqi invader, weapons which it had been prevented from obtaining in the past because of the American arms embargo." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 37-40. Ledeen's response continues in next entry. For Ledeen's account of the events of May to July 1985, see 85/05/04-100 through -106, 85/07/03-105.)
85/07/29-101 JULY 29, 1985			LEDEEN'S MEETING WITH GHORBANIFAR LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Ledeen's response continues from preceding entry:] "[A.] This is the basic test that Ghorbanifar proposed and tests that emerged in the course of this long conversation, and we talked to him in some detail about the real desire on the part of the leading Iranians to have the policies of Iran moderated and their ability to do so, and what could one hope to achieve over time and at greater length about the internal situation in Iran and about the role that Iran had played, was playing

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			and was planning to play in international terrorism. "When our conversation was over the next day or the day afterwards, the four of us -- that is the three Israelis [Kimche, Nimrodi, and Schwimmer] and me, without Ghorbanifar -- met to discuss what we ought to do about all of this. "Q. Before you get into that, let me just ask you some questions I had arising out of the conversations. "First, between the time that you had obtained authorization to speak to Mr. Ghorbanifar on your trip and the time you actually met with him, did you do anything to check out who Mr. Ghorbanifar was? "A. I was not in a position to do that. "Q. Do you know whether Mr. McFarlane did anything or anyone at the NSC to check out his bona fides or anything along those lines? "A. I don't know. "Q. Did Mr. Ghorbanifar during the course of that meeting tell you who[m] he represented in Iran? "A. Yes. "Q. Did he give you a specific name? "A. He gave us several specific names. "Q. Were those names people that you recognized? "A. Yes. "Q. They are people who[m] you knew to be major leaders in Iran? "A. Yes. "Q. How would you characterize their

political position in Iran? There has been excessive -- extensive -- although excessive may be more accurate -- discussion about moderates, radicals, various other characteristics.

"A. Well, if I could say something about the question of moderates, Iranian moderates. I do not believe in the existence of Iranian moderates in the sense that one would normally use the English word 'moderate.' I do, however, believe -- and I took this to be Mr. Ghorbanifar's meaning -- that there are Iranian leaders who are willing and indeed eager to moderate the behavior of Iran in the world and to influence Iranian policy in a direction which we would consider more moderate than the one that they are pursuing now, and I do believe also that within the Iranian -- current Iranian regime, there are more and less radical people, so there are people who are relatively moderate compared to a very high standard of radicalism, which is Khomeini himself and some of his people.

"So with that, Ghorbanifar also stressed -- and I think that it is something that has to be checked, but it is certainly not to be rejected on the face of it -- that there are some people in Iran who appear to be extremely radical and even fanatic but who, in fact, are wishing for a different kind of government and different kinds of policies which they are secretly prepared to advance.

"So that it is quite conceivable to me that there are people in Iran who are publicly one thing and privately something quite different.

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			This was one of the things which I thought we should be investigating and one of the reasons why I urged one course of action rather than the one that was ultimately adopted by the United States Government. "But to answer your question, after all, I would cha[ra]cterize the public positions of the people with whom Mr. Ghorbanifar said he was in contact as mixed. Some of them were among the people who had the most radical reputations; some of them were people who had reputations as being somewhat blander or somewhat less ferocious." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 40-42.)
85/07/29-102 JULY 29, 1985			LEDEEN'S MEETING WITH GHORBANIFAR LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Were you able to reach a conclusion about whether or not Mr. Ghorbanifar actually had contacts with these individuals? "A. We were able to establish to our satisfaction that he did have contact because he was able to pick up the phone in Tel Aviv and dial Teheran and talk to these people and talk to them on a first-name basis, where clearly they knew who he was, what he was, what he was doing, and all that. "This was one of several occasions on which he would make such calls with Nimrodi on the extension, listening. "Q. Was . . . Mr. Ghorbanifar in the posture or did he inform you that he had been sent by the Iranians or was he more in the posture of someone

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			who was trying to bring two sides together? "A. It was rather between those two positions and the impression was of a person who was acting with the knowledge of people in Teheran who either -- depending upon what sort of emphasis you want to give it -- either approved of what he was doing or were willing to let him try, but that in any case, they were interested in obtaining the same results as he was attempting to obtain, namely an improvement in the relationship between the two countries leading to a moderation of the behavior of Iran. That was the bottom line. "Q. Was there any discussion in these conversations about whether or not Iran had control of the hostages? "A. Yes, there was. "Q. What did he tell you about it? "A. He told us that he believed Iran had considerable control for the hostages and that they could, in fact, effect the release of hostages. "Q. You indicated that as part of this discussion he referred to the release of one or more hostages. "A. Yes. "Q. I take it it was not -- those were carefully chosen words by you [--] was not necessarily that they would release all the hostages? "A. No. The main hostage discussed, the hostage on which he put the most emphasis from the beginning, was Buckley. He knew who Buckley was. He told us that Buckley was being tortured and he

said that he thought that they could get Buckley out, but he wasn't sure, but he thought that they could get Buckley and several of the others. This was the basic hope.

"Q. And finally, . . . was there any discussion about the quantity or the amount of arms that they were seeking as a return gesture?

"A. Yes, there was, but I cannot remember any[ ]more whether it was 100 or 400 or 500, but it was TOW missiles.

"Q. It was somewhere in that vicinity?

"A. Yes."

(Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 43-45. See id., at 163 [McFarlane's only instructions for Ledeen's meeting with Ghorbanifar: "The instructions were to attend it."]; Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 13-14 [Ledeen's notes of meetings with Ghorbanifar].)

85/07/29-110
JULY 29, 1985

LEDEEN'S MEETING WITH GHORBANIFAR
LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Q. Is it fair to say that the next contact you had with the Israelis on this matter [after July 11, 1985; see 85/07/11-010, -011] was in July, when you travelled to Israel on a vacation?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And prior to going on that vacation, you obtained Mr. McFarlane's approval to meet with Ghorbanifar and Schwimmer, Nimrodi and Kimche, in Israel, correct?

"A. Correct.

"Q. What instructions were you given by Mr. McFarlane about what you were authorized to do on that trip?

"A. I was authorized to meet and to learn as much as I could, and then to report back to him on what had taken place.

"Q. You weren't given any authority to approve this proposal that involved the exchange of missiles as a gesture of good will, which would in turn result in the release of hostages?

"A. I think it was inconceivable that a person at my level could negotiate anything regarding such matters.

"Q. And you weren't given any instructions to negotiate by Mr. McFarlane, and you did not negotiate, is that right[?]

"A. That is right.

"Q. Tell me how much time you spent with Ghorbanifar, Schwimmer, Nimrodi and Kimche during this trip to Israel in July.

"A. I would say the better part of two days.

"Q. And in general terms, is it fair to characterize your meetings as discussions about Ghorbanifar's proposal?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And at this point did you learn more details about the proposal than you had learned in the luncheon meeting with Mr. Schwimmer?

"A. Mainly we learned a great deal more about Iran. Since Ghorbanifar was saying that a change in the relationship was possible, we were quite curious about what it was in Iran that would make a change come about, after so many years of violent hatred on the part of the Iranians toward the West in general, and the United States and

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			Israel in particular. So why now, and how could it be that they were now thinking in terms [of] a new relationship in which not only were they willing to contemplate better relations with the United States, but even had a man travel to Israel and deal with the government of Israel in this connection? "Q. At this point, would it be fair to characterize Ghorbanifar's proposal in the same terms that Mr. McFarlane did, in that it had a short-term dimension and a long-term dimension? "A. Yes. "Q. And that the short-term dimension was part of achieving the longer-term dimension? "A. Yes." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 54-57.)
85/07/29-111 JULY 29, 1985			LEDEEN'S MEETING WITH GHORBANIFAR LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. I want to focus on the short-term dimension of this proposal. When you left this series of meetings with Ghorbanifar, Schwimmer, Nimrodi and Kimche in July, did you understand the short-term dimensions of this proposal to be that the United States would make a gesture by allowing Israel to ship 100 TOWs to Iran, and that in turn, the Iranians would make several gestures, one of which was to effect the release of hostages? "A. Yes. "Q. So it was your understanding in July, that the figure of 100 TOWs was still being discussed at that point?

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			"A. I don't remember that, to tell you the truth. It could very well have been, and it may not have been. "Q. Do you recall any discussions in these meetings in July about the issue of how much Iran was going to pay for the TOWs? "A. No. "Q. And do you recall any discussion in these meetings in July about whether the United States Government would replenish the Israeli stock of TOWs? "A. Yes. That question was raised. "Q. Who raised it with you? "A. Well, at a minimum, Defense Minister Rabin raised it with me. "Q. What did he say to you? "A. He asked me whether Israel would be permitted to buy TOWs to replace the ones that they were selling to Iran, because he was not enthusiastic about depleting their stockpile of TOW missiles. "Q. And what was your response to that statement? "A. I told him that I wasn't competent to answer the question. "Q. Did you pass on his concern about replenishment to McFarlane, when you returned to brief him on the trip? "A. No. "Q. Did Kimche say anything to you about the issue of replenishment during these July meetings? "A. I don't think so. "Q. Did you keep any notes of what was said

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			at these July meetings? "A. I did at the time, yes. "Q. Did you turn them in[ ]to anybody? "A. I gave McFarlane a set of notes regarding what Ghorbanifar had had to say about Iran, and the picture of the situation in Iran. "Q. Notes that you prepared from the discussion with Ghorbanifar? "A. Yes. These were extremely long conversations, so that part of the time Kimche took notes, and part of the time I took notes, and when it was over, we sat down and typed up our notes, respectively, and got an overall copy of what had taken place and this was given to McFarlane. ". . . . "Q. At these meetings in July, was Ghorbanifar holding out the possibility of introducing you and the Israelis to senior Iranian officials? "A. Yes. And not only senior Iranian officials, but Iranians from various sectors of Iranian society and activity. "Q. And was that part of the appeal of this proposal to you and to the Israelis? "A. It was, frankly, the major part of the appeal to us. By the way, if I could just add one thing, because it is always forgotten in these conversations, and that is, that in addition to the seven American hostages in Lebanon, there were twelve Jewish hostages being held by Hezbollah, and the Israelis were concerned about them and were trying to do what they could. They were

trying to help in that situation as well.

"Q. I take it that when you returned to the United States after this trip, that you briefed McFarlane on what had transpired, correct?

"A. Well, Kimche had already briefed him. Kimche had come to Washington early in August.

"Q. While you were still in Israel?

"A. Yes."

(Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 57-60. See id. at 63-66 [discussion of pricing of TOWs and profits at July meeting].)

85/07/30-100
JULY 30, 1985

FOLLOWING LEDEEN'S MEETINGS WITH GHORBANIFAR
LEDEEN ACCOUNT:

"Q. So you were telling us that shortly after, the next day after this meeting [see 85/07/29-100 through -102], you had a conversation among the four of you without Ghorbanifar?

"A. Yes. We decided there was something that should be reported quickly to McFarlane. And I agreed with that, although the idea of flying back to Washington, interrupting my vacation, was not attractive, especially because Kimche had to go anyhow.

"He offered to report on these conversations to McFarlane. That was fine with me. I wrote a short note that Kimche brought. And Kimche went to report on this to McFarlane and carried with him a handwritten version of some notes that he and I had taken and of which we had produced a kind of joint copy of the conversations with Ghorbanifar, what we had spoken about, what -- who the people were inside Iran whom he thought would be interested in working in this direction, what was the basic lines of -- what were the basic lines of conflict inside Iran, et cetera.

"Q. Do you know whether the State Department was aware you were meeting with these individuals?

"A. I don't know.

"Q. Do you know why Kimche was going to Washington?

"A. I don't remember, but for Kimche to go to Washington was not at all extraordinary.

"Q. I assumed that would be correct.

"(Discussion off the record.)

"BY MR. EGGLESTON:

"Q. Do you know when it was that Kimche spoke to McFarlane back in Washington?

"A. The very beginning of August.

"Q. You were still in Israel at that time?

"A. Yes . . . . He went and briefed McFarlane about this and came back and told us that McFarlane had said that for a test of the sort that Ghorbanifar was proposing, he would have to ask the President what the President wanted to do, and that when he had an answer from the President, he would report back."
[Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 45-46.)

85/07/31-150
AUGUST
THROUGH
SEPTEMBER
1985

SUMMER 1985 SHIPMENT: SOURCE OF THE TOWs
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on the source of the TOWs shipped by Israel to Iran:

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it one thing is clear, and that is that the TOWs or the weapons that were being shipped were Israeli weapons that were in

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			Israeli stocks, not U.S. weapons in U.S. stocks? "Mr. NORTH. . . . [I]t was my understanding at the time that there were 500 TOWs which had originally been provided by the United States to Israel that were shipped in August and September." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 131.)
85/08/00-000 SOMETIME IN JULY AND INTO AUGUST 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 3 SIGUR ACCOUNT: After Sigur's initial meeting with the Country 3 representative, North approaches Sigur "a week or ten days or two weeks later" to ask Sigur to arrange a meeting between North and that official to talk about having a second meeting between a Country 3 representative and the Contra leadership. Sigur arranges the first meeting for North in August 1985 at the Hay-Adams Hotel. Sigur walks North over, introduces him to the Country 3 official and leaves. He hears none of the conversation, and North tells him nothing afterward. Weeks later, Sigur hears that Country 3 "had decided to provide some humanitarian assistance financially to the contras . . . in the amount of $1 million." (Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 114-16; see also id., at 104-14 [earlier meeting between Sigur and the Country 3 official].)	
85/08/00-010 JULY AND INTO AUGUST 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 3, AND COUNTRY 3's END OF THE DEAL NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. I am not too sure how the approach with Three started. I believe it was	

through a person who has already testified.

"Mr. JENKINS. General Singlaub.

"Mr. NORTH. Exactly.

"Mr. JENKINS. And it took a year or so before they contributed, and you met with them one time, did you not?

"Mr. NORTH. I did.

". . . .

"Mr. JENKINS. . . . In your meeting with the delegate of Country Number Three that eventually gave us the one that did contribute--

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. JENKINS. --a total of $2 million.

"Mr. NORTH. I believe so, yes.

"Mr. JENKINS. At that particular time, what did you discuss with that representative . . . ?

"Mr. NORTH. . . . [H]e said that various overtures had been made to him by various parties and that there was interest back in his capital, but that he wanted to make sure that that was something that we would indeed want done, and I confirmed that.

"I told him that we would be very grateful, as indeed we were. No quid pro quo was suggested, none was offered, and the contributions were made.

"Mr. JENKINS. Well, as you probably know from previous hearings at that particular time, there was a very important trade bill that affected that country.

"Mr. NORTH. I do understand that.

"Mr. JENKINS. And that had been passed by the Congress but not dealt with at this particular time, vetoed or signed, by the President.

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. JENKINS. And that the contribution came after the bill had passed the Congress adversely affecting country number 3, and it was subsequently vetoed. There was no discussion about trade issues or any other issue?

"Mr. NORTH. Never.

"Mr. JENKINS. Because that sounds out of your jurisdiction anyway, and you would not have discussed that, would you?

"Mr. NORTH. I dealt intensely in trade issues which were political military issues in Central America. That issue was never ever raised, discussed in any way, Congressman Jenkins. I want it to be very clear on the record that neither he nor I discussed it and I--because it was a part of the world in which you did not have political military policy activity--was totally unaware that that was an issue. Totally.

"Mr. JENKINS. Totally unaware that it was even an issue on the Hill?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. JENKINS. Is that correct?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct, sir."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 183-87.)

85/08/00-020
AUGUST -
OCTOBER 1985

THIRD-COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. Other than [redacted] contribution is there a single other contribution for the contras during the Boland period that you are aware of that the President knew, and that's prior to Brunei?

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		"A. I suspect that -- I can't remember the exact timing of the contribution from [redacted.] "Q. Well, I'll help you on that. "A. When was that? "Q. The contributions from [redacted] came in before the diversion. "A. What I was going to say was I suspect the President knew about that. I can't recall -- "MR. LEON: It was the August-October time frame. "THE WITNESS: '85. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. When you say you suspect he knew about then, what gives you that suspicion? "A. Well, Mr. McFarlane was still there and there would have been no reason for him not to tell the President about [redacted] contribution because the President was aware of [redacted] contribution. "Q. But Mr. McFarlane denies that he knew of the [redacted] contribution. "A. Well, that's his recollection. "Q. Did you ever hear McFarlane tell the President about the [redacted] contribution? "A. I can't recall it. "Q. Now the [redacted] contribution would have also been a very controversial contribution; correct? "A. It would have for many of the same reasons. "Q. Did you tell the President about the [redacted] contribution? "A. I don't recall doing that.	

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		"Q. Who told you about the [redacted] contribution? Who told you about it? "A. Colonel North, my recollection is." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 269-70.)	
85/08/01-400 SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER [PERHAPS AUGUST] 1985		THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD GARWOOD ACCOUNT: Ellen Garwood meets Oliver North for the second time. They meet at North's OEOB office, where North shows her "a map of Nicaragua and of Central America and discuss[es] the chances of the freedom-seeking forces there to invade and go forward with their program." North does not ask her for a contribution. When they leave his office, however, Channell asks her for a specific amount. (Garwood: "He always specified the amount, yes, sir.") Garwood's records show she wrote two checks that summer which totaled $90,000. (Garwood Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 70-71.)	
85/08/01-405 1982-87		CHANNELL'S FUND-RAISING ACTIVITIES SUMMARY: For a description of Carl (Spitz) Channell's activities and his connection with the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), see Iran-Contra Report, at 85-88. On private fund-raising for the Contras, see generally Iran-Contra Report, at 86-103.	
85/08/01-410 UNTIL 1987		PRIVATE FUND-RAISING FOR THE CONTRAS SUMMARY: For a narrative description of private	

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		fund-raising for the Contras, including the Channell-Miller operations, International Business Communications (IBC) and the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), and North's connection with these activities and groups, see Iran-Contra Report, at 85-103. (See also 85/04/30-800, 85/11/01-420.)	
85/08/01-420 1984-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: FUND-RAISING SUMMARY: For a narrative description of North's contact and activities with private fund-raising operations for the Contras, see Iran-Contra Report, at 85-103.	
85/08/02-200 AUGUST 2, 1985			McFARLANE-KIMCHE MEETING LEDEEN ACCOUNT: Ledeen testified on McFarlane's knowledge of the meeting in Tel Aviv among Ledeen, Ghorbanifar, Schwimmer, Nimrodi, and Kimche (see 85/07/29-110, -111): "Q. I take it that when you returned to the United States after the trip [to Israel], that you briefed McFarlane on what had transpired, correct? "A. Well, Kimche had already briefed him. Kimche had come to Washington early in August. "Q. While you were still in Israel? "A. Yes. "Q. And Mr. McFarlane's calendar shows that that was on August 2nd. Does that sound right to you? "A. Yes. "Q. And it was your understanding that Mr.

Kimche was going to brief Mr. McFarlane on the proposal, wasn't it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. When you returned in August, did Mr. McFarlane say anything to you about whether he had discussed this proposal with the President?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What did he tell you?

"A. He told me the President had approved it.

"Q. And when you say the President had approved it, you understand that to mean that the President had approved this proposal with two dimensions, and the short-term dimension being the sale of TOW missiles from Israel to Iran which it was hoped would result in a reciprocal gesture from Iran that would involve the release of hostages?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was it your understanding that it would involve the release of all the U.S. hostages?

"A. It was what the Iranians, through Ghorbanifar, had said they would attempt to do. I did not expect all the hostages to come out. Indeed, many of us [redacted] expected that no hostages would come out. But it seemed to most of us, that it was important to test the overall situation, not simply the capacity or the willingness of the Iranians to do that, or the other things, which were also important.

". . . ."

(Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 60-62.)

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JULY 21 - AUGUST 8, 1985			IRAN PROPOSALS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: NSC review of the proposal of arms for the Iranians: "Mr. LIMAN. Tell us what the next event, next milestone is that you recall. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. The President came back from Bethesda and was in convalescence in the White House . . . for ten days to two weeks. And between the 21st of July, which I believe was the date on which he returned, and approximately the 8th of August there were meetings in the residence with him by each of the cabinet officers in the National Security Council; that is, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, Director of Central Intelligence and myself and my deputy, Admiral Poindexter. "There was at least one session in which all of the princip[al]s and the President were together and a rather fulsome [sic] discussion of the pros and cons, risks of going ahead with any kind of Israeli-brokered exchange with Iran was thoroughly vented. "The Secretary of Defense was very vocal in drawing out the legal implications and as well the policy implications, such as . . . were made by the Secretary of State. "The President's points were foremostly that he could imagine that if these people in Iran were legitimate and their interest of changing Iranian policy, and were against terrorism, that to provide them arms would not be at variance with his policy since he wasn't providing arms to

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			Khomeini, but to people opposed to Khomeini's policies. "And that he would be willing to take the considerable public heat that would inure if this were tried and it failed because he could make that distinction. "The Secretaries of State and Defense argued against it. Other cabinet officers expressed their views. The President, as was often the case when disagreement existed, didn't reach a decision at the moment." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 114-16; see id., 5/12/87, at 191 ["meeting of the guys" takes place in the period between July 21 and Aug. 8, 1985].)
85/08/06-022 LATE JULY - EARLY AUGUST 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: PRESIDENT'S DECISION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane elaborated on the July proposal of arms for Iran: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, who[m] did you understand and tell the President would be getting the arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, by this time -- I will respond to the question. I should note there had been a third proposal made. ". . . . "Mr. MCFARLANE. We have covered the first one where no arms were talked about. Two weeks later, a second where 100 TOWs were requested and turned down. And then Mr. Kimche called in late July and asked to come and did in early August to visit me in the White House and . . . asked what if Israel were to sell the weapons, what would be the United

States attitude and, more specifically, would Israel be willing or able once they had sold weapons to come to the United States to buy replacements.

". . . .

". . . I reported it to the President, it being the question whether or not he would approve Israel making sales under terms that Israel would negotiate and at some point coming to the United States, Israel, to buy replacement arms.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, was this the appropriate proposal that was discussed at that meeting that you talked about with all the principals being there?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you were saying the President made the point that the arms were not going to be going to the extremists, but to the people who were opposed to Khomeini and the extremists; am I correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Who[m] did you understand and tell the President would actually be getting these arms in Iran?

". . . .

"Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . [G]enerically the Iran[ian]s involved represented the highest level decisionmakers, but the principal advisers to them as well, both civilian, clerical, and military and that the circle of people of this persuasion--that is interested in change, included military, cleric, and government officials.

". . . .

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			"Mr. LIMAN. And you understand that the TOWs were going either to the military or to the guard in Iran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Was there any discussion in the presence of the the President that somehow the guard or the military were not under the control of the Ayatollah Khomeini? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that there--that it was conceivable to us that there were elements within the military not completely devoted to the Ayatollah. "Mr. LIMAN. So, was a predicate of the discussion that the arms might be going to a group that the Ayatollah would not have control of? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It was conceivable. There were doubts. "Mr. LIMAN. And there was no way of verifying that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, but the President was very conscious of the risks and the impossibilities of that and did put two stipulations on any sales that were made. They included that they couldn't be of a size and number that would have had a significant effect on the balance or influence the condition of war with Iraq nor could they be weapons that would be easily adapted into terrorist use. "Mr. LIMAN. And the second condition? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That they could not be used for terrorism. There was a third really, also, although it was mine. That was that there could not be any major end item, which is the term of

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			art for any completed major weapon like an airplane, a tank, something like that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 116-19.)
			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: REPLACEMENT ARRANGEMENTS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane on the details of the U.S. replacement of the TOWs: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever, incidentally, in talking to the Israelis about the original TOW sale, tell them they could get the TOWs back for nothing? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. "Mr. LIMAN. Did there come a time in January when you received a message from North asking you what your understanding was with the Israelis? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And . . . this is reflected in a note telling him that the understanding was that they would purchase them, but you hadn't agreed with them on what the price would be? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct." (McFarlane Testim., 5/11/87, at 148-49; JHICI Ex. 45-B.)
85/08/06-023 LATE JULY - EARLY AUGUST 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: PRESIDENT'S DECISION, AND DENIABILITY McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane on U.S. deniability of the Iran-Israel transaction, and on the President's response to Kimche's question whether the U.S. would replace the TOWs for Israel:

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			"Mr. LIMAN. You told us, Mr. McFarlane, the President did not make a decision at this meeting at which he had the Secretaries and you and others present? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, he did not. "Mr. LIMAN. Was there a discussion at this meeting that if the Israelis were permitted to sell and it came out, that it could be denied that the United States had authorized it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . [I]t seemed clear to me that [th]e linkage was very apparent and that we had an obligation not to be naive that this did engage U.S. interests in a major way. "I have never felt for the past ten years that there is such a thing as deniability. "Mr. LIMAN. Was that concept advocated at the meeting? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I frankly don't recall it being mentioned . . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Now, after that meeting, did you hear from the President again? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, within a matter of a day or two. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. What was his decision? "Mr. MCFARLANE. His decision was to approve Israel being authorized to sell modest levels of TOW missiles or other military spares and items to Iran and to come to the United States and be allowed to purchase replacements, that they not affect the balance of the war, that they not be for terrorist purposes, and that they not include major end items.

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			"Mr. LIMAN. To whom did you convey that decision? "Mr. MCFARLANE. To Mr. Kimche. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell Mr. Kimche that you did not want Israel to seek immediately replacement of the TOWs? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I didn't. But I think that he and I did understand that to minimize risks of disclosure, the replacements ought to be part of a normal procurement cycle. When they would be part of Israel's normal purchases from the United States. "Mr. LIMAN. Were they trying to avoid linkage? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That, too." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 119-22.)
85/08/06-025 SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Let's turn to the Iran initiative. Were you advised some time in August of 1985 by Mr. McFarlane that the President had approved some Israeli transaction with Iran? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, that is a very fuzzy time period for me. As I am sure you can appreciate, the breadth of responsibility of the National Security Adviser is very broad, and one of the reasons, of course, of having a principal deputy is so that two people can work the issues, and although we did not have a written understanding of the division of responsibilities, there w[ere] clearly some issues that Mr. McFarlane followed very closely and there were

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			other issues that I followed. "He also tended to concentrate on the President, the Cabinet Officers, and I concentrated at the under secretary, deputy secretary level of the departments. "So, yes, this of course--the reason I bring this up is that the period of time you are asking about, August of 1985, I was the deputy and I did not have primary responsibility on this issue. "Mr. McFarlane had met with the Israeli officials. I had met or I had missed a significant NSC meeting in August of 1985 while I was on my week's leave, which I was able to work in annually. "I have a vague recollection, after hearing Mr. McFarlane's testimony earlier in the sessions, of a call that he got from the President at Camp David over a weekend. "I am very fuzzy on the content of his report to me later as to the description of that call, and I have tried very hard to remember it. "I don't have any notes that cover it that I have been able to find, and so I really--it is hard for me to say with absolute confidence that I was aware in early August, which I think is when the call that he described took place--his recollection says it took place. "Mr. LIMAN. But you did become aware there was an Iran initiative? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. You became aware of that from a conversation with Mr. McFarlane? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did.

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			"Mr. LIMAN. I take it you did not participate in any of the conversations that Mr. McFarlane was having with either the President or the Secretary of State or the Israelis about that initiative at that time? "Mr. POINDEXTER. None that I recall." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 37-39. See Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 86-87 [Poindexter: "I was not involved with the decisions with the Israelis at that point [in 11/85]. I was not involved in discussing the matter with the President. I had missed a major NSPG meeting in August of 1985 . . . ."].)
85/08/06-029 JULY THROUGH NOVEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: PRESIDENT'S DECISION NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on his knowledge of Presidential authorization for the 1985 TOW and HAWK shipments: "Mr. NORTH. . . . I was not a party to any of th[e] discussions with the President, but I was told at some point that the President had authorized these Israeli transactions to proceed during the summer, in July. "Mr. NIELDS. And I think you may have said this, but when did you first become aware of the fact that the President had authorized these transactions? "Mr. NORTH. My first awareness of a specific Presidential . . . authorization for a transaction is, as I recall, in the time period when we were engaged on the Hawk shipment, wherein I believe I have a--I made a recording, a note to the effect

that Admiral Poindexter told me that the President had authorized it to proceed.

"Mr. NIELDS. Were you ever told that the President had authorized the TOW shipment to proceed?

"Mr. NORTH. I was at some point, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. To the best of your recollection, when?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, I know I was told that in 1986, as I was preparing the chronologies. I was probably told that in 1985, or I would have asked more questions than I did about it.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. Who told you in 1986 that the President had authorized the TOW shipment?

"Mr. NORTH. Mr. McFarlane.

"Mr. NIELDS. And assuming that you were told it earlier, do you recall anyone other than Mr. McFarlane telling you that earlier?

"Mr. NORTH. No, I don't at all. But I want to make a point about, at some point in December, while I was overseas, there were meetings held at the White House among a number of Cabinet officers, in which apparently these issues were discussed; and subsequent to that, there was a finding done giving retroactive ratification to what had already transpired, that Cabinet officers were also aware of."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 127-29.)

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EARLY 1985
THROUGH

SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: NORTH ROLE
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on events leading up to the

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SEPTEMBER 1985			August-September 1985 TOW shipment: "Mr. NORTH. I am working without refreshed recall. "Let me do the best I can to remember back to that period of time. "I had had several meetings with Mr. Ledeen which led to a meeting or two with two Israeli citizens, private citizens [identified by North later as Nimrodi and Schwimmer], and then a subsequent meeting, as I recall, with Mr. Ghorbanifar. "That, in turn, led to a meeting with Mr. Kimche, and I believe all of these took place prior to the September shipment. "Mr. Kimche and Mr. McFarlane then had a meeting, as I recall; and I was aware . . . at the time that the Israelis were indeed involved in the transaction. "I did not know at the time the exact nature of that, I don't think, but I did know that as a consequence, an American hostage or two was expected to be released. "I was instructed to take precautions for that eventuality. We did so. "Reverend Weir was picked up in accord with what we expected to happen, delivered to a U.S. vessel, and then shortly thereafter brought to a U.S. military installation here in the United States. "I met him and brought with me a letter from the President asking his assistance as best he could give it and expressing the President's well wishes on his release from captivity.

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			"I don't have a specific recall of many things happening in between, although I believe I had another meeting with Mr. Ghorbanifar. "My next very specific recollection is the series of phone calls I described to you on or about the 17th of November. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Were the meetings that you described with Mr. Ledeen, Mr. Schwimmer, Mr. Nimrodi, and Mr. Ghorbanifar meetings in which arms were discussed? "Mr. NORTH. I believe they were, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And hostages? "Mr. NORTH. Oh, yes. But also discussed were the broader purposes for an opening with Iran, the opportunity to end Shiah fundamentalist terrorism. "Mr. NIELDS. What was your authority for participating in those meetings? "Mr. NORTH. Well, Mr. McFarlane's authority as a[n] NSC staffer. "Mr. NIELDS. So that Mr. McFarlane was aware of the fact that you were having these meetings and he had authorized them? "Mr. NORTH. I did keep Mr. McFarlane apprised of those. . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 124-26 [Schwimmer and Nimrodi named by North at p. 126].)
85/08/06-100 AUGUST 6, 1985			WHITE HOUSE MEETING, 8/6/85: ARMS PROPOSED REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. SMILJANICH. In August of 1985, the committee has heard testimony about a meeting that the President held with the Secretary of State,

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			yourself, and others in which Mr. McFarlane discussed this particular Israeli initiative. "Was it at that meeting that you recall the arms being mentioned for the first time? "Mr. REGAN. I believe so. "Mr. SMILJANICH. You understood that a part of this plan was that Israel would ship some type of munitions to the Government of Iran and it was also presented to you and the President that Israel would contemplate or expect the United States to replenish those munitions or missiles that were shipped to Iran? "Mr. REGAN. What I recall is this: It is quite curious, and I will tell you why I recall it so vividly. In explaining what we were attempting to do and to open up this Iranian contact and start discussions with emissaries from that country, it was said that they were suspicious of the people with whom they were dealing, that is how high up in the United States Government did they go. "On the other hand, we were suspicious of them. Did they really represent a reputable portion of the Iranian Government, if there is such a thing; and as a result, they used a curious word. They said we would have to show our bona fides. "As an old Latin scholar, that grated right on my nerves, bona fides [sc. 'fides' pronounced as a monosyllable with the 'i' long]. "Anyway, we would show our bona fides by using weapons which was a common currency in the Middle East; and in return, we were going to ask for

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			their bona fides, which would be that they would use their best efforts to cut down on terrorism to haul in or rein in any terrorist over whom they had influence. "At the same time, they would use their best efforts with the kidnappers of the American hostages, to secure the release of the hostages. That is the way it was presented. "Mr. SMILJANICH. So in connection with this matter, our currency was TOW missiles or munitions and their currency was terrorism and hostages? "Mr. REGAN. That is right. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Now in September-- "Mr. REGAN. I hasten to add before anyone gets the impression that this started out as strictly an arms-for-hostage deal--and I know there has been a lot of controversy about that--that was the--you [sic] down, down No. 3 and 4, the first purpose obviously was to start this dialog with Iran, a very important nation, a crossroads between East and West; that we should do all we could to make certain that we had an anti-Soviet Iran. "A pro-Soviet Iran stretching as it does from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf would give the Soviets the warm water ports they had been looking for for centuries. "So we decided that we should try to open up a dialog with Iran. That was the first purpose of it. "Mr. SMILJANICH. But the first step in the process was this exchange of bona fides? "Mr. REGAN. That is right."

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			(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 27-29. See id., 7/30/87, at 29-30 [Regan on the President's decision at the 8/6/85 meeting: "[H]e had told Mr. McFarlane . . . to go slow on this and let's make sure we know who[m] we are dealing with before we get too far into this."].)
85/08/06-120 AUGUST 6, 1985			ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGES PROPOSAL: SHULTZ' REACTION DoS CHRONOLOGY: "At GPS' regularly scheduled meeting with the PRESIDENT, MCFARLANE states that three meetings between Israel and the Iranians have occurred, and that MCFARLANE'S contact is DAVID KIMCHE. The Iranians want a dialogue with the United States, want arms from the U.S. and 100 TOWS from Israel, in exchange for four hostages. MCFARLANE says that the deal will be 'totally deniable,' and that he is pursuing the contact. GPS argues that any policy of selling arms to Iran or loosening arms flow restrictions is wrong, and could not be kept deniable or secret." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/09/04-030.)
85/08/06-121 AUGUST 6, 1985			ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGES PROPOSAL: SHULTZ' REACTION SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [O]n August 6, 1985, you attended a meeting with the President--Mr. McFarlane was there as well--at which Mr. McFarlane reported on three contacts which had by then taken place between the Israelis and the Iranians, and he reported also that the Iranians

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			wanted a dialog with the United States, arms from the United States and then 100 TOWs from Israel in exchange for what he reported would be four hostages. He also talked about the deal being totally deniable. "Mr. Secretary, can you give us your recollection of that meeting and specifically what you said in response to Mr. McFarlane's report and his assertion that if our Government blessed this deal, it would be, in his words, totally deniable? "Secretary SHULTZ. I think your summary of that meeting is taken from my own-- "Mr. BELNICK. It is. "Secretary SHULTZ. --notes that I wrote after the meeting. "But I believe that that was one of my regular meetings with the President. I have an arrangement whereby, assuming we are both in town or not travelling, I meet with him a couple times a week, and the National Security Adviser is present. And I think it was one of those meetings, but I'm not absolutely sure about that. "At any rate, the substance of what you read out was discussed, and I said that I thought this was a very bad idea, that I was opposed to it, that we are just falling into the arms-for-hostages business and we shouldn't do it. "Mr. BELNICK. Did the President express any views? "Secretary SHULTZ. He didn't. As I remember, he didn't seem to push one way or the other. He listened and it seemed to be relatively new information for him.

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"Mr. BELNICK. No decision was reached?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No decision was made.

"Mr. BELNICK. But you did challenge Mr. McFarlane's assertion that any such deal, if it went forward, could be kept secret or made totally deniable?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. I didn't think it could be kept secret, but I thought it was undesirable even if it were kept secret, for all of the reasons I had laid out in my cables and in my response to the draft NSDD--everything--there are lots of arguments strewn in through there, and those are the same arguments.

"Mr. BELNICK. Now, sir, subsequent to the August 6, '85, meeting did Mr. McFarlane inform you that he had heard from the President approving the proposed deal and approving the Israelis going forward and shipping TOWs to Iran?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No. I have no recollection of being so informed.

"Mr. BELNICK. Were you informed of the Israeli TOW shipments themselves in the early fall, September, of 1985?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No, I wasn't. I believe, according to my notes and recollection, that at a meeting in December, I think December 7, the general meeting on the subject, that Mr. McFarlane said that there had been that shipment. But I didn't know it at the time.

"Mr. BELNICK. And you were not informed that Reverend Weir's release was in any way connected to a shipment of arms to Iran from Israel?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No. I tended to take the

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			statements of Reverend Weir about his release and the use of it by the hostage-takers to carry a message as more or less at face value. ". . . ." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 66-68.)
85/08/06-500 AUGUST 6, 1985			WHITE HOUSE MEETING, 8/6/85: SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. Mr. Secretary, do you recall that in or about early August of 1985, at a time that the President was recuperating from surgery, that there was a meeting in the White House? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Do you recall where that meeting took place? "Secretary WEINBERGER. That was upstairs in the residence, I believe, at the end of the long ha[l]l. "Mr. EGGLESTON. We have heard testimony from other witnesses about that particular meeting, and I would like your recollection of the subject of that meeting. "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, the subject of the meeting seemed to be essentially to revolve around whether or not the general conclusions stated in the draft NSDD [see 85/06/17-100], which I had objected to, should be adopted, whether that NSDD should be put into effect and that policy put into effect, and that was the general subject of the meeting. "Mr. EGGLESTON. As you have indicated, the NSDD itself makes reference to selling arms to

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			Iran as part of the method of developing a relationship. Do you recall that aspect of the NSDD was discussed? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I believe it was, yes. I don't have notes about it, but my memory is that we went through the whole thing, and one of the objections that I raised was this precise point. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Do you recall that this meeting arose in the context of a discussion about selling arms in order to help achieve release of the hostages? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, it was one of the arguments advanced, but not as a major point. The major point at that meeting, as I recall it, was this broad general policy change that was being suggested in this draft NSDD. I think the hostage thing was mentioned as a kind of incidental benefit that might come from a better relationship. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Was Mr. McFarlane the one advocating this change? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, that seemed to me to be the case. "Mr. EGGLESTON. As of that meeting, I take it you once again expressed your firm view that it was not a good idea? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I did indeed, yes. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Do you recall the views of others at the meeting? "Secretary WEINBERGER. George Shultz made exactly the same points with the same general vehemence that I did. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Was there anyone that you

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			recall that was in favor of this plan? "Secretary WEINBERGER. It seemed to me Mr. McFarlane was in favor of it. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Do you recall any discussion of using Israel as a method of pursuing an initiative? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Not at that time, no. I don't think anything like that came up at that point. "Mr. EGGLESTON. I take it that it is your conclusion that as of the end of that meeting in the residence, certainly the President had not as of that time approved a plan-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I certainly didn't get that impression at all. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Did you have an impression of what his view was of the plan? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. I felt that the arguments that I had made were basically congruent with his views at that time. "Mr. EGGLESTON. So at the end of August of 1985, it was your view that this proposal in this NSDD was essentially dead? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I thought the whole thing had gone away, yes." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 88-91. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 13-17 [White House Meeting, 8/85].)
85/08/06-600 JANUARY 26 - FEBRUARY 20, 1987			PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL OF THE TOW SHIPMENT: "I DON'T REMEMBER--PERIOD." PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO THE TOWER BOARD: "In his meeting with the Board on January 26,

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			1987, the President said that sometime in August he approved the shipment of arms by Israel to Iran. He was uncertain as to the precise date. The President also said that he approved replenishment of any arms transferred by Israel to Iran. McFarlane's testimony of January 16, 1986, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on which the President heavily relied, takes the same position. This portion of McFarlane's testimony was specifically highlighted on the copy of the testimony given by the President to the Board. "In his meeting with the Board on February 11, the President said that he and Regan had gone over the matter repeatedly and that Regan had a firm recollection that the President had not authorized the August shipment in advance. In response to a question from the Board, the President said he did not authorize the August shipment. He noted that very possibly, the transfer was brought to him as already completed. He said that subsequently there were arms shipments he authorized that may have had to do with replenishment, and that these could have taken place in September. A memorandum from Peter Wallison, White House Counsel, on which the President heavily relied, stated that the President had been 'surprised' that the Israelis had shipped arms to Iran in September, and that this fact caused the President to conclude that he had not approved the transfer in advance. "On February 20, 1987, the President wrote Chairman Tower: "'In trying to recall events that happened eighteen months ago I'm afraid that I let myself

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			be influenced by others' recollections, not my own. "'* * * "'I have no personal notes or records to help my recollection on this matter. The only honest answer is to state that try as I might, I cannot recall anything whatsoever about whether I approved an Israeli sale in advance or whether I approved replenishment of Israeli stocks around August of 1985. My answer therefore and the simple truth is, "I don't remember--period."'" (Tower, at B-19 and -20.)
85/08/08-200 AUGUST 8, 1985 - MARCH 31, 1986		STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON CONTRA AID: APPLICABILITY: Any agency, other than CIA or DoD, designated by President (NHAO) FUNDS AVAILABLE: $27 Million USE OF FUNDS: Humanitarian aid only, to be obligated by March 31, 1986 PERMISSIBILITY OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: Exchange of information allowed (effective 8/15/85) PERMISSIBILITY OF SOLICITING OTHER NATIONS: Not mentioned, except neither foreign nor military aid may be made contingent on contributions (JHICI Chart VII.)	
85/08/08-210 AUGUST 8, 1985 - MARCH 31, 1986	Humanitarian Assistance for Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, section 722(g) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, is in effect. See col. 2.	INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT: $27 MILLION IN HUMANITARIAN AID STATUTE: Section 722(g) of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1985 "authorized to	

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		be appropriated $27,000,000 for humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance." Subsection 1 allowed the money to "be provided to such department or agency of the United States as the president shall designate, except the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense." Subsection 4 provided that "[t]he President shall establish appropriate procedures to ensure that any humanitarian assistance [so] provided . . . is used only for the intended purpose and is not diverted . . . for acquisition of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death." Subsection 5 defined "humanitarian assistance."	
85/08/08-400 AFTER AUGUST 1985		NHAO: DISTRIBUTING THE $27 MILLION ABRAMS ACCOUNT: After the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) is established in August of 1985, the DoS (Abrams in particular) is tasked with getting the $27 million in humanitarian aid flowing. Abrams testified, "I think it is worth noting that was done over our dead body. We all, the Secretary on down, felt that that was crazy. "What did the State Department know about buying boots and shipping them down to Central America? It would take us months to set up an office from scratch to figure out how we do this. There were two agencies of government . . . that know how to do it, that know how to account for it . . . , CIA and the Defense Department.	

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		"And we fought and fought to not have to do this and try to persuade Congress this was not a sensible thing to do and we lost. . . . [W]e concluded reluctantly really there wasn't any other way to do it so we did it." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 90-91.)	
85/08/08-401 AFTER AUGUST 1985		NHAO: PROBLEMS ABRAMS ACCOUNT: The problems NHAO (and Ambassador Duemling, its head) faced, according to Abrams, were "organizational" and "definitional". Abrams gave an example of the definitional problems--wrist watches for the Contras: "And I remember saying, well, you know, unless you have a very large wrist watch and hit somebody with it, it was not lethal aid. "This was deadly serious . . . . We actually debated. "Of course, wrist watches weren't lethal aid, but were they humanitarian aid? Did they fit? . . . "We ultimately decided, or I decided, yes, wrist watches were okay. That was the kind of discussion we had, what was do-able." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 92-93.)	
85/08/08-402 AFTER AUGUST 1985		NHAO: CRITICISMS ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams commenting on a GAO report criticizing NHAO: "Staggeringly unfair. To Ambassador Duemling and the Department of State." "Mr. BELNICK. In your view, despite the	

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		limitations and the department's reservations, NHAO was a successful operation? "Mr. ABRAMS. Absolutely." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 100, 102.)	
85/08/08-420 AFTER AUGUST 1985		NHAO: PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. DEWINE. . . . Mr. Secretary, as you know, the last of the Boland Amendments which went into effect in November, 1985, provided for $27 million in humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. This specific law also spelled out this could not be administered by the CIA []or by the Department of Defense. "Ultimately, this responsibility was turned over to the State Department. Were you in favor of that, first of all, administering that program? "Secretary SHULTZ. I didn't like the idea. But it came to be clear that that was what I had to agree to if we were going to get the money, and I was very anxious to get the money, and so I said, all right, if that's what it takes, we'll do it. And I think we did it quite well. "Mr. DEWINE. Could you describe why you had some reservations about that and maybe any problems . . . that you may have had in regard to administering that? Is there anything about that type of program that is maybe tougher for the State Department to administer than some other agency? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, there are basically two things. Number one, it was an overtly voted program, that by its nature had to be administered	

covertly. And I think that--that is not the State Department's thing to do. That is what CIA does; they administer the covert action programs. So you--I'm a great believer that we have different organizations in the government because there are different kinds of functions, and it's a mistake to mix up functions.

"So that I think was one principal reason. And the other reason was that we didn't have any direct experience in administering that kind of thing in that area. Of course, we--AID had facilities and so forth and we weren't totally without experience, but we weren't doing that. So we had to kind of get something going from scratch, and as I say, I think it was done pretty well.

"Mr. DEWINE. You were ultimately criticized by Congress, or at least one subcommittee of this Congress I happen to serve on, for the way your department conducted that. Did you think that criticism was justified?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No, I don't. I think it was based on an accounting difficulty, really. We were charged with delivering humanitarian aid into a place where we were not permitted to be. Therefore, it was not possible to put certified public accountants in that place to account for the fact that what was delivered was actually delivered and to the people for whom it was intended.

"And our only method of verification was through the intelligence that we were able to gather about it, which fundamentally satisfied us

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		that by and large it was delivered. But we were not able to share that intelligence with the GAO and so they said that we, as far as they were concerned, we couldn't account for it. "So I think that was a misplaced criticism myself." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 211-13.)	
85/08/10-100 AROUND AUGUST 10-20, 1985			LEDEEN'S ROLE IN THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Let me just make sure I have the chronology in my head. Have there been any discussions of the release of hostages prior to this meeting in Tel Aviv [see 85/07/29-100 through -102, 85/07/30-100]? "A. There may have been a possibility of a discussion of the release of hostages when Schwimmer and I had lunch in Washington. [See 85/05/04-104.] In which case, I would have reported that to McFarlane. "Q. That would have been early July? "A. Yes. "Q. But no mention of arms? "A. I just don't remember. "Q. Okay. "A. I tend to think not. But there may have been. In any case, this so far as I can remember is the first detailed discussion at which a test of the sort that Ghorbanifar proposed to us was discussed, and again I want to stress, as I have stressed on every occasion, that this was not proposed as a swap of arms for hostages nor was it in that context. The context of the discussion

was the relationship between the United States and Iran, and it was necessary -- this was a stage through which this dialogue must pass in order to establish who was who and what was what. Because all the questions that one had on each side, we were -- I was extraordinarily suspicious of Mr. Ghorbanifar.

"Mr. Ghorbanifar seemed to me at the time to be altogether too good to be true. He was exactly the thing that we were all looking for and that he magically appears with all of the things that if we could prepare a wish list, there he was and he had it all. I do not believe that things like that normally happen in a lifetime.

"So we wanted to know about Iran and he knew more about Iran than anybody knew. And we were interested in seeing what was the chance in the future of change, and he came proposing precisely that. So I was extremely skeptical and I told McFarlane when I came back in August.

"Q. Do you remember when you came back, approximately?

"A. The middle of August. I told him that Ghorbanifar could be anything and could even be a KGB agent since if I were the KGB, I would certainly want to know about American intentions with regard to Iran and I might be willing to invent a Ghorbanifar and send him to us to see how we would respond to this. That's the sort of thing they had done.

"I told him I thought we had to be extremely careful with this gentleman. He, McFarlane, told me a couple of days later that the President had

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			approved this test and he asked me to meet with Kimche as quickly as possible to assure Kimche that the President had in fact made this decision and to arrange a way that it was -- we could communicate with the Israelis securely without going through the normal communications systems either in the Israeli embassy or the American embassy in Tel Aviv. "McFarlane had written out a one-time code to be used in connection with the hostages, were [sic (where)] they were going to be released, and where, if at all, it would be required for the United States to pick them up. "There were various contingencies that might come up in connection with the release of one or more hostages. They might be on a beach, in the city, on a hilltop someplace. "I was to explain to Kimche that there were places that were better than other places for us to extract hostages in Lebanon and that in his conversations with Ghorbanifar, I should stress if the Iranians had an option of having these people emerge at certain locations, these are the ones we preferred; if we could get advance notice, that was all to the good, et cetera. "So I flew to London on the 20th of August." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 46-49. See id. at 164-65 [McFarlane's message to Ledeen in 8/85].)
85/08/10-101 AROUND AUGUST 10-20, 1985			LEDEEN'S ROLE IN THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. . . . As best you recall your meeting with McFarlane, after you returned, it was sometime in mid August?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Can you -- you have no way to place it any better than that?

"A. If I had to bet, it is between the 10th and 15th of August.

"Q. McFarlane indicated to you he had spoken with the President?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did he tell you anything else about his meeting with the President?

"A. No. He just said the President had approved it.

"Q. Did he tell you whether or not any other senior officials were involved in the decision?

"A. No.

"Q. So you didn't know the positions of Shultz, Weinberger, Regan, or anyone else?

"A. No.

"Q. And . . . when he indicated to you that the President approved the test, did you know at that time what amounts both of hostages and weapons people were talking about?

"A. I knew the amount of weapons. So far as I can remember, we were talking about 100 TOWs.

"Q. Do you recall -- and again I understand that it was not your position that this was a swap, but can you recall how many hostages we anticipated getting out as a result of it?

"A. I don't think that was explicit. That is, they would do what they could. This was a gesture on their part. They always denied being in control of the hostages, although they -- Ghorbanifar said that he thought they could get them out, but he said the Government of Iran would always deny having either organized the taking of these hostages or being directly involved with the hostage takers.

"Q. Let me ask you this: Was it your understanding if no hostages would be released, we would send the TOWs anyway?

"A. Well, we were going to sent the TOWs and then we were going to see who came out, if anyone. Then -- when we met in Paris in early September, there was some talk about perhaps there would be some magical way in which one could achieve a form of simultaneity, of arrival of weapons and departure of weapons [sic ("hostages" to replace one of these "weapons")]. Since there was not very good trust on the two sides.

"I did not know, by the way, at this time --

"Mr. Woolsey. At which time?

"The Witness. At this time, either in August or September, of the role played by Khashoggi in all of this.

"BY MR. EGGLESTON:

"Q. Your understanding is his role was one who had written this memorandum?

"A. He introduced Ghorbanifar to the Israelis, period.

"But I didn't know about the bridge financing. I didn't discover that until sometime later." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 49-52.)

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85/08/14-100 AUGUST 14, 1985		TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NO DoS AUTHORIZATION TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testifying on his assignment in Costa Rica: "Chairman INOUYE. Ambassador Tambs, I believe in your testimony you indicated that the major objective of your assignment in Costa Rica was to assist patriotic Americans in aiding the freedom fighters; is that correct? "Mr. TAMBS. Well, that was one of my tasks. "Obviously, I had other things to do, Senator. . . . ". . . . "Chairman INOUYE. I have before me a letter dated August 14, 1985, from the Secretary of State to you on the eve of your assignment as chief of mission in San Jose. This letter to you is marked 'secret,' and this letter has no reference to giving assistance to the contras. "Mr. TAMBS. I believe, sir, that I was already in Costa Rica at that time. "Chairman INOUYE. Wasn't it strange that the Secretary of State would not mention the importance of the contras in this letter to you? "Mr. TAMBS. Frankly, it would seem more strange if he had mentioned it." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 198-200.)	
85/08/16-150 AUGUST 16, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC BARNES LETTER: Letter from Rep. Barnes of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to McFarlane:	

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		"I am writing in response to recent press reports detailing the activities of certain National Security staff members in providing advice and fundraising support to Nicaraguan rebel leaders. ". . . It would be stretching the integrity of the law [the Boland Amendment] to suggest that this prohibition was not intended to cover the NSC. President Reagan, himself, in his executive order on the nation's intelligence agencies, describes the National Security Council as the highest government entity with responsibility for intelligence activities. ". . . . ". . . I request that you provide Congress with all information, including memoranda and any other documents, pertaining to any contact between Lt. Col. North and Nicaraguan rebel leaders as of enactment of the Boland Amendment in October, 1984." (JHICI Ex. JMP 7-A.)	
85/08/16-151 AFTER AUGUST 16, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC POINDEXTER RESPONSE: Poindexter's handwritten note to Bob: "Send Bud an info copy with staffing indicated. Barnes is really a trouble maker. We have good answers to all of this. . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 7.)	
85/08/16-160 AUGUST 1985 - 1986		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC SUMMARY: For a narrative account of Congressional	

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		inquiries into Contra-related activities of North and other NSC staff members, including the Barnes and Hamilton letters to McFarlane, McFarlane's responses, and McFarlane's discussions with North about altering documents, see Iran-Contra Report, at 122-36; Tower, at C-6.	
85/08/16-195 AUGUST 1985 - 1986		THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS SUMMARY: For a summary of the documents McFarlane found problematic, and what became of them, see Iran-Contra Report, at 124-26.	
85/08/16-200 AUGUST 16-26, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC, AND THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Am I correct that in August of 1985, Mr. McFarlane, you received some inquiries from Congress about Oliver North's activities with respect to supporting the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And these are marked as exhibits, in our book 40-A is the first in time, and it was a letter of August 16 from Congressman Barnes referring to press reports about-- "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. --Oliver North. And then on--you also received requests on this subject from Chairman Hamilton, correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And you also received them from the Chairs of the Senate Intelligence Committee? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.	

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		"Mr. LIMAN. Now, the thrust of all of the requests was for you to respond to these allegations that North was violating Boland. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. What did you do when you got these requests? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I got them while I was with the President on the West Coast, and I asked Admiral Poindexter to have the records, files of all memoranda, papers, travel vouchers and so forth that related in any fashion to the requests from the Congressmen, the Senators, put together for me to look at when I got back, and since--when I returned learned that he had tasked Brenda Reger, who was really an expert in handling of NSC files, to research the several compartmented files the NSC has, or memoranda that related to the nature of the requests in any way. "And they were put together and brought to Admiral Poindexter, who gave them to Commander Thompson, who was the staff general counsel, and also the military assistant, who had custody of them and who brought them to me when I returned on about August 26 to the office. "I went through them, read each one and found a number of them that seemed to me to raise legitimate questions about compliance with the law. "Mr. LIMAN. Did Commander Thompson point out any of these documents to you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. When he gave the entire collection to me, he said that he had some concerns about several. I don't believe that he	

pointed out each one. He said that I would see them myself. And I found I think half a dozen that raised that question in my mind.

"Mr. LIMAN. And what question did they raise?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, simply that an objective reading would have taken passages in each of these memoranda to be either reflective of a past act that was not within the law or a recommendation that a future act be carried out that wouldn't be. And, taking these documents aside from the stack, I arranged the next day and the following day to start a series of meetings with Colonel North to get to the bottom of whether or not my own interpretations were correct." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 185-86; JHICI Exx. 40-A [letter from Rep. Barnes to McFarlane, 8/16/85], 41 [letter from Rep. Hamilton to McFarlane, 8/20/85]. See 86/08/06-220, 86/10/05-305 [Poindexter testimony on McFarlane's collecting documents in 8/85 related to North's Contra activities].)

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CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC, AND
THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS

McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, these documents that you have referred to are the documents that we have reviewed earlier, am I correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. You met with Colonel North?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. And I told him that I had gone through all these documents and felt

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		responsible for whatever had been done, but I simply had to know what had been done, that it was my responsibility for any actions of anybody on the staff, but that specifically there were in a half-dozen cases reporting of what any objective reading, I said, would probably take as being close to or even beyond the law, and I wanted to go through each of those with him and to find out if my reading was the same as his. "And we did. And we went through a couple that you have already raised in the book today of December 4 [see 85/12/04-005, -006], and in early 1985, as well as four others that involved various kinds of things. "For example, in one that I raised, he was providing a summary of progress of FDN as a military force, and noted they had responded well on how to form a G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4. [See 85/04/11-200.] "I said, well, this looks to me like a Congressman could read that you have been instructing them on how to do that, providing military advice. He said well, that is not the case, the contras have hired retired officers from the U.S. military to do that, and they are responding well, but it isn't me. "And I accepted that, because that seems to me the kind of thing if I had been a contra I would have done, and the CIA was certainly able before the cut-off to have told them to do that. But I went through others-- "Mr. LIMAN. Were you troubled by the references in these documents to the current	

donors and exhortations to you to solicit them?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. The possibility of Colonel North having made a passing remark of advice to the contras while in Honduras was of less concern to me than what I took to be the real concern of the Congress, which was fund-raising, and we spent most of the time asking about whether these reports in The New York Times or elsewhere of Ollie's involvement in meetings where donations were made include his being party to or solicitous of or coercing or otherwise collecting or being a middleman for fund-raising.

"He was very careful and insistent to say that in none of these cases had he taken part in any fund-raising. He acknowledged that he had made almost 100 speeches in public settings where he had made a very strong case, as the President did, and I did, for support of the contras, and he acknowledged further that after these often people would come up and say, I want to help, what do I do?

"But he was equally emphatic in saying whenever that happened, that he said I am a U.S. Government official, and I couldn't become involved in the collection of [sic (or)] brokering of money, and if you want to be helpful to the contras, go to Miami, there in the phone book they have an office, and do it yourselves." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 187-89; JHICI Ex. 40 [McFarlane's list of the 6 problem documents].)

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CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC, AND

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AUGUST 16-26, 1985		THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask him [sc. North] to do anything with respect to these documents? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, as we went through them, he pointed out where my own interpretation was just not accurate, such as in these earlier efforts about the G-1 and so forth, and he just said, you are misreading my intent, and I can make it reflect what I have said if this is ambiguous to you, and I said all right, do that. "Within the matter of a day or two, he returned to my office and he had two single pages, one of them was the same text or close to it, of the first page of a memorandum, the second piece of paper was the last page of a memorandum. "I say that because the format has 'from' and 'to' on the first page, and the signature page on the last page, so it wasn't an intervening page. He pointed out to me on the single sheet, the first page, what had been altered to reflect with greater clarity what his intention had been, and it didn't seem to me substantial. "The second one represented a shortening, really, of the last page of [a] memorandum that basically took out what had been, that an effort should be made to solicit from current donors additional funds, and I think the replacement said an effort must be made to persuade the Congress to support the contras, rather fundamentally different. "Either immediately, or within 24 hours, I put	

them in my briefcase and took them home, intending to read them when I got a chance. Each night, when I finished with the documents at 9 or 10:00, I would return them to Commander Thompson, who had custody of them in the safe.

"The next two or three days, Congressman Barnes was down, we discussed the issue, I told him that having checked with the White House Counsel, we proposed that he go through them on the spot, but without staff, and thought about it, said that he believed that unsatisfactory, and went away.

"Subsequently, he made no additional requests for the documents. Now, the sum and substance of that probably three or four-week episode of seeking to find what papers in our files and what explanations from Colonel North could respond to Mr. Barnes and others, I did have misgivings, I felt it was likely that an officer of the qualifications and excellence of Colonel North, when he was down visiting in Central America probably did extend advice.

"It seemed to me that that was inconsequential to the outcome of the conflict, and probably not in the eyes of the Congress a serious matter.

"On the issue of fund-raising, having talked with Colonel North and with one or two others that I could identify that had been in settings where he spoke, I couldn't find any evidence that he had done that, and his very clear insistence that he always referred potential donors to the contra leadership itself was a matter that I could not disprove.

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		"So, I asked him to write responses to these letters, which he did. He brought them to me. I went over them, and signed them, expressing, I have to say, too categorically, that the NSC staff, and specifically Colonel North, had not broken the spirit or letter of the law. And I could find no solid evidence to the contrary. "Looking back, I think that while in any event, it is my responsibility, not Colonel North's, that suspicions that I had ought to have led me to be more probing and to get more concrete information one way or the other." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 189-91. See JHICI Ex. 37 [North memo to McFarlane, "FDN Military Operations," 4/11/85].)	
85/08/16-203 AUGUST 16-26, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC, AND THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Mr. McFarlane, was it your intent to substitute those pages? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. And ultimately, long after I was out of government, I destroyed those pages. They weren't--I left government with nothing having been altered. "Mr. LIMAN. What was the purpose of asking North to alter the papers if you weren't going to substitute them? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, in fact, he could have been right, that it was simply my misinterpretation. "Mr. LIMAN. In which case, you would correct	

the old record by substituting?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I don't think you really could. Even so, I did ask counsel about that. I got an answer which I did not put great store in, but I didn't suspect you could really do that unless at the same time you reflected by memorandum for the record, you had made this change to reflect a more accurate intent.

"Mr. LIMAN. Mr. McFarlane, the letters you actually sent in the first place, did you give Colonel North the list of the documents that troubled you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I think so.

"Mr. LIMAN. Would you look at Exhibit 40?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that is it.

"Mr. LIMAN. Are those System 4 numbers?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, they are.

"Mr. LIMAN. Are they in your handwriting?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Are those the documents that you have been referring to that troubled you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe they are.

"Mr. LIMAN. And those are the documents that you pointed out to Colonel North?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell Colonel North that if Congress pursued this matter, he would have to defend his language?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I say we both would. I said it was my responsibility, but that I didn't believe that I could in the current circumstance, that I would go ahead and do it, but that I needed an accurate reflection of what was truth.

"Mr. LIMAN. Had you ever asked Colonel North before to rewrite documents?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No.

"Mr. LIMAN. After they had been sent?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 191-94; JHICI Ex. 40 [McFarlane's list of the 6 problem documents].)

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AUGUST 16-26,
1985

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC, AND THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS

McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 5:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, the letter to Congressman Barnes that you sent is Exhibit 40-B, and as I understand your testimony, that was drafted by North.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it says, 'Based on this review, I want to assure you that my actions and those of my staff have been in compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the law.'

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And when you say that the letters were too categorical, that is one of the statements you are talking about.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that statement indeed was not compatible with at least one construction of the documents that you listed in Exhibit 40.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you wrote a similar response to Chairman Hamilton.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And was that also drafted by North?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And did you also send a response to Congressman Barnes telling him that [h]is staff could not look at the documents?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I communicated that to him. I would have said in person, but it may have been in writing.

"Mr. LIMAN. If it is in writing, do you know whe[ther] that was drafted by North?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. It would have been, yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, let's--and did you get some written questions from Chairman Hamilton? They are Exhibit 41-B.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And who prepared the responses to those?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Colonel North.

"Mr. LIMAN. And again, are there some of those that you have reviewed that are categorical?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you feel at the time that you were caught in the middle?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No. It was my responsibility.

"Mr. LIMAN. I understood that you have taken responsibility, but [if] you gave the responses that were less categorical, your chances of getting aid might be jeopardized?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I suppose that is true." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 194-95;

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		JHICI Ex. 40 [McFarlane's list of the 6 problem documents]; Exx. 40-A through 40-E, 41, 41-A through 41-E [Congressional correspondence, with responses prepared by North]. On McFarlane's responses to Congress, generally, see below at 86/12/10-009 ["I think I did not give as full an answer as I should have."].)	
85/08/16-210 AUGUST 16-26, 1985		THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS: LEGAL OPINIONS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane elaborated on the response of counsel, Cmdr. Thompson, on whether the documents could be replaced with revised versions. His responses leave unclear whether he at the time -- or Oliver North at some later time -- raised with a lawyer the question of the legality of revising the documents: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [D]idn't you have a conversation with Mr. Thompson on the subject of whether it was proper to re-write the documents? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, but that didn't affect what happened to the documents prepared and collected for this investigation. "Mr. NIELDS. But you did discuss that with Mr. Thompson and he told you that he thought documents that go from an inferior to a superior and that were put in NSC files could not be re-written? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And nonetheless, you had North draft some revisions to one or two of these documents? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it isn't nonetheless,	

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		because only after North made the distinction between what I interpreted and what was true and went away to write what he said to be the true case did he [sic] then consult with Mr. Thompson and based upon what he said, although I didn't take it as an informed opinion, truly, I did not integrate what Colonel North had written. "Mr. NIELDS. So, first, you had North re-write a couple of the documents, then you [sic] went to Mr. Thompson and asked him if it was proper and he said no, and you [sic], in fact did not re-write any of the documents? "Mr. MCFARLANE. None of them were integrated into existing files. "Mr. NIELDS. Thereafter, one week after you had decided not to re-write the documents, you did contemplate withholding them from Congress, did you not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I asked the advice of counsel in the White House at the time, Mr. Fielding . . . . ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. In any event, I take it you communicated to Congressman Barnes that you would not let any of his staff review them. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And you told him to come down to your office and he did. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I invited him down, yes, that is right. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And you met with him for a relatively short period of time, did you not?	

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. How long was it?

". . . .

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Not more than 10 minutes or so.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you had budgeted a relatively short period of time, had you not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 92-96; see JHICI Ex. 70 [Barnes visit scheduled 10/17/85]. See also 85/10/17-000 on Barnes' visit.)

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AUGUST 1985
THROUGH
NOVEMBER 1986

THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified his discussion with McFarlane about the questionable memos took place after Rep. Barnes made his request on October 29, 1985 to McFarlane for documents relating to NSC staff activities. The actual alteration of the documents, according to North, occurred in 1986 as he prepared to leave the NSC -- not in August 1985, as McFarlane testified.

"Mr. NIELDS. We have the letter dated October 29, 1985, and it is Exhibit 111 and it is a letter requesting documents.

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. The earlier letter requested answers.

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And a letter was sent in reply[,] that you have said you probably participated in[,] that[] gave false answers.

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

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		"Mr. NIELDS. Then Congress wasn't satisfied with the answers and they sent the letter back dated October 29 seeking documents . . . . ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Let's get to the documents then. The documents that were requested were reviewed by you, were they not? "Mr. NORTH. I guess they were. I don't recall the specific event, but I assume that they were because I was asked to provide certain documents. "Mr. NIELDS. And they were taken out of official NSC files? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And they were brought to the attention of Mr. McFarlane? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you and he sat down together and talked about them? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall that we necessarily sat down and talked about them. I do know that he brought those to my attention and indicated that there were problems with them, and told me to fix them. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Now, you just said that he asked you to fix them. What does that mean? "Mr. NORTH. Remove references to certain activities, certain undertakings on my behalf or his, and basically clean up the record. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you? "Mr. NORTH. Tried to. "Mr. NIELDS. Then?	

"Mr. NORTH. No. I don't believe I got around to it until just before I left.

"Mr. NIELDS. And indeed, I take it the references that you were therefore instructed to fix up were such things as references to your current donors?

"Mr. NORTH. I would have to look in each of those documents to refresh my memory, but I am telling you those are documents that had problems with them, yes. And that referenced my activities.

"Mr. NIELDS. Activities --

"Mr. NORTH. And references to those things that I had done over the course of that period of time, or things that I reported on that had been done as a consequence of my activities.

"Mr. NIELDS. These were activities in support of military support and fund-raising support for the contras?

"Mr. NORTH. I would certainly admit to the former; I am not sure about the latter on the fund raising. There may have been reference to that, too.

"Mr. NIELDS. I would just state for the record, . . . they are Exhibits 141 through 153, that is in both original and altered form, and I will say that one of the things which is taken out of those documents [is] reference[] to a particular foreign country, Country Two?

"Mr. NORTH. Okay. Again, I told you yesterday that I still don't know who that particular donor was for sure.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I will note for the record that even in the altered version of the documents, there are still some materials that have been blanked out because the Executive regards them as classified.

"Mr. NORTH. Okay.

"Mr. NIELDS. So you didn't just remove all sensitive materials, you removed the materials that demonstrated that you were conducting activities in support of the contras?

"Mr. NORTH. All right.

"Mr. NIELDS. What was the reason for altering those documents right before you left?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, he had asked me to do it some time before. I simply hadn't gotten it done yet.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, he was gone. What was the reason that he gave you for changing these documents?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, those documents clearly indicated that there was a covert operation being conducted in support of the Nicaraguan resistance.

"Part of the whole thing with the covert operation is being able to protect those people with whom you are engaged as we had committed to do, and protect from political damage as well as international repercussions the Government of the United States, and so, I very clearly understood why he wanted those documents cleaned up, and I sought to do so."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 211-16; JHICI Exx. OLN 111 [letter from Rep. Barnes to McFarlane, dated 10/29/85], 112-13 [McFarlane's hand-written list of 6 targeted documents], 141-53

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		[original and altered versions of the 6 targeted documents].)	
85/08/16-270 1984-86 AND AUGUST 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: AUTHORIZATION, AND DOCUMENTATION NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on how and by whom his Contra-related activities were authorized: "Mr. NORTH. . . . I assumed that those matters which required the attention and decision of the President of the United States did indeed get them. I assumed that. "I never asked that. I never walked up to the President and said, 'Oh, by the way, Mr. President, yesterday, I met with so-and-so from Country Four.' Nor did he ever say, 'I am glad you had a meeting with Country Four and it went well.' "Mr. NIELDS. Do you know whether or not the President was aware of your activities seeking funds and operational support for the contras from third countries? "Mr. NORTH. I do not know. I assume that he did. "Mr. NIELDS. What was the basis of your assumption? "Mr. NORTH. Just that there was a lot going on, and it was very obvious that the Nicaraguan resistance survived. I sent forward innumerable documents, some of which you have just shown us as Exhibits that demonstrated I was keeping my superiors fully informed as to what was going on. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, you indicated . . . that	

you made numerous documents, and we have shown them to you. I don't believe we have shown you any that post-date August of 1985. Did there come a time when you stopped writing documents relating to your support for the contras?

"Mr. NORTH. There came a time when I stopped sending up what we call in-system memoranda. I continued to communicate with my superiors using the PROF system and I continued to send forward non-log or out-of-system documents, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And where are they?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, the PROFS notes you got, I guess.

"Mr. NIELDS. Where are the non-logged documents?

"Mr. NORTH. I think they were shredded or burnt-bagged.

"Mr. NIELDS. And the PROFS messages you thought had been deleted?

"Mr. NORTH. I had hoped that they had been, yes.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . But are you saying that your decision to stop putting these documents in the system had nothing to do with the fact that they were pulled out of the system by Mr. McFarlane for the purpose -- in response to a Congressional request for documents?

"Mr. NORTH. No. I think we arrived at a point -- and I don't recall whether it was his idea or my idea -- in 1985 to stop putting these documents in the system, you're right. I'm not saying it was his idea. It might have been mine.

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		"Anyway, we decided not to. "Mr. NIELDS. And that arose out of the fact that Congress had asked to look at the documents? "Mr. NORTH. Well, sure. "Mr. NIELDS. And the documents that were gathered for them all came out of a system. "Mr. NORTH. Exactly. "Mr. NIELDS. And you didn't want to show Congress the documents in the system? "Mr. NORTH. I didn't want to show Congress a single word on this whole thing." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 226-28. See id., 7/9/87, at 64 [North on lying to Congress: "I do not believe that there ought to be circumstances in which people like myself have to make judgments over lives or lies. . . . I am not justifying what I did except to say to you if I had divulged what I was doing, if Mr. McFarlane had divulged what I was doing, many, many lives were at stake."].)	
85/08/16-290 AUGUST 1985 THROUGH NOVEMBER 1986		THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS, AND SYSTEM IV GENERALLY NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on System IV documents within the NSC: "Mr. NIELDS. And [System] 4 is where the most highly classified documents are stored? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [T]he whole reason you have documents classified as System 4 documents is so that they will be handled and stored in such a way that they will not be inappropriately exposed	

to public view?

"Mr. NORTH. True.

"Mr. NIELDS. So, there was already in existence an official way of protecting information that ought not to be made public?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes, but you have to remember that that system, just like any information in my safe, is very much what I would call successor dependent, and there is some uncertainty as to what your replacement might do with those documents when he walks in the door, and so, I had absolutely no problem whatsoever with Mr. McFarlane telling me that these documents need to be cleaned up.

"In fact, we had earlier, perhaps subsequent to those documents being prepared, decided to take those kinds of documents out of the system altogether, so that they no longer were in the system, they were non-logged, if you will, and they were hand-carried back and forth between my office and the West Wing.

"An effort was made, in other words, to keep them out of the system so that outside knowledge would not necessarily be derived from having seen them, the documents themselves.

"Mr. NIELDS. These documents that were on Mr. McFarlane's list after they were discussed by you with him in 1985, they were placed back into the system, were they not?

"Mr. NORTH. I got them out of the system. I don't know where they sat in the interim, but I went to the system to retrieve them, because I saw towards the end of my tenure that this list still had not been cleaned up, and so I went and got the documents out of the system and started revising the documents.

"I had created them, and I was now changing them, in consonance with what I believed he wanted on the documents to begin with. The documents, after all, demonstrated his knowledge and cognizance over what I was doing, and he didn't want that. He [sic] was cleaning up the historical record. He [sic] was trying to preserve the President from political damage.

"I don't blame him for that.

"Mr. NIELDS. He was changing it to make it untrue.

"Mr. NORTH. Yes. I think by omission more than commission, but we are certainly deleting in the redrafts of those documents, deleting portions of it which indicated the full depths of what I was doing and his knowledge of what I was doing." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 217-19. On non-log documents, see Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 41-43. On System IV, generally, see McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 60-61.)

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THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS, AND McFARLANE'S RESPONSES TO CONGRESS

McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH:

"Colonel North also assured me that he was not soliciting funds when, as I have testified, I questioned him on this subject before signing the letter that he drafted for me to send to Congressman Barnes and to Chairman Hamilton later.

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		Colonel North also testified that at a time before Congressman Barnes came to my office in October of 1985, when I drew Colonel North's attention to certain of his memoranda to me that raised doubts about his compliance with the law, I then instructed him, in Colonel North's words, to 'fix them.' This is incorrect. "In fact, Ollie proposed revision of certain of the documents, but only to conform them to his actual intent, which he said that I had misunderstood. He gave me an [sic (in?)] order to obtain my go-ahead for the project, two revised pages of which were grossly at veriance with the original text, so I did not approve them. I did not return them, and I ultimately discarded them. "The effort, so far as I was concerned, was ended. Prior to my testimony, during questioning by the committee staff, I learned for the first time that within days before Colonel North left the White House in November of 1986, he withdrew these documents and altered them. This was done without my knowledge or concurrence." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 203-04. See also entries starting at 86/11/21-600.)	
85/08/16-400 AUGUST 16-26, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane testified on his responses to Rep. Hamilton's inquiries about Col. North: "Mr. BOLAND. Why would you allow that type of an answer to be forwarded when you had doubts as to its accuracy?	

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		"Mr. McFARLANE. Specifically, Mr. Boland, I believe that the central concern of the Congress enacting that law had not been violated. I could not prove that it was violated, and I accepted Colonel North's personal certification that had [sic] not done so. "The other areas that could have involved breaches with regard to whether or not he gave advice concerning military or para-military activities, . . . it seemed to me that it was likely that he had . . . . "Not being able to dis[]prove it, I accepted that as such grounds for saying it was truth, and I believe that was wrong to do so. But that is why I said it." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 3-6)	
85/08/16-420 AUGUST 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you or any member of your staff ever tell Congress that you already were free to and were engaging in the solicitation of lethal aid at the time you asked Congress for permission to do restricted solicitation of humanitarian aid? "Mr. NORTH. No. And by the way, my staff was--at that point in time, consisted of me and a secretary. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, did any of your colleagues to your knowledge tell that to Congress? "Mr. NORTH. No, no. Very few of my colleagues knew.	

"Mr. LIMAN. In fact, the law changed to permit this limited solicitation in December 1985 and you have already reviewed with Mr. Nields the letters that were written in August of 1985 by Mr. McFarlane saying that you weren't engaged in solicitation and that the NSC staff was abiding by the letter and spirit of Boland.

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, is what you are telling us today that when you helped in the participation of the letter saying that we are complying with the letter and spirit of Boland, what we are saying is that Boland doesn't apply to us and so we are complying with its letter and spirit?

"Mr. NORTH. Exactly.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that is what you think is a fair reading of that letter?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, I have not denied, Counsel, I have admitted that the letter[s] are misleading, evasive, and wrong.

"If you are talking about the specific part that we are living within the letter of Boland, absolutely.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now--

"Mr. NORTH. And as you know, my recommendation all along was to withhold that information.

"Mr. LIMAN. But [ ] your recommendation all along would have been to confront Congress on this, right?

"Mr. NORTH. You got it. And if I may, just let me answer that.

"I think--and I mean no criticism of my

superiors or anyone else--that I think as one of the members of this panel has indicated, that we all would have been better served by that confrontation.

"Not a confrontation of a lieutenant colonel sitting across from a panel of elected officials of the Government of the United States or even taking it to the Supreme Court in my own defense; but the fact is there should have been that.

"But I agree with what one of the members of this panel has said, that that should have been done. But nonetheless, it was chosen to go another way and I believe that the way we went was legal."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 222-24. See id., 7/9/87, at 64 [North on lying to Congress: "I do not believe that there ought to be circumstances in which people like myself have to make judgments over lives or lies. . . . I am not justifying what I did except to say to you if I had divulged what I was doing, if Mr. McFarlane had divulged what I was doing, many, many lives were at stake."].)

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CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: POINDEXTER'S INVOLVEMENT

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, there came a time in 1985, in August of '85, when the Congress got some wind of Colonel North's activities; do you recall that?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I do.

"Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall that that came at or close to the time that Congress had just

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		appropriated $27 million in humanitarian aid for the contras, the summer of '85? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I'm not certain what was happening at the time, but-- "Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall that there were letters from-- "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that there were letters from Chairman Barnes and Chairman Hamilton inquiring about Colonel North's activities? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I recall there were several letters. "Mr. LIMAN. And I think you have already testified that there was concern that if there was a disclosure of Colonel North's activities to Congress, it could lead to some adverse reaction? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. It would certain[ly] add to the controversy. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall, if you look at Exhibit [JMP] 7-A, that . . . you were sent a copy of the Barnes letter? . . . "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I have Exhibit 7-A. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [O]n the second page . . . is that your handwriting on it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, it is. "Mr. LIMAN. It says, 'This was brought up to me first thing this morning from the Situation Room. Do you want to send R.[C.M.] a copy before it is staffed?' And you initialed it as 'no,' correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.	

"Mr. LIMAN. And then you wrote a note, 'Bob' --who is Bob?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Probably Bob Kimm[it]t. It could be Bob Pearson, but probably Bob Kimm[it]t, the executive secretary of the staff.

"Mr. LIMAN. You wrote, 'Send Bud an information copy with staffing indicated. Barnes is really a troublemaker. We have good answers to all of this. Staff to' --and then you indic[a]ted who would be the people to staff it; you said 'North,' and you put 'action.'

"First, what were the good answers to Congressman Barnes' letter inquiring about Oliver North's activities for the NSC that you had in mind?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall, Mr. Liman, right now exactly what I had in mind.

"The problem is, there is a lot of water over the dam since that time, and I have been exposed to a lot of information. But I felt comfortable in what Colonel North was doing and I thought that the letters could be answered.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, I had understood your testimony earlier that if you disclosed what Colonel North was doing, it could create some adverse action on the Hill, and that's why I'm asking you, what were the good answers that you were contemplating that could be given that wouldn't create some kind of adverse action on the Hill?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, again, at this point it is very much--

"Mr. LIMAN. You just don't recall?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. --a hypothetical situation, and I frankly just don't recall. But at the time, I obviously felt that there was a good way of answering this."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 206-09; JHICI Ex. JMP 7-A [Poindexter's handwritten note on Barnes' letter].)

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CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: POINDEXTER'S INVOLVEMENT
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Was the way that you were advocating at that time that Executive Privilege should be asserted; was that your preference?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Is this--is this the letter where he was asking for documents or--

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, there was a letter for documents, but this is not the letter for documents. This, you will see, is--

"Mr. BECKLER. This is the August 16, 1985, letter?

"Mr. LIMAN. Right. It says, 'I request that you provide information, including memoranda and other documents, pertaining to any contact between Colonel North and the Nicaraguan rebel leaders.'

"And the letter from Chairman Hamilton asks for a full report on the activities of the NSC.

"I take it that you just don't recall as you sit here now--I'm not asking for speculation or hypothetical answers--you don't recall what those good answers were you had in mind?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I don't.

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		"Mr. LIMAN. You indicated 'North, action,' as the staff. Does that mean that he was to be the action officer in responding to these requests? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That means that he was to prepare the first draft of the response and it was to be coordinated with the other officers that are indicated there. "Mr. LIMAN. And when you suggested that he prepare the first draft of the response, was it your intention that Colonel North be able to answer that letter with finessing a description of his activities? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is exactly right. "Mr. LIMAN. That is why you designated him as the action officer? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right, because my objective here again would have been to withhold information. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you participate at all in the preparation of the actual responses that were given to Congress? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't have a recollection of participating in those preparations. I think it is--to understand the situation at the time, Mr. McFarlane was out in Santa Barbara with the President-- ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. But you were out of town from August 23 to September 2. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I was in California then? "Mr. LIMAN. According to your diary. "Mr. POINDEXTER. My point is that when I wrote that note, I believe I was in Washington.	

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		Mr. McFarlane was in Santa Barbara. "Mr. LIMAN. Then you went to California? "Mr. POINDEXTER. We switched positions. The standard procedure when Mr. McFarlane received a letter from a member of Congress was that he would be the first one to see the letter. That was his personal preference. "In this case, Kay, one of his secretaries, had opened the mail and sent me a copy of the letter and she was asking whether we should send the letter to Mr. McFarlane before we assigned it for staffing. I read the letter and thought that we ought to get started on the staffing of the letter and to send a copy out by facsimile to Mr. McFarlane, that is what the first sheet of the exhibit is, with the staffing indicated on it. "So the staffing started, and I do not recall doing much more on it after that point." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 209-12.)	
85/08/16-432 AUGUST 16, 1985 - SEPTEMBER 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: POINDEXTER'S INVOLVEMENT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Did you review the letter [drafted by North in reply to Congressional inquiries] before it was sent? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I do not believe I did. I may have had access to it, but I do not recall seeing it because I do recall a conversation in--a year later on a similar issue with Commander Thompson in which I asked him if he had the letters because I did not recall having seen them	

before.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you then look at the letters?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not. I intended to, but never got around to it.

"Mr. LIMAN. When you first saw those letters, did you have any problem with them?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I would not have answered them the same way that Mr. McFarlane did--

"Mr. LIMAN. They were more categorical than you would have made them?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I would have[,] I think[,] said it in a different way and not gone into the detail that he did.

"Mr. LIMAN. You said that you were operating on the premise that Boland didn't apply.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. The fact of the matter is that these letters to Congress suggested that Boland did apply to the NSC and that you were abiding by it, correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think that Mr. McFarlane and I had a different understanding. I have listened to his testimony. As I understand his position as explained at this point is that his observation that he thought Boland applied didn't necessarily mean in a legal sense, but he, according to his testimony, as I have interpreted it, meant that he wanted things done in accordance with Boland.

"I don't recall that being stated quite the way at the time.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, in fact, as I understand the whole thrust of your testimony on this

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subject, it is that things were not being done in accordance with Boland, as if Boland applied to the NSC and that the NSC was engaging in the activities the CIA did because the NSC wasn't covered and, therefore, it was the only agency in the Government that could do it; fair?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is a fair description of my understanding.

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . Did you ever participate in any discussions at the NSC where a decision was made that you should keep from Congress this interpretation that Boland did not apply?

"Did you understand the question?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I am not sure.

"Mr. LIMAN. I will try it again.

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. LIMAN. Let me try it again so that we understand and if you don't understand the question, you don't even have to wait for your lawyer to say 'rephrase it'. I think you know that you can ask me.

"Did you ever participate--

"Mr. BECKLER. Thank you, Arthur.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever participate in any discussion at the NSC where someone said 'Let's not tell Congress that we don't consider Boland applicable to us'?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, you have an exhibit, I think, that bears on this. And I think it is a PROF note from Mr. Fortier to Mr. McFarlane.

"Mr. LIMAN. About our legal fellow not arousing speculation?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I can't remember that part

of it. The point I want to make is that at various times there was consideration given by or promoted by some on the staff that we ought to go to Congress and clarify this question about third countries, and I was--I was always opposed to that."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 212-16. See JHICI Exx. JMP 5 [Fortier PROF to McFarlane, "Contra Project," 1/22/85], JMP 8 [North PROF to Pearson, "Barnes letter," 8/20/85, which mentions that "our legal fellow is going to create unhelpful speculation." See 85/08/20-150.].)

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CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: POINDEXTER'S INVOLVEMENT

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. I think you are referring actually to Poindexter Exhibit [JMP] 5, which says, 'Ollie believes we need to flag the possible option of a finding permitting us to seek third-country support. John and I are very uneasy about raising this.'

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is the exhibit I am referring to.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you were uneasy about raising it because you thought you might get more restrictive legislation?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right, and I felt, based on my assessment of the situation, that we weren't precluded from doing that.

"Mr. LIMAN. I understand that you acted in accordance with your convictions. What I am

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		asking is, did anyone else at the NSC say, 'Look, let's not tell Congress that we have this conviction about Boland not applying'? "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall having that discussion with anybody. That was the way I felt about it. "Mr. LIMAN. I want to say something just for the record, Admiral, so everyone understands it, that before anyone testified at these hearings publicly, when you testified in the private session you expressed that conviction, you made it clear in your conduct you acted in accordance with the conviction that Boland did not apply, and you have acknowledged various activities that you have testified to here, so this is not a matter of adapting a position to a record, and you said that in your private testimony in early May. "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And that is the way in which you operated with respect to the contras, correct, and it is that belief that you were not bound by Boland that led you to conclude that you could authorize the diversion of the funds as consistent with policy and not contrary to law? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct, and consistent with the other methods that were being used to finance the support for the contras. "Mr. LIMAN. But it was-- "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. LIMAN. I think that your counsel is anticipating my next question, which is, but it was your recognition that there were Members of	

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		Congress who disagreed with that interpretation that led you to believe that you could not go public with that interpretation? "Mr. BECKLER. Counsel, I could never have anticipated that question. "Mr. LIMAN. That good? "Mr. BECKLER. May we finish our conference now? "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Chairman HAMILTON. Admiral, please, if you will suspend. . . . ". . . . "Chairman HAMILTON. . . . I think with the fact that the House is now voting, we should now conclude this session . . . ." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 216-19; JHICI Ex. JMP 5 [Fortier PROF to McFarlane, "Contra Project," 1/22/85].)	
85/08/16-434 AUGUST 16, 1985 - SEPTEMBER 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: POINDEXTER'S INVOLVEMENT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 5: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, just before the break yesterday, we were reviewing the letters which Mr. McFarlane had sent to Chairman Hamilton and to Chairman Barnes and you had testified that you would not have answered the letters the same way; and you said that--I will read it--'I would not have answered them in the same way that Mr. McFarlane did. I would have, I think, said it in a different way and not gone into the detail that he did.'	

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, do you remember that you were uncomfortable when you first saw that letter?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes.

"As I recall, the first time that I saw that letter was actually, I think, in the exhibits that you provided. There were extracts from it, as I recall, in the Tower Commission report and I had seen portions of it there.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you are aware of the testimony of Oliver North who said he prepared it or helped prepare it, and it was wrong and misleading?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I heard that testimony.

"Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact that knowing what you did about the activities of Oliver North and the NSC, that you considered the statement that you are complying with the letter and spirit of Boland to be misleading?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I understand your last question, Mr. Liman, you are saying that I would say that saying that the letters that said that we were complying with the letter and spirit of Boland was misleading. [Sic.] I haven't said that.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, do you feel that telling Congress that you were complying with the letter and spirit of Boland, given what the NSC was doing, was a misleading statement?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified yesterday, I felt that the Boland amendment did not apply to the NSC staff and I felt that indeed we were complying with the letter and spirit of the Boland amendment.

"Now, it doesn't say that we are not helping the contras.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, in saying that you are complying with the letter and spirit of law, when you mean that the law doesn't apply and that you are supporting the contras, you do not consider that to be misleading Congress?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The only thing I meant, Mr. Liman, was withholding information from the Congress. We did not--I have not said that we weren't helping the contras. We were clearly helping the contras. But we were also trying very hard to stay within the letter and spirit of Boland by keeping the other departments that were covered by the Boland amendment out of the issue." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 2-5.)

85/08/16-435
AUGUST 16,
1985 -
SEPTEMBER
1985

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: POINDEXTER'S INVOLVEMENT

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 6:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. So that in saying that you are complying with the letter and spirit of Boland, what you mean is that the NSC was doing the support without the CIA?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That was my understanding.

"Mr. LIMAN. And did the President understand that?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think he did understand that.

"Mr. LIMAN. What is that based on?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. In a general way. He understood that the contras were being supported and that we were involved in--generally in coordinating the effort. He was aware of the contributions from country two and he himself felt personally, as related to me, that it was entirely appropriate for private individuals to support the contras and he was aware of the status of the contras in the field, the kinds of things that he was briefed on, I think, would have made that clear.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you--I am sorry.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I was just going to add that he was not briefed on every little issue involved in coordinating this effort. As I have testified before, the items that he was briefed on were primarily in the policy area and it was a judgment call every day as to exactly what level of detail I had to get into.

"That doesn't mean that we were--or that I was trying to withhold information from him. It was just a matter of giving him the information that I felt it was most important depending upon the circumstances of the day.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you brief the President on the fact that the NSC staff was helping the contras?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, as I have testified yesterday, I am not going to answer a question in a positive way unless I can remember a specific conversation. I have told you in general what I briefed the President on, and I don't

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		recall a specific conversation that would allow me to answer your question in an affirmative way. "Mr. LIMAN. Now--or a negative way? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Or a negative way." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 6-7. See 86/07/21-120 [Poindexter's response continues with regard to the August 1986 Congressional inquiries about North].)	
85/08/20-100 AUGUST 20, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC HAMILTON LETTER: Letter from Rep. Hamilton, Chair of the House Intelligence Committee: ". . . . "If the NSC did engage in actions that supported the military activity of the contras, I am curious about what actions were taken by the NSC to support the activities of the contras during the period after the enactment of the Boland amendment and before its recent modification. "I would like to receive a full report on the kinds of activities regarding the contras that the NSC carried out and what the legal justification is for such actions given the legislative prohibitions that existed last year and earlier this year. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 7-A.)	
85/08/20-150 AUGUST 20, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC PEARSON RESPONSE ON BARNES: PROF from Bob Pearson to Poindexter, "Subject:	

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		Barnes letter requesting material re North/Contra contacts": " . . . I agree with Ollie that we need to proceed carefully. Paul Thompson suggested that Jock Sharfin might become familiar with the Boland amendment as part of his familiarization wit[h] NSC issues. He's reading up on the subject in the law library and will not be contacting anyone at State or elsewhere. . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 8.)	
85/08/20-151 AUGUST 20, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC NORTH RESPONSE ON BARNES: North PROF to Poindexter, "Subject: Barnes letter requesting material re North/Contra contacts": ". . . I discussed the Barnes ltr w/ Jim Michel and he urges that we not jump too fast on this issue. He shares my concern that our legal fellow is going to create unhelpful speculation re our intentions on this matter as he proceeds around town asking questions about the Boland amendment and its legal/legislative intent. Jim recommends, and I agree, that[ ]our response to the Barnes letter should be very quietly[ ]drafted by Jim, Paul Thompson and a rep from Fielding's office. Regards, North." (JHICI Ex. JMP 8. See 84/10/03-328 [Poindexter testimony on the PROF].)	
85/08/20-175 AUGUST 20, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC REGER RESPONSE ON BARNES: Memo to Poindexter from Brenda Reger of the	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		NSC, "Subject: Barnes Request": ". . . . "It may be in our interest to be terribly forthcoming and bury Mr. Barnes in logs of dates and/or names re meetings and telecons or perhaps to offer to do so putting him on notice that the logs give times and dates but no substance. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 9.)	
85/08/20-200 AUGUST 20 - SEPTEMBER 4, 1985			LEDEEN-KIMCHE MEETING LEDEEN ACCOUNT: Following his contact with McFarlane in mid-August 1985 (see 85/08/10-100, -101), Ledeen meets with Kimche in London on August 20: "A. So I met Kimche at Heathrow Airport in London. I rented a room at one of the little hotels there around the airport. He flew from Tel Aviv, I flew from Washington. We met there for several hours. I gave him the codes. [See 85/08/10-100.] "We talked about how this might work, and I then [fl]ew to Los Angeles where I was scheduled to give a speech and when I was done with the speech, I went up to Santa Barbara and briefed Bud [-- h]e was then in the summer White House, about the conversations and gave him -- now Kimche had prepared a detailed set of notes now properly typed and all of that from the meetings in July. [See 85/07/30-100.] I gave those to Bud and off I went and we waited to see what would happen. "Q. That would have now been around what time?

"A. Now the 22nd or so of August, 22nd or 23rd.

". . . .

"A. Okay. I don't remember exactly the sequence, but a reasonable sequence might well be that the first -- a number of TOWs goes at the end of August or the very beginning of September. And nothing happens.

"Q. As you are describing this to me, are you describing the knowledge that you had at the time?

"A. Yes. I think I knew when the -- when these first things went.

"Q. Okay.

"A. Nothing happens. I was then invited to come to Paris to meet with everybody to see what was going to -- what was going on. So I went to Paris on the 4th of September.

"Q. Did you know at that time how many TOWs had been sent?

"A. I think I did. I think it was 100. As best as I can remember.

"Q. Right.

"A. It was 100."

(Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 52-53. See Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 66-67.)

85/08/20-300
AUGUST 20,
1985

SUMMER 1985 TOW SHIPMENT: 96 TOWs TO IRAN
SUMMARY:

In the early morning hours of August 20, 1985, a plane leaves Israel bound for Iran with Ghorbanifar and 96 TOWs on board. After the TOWs are delivered, the plane returns to Israel the same day. No hostages are released. (Iran-Contra

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Report, at 168 [citing the Israeli Historical Chronology].)
85/08/22-110 SOMETIME IN 1985[?]		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: NORTH AND SECORD INVOLVEMENT NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on how the air resupply project was set up: "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it one of the other things which you did was to organize a resupply operation in Nicaragua, for Nicaragua? "Mr. NORTH. I helped do that, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. You asked General Secord if he would be willing to run it himself, did you not? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 153.)	
85/08/22-115 SOMETIME IN 1985 [?]		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: NORTH'S AUTHORITY TO INVOLVE SECORD NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NUNN. Mr. McFarlane testified also that he did not know that you had asked General Secord to undertake the airlift effort. "Quoting from that testimony, Mr. Liman said: 'Did he ever tell you that he was turning to General Secord to undertake that mission?['] "'Mr. McFarlane: No, he didn't.' "Do you recall consulting or letting Mr. McFarlane know what you were doing in that regard? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 94-95.)	
85/08/22-130		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: NORTH--AND USG--ROLE	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
SOMETIME IN SUMMER 1985		NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. I take it that you would agree with the proposition that this resupply operation was doing business with or for the United States? "Mr. NORTH. They were certainly doing it to benefit the foreign policy of the United States of American, I will certainly agree with that. "Mr. NIELDS. And was it in furtherance of a covert operation being run by the National Security Council? "Mr. NORTH. It was in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States to support the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, an activity that I was coordinating, that I wrote policy papers on and on which I carefully kept my superiors apprised of what I was doing." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 160-61.)	
85/08/22-220 SOMETIME IN SUMMER 1985		NORTH'S AND TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP AND RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified that while he was unsure whether he had asked Tambs specifically to help in the resupply operation, he did ask for Tambs' help in setting up the Costa Rican airstrip: "Mr. NORTH. . . . I did ask for his help and received it in trying to obtain the use by virtue of a lease or planned sale of real estate in that country for purposes of building an airfield that would be used for supporting the Nicaraguan resistance, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that one of the purposes for the airstrip was an emergency landing	

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		place for the resupply operation? "Mr. NORTH. In a place to fly small planes in and out of, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Just so we are clear, I take it a resupply operation involves the flying of goods, including arms, inside Nicaragua and dropping them to contras that were stationed there and needed to be resupplied? "Mr. NORTH. You said it. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that you asked others to help out in attaining this airstrip? "There is a Mr. Haskell who has been referred to in some of your documents as Mr. Olmste[a]d, who[m] I take it you knew and asked to help out in obtaining the propery and developing it? "Mr. NORTH. I did, and I'm pleased to note that he helped. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that among other things that you interceded with third countries in an effort to obtain airplanes? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. And other things, yes, as we already know. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it this resupply operation eventually got started and was operational sometime in 1986? "Mr. NORTH. I don't want to get pinned down to an exact date when it got going, but it did get going. "Mr. NIELDS. And you obtained certain secure communication devices, KL-43's? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, I did. "Mr. NIELDS. And distributed them to members of the resupply operation?	

"Mr. NORTH. And others, yes, that is correct. American citizens.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I take it you utilized these and so did they in communicating with respect to the air resupply operation?

"Mr. NORTH. And other matters.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. And among other things you directed those who were operating the resupply operation down in Central America with respect to when they should make drops, how they should make them, where they should make them and so on?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't think that 'directed' is the right term. I am not trying to back away from any of the things that I did, but it is hard to direct a war from a desk in Washington, and I was not trying to direct a war from a desk in Washington.

"I provided as much support for those activities as I was physically able. I went down frequently to coordinate with people in the region and I would receive and try to coordinate those activities based on information that I received from a multiple of sources. And so 'directing' I don't think is quite the right phrase to use.

"Mr. NIELDS. But you did from time to time give instructions about where items should be dropped --

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. -- when they should be dropped, how they should be dropped?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, again, I mean they are going to be dropped by parachute, number one. But

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		I would have communications in -- that would indicate we needed a unit in a certain place, needed a certain number of items, and I would pick up the phone and -- the KL-43 -- and ask those guys to see if they could do that. Sometimes they could, sometimes they couldn't. "But 'directing' -- I don't think that I ever sent out, 'I direct you to do the following[] at such and such a time.[']" (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 154-56. See Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 76 [Secord on Olmstead's (Haskell's) role in the Costa Rican airstrip]. See generally Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 75-77 [Secord on Olmstead's role in buying the ship, the Erria].)	
85/08/22-300 AUGUST 22, 1985		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LEGAL CONCERNS SECORD ACCOUNT: At Secord's request, a Washington law firm (Patton, Boggs & Blow) gives him an opinion on the applicability of the Neutrality Act to the airlift operation in Nicaragua. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 209-11. Compare id., 5/6/87, at 143 [Secord testifies he sought the opinion prior to becoming involved in the operation. By Nov. 1985, Secord was working on the operation.], with id., 5/7/87, at 209-11 [giving May 8, 1986 as date of opinion] and JHICI Ex. 23 [while cover letter is dated Aug. 22, 1985, it is stamped "RECEIVED MAY 08 1986"].) THE PATTON, BOGGS & BLOW OPINION: "As the[] elements [of a violation of the	

Neutrality Act] relate to the proposed Nicaraguan airlift, three of the four elements . . . would be met. . . .

"The propriety of the proposed arrangement therefore will turn on whether or not the airlift itself constitutes a 'military expedition or enterprise,' as that term has been defined in the case law relating to the statute. . . .

". . . .

". . . As long as the airlift operations transport only supplies (whether or not including implements of war), but not men, and as long as the persons engaged in arranging or providing the airlift services do not also engage in broader planning or action in concert with others to combine these supplies with insurgents on the ground for military purposes, those providing the transportation of supplies have not begun, or provided the means for any military expedition within the meaning of the statute. . . .

"One final note: the Neutrality Act has been neglected by prosecutors since the First World War. . . . 'Public interest' actions to compel Justice Department investigations of such activity therefore remain a possibility."
(JHICI Ex. 23.)

85/08/25-100
AUGUST 25,
1985

OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: TRIP REPORT ON THE EMERGENCY AIRFIELD ("THE FARM")

OWEN MEMO:

Owen, writing as "TC" (The Courier), reports to North, "BG" (Blood and Guts), on developments related to the Costa Rican airstrip and on his August 19, 1985 trip to San Jose, Costa Rica:

". . . .

"The area decided on is on the west coast, bordered by a National Park on the north, the ocean to the west, the Pan American Highway to the east, and mountains and hills to the south. The property is owned by an American living in New York. It is managed by a Colonel in the Civil Guard who will be glad to turn it over to [redacted] who has been designated by [redacted] to be administrator for the project. Am presently waiting for the name of the American so information on him can be found out and he can be approached by a company wishing to rent the land for a year with the option to buy. A guess is the cost will run between $10,000 and $20,000 for a year.

"The cover for the operation is a company, owned by a few 'crazy' gringos, wanting to lease the land for agricultural experimentation and for running cattle. A company is in the process of being formed. It might be a good idea to have it be a Panamanian Company with bearer shares, this way no names appear as owners. The gringos will own two planes, registered to the company and duely [sic] registered in the country in question. Cattle will be purchased as will some farming equipment and some land plowed.

"The main house, which sits next to the Pan American highway, will be vacated and used by the Gringos. It will be possible to use third country nationals, although this was not extensively discussed. The Colonel will provide a cook, the peones to work the farm, and security.

". . . .

"Once the new strip is completed it will be designated a military zone and will be guarded by the Colonel's people. The cover is it will be being used for mortar and rifle practices. There are no houses or farms near by and the strip is right off the water and in a draw between two ridge lines, so it is well out of sight.

"Initial costs for the project include:

"-Construction costs

"-Purchase of at least two vehicles, both 4 wheel drive, a truck and pickup

"-Cost of land, cattle and farming equipment

"-Establishing the company, lawyers and registration costs

"-Colonel's costs; should not be too high

"-Salaries for gringos

  "-Air ops (Spanish speaking)

  "-2 pilots

  "-Mechanic

  "-Loadmaster/packer/rigger

  "-Civil engineer to oversee construction of the strips

"-Registration of two planes in country

"-Fuel

"Requirements in the States for the project:

"-Form company

"-Off shore bank account

"-Contact and negotiate with present owner

"-Budget project

"-Contract personnel

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		"Next trip to the country should be with a civil engineer and air ops officer to begin the project with site survey, follow-up meeting with the Colonel, transfer of the property, establish company, begin construction. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. RWO 9. See Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 22 [Owen identifies TC and BG].)	
85/08/26-000 AUGUST 26, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: McFARLANE'S REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane returns to the White House from the West Coast and begins his review of the documents which Adm. Poindexter has ordered to be collected. McFarlane is to prepare his response to Rep. Branes' inquiry about Oliver North's activities. (See above at 85/08/16-200 for discussion.)	
85/08/29-000 SOMETIME IN LATE AUGUST 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP TOUR OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen travels to Costa Rica to locate a site for an airfield from which lethal and non-lethal drops could be made. He is met at the airport by a CIA representative with whom he again meets that evening. The following day, they meet with a Costa Rican official. The three visit a suggested site. Owen testified, "I was introduced as a private citizen who was interested in helping the cause of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. I do not believe that the Costa Rican official knew that I was	

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		working directly for or with Colonel North, and we did have a conversation." Owen also may have spoken with Tambs about the airfield during his Costa Rican trip. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 5-8. See JHICI Ex. RWO 9 [Owen memo on the airfield site].)	
85/08/29-100 SOMETIME IN LATE AUGUST 1985		OWEN'S AND NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Tambs introduces Castillo to Robert Owen. The next day Castillo visits the site of the Costa Rican airfield with Owen. "Mr. Barbadoro. What did he [Tambs] tell you about Robert Owen? "Mr. Castillo. That he was a -- I am using my own words -- a friend, collaborator of Colonel North[]. ". . . . "Mr. Barbadoro. Did anyone explain to you why Robert Owen was going to look at the site of the airstrip? "Mr. Castillo. My recollection is that he would report back to Colonel North about this site and the information that had been given to him by Ambassador Tambs at that meeting that I had the day before we went to the site. ". . . . "Mr. Barbadoro. What happened when you got to the site of the airstrip? "Mr. Castillo. The Colonel [not otherwise identified] and I walked around with Rob Owen, who took pictures of the land. . . .	

". . .[H]e took the film back to Washington with him.

"Mr. Barbadoro. Did you ever learn what happened to those photographs?

"Mr. Castillo. Yes.

"Mr. Barbadoro. What happened to them?

"Mr. Castillo. Colonel North told me after that that he had seen the film--the pictures, the photographs--and that he thought it was an ideal place for a refueling or re-supply base, location.

"Mr. Barbadoro. Did he ever tell you that he had shown the photographs to other people?

"Mr. Castillo. No."

(Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 39-42. See id., at 161-62 [Castillo on why he considered it odd that Ass't Sec'y of State Abrams knew about the airstrip, but not that Robert Owen knew.].)

85/08/29-101
AFTER AUGUST
1985

THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: CASTILLO ROLE

CASTILLO ACCOUNT:

Castillo testified further on his contact with the construction of the airstrip:

"Mr. Barbadoro. Other than that one trip that you made with Rob Owen to the actual site, did you have anything else to do with the construction of that airstrip?

"Mr. Castillo. No, sir.

"Mr. Barbadoro. I felt that my position regarding what I considered a rather sensitive activity was one of just passively monitoring it. . . .

"In other words, these people could have done

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		all of this without anything, any involvement of my own. I also considered the possibility, and very strongly so, that once funding was resumed, that in fact CIA might take over this airstrip and use it in our own resupply operations. ". . . . "Mr. Castillo. So my involvement was one of, at least as I tried to keep it, the sideline spectator in protecting the ambassador's interests so that he would not do anything which might be considered improper, protecting [redacted] interest, . . . so I had public relations interests as well, and furthermore there was the thought in my mind, and perhaps even at the Washington level, that this site, although built by private benefactors, might one day down the line be used by CIA air operations." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 49-51.)	
85/08/29-250 LATE AUGUST - DECEMBER 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: C/CATF UNAWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Carome. Owen and [redacted] have both testified that later that month [August 1985], they went on a flight to look at possible sites for the airstrip. Did you know that that was going on? "[C/CATF.] Let's go through a little time warp here. I have been over and over and over the whole airstrip story in my mind, in testimony before the grand jury, in testimony both sworn and unsworn with this committee, with the Tower Commission; and the first clear recollection I have of that airstrip is [redacted] in December of	

1985 when I talked with [redacted] about it on the veranda of [redacted] talked with [redacted] about it.

"Mr. Carome. I want to get to that point.

"[C/CATF.] I just do not know. So the answer to your question is no.

"Mr. Carome. If you could turn to [C/CATF] Exhibit 15, please? Exhibit 15 is notes by Ambassador Duemling of an NHAO meeting on the 1st of October, 1985. You are listed as one of the people attending that meeting.

"About a third of the way down, on page 2, there is a reference to a discussion of the airstrip being prepared under the heading [redacted.]

"Are you telling me you have no recollection of that subject of the airstrip coming up at that meeting?

"[C/CATF.] What I am telling you is that I have seen this before. I have read Ambassador -- Assistant Secretary Elliott's testimony. I have read [redacted] testimony. It seems obvious to me that I must have been in and around discussions of that airstrip prior to December of 1985.

"But I can tell you I remember something, I can conjure up a story, and I can see shadows in my mind, but I can't give you a straight recollection. No, I can tell you that this discussion took place and after reading this six times, I can probably begin to see it in my mind. But I don't recall it having been discussed in specific terms. I don't have a clear recollection of it until that December meeting where I

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		discussed it on -- with [redacted.] I do not deny or am not saying I didn't hear about it earlier than that. But I don't recall it. I am sorry for that, because that's the big gaping hole in my testimony." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 267-68; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 15. See below at 85/12/09-400 [C/CATF testimony on what he learned in 12/85 about the Costa Rican Airstrip]. See also 85/10/01-510 [C/CATF further testimony on C/CATF Ex. 15].)	
85/08/29-400 SOMETIME IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen testifying on his memo to North about his trip to Costa Rica to locate an airstrip site, and on the airstrip project: "Mr. EGGLESTON. You also talk in your memo, do you not, about the need for a cover operation to cover the airfield; is that correct? "Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir, we felt it was very important that one be in existence. Costa Rica is a neutral country, and at that time, obviously there was no exposure to this operation, and we felt that that was the best way to keep it, was to set up a cover. "Mr. EGGLESTON. And did you have conversations with Colonel North about setting up offshore accounts? "Mr. OWEN. Yes, I did. "Mr. EGGLESTON. And a Panamanian company in order to cover this operation? Mr. OWEN. Yes, I did, but I believe that may	

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		already have been underway. I am not sure, though. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Did you take any specific steps in order to get the offshore accounts established? "Mr. OWEN. I had a meeting with the lawyer here in Washington, D.C., and asked him to draw up various ways that money could be, if you will, moved about overseas. "Mr. EGGLESTON. And did you report the results of that conversation to Colonel North? "Mr. OWEN. I gave a copy of the letter that I received from the lawyer to Colonel North. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Was there discussion of establishing a specific corporation; do you remember the name of the corporation that was going to be used as the cover? "Mr. OWEN. No, I did not, but I subsequently learned that it was Udall Corporation." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 9-10.)	
85/08/29-500 AUGUST 29, 1985		NHAO CREATED SUMMARY: By executive order signed on August 29, 1985, President Reagan establishes the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) in the Department of State to administer the $27 million in humanitarian aid for the Contras. Ambassador Robert Duemling heads the office. (Iran-Contra Report, at 61.)	
85/08/31-100	PROF SYSTEM FILE, "PRIVATE BLANK CHECK,"		

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AUGUST 31, 1985	IS SET UP POINDEXTER PROF: Poindexter PROF to North: "If you move this note in your files, I believe that you can always reply direct to me when you have sensitive info. "PRIVATE BLANK CHECK." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, Ex. 9. See Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 46-49.)		
85/08/31-103 AUGUST 31, 1985		PROF SYSTEM FILE, "PRIVATE BLANK CHECK," IS SET UP POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. What occasioned you on August 31, 1985, to give Colonel North this direct access to you? Why on that date? "A. I can't be certain. "Q. Was it the Central American affairs that did it? "A. It could be a -- it could be that. It could be hostage negotiations. [Redacted.] But I rather think that what precipitated it was that that was probably the time frame in which we instituted this software control in the system that would have his messages intercepted. That probably is more related to the time frame than any other particular event. "Q. Do you recall that in August of 1985, there had been some inquiries from the Hill about Colonel North's activities on behalf of the contras? "A. Yes. I do recall that in 1985 there were inquiries from Michael Barnes of Maryland and Lee Hamilton of Indiana, who was Chairman of the House	

Intelligence Committee at that time.

"Q. Was giving Colonel North this direct access related in any way to the inquiries that you had been getting from the Hill about his activities?

"A. Well, indirectly, yes.

"Q. How?

"A. It is related in that we -- I felt, and I think Mr. McFarlane felt the same way, that what Colonel North was doing in terms of supporting the democratic resistance was within the letter of the law at the time, although obviously very sensitive, very controversial. We wanted to avoid more restrictive legislation, and so any activity that he would have been involved with on Central America, we wanted to keep very highly compartmented.

"So that very likely played a role in my deciding to do that. Whether those particular letters that you are referring to precipitated that note, I would doubt it. But generally, the concerns that we had about keeping compartmentalized and keeping very closely held Colonel North's activities would have been an obvious factor in it.

"Q. Did you discuss with Mr. McFarlane the fact that you were giving North this direct access?

"A. I don't believe I did.

"Q. Do you know whether or not Colonel North had that kind of code-word direct access to Mr. McFarlane?

"A. I don't know, but I would doubt it

because I don't think Mr. McFarlane understood how the system worked in that level of detail.

". . . .

"Q. Tell me, in August, 1985, as you best recall it, without getting into detail, what were the issues that North was working on?

"A. In August of '85? He was working on the Central America issue, keeping the contras supported. He was working on the Vice President's task force on countering terrorism. He was working on the hostage issue. He was working in August of 1985 -- I don't think he was working on the Iranian project in August of '85. I don't think he came into that until November of '85.

"Q. Is there a priority among these matters that he was working on that you characterize?

"A. Well, I would certainly have considered the most important thing he was working on Central America. I don't recall we actually prioritized it."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 46-49.)

85/09/00-002
AROUND
SEPTEMBER
1985

THE RESUPPLY OPERATION
GADD ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Q. Sir, in or about September 1985, did General Secord contact you in reference to setting up an air re-supply operation?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What did he say in reference to that?

"A. First, verbally to describe how that could be done. Subsequently he asked me to develop a plan.

"Q. Did he specify to you that it was a plan to drop weapons and other supplies in the area of Central America?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did you draw up such a plan?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And who[m] did you give it to?

"A. General Secord.

"Q. Did General Secord tell you to whom he was taking the plan for approval?

"A. General Secord said he was taking it to the White House.

"Q. As a result of the plan, did you investigate and subsequently discuss with General Secord the various types of aircraft necessary to conduct this operation?

"A. Yes.

". . . .

"A. When we were unable to arrange for the purchase of C-123s, we changed to C-7 Caribou.

"Q. Do you know whether Secord presented this option of the planes to anyone at the White House?

"A. He indicated to me that the White House approved that choice of aircraft.

"Q. Did Secord tell you that there would be an opportunity for you to profit from your involvement in this re-supply operation?

"A. Ultimately, yes.

"Q. And how did he tell you that?

"A. That we would be given the opportunity to set up the air operation in Central America, and to charge an overhead plus fee.

". . . .

"Q. What, if anything, did General Secord

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		tell you about the covert nature of the operation? "A. Covert is not the correct word. "Q. Okay. Why don't you tell me what would be. "A. I would say more accurately confidential air activity to support or provide air support to the contras. "Q. Did he tell you why it had to be confidential? "A. It was implied that this kind of operation should be kept very low key and not be known to the general public. "Q. Specifically, did he tell you it should be kept secret to protect the sponsorship of the United States Government in this operation? "A. I was told to protect both his name and the White House. That was the implication." (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 12-14.)	
85/09/00-003 AROUND SEPTEMBER 1985		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION GADD ACCOUNT, Part 2: Gadd's account of his involvement, at Secord's request, in setting up the resupply operation continued: "Q. And sir, did you subsequently hire Edward DeGaray in this operation? "A. I did. "Q. And did you explain to General Secord that DeGaray would be useful as a cut-off [sic (cut-out?)]? "A. Yes. "Q. To protect the identity of the Government and General Secord?	

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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		"A. Correct. "Q. When I say the identity of the Government, the sponsorship of the United States Government. "A. Ray was hired to conduct the operation, and by using Garay, Garay would not know that General Secord or the United States, or the White House was involved. "Q. Sir, did you contact Southern Air Transport to purchase and help maintain the aircraft? "A. Yes. "Q. And did you ask them to acquire a shell company in Panama to hold title to the aircraft? "A. Yes. "Q. Did they agree to do so? "A. Yes. "Q. And what was the name of the company they acquired? "A. I think the name was Amalgamated Consolidated Enterprise, also known as ACE. "Q. And was there a plan between you and Southern Air Transport? "A. Yes. "Q. To share ownership of Ace? "A. That is correct. "Q. What would be the ownership percentage? "A. Fifty percent for Southern Air Transport, and 50 percent for my companies. "Q. And in addition to that, was there any plan to use the aircraft for commercial purposes, for additional revenue and as a cover for the operations?	

"A. Yes. That is correct."
(Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 14-16.)

85/09/00-010
[LATE AUGUST
- MID
SEPTEMBER
1985]

SUMMER 1985 TOWs SHIPMENT: NOTICE OF TOWs SHIPPED, AND WEIR'S RELEASE

McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

McFarlane on the Israeli shipment of TOWs to Iran and the subsequent release of Rev. Benjamin Weir in Lebanon:

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, there came a time when you learned that Israel had shipped the TOWs?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And did you learn that they shipped more than 100 TOWs?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Who told you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I am not certain. It is possible it was Mr. Kimche. Could be Mr. Ledeen. I learned that there had been 508, I believe.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did there come a time when you received a call from an Israeli representative telling you that as a result, an American hostage would be allowed to go free?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Was that a very unpleasant call?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it was extemely disappointing.

". . . .

"Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . [I]t was the report from Mr. Kimche in Israel that, as a practical matter, they had run into difficulties with the Iranian intermediaries . . . .

"His call must have been on or about the 10th

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			or 12th of September. "Mr. LIMAN. Were you asked to play God and choose one hostage? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. And I asked for Mr. Buckley. "Mr. LIMAN. And it brought home to you, I take it, what it meant to be negotiating for hostages? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it was very clear that this was not a--the kind of exchange that was proper. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you report to the President that as a result of the Israeli shipment, a hostage would be released? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And you told him ultimately that it was Mr. Weir. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. I believe it was on a Sunday [Sept. 15, 1985] when we got word of that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 122-23.)
85/09/00-013 SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 TOWs SHIPMENT REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. SMILJANICH. In September of 1985, Mr. McFarlane specifically advised you and the President that the Israelis had in fact shipped 500 TOW missiles to Iran; is that correct? "Mr. REGAN. That is right. "Mr. SMILJANICH. All right. "Is it your testimony that . . . you and the President did not know prior to that shipment of TOW missiles that Israel intended to do so?

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			"Mr. REGAN. I certainly did not know it, and I have no recollection of anyone telling the President in my presence about the shipment prior to its being done. "Mr. SMILJANICH. What was said at that meeting in September of 1985 about the replenishment of the missiles that Israel had shipped to Iran? "Mr. REGAN. The President was quite upset that his hand was being forced this way. He still wasn't certain, because he had told McFarlane in the August 6 meeting to go slow on this and let's make sure we know who[m] we are dealing with before we get too f[illegible] into this. "As a result, to have his hand forced that way was quite upsetting. And he said, 'As far as any replenishment is concerned, we will cross that bridge later. I am not going to do anything about that now.['] "Mr. SMILJANICH. It would be fair to say he did not rule out the possibility at that time? "Mr. REGAN. He didn't, but he didn't volunteer to do it right away either." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 29-30. See 86/11/19-332.)
85/09/00-014 AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 TOWs SHIPMENT: U.S. AUTHORIZATION REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Let me go back just briefly and trace the history of this sale. I think in August you indicated, August of 1985, there was a discussion in the White House, upstairs in the President's private quarters [see above entries

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			starting at 85/08/06-022]; at that time as I recall your testimony before the Intelligence Committee, you indicated no decision had been made at that time. And Bud McFarlane has since testified that the President spoke with him directly either in response or by phone giving him the go-ahead on the proposed plan. "I recall your testimony before the Intelligence Committee, you indicated that--and I think you conformed that today--that President Reagan was upset when he found out the Israelis had, in fact, gone forward, expressed that displeasure to Mr. McFarlane and asked him to convey it to the Israelis, but not go public with it; is that correct? "Mr. REGAN. That is correct. "Mr. COHEN. I guess what is troubling to me is--and there are many implausibilities in this entire affair we have been discussing for the past several months. But what doesn't seem plausible to me is that Bud McFarlane, who[m] I don't regard as a man who takes great steps without authority, he is fairly cautious, to say the least, would deliberately ignore the President's directive to go slow and walk out and tell the Israelis to go forward and ship the TOWs and worry about the replenishment later. "Does that sound reasonable to you that he would do that? "Mr. REGAN. I have never thought that McFarlane told them to go ahead. My understanding was that they, as he described it to us, they went ahead in spite of what he had told them rather

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			than with his knowledge. "Mr. COHEN. Does it sound reasonable or plausible to you knowing the Israelis they would go forward and deplete--not deplete, but diminish this inventory of TOW missiles without some sort of a guarantee that they would, in fact, be replaced at a future time? "Mr. REGAN. I can't answer that. I don't know what was in the minds of the Iraelis. What I was looking for here in my notes, I have notes somewhere that the--John Poindexter, at the November 10th [1986] meeting giving the background to everybody, in there described the fact that the Israelis had gone ahead without our permission. "This is Poindexter now, who is the deputy at the time the incident happened, describing it to the rest of us and saying the same thing. "So there was no presidential knowledge, no presidential concept. So the Israelis apparently took a chance that if they did something that pleased us, we would replace them. "Mr. COHEN. Now, was that the same notion that was held in November when you and the President were aware that a shipment of munitions w[as] to go to the Iranians? "Mr. REGAN. I suspect and I can't remember that exactly, Senator, but I suspect that if we knew in advance that much in advance of this happening, that we had either tacitly or openly had agreed that we would replace those missiles, the Hawk missiles for the Israelis. "Mr. COHEN. So by November, at least, there had been a change of attitude within the White

House that the Israelis, acting without authority in August or September, were acting with your either approval or acquiescence--not yours, but the President's acquiescence or approval--in November, prior to the time you were off to Geneva?

"Mr. REGAN. That's right."

(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 116-19. On the November 1985 shipment, see below at 85/11/20-303 and surrounding entries.)

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SUMMER 1985 IRAN TRANSACTIONS: NORTH'S KNOWLEDGE
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on the extent of his knowledge in September 1985 that the Israelis were shipping TOWs to Iran:

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . Were you aware at the time of the . . . September TOW transactions?

"Mr. NORTH. . . . It is my recollection now that I was aware that some kind of transaction was going to take place, that I had been briefed on this by representatives of the Israeli Government in general terms . . . .

". . . .

"Mr. NORTH. . . . As a consequence . . ., I was aware there was indeed a transaction occurring, although I did not know, I don't believe, the specific details of it until somewhat later.

"I did make arrangements in September to position certain of our assets to receive Reverend Weir, and indeed I went to meet with him carrying a letter from the President.

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			"So we did have specific information, knowledge that he would be released." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 63-64.)
85/09/00-040 AUGUST 30 - MID-SEPTEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 TOWs SHIPMENT: GEORGE'S KNOWLEDGE; AND NORTH'S CONTACT WITH ALLEN GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. Now, we know from other testimony and documents that have been put before the committee that the Israeli shipment of TOW missiles, the first shipment of TOW missiles occurred the last of August, the first of September and that there was then a subsequent shipment of 408 TOW missiles in mid-September of 1985. "Do you recall -- "Mr. George. Excuse me. Two Israeli shipments in September? "Mr. Kerr. One begins on August 30, but, yes -- "Mr. George. Two different loads? I should know that but I don't. "Mr. Kerr. In terms of what you all know we have received information from [redacted] there was following of cable traffic that allowed you to at least have a suspicion. [Sic.] "Mr. George. There were newspaper reports in the Israeli press. A plane had crash landed at the Jerusalem airport. [Redacted.] There were signs, glips in the air in the fall of '85 something was going on between Israel and Iran. "Mr. Kerr. If I understand your testimony, in

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			terms of knowing of a relationship between Manucher Ghorbanifar, [redacted] and that knowledge you did not have that? "Mr. George. No, nor do I believe anyone in my directorate would have had that. "Mr. Kerr. Focusing on the September period, you are familiar with Mr. Allen's testimony he received an assignment he places about September 9, another document places it September 12, to begin [redacted] for Colonel North? "Mr. George. Yes. "Mr. Kerr. He also indicated that you would have [been] a recipient of that material. Do you recall when you received it? "Mr. George. I disagree with Mr. Allen. I'm sure he may believe that he sent it to me. I think throughout this entire affair Mr. Allen, who was National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism, who was not under my direction, forgive me for saying it again, the intelligence officer on counterterrorism reports directly, in theory, to the Director. In fact, I'm told Mr. Allen was told by Colonel North at the time this took place he was not to share this material with members of the Operations Directorate." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 275-77.)
85/09/00-050 FROM SEPTEMBER 1985			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NORTH'S AND CASEY'S SHUTTING OUT THE CIA OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Kerr. . . . Can you give me an understanding, if you have one, of why it was that

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			Colonel North in September of 1985 looked to NIO Allen for this type of assistance [see 85/09/00-040] as opposed to going through the Agency to its Operations Directorate and asking you all to do that? "Mr. George. He didn't want us to know about it. "Mr. Kerr. Do you have any understanding today as to why he didn't want you to know about it? "Mr. George. I think they were going to run an operation on their own. "Mr. Kerr. When you use the term 'they', you are referring to the NSC? "Mr. George. I guess so. I would say that. But it is based on an awful lot of television and newspapers over the last three months. "Mr. Kerr. Let me focus on Director Casey for a moment. Mr. Allen's testimony is while he didn't tell Director Casey the day he got the assignment he did have a session with Director Casey within the matter of a day or two after the assignment to go over [redacted.] Did Director Casey apprise you in September of 1985 that Mr. Allen was engaged in this kind of [redacted] effort [redacted.] "Mr. George. No, he did not. "Mr. Kerr. When did you learn, if you can recall, that Mr. Allen was engaged in this type of task? "Mr. George. The unpe[e]ling of the onion, of the relationships, the complicated relationships that are involved in the Iranian caper came in

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			degrees and degrees and degrees, and we will discuss them I'm sure, the famous flight, when did we know arms were aboard it, when Michael Ledeen approached us independently of the National Security Council in promoting Mr. Ghorbanifar; my first recollection of [redacted] that was suddenly being made available to me with great regularity, and I knew the purpose, although I will testify I didn't follow it because there was so damn much of it I couldn't, was after the finding. The finding formalized my participation in it. "Mr. Kerr. This strikes me as something of an incongruity here that I wanted to explore to you. The Director turned to the Operations Directorate when he had a shady problem in the fall of 1985. The Director apparently turned to Mr. Allen on a project Colonel North was working on without telling the Operations Director in the fall of 1985, again ultimately as we now know relating to Mr. Ghorbanifar. Was there anything that occurred with regard to the way you all handled the Hashemi matter that left a bad taste or problems between you all and the Director to your knowledge? "Mr. George. The issue is we never had a fighting charge on the Ghorbanifar -- I'm jumping to my conclusion. We never had a jumping chance on Ghorbanifar. It wasn't the Hashemi case or it wasn't Ledeen indeed sort of saying this guy is really sensational, he can get a lot of terrorism information. "Whether Casey knew it or not, our reaction was going to be this won't work, but the White House was already working it. In other words, we

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			never played with a full deck. I'm running around saying, hey, here is my burn notice, this guy is a loser, and, Christ, he is working with the Government of Israel, he has already arranged a flight, he has helped, I assume, I'm sure you know, he had arranged the November flight or was an intermediary and I'm running around saying we don't want to work with him when two major countries, the Government of Israel, a close ally and ourselves are still working with him. It's sort of would you please get out of the way. They never dealt us a whole deck." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 279-81.)
85/09/00-051 FROM SEPTEMBER 1985			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: CASEY'S SHUTTING OUT THE CIA OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Kerr. . . . [W]ith regard to Director Casey, again, trying to focus in on what happened, is there anything that you know of in terms of Director Casey's perception of the operations directorate that allowed him to cause this to happen, to have you all marching in one direction while Colonel North on a major initiative is marching in another? "Mr. George. Well, you have have [sic] to tell me in your report at what point and did Director Casey, is it really true, decide we need something besides the operations directorate to run covert operations? And I might say to you, counsel, and to the good members that this is not the first administration and will not be the last

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			that becomes totally frustrated with its spy service. You want a spy service that produces regularly and we don't. Life is tough. And so at what point a director, and we saw a bit of it in the previous administration and the administration before that, and God knows, the administration before that, I am going to set up an operation and I am going to run it around these bureaucrats. "Mr. Kerr. Did you yourself have a perception in the fall of 1985 that Director Casey was prepared to wire around the operations directorate? "Mr. George. Not really. I know that now, but, no, my -- again, I know this is the hearing, and this is the issue, and it is Iran and contras, which I am sure we will discuss. May I say forgive me, I have [redacted] Americans that work for me, I have [redacted] foreign nationals who support our intelligence service abroad, I have people in [redacted] posts outside the continental United States and we send back and forth any month, God knows most of it is trivia, [redacted] telegrams. So this was not my whole world, and if he would have cut me out of a corner of something I would have been so busy doing 20 other things I am not sure I would have noted it. "Mr. Kerr. That may underscore the point, but I would point out to you we have a State Department cable which says [redacted] was quite negative on the Hashemi initiative. I was curious whether or not you had received as of the fall of 1985 any feedback from the Director that suggested he though you all had been less than aggressive?

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			"Mr. George. No, not at all. In fact, to the day I last saw Bill Casey and I had gone into the hospital last fall and many days later Bill Casey went in the hospital, let me assure all of you that he was a warm colleague of mine, I always believed him to be fair, and he was the Director and if he made certain operational decisions, he made them. "But personally, although he was not an intimate, personal friend, never at all, he was always good to me." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 282-83.)
85/09/00-070 SEPTEMBER 1985 - JANUARY 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: CIA EXCLUDED GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. In terms of what that leaves us, I would like to kind of summarize where we have been in the period between June of '85 and January of '86 when you all got your assignments. "One of the things that you all are responsible for doing is collecting information off American shores of things that related to American foreign policy and risks to the national security; isn't that right? "Mr. George. We are the primary collector of human intelligence outside the Continental United States. "Mr. Kerr. So knowing what's going on beyond our borders is a big part of your portfolio? "Mr. George. Sometimes we make it, sometimes we don't. "Mr. Kerr. In this situation we have a situation where, for a variety of reasons, you

didn't know what was going on.

"Mr. George. We knew less about what was going on in Washington than we did overseas.

"Mr. Kerr. You were being cut off inside your own capital from information that would allow you to know what was going on outside; isn't that right?

"Mr. George. In September of '85, Bill Casey had me, John McMahon, Bob Gates in his office, and Bill Casey said, 'I've just had a strange meeting in the White House. Bud McFarlane informs me that the Israelis have approached them, the Israelis have established a contact with Iranian interests, and these contacts could lead to an opening of a dialogue with certain Iranians and to release of the hostages. But the Israelis have one demand: CIA not be informed.' And there was a twinkle in Casey's eye and he said, 'I wonder what in hell this is all about.'

"[Redacted.]

"Mr. Kerr. Let me just try to crystallize the points. Your job was made tougher. You were blinded by the lack of information.

"Mr. George. I don't want to appear -- I'm not going to sit here and say, my God, I didn't know a thing, I'm an innocent child in the woods. An important policy decision was made between the government of Israel and the government of the United States to ship arms to Iran for the purpose of getting hostages and getting a dialogue. It was decided to do that within the White House with only, in January, the technical support of the CIA.

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			"Mr. Kerr. But what that means is that the professional skill and expertise that was within your operational directorate -- "Mr. George. Was not used properly. "Mr. Kerr. And it was not brought to the attention of the President? "Mr. George. I do not know what the President knew." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 22-24.)
85/09/00-075 SEPTEMBER 1985 THROUGH 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: CIA EXCLUDED GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Stokes. As you reflect back now in terms of hindsight, do you think the CIA did a good job of monitoring the intelligence on the Iranian initiative or not? "Mr. George. Was our performance a good performance -- "Mr. Stokes. Basically I think that is what I'm getting at, your evaluation. "Mr. George. I'm to blame for most of it because I -- I mean of what I know about it. I don't know what the hell an intelligence service does when it is not allowed to participate fully inside what is basically a clandestine operation. "I think that a terrible mistake was made in the summer of '85 when, if I am to believe what I'm told, the Israelis came to Bud McFarlane and said, 'We've got a deal, but don't tell CIA.' [See 85/09/00-070.] I think you make a great mistake not telling your spy service. "First of all, your spy service is everywhere and starts hearing about things. I think what

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			should have happened at that particular moment is that we, not necessarily me, but whomever [sic], John McMahon, Bill Casey, representatives from my service, should have sat down with McFarlane and been allowed to help decide the validity of the Israeli request. When that didn't happen, when we played with less than a full deck, as I said, I think we protected ourselves -- if I exaggerated anywhere along the line, I became very protective of the institution. I think we did not do badly in protecting ourselves. I cannot be proud of our overall performance because if we would have succeeded, this would never have happened." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 178-79.)
85/09/00-100 LATE SUMMER OR EARLY FALL 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 3 SIGUR ACCOUNT: After Sigur arranges the meeting between North and the Country 3 official at the Hay-Adams Hotel in August 1985, the Country 3 official tells Sigur that Country 3 "had decided to provide some humanitarian assistance financially to the contras . . . in the amount of $1 million." This conversation occurs "a while" later, "probably weeks . . . [s]ummer of 1985, yes, in the fall." Sigur then reports the message to North. "[A] few days later . . . [North] asked if I would call this particular official and say that someone on behalf of the contras would go and talk to him and tell him how the funds should be transmitted. So I passed that on to the official." The Country 3 official later tells Sigur he	

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		did meet with a representative of the Contras. Both North and the Country 3 official later tell Sigur that Country 3 has sent the $1 million contribution to the Contras. Sigur does not bring the matter up with McFarlane. (Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 116-19; see also id., 5/14/87, at 104-16, 119-21 [Sigur's other contacts with the Country 3 official about the Contras].)	
85/09/00-110 LATE SUMMER OR EARLY FALL 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 3 OWEN ACCOUNT: North invites Owen to his office where he tells Owen that Country 3 wishes to provide assistance to the Contras. North asks Owen to deliver an envelope to a Country 3 official. North tells Owen that the envelope contains a bank account number, probably from a Swiss bank. Owen meets with the Country 3 representative and tells him he is "a private citizen . . . not representing the United States Government." Owen delivers the envelope. He does not learn whether Country 3 makes the contribution. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 11-14 [Owen commenting on Sigur's testimony that he set up a meeting at North's request for the Country 3 official to meet a Contra representative: Owen probably was the Contra rep, "and Gaston Sigur's name had been mentioned to" him.].)	
85/09/00-120 JULY AND INTO AUGUST 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 3, AND GENERAL ACTIVITIES NORTH ACCOUNT: Asked whether he instructed Sigur to meet with	

officials of Country 3, North testified:

"Mr. NORTH. First of all, I didn't instruct Dr. Sigur to do that. I probably asked him, and the word 'asked' is indeed underlined in my notes.

"Mr. NIELDS. You asked him. Did you talk to Mr. McFarlane before you asked him to do that?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. You got his approval?

"Mr. NORTH. You bet.

"Mr. NIELDS. The you asked Gaston to go meet with the officials of Country Three?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And then after Gaston had done that, you asked him to set up a meeting for you?

"Mr. NORTH. Right.

"Mr. NIELDS. And representatives of Country Three?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And at that meeting, you told them that . . . this country would be very grateful if they were to make the contribution?

"Mr. NORTH. I did.

"Mr. NIELDS. And then and only then they actually made it?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. And you then sent Mr. Owen with an account number so that the officials of Country Three would know where to send the money?

"Mr. NORTH. I recall that happening.

"Mr. NIELDS. And that was the account which Mr. Secord had set up in Switzerland?

"Mr. NORTH. I guess so, yes. I don't

remember exactly which account number I gave him.

"Mr. NIELDS. But it was one of Secord's accounts?

"Mr. NORTH. I believe it was.

"Mr. NIELDS. And those accounts had been set up at your suggestion?

"Mr. NORTH. Absolutely, as part of a covert operation to support the Nicaraguan resistance.

"Mr. NIELDS. To receive moneys to support the Nicaraguan resistance?

"Mr. NORTH. Absolutely.

"Mr. NIELDS. And it wasn't under the control of the Nicaraguans?

"Mr. NORTH. No.

"Mr. NIELDS. It was under the control of Secord, who was responding to your direction?

"Mr. NORTH. I'm not sure that a major general is going to be happy with words saying that he was responding to my direction. General Secord was indeed cooperating in every way that I asked him to, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Who was in charge? You were a government official. He was not. He's a major general. You are a lieutenant colonel. Are you telling this committee that because he had a higher rank when he was with the government that he was the boss?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, he was the boss of what? He was the boss of the organizations and the commercial enterprises that he set up to assist the Nicaraguan resistance, and that I eventually asked him to expand out into other covert operations, and he did those things.

"Mr. NIELDS. He did those at your request, did he not?

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct. But you said 'direction.' I think he would probably take umbrage with that.

"Mr. NIELDS. I am not asking you whether he would take umbrage; I am asking you whether the United States Government retained control over this covert operation.

"Mr. NORTH. I [sic] tried to, counsel. Tried to.

"Mr. NIELDS. And indeed all of the money that went into that bank account in Switzerland resulted from your efforts?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't know that, no, because you say 'that bank account.' I'm not sure to this day exactly how much money went into that bank account or which bank account.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, I can tell you that the committees' records reflect that the monies that went into those bank accounts came from the proceeds to sales of arms to Iran, from Country Three, directly or indirectly from Spitz Channell's organizations, a little bit from the Government of Israel and one deposit from Joseph Coors.

"And my question to you is: Isn't it true that you were responsible for directing all of that money into those accounts?

"Mr. NORTH. My sense is that the ones you have just identified -- except that I don't know that it is the Government of Israel; I believe it was an Israeli private citizen -- I would agree

that I am the person that caused that money to go into those accounts."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 206-10.)

85/09/01-000
SOMETIME IN
SEPTEMBER
1985

ABRAMS-TAMBS CONTACT
TAMBS ACCOUNT:

Tambs speaks with Elliott Abrams about the Costa Rican airstrip while at a chief of missions meeting in Panama. During the meeting, the difficulty in getting an agreement with the Costa Rican government is mentioned. According to Tambs, Abrams is informed "that the hang-up was they couldn't get an agreement with the private owners of the airstrip." Abrams indicates familiarity with the project, but Tambs does not tell him the instructions he was given by North through Castillo about approaching the Costa Rican government to ensure the airstrip is built.
(Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 158-61. See id., 5/28/87, at 202-03 [opening a southern front discussed at chief of missions meeting in Florida in Sept. 1986].)

85/09/01-001
SEPTEMBER
1985 AND
THEREAFTER

THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: WHO KNEW
TAMBS ACCOUNT:

Tambs testified further on the Panama meeting and his contact there with Abrams about the airstrip:

"Mr. DEWINE. . . . You had a conversation with Elliott Abrams in Panama at this Panama meeting, I believe; is that correct?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes.

"Mr. DEWINE. Was that the first time any discussion had taken place between you and Mr. Abrams in regard to this airstrip or southern strip?

"Mr. TAMBS. That is correct.

"Mr. DEWINE. All right.

"And how long did that conversation last? Do you have any idea?

"Mr. TAMBS. What, three minutes? Four?

"Mr. DEWINE. My understanding is that was in the hallway.

"Mr. TAMBS. That is right, exactly.

"Mr. DEWINE. At that time, did he give you any specific instructions [a]bout what to do in regard to the southern front or in regard to the airstrip?

"Mr. TAMBS. No, he didn't give me anything, tell me anything not to do either.

"Mr. DEWINE. You got the impression he knew what was going on, but there is no, no instructions [sic].

"Is that my [sic] understanding?

"Mr. TAMBS. That is correct.

"Mr. DEWINE. Did he at any time give you any instructions about that later on?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, now, on a couple times--

"Mr. DEWINE. Specific orders, something that you would follow?

"Mr. TAMBS. No.

"Mr. DEWINE. Either way?

"Mr. TAMBS. No.

"On one occasion, I [k]now, at least two, he expressed his concern about reluctance of the new

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government.

"Mr. DEWINE. All right.

"At what point in time?

"Mr. TAMBS. I would not say that that was an instruction.

"Mr. DEWINE. Anybody else in the United States Government with the exception of Mr. North and with the exception of the CIA Station Chief down there, did you get instructions from anybody else about this airstrip?

"Mr. TAMBS. No, no. I discussed it, as I testified earlier, with Mr. Casey.

"Mr. DEWINE. All right.

"Now--

"Mr. TAMBS. But he is not giving me instructions.

"Mr. DEWINE. That is at some later date, I believe?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes, right.

"Mr. DEWINE. I want to make sure I understand.

"Is it my [sic] understanding, Mr. Ambassador, that your contact in regard to this whole operation was primarily with your CIA Station Chief? Is that a fair statement or not?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir, in general, that is correct.

"Mr. DEWINE. All right.

"You also had some contact with Ollie North; is that correct?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes. Very peripheral, yes.

". . . .

"Mr. DEWINE. Now, you have testified that you

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		assumed that the instructions were coming from the RIG; is that correct? "Mr. TAMBS. Right." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 220-223. See id., 5/28/87, at 239-40 [Tambs on the Panama meeting: "It was basically one of those hallway affairs, because there seemed to be a cast of thousands, but it was obvious to me, at least as I understand it, that he knew as much about it as I did."].)	
85/09/01-100 SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: ABRAMS' KNOWLEDGE TAMBS ACCOUNT: "Chairman INOUYE. Would you be surprised if you were told that Secretary Abrams has testified that he was not aware of the construction of the air strip before it was started? "Mr. TAMBS. Well, I can't speak for Secretary of State Abrams. I would be somewhat surprise[d] but -- "Chairman INOUYE. Is his memory failing him? "Mr. TAMBS. Well, he might have been distracted. I don't know what context that he possibly received the information, or whatever, and really only he can speak for himself. . . . ". . . . "Chairman INOUYE. Secretary Abrams has testified that he does not recall discussing this assignment with Ambassador Tambs during the September 1985 Central American Chiefs of Mission Conference. "Mr. TAMBS. I did not know, sir, that he testified that.	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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		"Chairman INOUYE. But you are convinced that at that time he did discuss it with you as you have testified? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87 at 204-06.)	
85/09/01-200 SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER OR LATE FALL 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: ABRAMS' KNOWLEDGE TAMBS ACCOUNT: Abrams attends a briefing in Costa Rica with various embassy officers and U.S. Government personnel: "Mr. BELNICK. Can you tell us what you recall having happened at that briefing in connection with the airfield? "Mr. TAMBS. Well, Tomas Castillo was also present. ". . . . "Mr. TAMBS. And the Assistant Secretary began to talk about the airstrip as if the people in the room were familiar with it? "The vast majority -- that is, all of them with probably the exception of Castillo and myself -- were not. I thought that Castillo was going to have a cardiac arrest for a minute. So -- because it was -- everything was on a need-to-know basis. And Mr. Abrams was pulled aside by Tomas Castillo and advised of his possible indiscretion." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 161-62.)	
85/09/01-201 SEPTEMBER 1985 AND THEREAFTER		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: WHO KNEW TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs summarized the persons familiar with the airfield project: Tambs; Castillo; the deputy	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		chief of mission; Col. John Lent, the defense attache or political military advisor ("But he really was not in on the action."); North; Abrams; Chief of the CIA CATF; Casey (Tambs spoke with him "[m]uch later. . . . I believe it was the end of July 1986."); Poindexter (Tambs spoke with him about the airstrip sometime between mid-December 1985 and early January 1986). (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 162-66. See id., 5/28/87, at 289-91.)	
85/09/01-210 SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: ABRAMS' KNOWLEDGE CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Castillo testifying on Abrams' awareness of the construction of the airstrip in Costa Rica: "Mr. Barbadoro. Do you recall a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Abrams about the construction of the airstrip? "Mr. Castillo. Yes[,] sir. ". . . . "Mr. Barbadoro. Who was present during that conversation? "Mr. Castillo. Two station officers. "Mr. Barbadoro. And what happened in the conversation? "Mr. Castillo. At the end of the briefing that we gave Assistant Secretary Abrams[,] he turned to me and asked me about Point West--'tell me about Point West.' "I was, frankly, quite surprised that he would ask about Point West because I did not know how he would have known that I knew about Point West, since it was a--I thought it was a compartmented	

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		subject. ". . . . "Mr. Barbadoro. Did he say how he learned of Point West? "Mr. Castillo. I asked him how he had learned about it and he said that Colonel North told him about it. I then asked him if the Chief of the Central American Forces knew . . ., and he said he did." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 47-48. See id., at 161-62 [Castillo told Abrams only where the airstrip was located.], 170-73 [Rep. Rodino commented that Castillo was surprised that Abrams knew about the airstrip, yet did not wonder when Robert Owen toured it and took pictures. Castillo responded, "It is not cause for surprise to have a private American going about . . . in pursuit of his own personal interests as in the case of Robert Owen. The fact that I had accompanied Robert Owen is not necessarily a surprising thing, but to have the assistant secretary of State query out of the blue sky in front of two of my officers about something they didn't know about, yes, that surprised me."].)	
85/09/01-220 LATE FALL 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: ABRAMS' KNOWLEDGE ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testifying on his question to Castillo about the airstrip: "Mr. BELNICK. Didn't there come a time in the fall of 1985 when you were in Costa Rica meeting with the senior CIA representative and two of his assistants, correct?	

"Mr. ABRAMS. That is correct.

"Mr. BELNICK. And you asked him, what about the airstrip, because you were surprised he hadn't mentioned it to you; is that correct?

"Mr. ABRAMS. That's correct.

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . [W]eren't you surprised because you believed that he knew about the airstrip?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I was surprised because I had spent a[t] least, I would say by memory, at least an hour with the station chief and two of his staff members. And they gave me what was purported by them and believe[d] by me to be a totally complete briefing on everything going on in Costa Rica. There wasn't supposed to be a lawn[ ]getting mo[wed] in Costa Rica without them knowing about it.

". . . .

"They gave me a full, complete, total briefing. I knew something they didn't seem to know. I had been told there was an airstrip being built. Come on, how is it possible they did not know this?

"I said to the station chief when the briefing was theoretically over, 'Isn't there an airstrip being built someplace?'

"I believe he has testified correctly that he nearly had a cardiac. I thought he was going to fall off his chair. He looked at me and he looked at the two guys, and he looked at me and looked at the two guys. It became apparent that his real concern was them. He said something to the effect that they don't know about that or they didn't know about that. They knew about it then.

"It just seemed to me obvious that if somebody is building a--I mean, he was supposed to be reporting on things like this. It was very odd to me he didn't know about it.

"Of course, he did know about it. He said to me, 'Yes, these two guys didn't know about that. Yes,' and he showed me--my memory is he actually had a map or we had a map or there was a map in the room. He showed me where it was, and he said something to the effect that 'It isn't open yet' or 'It isn't sta[r]ted yet.'

"In other words, this is an airstrip which is not in use, was what stayed in my mind. That was the end of that.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you ask the station chief why it was such a secret from others who were working with him?

"Mr. ABRAMS. No. I had no reason to question who in his station he was telling what.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you ask the station chief whether anybody from our government was involved in the construction of the airstrip?

"Mr. ABRAMS. No. It had been presented to me, I think, as a private benefactor effort. I did not assume and do not assume people are violating the law."

(Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 54-57.)

85/09/01-600
SOMETIME IN
AUGUST OR
SEPTEMBER

THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: PRIVATE BENEFACTORS' INVOLVEMENT

ABRAMS ACCOUNT:

Abrams first learns about the airstrip

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1985		project: "Mr. BELNICK. When did you first learn of that proposed airstrip project? "Mr. ABRAMS. . . . I learned of the existence of the airstrip probably in August, being that I was sworn in late in July. Probably in August of 1985, maybe September of 1985. But that's the time period. "Mr. BELNICK. How did you learn of the project at that time? "Mr. ABRAMS. I don't recall any conversation in particular in which I was told of it. The--as you know, the former station chief has testified that I told him that it was Colonel North. That's perfectly logical and plausible to me. "Mr. BELNICK. You don't recall whether you learned about the airstrip from Colonel North or from someone in the Agency? "Mr. ABRAMS. That's correct. I don't recall. "Mr. BELNICK. What do you recall learning? "Mr. ABRAMS. That there was an airstrip being built by the private benefactors, as we used to call them, in Costa Rica, that this was a project which was either under way or about to be under way, period. "Mr. BELNICK. Did you learn whether the United States Government or any U.S. Government officials were involved in that project? "Mr. ABRAMS. Well, it was pretty clear from the way it was told to me that no U.S. Government officials were involved in the project. That would have been illegal. "Mr. BELNICK. Did someone tell you	

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		specifically no U.S. Government officials were involved? "Mr. ABRAMS. I doubt it was said in so many words. It was obvious no U.S. Government officials could be involved. "Mr. BELNICK. How was it obvious? "Mr. ABRAMS. It would have been illegal. "Mr. BELNICK. Therefore you assumed no one was involved? "Mr. ABRAMS. Yes." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 50-52.)	
85/09/01-640 SOMETIME IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: SHULTZ' UNAWARENESS ABRAMS ACCOUNT: When Abrams learns of the airstrip "[p]robably in August . . . maybe September of 1985," he does not report it to Shultz. "Not important," Abrams explained. "Private benefactors were presumably doing a whole lot of things. I mean, they were sending machines guns and bullets and all kinds of things into Central America. That was generally common knowledge. "It was known by us, it was known by the Congress. That there should be in addition to this use of an airstrip in Central America to facilitate their activities, I mean, surprise, surprise." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 60-61.)	
85/09/02-100 SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER 1985	SINGLAUB PUBLICITY SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Gen. Singlaub, inundated with requests from the news media (especially in the Washington, D.C.	THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD GARWOOD ACCOUNT: Garwood meets with North for the third time. Channell and Calero are also present at the	

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	area) hires a public relations firm. The firm is to help Singlaub as he hosts "a major worldwide conference of the World Anti-Communist League, . . . [with] over 100 nations coming to Dallas." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 220-21; see id., 5/21/87, at 231-33.)	meeting at the airport in Dallas. North tells Garwood the Contras' supplies are delayed "and that there was some mix-up or tangle where there was no transportation to take them across the border from Honduras to their camps." North does not ask Garwood for money. "[H]e always said, 'I am not asking you for money. I can't. I am not supposed to.'" Following the meeting with North, however, Channell talks money. He requests $32,000 "for transportation for trucks and boats and things to take the materials that were being sent, supposedly for humanitarian aid." Garwood make her second contribution to Channell, this time for $32,000. (Garwood Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 71-73. See id., 5/21/87, at 109-13.)	
85/09/02-150 SOMETIME IN 1984-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE ONE-TWO PUNCH GARWOOD ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. And Mr. North told you of it, according to your deposition, that there was a need for all sorts of things down in Nicaragua, particularly, I believe, possibly trucks and other supplies. " . . . . "Mr. RUDMAN. And they didn't have trucks to move [supplies] with? "Mrs. GARWOOD. That's right. "Mr. RUDMAN. And then Colonel North left and Mr. Channell took you back to your hotel in a cab; is that correct? "Mrs. GARWOOD. Yes.	

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JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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		"Mr. RUDMAN. And then essentially within a short time frame after Colonel North telling you, Mrs. Garwood, that trucks were needed, Mr. Channell said to you, Mrs. Garwood, you can help. "Mrs. GARWOOD. Yes. "Mr. RUDMAN. And in fact you did. "Mrs. GARWOOD. Yes, I did. "Mr. RUDMAN. Then there, you issued a check or shortly thereafter issued a check for $22,000? "Mrs. GARWOOD. Yes, sir. "Mr. RUDMAN. From where we come from we call that the old one-two punch, is what we call that. "Mrs. GARWOOD. What do you mean by that? "Mr. RUDMAN. Well, I don't speak Texas, but let me see if I can explain it. Colonel North was telling you of a terrible need, knowing that you were a person of some means, but obviously was precluded or thought he was precluded from asking directly for money, but he set forth this dire situation and moments later his friend, who took you to the airport to meet him, could incidentally, ask you for money. "Mrs. GARWOOD. Yes sir. I think what Colonel North and Mr. Channell both knew mostly about me was not that I had a lot of funds so much as I was deeply interested in protecting the independence of the United States, and that the target of the Soviets is not really Nicaragua, it's our country, and anything I could do to help those freedom-seeking people prevent another Cuba down there and Soviet stronghold was really to defend our country. "	

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		"Mrs. GARWOOD. They didn't have to do a one-two punch with me. They knew I already was so interested and so eager to help defend our country that all they had to do was ask me and if I had it, I would give it." (Garwood Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 110-12.)	
85/09/02-175 SOMETIME IN 1984-86		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE ONE-TWO PUNCH NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Incidentally, I don't want to get into a sematic argument about solicitation or not solicitation. The slides that you have identified for us are part of a program that you would show, is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. It was described earlier by this committee as a one-two punch. "Mr. LIMAN. And that was what is was? "Mr. NORTH. I disagree with that characterization, counsel. I think that it denigrates the intelligence of the people with whom I was speaking and their willingness to contribute to a cause that was important to the national security of the United States. Mr. LIMAN. Do you deny that what you were doing was you were pointing out to them what you believed the national security of the United States required in terms of support for the contras, and then telling them that you could not ask them for money, that that had to be done across the street? "Mr. NORTH. I would stop my presentation at a point where somebody--where I would say that they had to go to somebody else. I don't think I ever	

told anybody else to go to Mr. Channell or Mr. Miller or anyone else. I would simply indicate to them that I could not or would not solicit money, and I don't believe that the committee has any evidence to the fact that I did.

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you deny that you told them if they were disposed to give, they should see Channell?

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. NORTH. My recollection, counsel is that I stopped at the point that I just told you. I have spoken to thousands of people, perhaps even tens of thousands of people, about the needs of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, and I did not solicit from them a penny."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 87-88.)

85/09/02-180
1985-86

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE ONE GOOD PUNCH
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . Colonel North, there is not one shred of evidence before this committee that you ever personally asked anyone to donate money for the contras.

"Mr. NORTH. Thank you, sir.

". . . .

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . As a matter of fact, each speech that you gave you were authorized to give it . . . ?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. RUDMAN. So we are not talking about the speeches. I want to characterize Mrs. Garwood's testimony to you because in no way was I using a pejorative phrase. I was saying it probably more

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		in awe. Mrs. Garwood told us that you sat in the Hay Adams with Mrs. Garwood and Spitz Channell and you went over all the needs of the contras and you left. "What happened after that, you probably only know from public testimony. She also testified that you met her in Houston, that you told her about the needs of the contras and said specifically, 'I am not asking you for money. I am not supposed to.' Continued to lay out the need and left. Thereafter, on both occasions the evidence is clear that Mr. Channell asked for money and received it. I assume that you knew that Mr. Channell was engaged in fund raising. You may not have known the details of his representations, but you certainly knew he was a fund raiser. "He was an individual and he had a right to do that. "Mr. NORTH. I did. "Mr. RUDMAN. Colonel North, the point I was making that day I will make again to you today. In fact, I will even amend it. "Watching you testify here for five days and knowing the fervor with which you speak, I will amend it . . . to say that the one-two punch wasn't necessary. Only the one punch. You made a strong case and it was only natural that people gave funds. "Do you want to deny that that was--I won't use the word 'scheme,' but it was certainly part of an effort to raise money for the contras? That's my question.	

"Mr. NORTH. Quite clearly it was."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 242-44.)

85/09/02-400
1985-86

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: McFARLANE'S AWARENESS OF NORTH'S FUND RAISING

McFARLANE AND NORTH ACCOUNTS:

"Mr. NUNN. . . . Colonel North, I think the thing that has impressed the committee members, most of them, many of them, and the American people more than anything else by your five days of testimony is the unequivocal statement you made at the beginning, and you backed it up throughout with your testimony, where you said, 'I never carried out a single act, not one, Mr. Nields, in which I did not have the authority from my superiors. In the 23 years that I have been in the uniformed service of the United States, I haven't in 23 years I have been in the uniformed service of the United States of America ever violated an order, not one.'

"That was a very impressive statement and you backed it up in your testimony. My problem at this stage is how we reconcile some of this with some of the previous testimony . . . .

" . . . .

"Mr. McFarlane testified he had no knowledge of your activities with the private group raising funds for the contras. Specifically, quoting from his testimony, Mr. Liman asked him: 'Were you involved at all in the activities of the Channell group to obtain moneys [for] the contras?'

"Mr. McFarlane replied: 'No, I wasn't.'

"Mr. Liman went on: 'Did you know that

Colonel North was involved with them?'

"Mr. McFarlane answered: 'No, I didn't.'

"Now, could I ask you Colonel North, if Mr. McFarlane is correct on that point or was he in error?

"Mr. NORTH. Senator Nunn, I have over five and a half days, in some very difficult testimony, testified as to what I did and the authorities that I had to do it as I understood them.

"One of the most difficult positions that a person can be in is to be in a situation where they are forced to contradict the testimony of anyone. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. NUNN. Did you get authority from Mr. McFarlane for the activities in fund raising?

"Mr. NORTH. There was never a speech that I made or a presentation I made that I didn't get approval to actually conduct that."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 91-94 [quoting North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 197; McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 85].)

85/09/02-403
1985-86

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: McFARLANE'S AWARENESS OF NORTH'S FUND RAISING

McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH:

"Mr. NUNN. One other question that you previously testified to that came up this morning, the Channell group. Did you know again that Colonel North was associated with the Channell group in the overall contra effort--I won't call it solicitation, because we have been through that one in length, but whatever it was, did you know

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		that he was involved with the Channell group? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, I didn't. The existence of the Channell group came to my attention when I suppose everyone else's here, a few months ago. I had heard earlier that some group was promoting ads on television for SDI and for the contra movement, but in the sense of raising money for direct linkage to the contras, no, I was never aware of that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 220.)	
85/09/03-100 SEPTEMBER 3, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH McFARLANE DRAFT RESPONSE: McFarlane PROF to North, "Subject: Reply to Hamilton on Ollie's Activities": ". . . Please bring me any edits you have. Ollie, don't send me any PROFS notes about it. Many thanks." The PROF attached from McFarlane to WGH (Wilma Hall), is a draft letter from McFarlane to Rep. Hamilton: ". . . I can state with deep personal conviction that at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law. . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 10.)	
85/09/04-030 SEPTEMBER 4, 1985			HOSTAGE RELEASE ANTICIPATED DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS learns that NORTH is expecting seven hostages to be released on a beach near Tripoli." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran]

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			continues at 85/09/13-200.)
85/09/04-070 SEPTEMBER 4, 1985		CONTRA FUNDING AND THE NSC: SHULTZ' INSTRUCTIONS TO ABRAMS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS advises GPS that fundraising for the Nicaraguan opposition is continuing and arms shipments increasing. ABRAMS says he has not asked NORTH for any information about fundraising for lethal aid. GPS responds that State Department must not be in the dark, that the Nicaraguan opposition is an integral part of the overall Central America picture, being managed by ABRAMS, and that ABRAMS needs to know how they are getting arms. GPS tells ABRAMS not to say 'go see the White House. It is very risky for the White House.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 85/10/07-500.)	
85/09/04-100 SEPTEMBER 4, 1985		"MONITOR OLLIE" ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testifying on the Secretary of State's instruction that he "monitor Ollie": "Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall whether the Secretary of State shared your view that it was best for you not to ask or to know what Colonel North was doing specifically? "Mr. ABRAMS. We had a conversation in--around Labor Day, 1985, in which--my memory is that I said something to him like, 'All these accusations about Colonel North, you want me to try to find	

out whether they are true and what he is up to, or do you want me to sort of leave?'

"And he said, 'No, you have got to know.'

"The note that I have in my notebook says, 'Monitor Ollie,' and I thought that I had, in fact, met that responsibility first by his assurances that he was not soliciting; second, by Mr. McFarlane's assurances to Congress; and third, by the fact that we worked together and it seemed to me we had these RIG meetings--it seemed to me I had a good grasp on what he was doing.

"Mr. BELNICK. You went to the Secretary of State, raised the subject of North's possible connection with fund raising for lethal aid on that occasion, which, I believe was September 4, 1985, correct, sir?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I think that is right.

"Mr. BELNICK. And the Secretary of State told you that we, the State Department, don't want to be in the dark. Do you recall that?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I don't recall the exact words, but that is certainly the general sense of it.

"Mr. BELNICK. Yes, sir. He told you that you were the overall manager of the Central American picture, correct.

"Mr. ABRAMS. Again, I don't remember the exact words.

"Mr. BELNICK. But, in substance, that is what he--

"Mr. ABRAMS. I think so.

"Mr. BELNICK. He told you, therefore, you ought to, as your own note of the meeting records, you ought to monitor Ollie, correct?

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		"Mr. ABRAMS. Correct. "Mr. BELNICK. Did you tell the Secretary of State at that meeting that you didn't think you needed to monitor Ollie or that you believed you had already monitored him sufficiently by asking him whether he was soliciting and hearing that he wasn't? "Mr. ABRAMS. No, because that wasn't true. "Mr. BELNICK. All right. "Mr. ABRAMS. Monitor Ollie is not an activity that you do one morning. It is a-- "Mr. BELNICK. That is for sure. "Mr. ABRAMS. It is a behavior pattern. Let's put it that way. . . ." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 34-35. See id., 6/2/87, at 82.)	
85/09/04-110 SEPTEMBER 4, 1985		"MONITOR OLLIE" ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testified: "I assure you that the conversation with the Secretary that day [9/4/85]--you can ask him about it--about Colonel North was a lot briefer than any of the other conversations." The other topics Abrams covered with Shultz at that meeting included Contra effectiveness, "diplomatic track," and economic aid. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 30, 32.) Abrams continued: "It may be . . . that the Secretary had come to the conclusion that [North] was a loose cannon because of his activities on the counterterrorism or Iran side, about which I knew nothing." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at	

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		34.) Many people, including Shultz, regarded North "as a loose cannon with respect to the Department of State." Abrams testified he did not. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 243.) Abrams thinks he conveyed to Shultz that he "did not share the negative view of North as a loose cannon." At one point he complimented North to the Secretary and said North was doing a good job. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 282-83.)	
85/09/04-111 SEPTEMBER 4, 1985		"MONITOR OLLIE" SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Sir, did you ever express the view that Colonel North was a loose cannon? "Secretary SHULTZ. No, I didn't. What I said--I think what you are referring to is an incident toward the end of a staff meeting in my office in which I told Elliott Abrams--the question was where are the freedom fighters getting their arms, as I remember; and I said to--Elliott said he didn't know. I said well, you're our point man here, you should find out. Or something like that. "Mr. BELNICK. As I understand, that conversation took place on September 4, 198[]5. Secretary Abrams has described that conversation here based on a note that he took in which he said you told him to 'monitor Ollie.' "Is that your recollection of the instruction you gave him?	

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, my recollection is based on a note that was taken by somebody else who was in the meeting about what it was that I said and what I said is the way I put it. But no reason why Elliott shouldn't have taken it that way, because Colonel North was commonly seen as a principal contact with the freedom fighters.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you have a view at that time that Colonel North, because of any information that you had about him, was someone who had to be watched closely or that Elliott ought to monitor?

"Secretary SHULTZ. There was talk about erratic behavior on his part, but I had no particular knowledge about it and didn't want to pass judgment. I'm not--and I can't get myself in the position of supervising people down the line working for others.

"Mr. BELNICK. But you did expect, based on what you told Secretary Abrams, September 4, 1985, that he would keep himself informed about the activities; and as I have read the note specifically, about how the contras were getting supplied with arms and not simply shut his eyes to that?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 56-57.)

85/09/04-112
AFTER
SEPTEMBER 4,
1985

"MONITOR OLLIE"
ABRAMS ACCOUNT (cont'd):

Shultz directed Abrams to "monitor Ollie" in response to the news stories which Abrams raised with him about North's involvement with fundraising and getting lethal aid for the Contras. (Abrams: "His general involvement with the resistance.")

"Mr. BELNICK. So it is correct that when . . . the Secretary told you to monitor Ollie, he was not limiting the scope of the monitoring that he wanted you to undertake, correct?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I think that is correct. I think he viewed Colonel North as, I won't say as the Secretary did--there was a widespread view of him as a kind of loose cannon and it was perhaps in that context also . . . that I was being told to keep track of what he was doing."
(Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 82.)

"MONITOR OLLIE": ABRAMS' OBSERVATIONS
ABRAMS ACCOUNT:

Abrams testified on his reports to Shultz about North:

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . Did you report on any of Colonel North's activities to the Secretary of State after he gave you the instruction to monitor Ollie?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Oh, I think we talked at times about suggestions from Colonel North, ideas from Colonel North. But there wasn't all that much to--there was nothing to talk about that appeared to be difficult legally. From a policy point of view, yes."
(Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 86.)

"MONITOR OLLIE": ABRAMS OBSERVATIONS
ABRAMS ACCOUNT (cont'd):

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you report any specific activities of Colonel North, of which you became aware, after the instruction from Secretary Shultz to monitor Ollie?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I didn't become aware of any which needed to be reported.

". . . .

"Mr. ABRAMS. Well, excuse me.

". . . .

"Mr. ABRAMS. I can remember one particular instance in which Colonel North raised a suggestion with me dealing with a foreign head of state which I went immediately to the Secretary on. But again, there were policy questions repeatedly that we discussed that I would discuss with him and others, and some of which had to be referred back to the Secretary. That is not your question as I understood it.

"Mr. BELNICK. Correct. I was asking whether you reported on any specific activities of North to the Secretary after September of 1985 until the fall of 1986 when the facts began to emerge publicly?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Well, specific activities, yes, but not involving his--what should I say--facilitation of private activities with respect to the Contras.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you report to Secretary of State Shultz when North called you about the press conference that he feared would be held by the Costa Rican Government?

"Mr. BELNICK. I didn't report to him at midnight, I reported to him early the ensuing day,

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		because it was necessary to tell him what had happened, that I had instructed Tambs. Because you see, actually we had raised the prospect of the state visit being involved in this (a). (b), Secretary Shultz was seeing Arias within about a week at the UN--well, maybe not within a week, but a couple of weeks--so yes." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 86-88.)	
85/09/04-130 AFTER SEPTEMBER 4, 1985		"MONITOR OLLIE" ABRAMS ACCOUNT: "I thought I had, in fact, met that responsibility first by his assurances that he was not soliciting; second, by Mr. McFarlane's assurances to Congress; and third, by the fact that we worked together and it seemed to me we had these RIG meetings--it seemed to me I had a good grasp of what he was doing." McFarlane's "categorical assurances to Congress" about North's activities came after Abrams' conversations with Shultz. Abrams: "I am not sure I would have asked the Secretary that if the day before the National Security Advisor had said, 'All that stuff in the press is not true.'" (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 34, 36.)	
		"MONITOR OLLIE" ABRAMS ACCOUNT (cont'd): Abrams later repeated the three steps he took to "monitor Ollie," and added another: "Fourthly, don't forget I had reports from embassies in the field. I had reports of some sorts from the Central Intelligence Agency, and I	

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		thought I had a pretty good picture of what was going on in Central America and in Washington. "Mr. BELNICK. Do you still feel that way? "Mr. ABRAMS. No." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/22/87, at 83-84.)	
		Abrams reported to Shultz on North's activities "basically orally." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 277.)	
		Abrams added that North did not tell anybody in the DoS about certain projects to ensure Shultz didn't find out about them. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 272.)	
85/09/04-140 AFTER SEPTEMBER 4, 1985		WHETHER ABRAMS "MONITORED OLLIE" SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [I]n light of what you now know or have heard from the investigations regarding, for example, the role of Colonel North and other NSC staff members in assisting the contras during the period of the Boland restrictions, the involvement in the Hasenfus flight, the involvement of at least one of our ambassadors, Mr. Tambs, in negotiations for an air strip to be used in Central America for contra resupply and in helping, as he testified to this panel on instructions from Colonel North to open a southern military front against Nicaragua during the period of the Boland restrictions, in light of those facts and others that have come out during the investigations, is it your view that Secretary Abrams carried out your instructions to keep	

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		himself and you informed? "Secretary SHULTZ. What has been brought out in these hearings about all of the activities you mentioned has surprised a lot of people. It surprised me, it must have been a surprise to Chairman Hamilton, who looked into this a couple of times and had assurances. So I imagine it has surprised the President. So things have come out that we didn't know about. "It wasn't too long, I think, after I had that conversation with Mr. Abrams that the results of inquiring into Colonel North's activities--and at that time I think Mr. McFarlane was the National Security Advisor--concluded with our feeling, and I think Chairman Hamilton's feeling that we had looked into this matter and there was no problem. So this was part of the general understanding, and that is what Elliott thought, and that is what I thought." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 57-59.)	
85/09/04-200 1984-86, AND OCTOBER 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ABRAMS' AND SHULTZ' AWARENESS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. I am going to ask you a few questions now about who in the U.S. Government was aware of this full-service operation. Was Mr. Abrams at the State Department? "Mr. NORTH. Well, I certainly believed he was. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you talk to him about it? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, what aspects of it did you	

discuss with him?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, let me describe the situation. You are in a meeting with the people who are in the business of formulating American policy and trying to coordinate what activities we can in the region. And the meeting goes, 'We desperately have got to do something about X, Y or Z, Ollie.'

"Now, as I just indicated to you a few moments ago, when Secretary Shultz took me aside at Ambassador Bob Oakley's retirement [in October 1986], I knew what he meant. He didn't have to say, 'You did a great job on the L-100 resupply the 9th of April.' He knew in sufficiently eloquent terms what I had done. And as I said to you, Counsel, I didn't walk around bragging. I didn't walk around saying, 'Hey, look at me.' I sought to avoid that. I did not seek the credit and I didn't want the blame.

"I am willing to accept the blame for what I did and I have told you a good bit of that here, and some of it has not been easy. I honestly believe that there were many, many people within the Executive Branch who had a grasp, if not in specific detail but in sufficient detail, that they knew who to turn to when they wanted something done. And so when the airplane being flown by Captain Bill Cooper and co-piloted by Buzz Sawyer, two of the braver people I have met on this planet, was shot down out of the skies over Nicaragua by a surface-to-air missile, I was the person called the raise the money to pay for the counselor services to retrieve their bodies.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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		"Mr. NIELDS. Who called you? "Mr. NORTH. Mr. Abrams. Why would he turn to me if he didn't know I was doing it?" (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 167-68. On North's account of Shultz' comment to him, and Shultz' response, see entries starting at 86/00/09-180.)	
85/09/04-500 SEPTEMBER 4, 1985			PARIS MEETING ON THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS LEDEEN ACCOUNT: Ledeen testified on his meeting in Paris on September 4, 1985 with Kimche, Nimrodi, Schwimmer, and Ghorbanifar: "Q. Did McFarlane tell you to go? "A. McFarlane approved the meeting and the NSC paid for the trip. And you will find that in the NSC documentation. "Q. Right. "A. The discussions in Paris revolved around two questions. "Q. Who was present at the discussions, first? The same five? "A. The usual suspects. [See 85/07/29-100.] "Q. The group of five now? "A. Yes. Two subjects of conversation. One was hostages and weapons, and Ghorbanifar is saying that with just a few more TOWs, this whole unpleasant problem will be solved; and I am not sure whether -- I think my recollection of this is prompted by something I read in the Tower Commission Report, but in any event, it sounds right to me. That is that the missiles -- the 100 TOWs -- were immediately [seiz]ed by the

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			Revolutionary Guards and therefore were unusable as a symbolic gesture by the people that Ghorbanifar had in mind and on whose behalf he was speaking and that this thing had been sabotaged by the Revolutionary Guards and that it was necessary, unfortunately, to send in more TOWs. "And there was then an extended discussion of the future of the relationship between the United States and Iran. By and large, when Ghorbanifar started to talk about hostages, Schwimmer and Nimrodi talked to him and Kimche and I started to go off and talk about the broader question of Iran and the United States. "Ghorbanifar also said that in the very near future, we would see public statements by the -- by leading officials in Iran that would show that a change was in the process of taking place; and, indeed, shortly thereafter, on the anniversary of the fall of the shah, September 8, 9, 10, 11, in that period, both the Presidents and the Prime Minister, I believe, on occasions which in the past it would have been traditional to denounce the great Satan and otherwise attack the United States, for the first time since the fall of the shah, they did not do that. There were no attacks against the United States in those speeches, and, indeed, there was an attack against the Soviet Union, which was interesting and encouraging. "In any event, the Israelis went ahead and -- with the balance of these TOWs." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 53-55. See Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 15-16 [HAWKs mentioned at the meeting in Paris with

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			Ghorbanifar].)
85/09/04-501 AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS LEDEEN ACCOUNT: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Do you know how the number of what turned out to be 408 [TOWs] was arrived at? "A. No. That was always a mystery to me, where the eight came from. "Q. Putting aside the eight, which could well have been a . . . packing error, do you recall any discussion about how the number 400 was arrived at? "A. Well, I am not certain whether the 500 figure was not there at the beginning and the 100 was supposed to happen and then the hostages would come out and the remainder of the 400 would go in. "I tend to think that that was the arrangement, because I don't remember any discussion at that point of a whole new problem which I am qui[t]e sure I would remember. That is, it did not happen that we made our full gesture and they did nothing and we decided, well, okay, they didn't like[ ]our first gesture; we will give you another gesture. That did not occur. It was supposed to be staggered. "Part of the sum total was to go in; then we would hope something was going to happen, and the balance would go in. That was the way it was designed. So the 400 were part of this gesture from the beginning. It was not a whole new situation. "Q. I take it then [t]hat your recollection

of what happened was . . . that the reason there was no one released between the two shipments is that the first shipment ended up in the wrong hands?

"A. That's what was said. And it may even be true. I don't know. I don't think I was ever able to check that. It wasn't a surprise, mind you.

"And another point I would like to make here in passing, because it is interesting in terms of understanding the way this happened, when I was in Israel in the July-August period, [redacted.]

"But there is an image that gets generated sometimes of a monolithic government of Israel which has a master plan and all, which it is actively advancing. What I found in Israel was an Israeli Government that was as internally divided as our own, and it was divided for many of the same reasons that our own government is divided.

"There were turf conflicts as well as substantive disagreements. [Redacted.]"
(Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 55-58.)

85/09/04-502
EARLY
SEPTEMBER
1985

SUMMER 1985 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS:
REPLENISHMENT
LEDEEN ACCOUNT:

"Q. As of, I guess -- as of September 4, did you have any knowledge -- let me do it by as of September 15 or something, to take it through the rest of the transaction. Did you have any knowledge of any agreement between Israel and the United States whereby the United States would replenish the Israeli TOWs?

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			"A. I didn't think that it required any kind of special agreement. "Q. Is that no, there was -- "A. No. I don't believe there was a special agreement. I hadn't been asked by the Israelis whether that would happen. I think I once discussed it with McFarlane. He said something to the effect, look, they have never had any trouble buying weapons from us before, why should they have trouble buying weapons from us in the future? "Q. It was not your understanding that the United States had committed specifically to replenishing whatever TOWs had been sent from Israel to Iran? "A. I don't have any knowledge of any specific understanding. "Q. Did you -- "A. However -- excuse me. However, I do have the clear impression that the Israelis asked the question and that they were told in essence what I said to you before, which is, look, you have always -- you have never had any trouble buying weapons from the United States before, and we don't anticipate you will have any trouble in the future." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 59-60. See id. at 60-67 [further Ledeen testimony on the summer 1985 Iran arms transactions]. See also Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 25-30, 35-37.)
85/09/04-503 SOMETIME IN EARLY			SUMMER 1985 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: NORTH'S INVOLVEMENT LEDEEN ACCOUNT:

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SEPTEMBER 1985			"A. . . . In the middle of September, then the Reverend Weir emerged. ". . . . "Q. . . . Do you recall additional discussions between September 4th and September 15th? "A. No. I think -- I don't think I had any. I would have reported to McFarlane about the conversations on the fourth when I got back to the United States. "Q. Right. "A. And North had been brought into this around this time, early in September on the basis that if it is going to be necessary to extract one or more hostages, that would be North's assignment. "So I had been asked to inform him if I had any information that hostages were coming out, if I had any knowledge as to where that would happen and when that would happen. And we discussed that possibility, although I did not tell him about background offers. "Q. Was this discussion prior to the release of, I guess, W[ei]r? "A. Yes. "Q. The discussion with North was prior to that time? "A. Sure. I was informed of W[ei]r's release by McFarlane in an early morning telephone call. "Q. Were you back in the United States? "A. Yes. I was at home." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 62-63. On North's involvement, see id. at 68; Tower, at B-28

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			and -29.)
85/09/04-505 SEPTEMBER 3-5, 1985			PARIS MEETING ON THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. As you now know, . . . 100 TOWs were shipped from Israel to Iran on August 30, 1985 [see 85/08/20-300; Iran-Contra Report, at 168-69, gives delivery dates of 8/20/85 (96 TOWs) and 9/14/85 (408 TOWs)], and no hostage was released. What happened after the TOWs were shipped and no hostage was released? "A. They shipped more TOWs. "Q. Was there any discussion between you and Mr. McFarlane about the fact that the first shipment of TOWs had been made and no hostages had been released? "A. Yes. And I think in fact that there was a meeting in Paris between the first shipment and the second shipment. "Q. Was that meeting scheduled because no hostages had been released, as you thought was going to happen after the first shipment? "A. Yes. "Q. And did McFarlane approve you going to that meeting? "A. Yes. "Q. And could you tell me what the purpose was of that meeting. "A. The purpose of the meeting was to decide where--if anywhere--we were going to go from here. "Q. This meeting was attended by you, Mr. Schwimmer, Mr. Nimrodi, Mr. Kimche and Mr. Ghorbanifar, correct?

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			"A. Correct. "Q. Did Mr. Ghorbanifar have an explanation as to why no hostages have been released? "A. Yes. "Q. What was it? "A. The wrong people had gotten the missiles. "Q. What does he mean by that? "A. Well, he meant that the missiles were supposed to go in such a way as to permit a moderate faction of the armed forces to get their--to obtain them, or at least to obtain the credit for having gotten them, and instead, some of the nasty revolutionary guards took possession of them. "Q. And did he promise that if more missiles were sent, that this time hostages would be released? "A. Yes. "Q. Did you believe him? "A. I think it's the wrong question, with all due respect. "Q. Well, did you urge that the initiative continue at this point? "A. I don't recall that I urged one thing or the other. I think the consensus was that as between 100 TOWs and 500 TOWs, it wasn't such a big difference, so that one could pretend to having been pure at a hundred and corrupt at five hundred. "And that if one was seriously interested in testing it, that a good deal of what Ghorbanifar had to say about what had happened was plausible, and that if you wanted to test it, you might as

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			well go ahead and test it, and this would constitute the final test, if you will. "So I think on that basis, the consensus was might as well go ahead and give it a try, and see how it all ends. Now I think we learned an awful lot from both the first hundred, and the second four hundred, and I think that probably on a cash basis, it's one of the best investments that anybody ever made, just in terms of understanding the way things work." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 67-70.)
85/09/04-506 EARLY SEPTEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: NORTH'S INVOLVEMENT LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. As of this period, September 3rd, 1985, what was the state of Colonel North's knowledge of the initiative, as far as you knew? "A. As far as knew, zero. "Q. You had not talked to him about what you were doing? "A. The time at which North was informed of this is still not clear in my mind. I had not told him about it. At a certain point I learned from him, I think, if I remember it correctly, that McFarlane had told him about it, and in particular, Ollie said that I was supposed to tell him--I was supposed to keep him up to speed about the possibility of a hostage release, in the event that anyone had to go and get them, because he would be in charge of managing that. "So by early September, he knew at least something about it.

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			"Q. All right. You're aware that in early September, that Colonel North tasked Charles Allen to collect intelligence information on certain Iranians in connection with this initiative, aren't you? "A. Yes. "Q. So he knew enough, at least by early September, to do that tasking? "A. Yes. "Q. Had you told him Ghorbanifar's name? "A. No." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 72-73.)
85/09/04-507 EARLY SEPTEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: CIA INVOLVEMENT LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. The CIA was not involved in this initiative at all during the summer of 1985, correct? "A. Correct. "Q. Was that a conscious decision on your part and Mr. McFarlane's part, not to involve the CIA in the initiative? "A. Yes. "Q. What was the basis of that decision? "A. First, there was no reason to. There was nothing in it that required a professional intelligence agency, and second, there was some concern that CIA was not as good at keeping secrets as it ought to be. "Q. Were you aware at this time that Mr. Ghorbanifar, during the summer of 1985, had, through other parties, made overtures towards the

CIA along the same lines that he made to you through Israel?

"A. No.

"Q. You have no knowledge of any overtures that Mr. Ghorbanifar may have made through other intermediaries to the CIA during the summer of 1985?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And was it Mr. Ghorbanifar who suggested to you that you not inform the CIA of . . . his proposal?

"A. No.

"Q. Did any of the Israelis suggest to you that the CIA not be involved?

"A. No.

"Q. So that was a decision that was made by you and Mr. McFarlane?

"A. It was made by Mr. McFarlane.

"Q. And it was a decision with which you agreed?

"A. Enthusiastically."

(Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 73-74. See id., 9/10/87, at 39 [it was McFarlane's decision to keep the CIA out of the Iran Initiative].)

85/09/05-050
SEPTEMBER 5,
1985

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC:
McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS
McFARLANE LETTER TO HAMILTON:

In response to the August 20, 1985 inquiry of Rep. Hamilton, chair of the HPSCI, McFarlane writes:

". . . I can state with deep personal conviction that at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law. . . . I would extend my assurance to the violation of any law.

". . . We did not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary activities either from Americans or third parties. We did not offer tactical advice for the conduct of their military activities or their organization. Nor did our liaison contacts seek to influence them toward other than a democratic outcome. Our most recent contacts with the Freedom Fighters have dealt with the administration of the $27 million in humanitarian assistance. Our effort has been to ensure that this program is properly administered and that it, too, is fully compliant with the legal requirements contained in the legislation. In short, we want to do it right.

". . . .

"Mr. Chairman, I believe that future events will confirm that our contact with the resistance has had a positive effect on achieving a democratic outcome in the region. I well recognize that the Administration and the Congress may differ as to how best to achieve this goal. Nonetheless, we are both in agreement that such an outcome is desirable and that it must be achieved within the limits of our law. . . ."

(JHICI Ex. JMP 12 [= Exx. 41-A, OLN 118]. See 85/08/16-202, -204 [McFarlane testimony on the categorical nature of the letters drafted by North which McFarlane sent in response to Congressional inquiries].)

85/09/05-100
SEPTEMBER 5,
1985

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC:
McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS

NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified with regard to a letter sent by McFarlane to Lee Hamilton, who chaired the HPSCI, concerning recent press accounts about NSC staff members' Contra-related activities:

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . [Y]ou were aware of that [HPSCI] inquiry at the time, were you not?

"Mr. NORTH. I believe I was.

"Mr. NIELDS. And indeed you were consulted about drafting an answer to it?

"Mr. NORTH. I am sure that I was.

"Mr. NIELDS. And indeed you helped draft it?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And the reply, again, answering questions about whether activities of the NSC staff violated the law, states . . ., 'Like you, I take such charges very seriously.'

"Did you also take those charges seriously?

". . . .

"Mr. NORTH. I take all charges seriously . . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. The letter goes on, 'and consequently have thoroughly examined the facts and all matters which in any remote fashion could bear on these charges.'

"I take it part of the examination that Mr. McFarlane did was to talk with you?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then he states, 'I can state with deep personal conviction that at no time did

I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or the spirit of the law.'

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . [I]t states, 'Our emphasis on a political rather than a military solution to the situation was as close as we ever came to influencing the military aspect of their struggle.'

"Is that statement true, sir?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, it is partially true. I am not saying that all of the rest of it is true. What I am saying to you is I continue to believe, as I did then, that there will ultimately have to be a political solution. What is, after all, a political endeavor, and I do not believe that we are going to see a victory march down the streets of Managua.

". . . .

"What I do believe that we can achieve is a democratic outcome in Managua as part of a political process. It will require diplomacy and requires military pressure on the Sandinistas.

"It is the essence of guerrilla war. This country fought a guerrilla war in which I served, and we lost the war. We won all the battles and lost the war.

"Mr. NIELDS. The part of it which is untrue is the part that says that this was as close as we ever came to influencing the military aspect of their struggle, isn't that true, sir?

"Mr. NORTH. With using appropriated funds, no, but I am not going to nitpick this thing.

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		"Mr. NIELDS. That is a false statement, isn't it? You were conducting, as you have testified here most of the afternoon, a full service covert operation to support the military efforts of the resistance. "Mr. NORTH. Yes, that is true. "Mr. NIELDS. And this statement that emphasizing a political rather than a military solution was as close as we ever came to influencing the military aspect of their struggle is just false, isn't it? "Mr. NORTH. It is not entirely false, but it is false, and I admit that there are other parts of this thing that are false. "Mr. NIELDS. The next paragraph says, 'It is equally important to stress what we did not do. We did not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary activities, either from Americans or third parties.' "That is just plain false, isn't it? "Mr. NORTH. Right." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 192-97; JHICI Exx. 114 [letter from Hamilton to McFarlane, dated 8/20/85], 118 [letter from McFarlane to Hamilton, dated 9/5/85].)	
85/09/09-100 SEPTEMBER 9, 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: REPLENISHMENT LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . On September 9, 1985, Wilma Hall sends a PROF note to McFarlane and it says on the top, RE Michael Ledeen and it says quote the issue of replacement the people who sold the soap for us

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			want to replenish their supply. Do you recall telling Wilma Hall that around that time? "A. I don't but that sounds right and probably what happens is that in Paris, Kimche would have said would you please check and see when we can get the hundred missiles. "Q. So at that point clearly, there was discussion about U.S. replacement for the Israeli TOWs that had been shipped, correct? "A. Yes, and I remembered discussing it with McFarlane at a certain point. I don't remember the date but I remember raising it with him and he said that he couldn't imagine what the problem would be. Couldn't they just buy it is the normal course of events. Why was there a need for some special arrangement? "Q. All right. At some point, did you learn that the Israelis were charging the Iranians a higher price for the TOWs and the Israelis had paid for the TOWs so that they could replenish the TOWs from U.S. stocks? "A. Yes, I did. "Q. When did you learn that? "A. I don't remember when, but I certainly became aware of it. "Q. Would it have been in connection with this phone call from Schwimmer? "A. It certainly was clear from the phone call with Schwimmer because when I quoted him a price--a price that I had been given from somebody in the Pentagon on TOW missile[s], he was alarmed and it sounded very much to me as if, in this case at least, he had charged the Iranians too little,

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			rather than too much. "Q. Do you recall who[m] you contacted in the Pentagon? "A. I don't. "Q. Do you recall what the price was per TOW that you were given? "A. No. "Q. You have not even a rough sense of what the price was? "A. No. "Q. And in any event, when you told Mr. Schwimmer what that price was, could you, as best you can remember, describe his reaction and what he said? "A. He said it's impossible, it's much too much. "Q. Did he in any way tie that statement to the price that the Israelis were charging the Iranians for the TOWs? "A. No. "Q. What did you think he meant when he said it's much too much. "A. That it was more than he intended to pay or that he was hoping to pay. It's what we normally mean. "Q. And what was your response to that? "A. He then said go tell them it's much too much and I said why don't you go tell them, I'm not in the business anyway and it can't be that difficult for the government of Israel to figure out how to buy TOW missiles from the Government of the United States." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 74-77. See id.

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			at 77-80 [Ledeen on pricing of weapons and profits. On whether anyone made more than expenses out of the deal, Ledeen testified, "I had no knowledge of it and I had their word that none would be made."].)
85/09/10-100 SEPTEMBER 10, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: STEELE'S ROLE NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY: North meets with Col. James Steele and Donald Gregg. One point of discussion is a proposed "Calero/Bermudez visit to [the resupply airbase] to estab[lish] Log[istical] support/ maint[enance.]" (Iran-Contra Report, at 62 [quoting North notebook entry, 9/10/85; Committee Document Q 1173].)	
85/09/12-100 SEPTEMBER 12, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS McFARLANE LETTER TO BARNES: McFarlane letter in response to the inquiry of Rep. Barnes on North: ". . . Like you, I take these charges very seriously and consequently have thoroughly examined the facts and circumstances which could bear upon these charges in any fashion. "Based on this review, I want to assure you that my actions, and those of my staff, have been in compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the law. . . . Indeed, our actions have been and must be in conformity, not only with th[e Boland Amendment] proscription, but with ALL laws. ". . . Throughout, we have scrupulously abided by the spirit and letter of the law. None	

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		of us has solicited funds, facilitated contacts for prospective potential donors, or otherwise organized or coordinated the military or paramilitary efforts of the resistance." (JHICI Ex. 40-B [emphasis in original]. See McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 85-91. See also JHICI Ex. 41-A [similar response to inquiry of Rep. Hamilton, dated Sept. 5, 1985]. See 85/08/16-202, -204 [McFarlane testimony on the categorical nature of the letters drafted by North which McFarlane sent in response to Congressional inquiries].)	
85/09/12-110 SEPTEMBER 12, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. Now, after . . . reviewing them [the 6 problem documents; see 85/08/16-200 through -204] and consulting with Colonel North, you then drafted a reply to Congressman Barnes' letter or he [sc. North] drafted one for you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that is right. "Mr. NIELDS. And I believe that is Exhibit 40-B. Do you have that in front of you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I do. "Mr. NIELDS. And is that your reply to Congressman Barnes? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that is. "Mr. NIELDS. And in that reply, you refer, do you not, to the search of documents that you did before you wrote the letter? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. You say in the first paragraph,	

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		'Like you, I take these charges very seriously,' --that is referring to charges that members of the National Security Council have been assisting the contras-- 'and consequently have thoroughly examined the facts and circumstances which could bear upon these charges in any fashion. "That refers to your document review. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Then you say in the next paragraph, ['B]ased on this review, []I want to assure you that my actions and those of my staff have been in compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the law.' "I think that was read yesterday into the record. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. At the bottom, in a section which I don't believe was read into the record, you expand on that statement, do you not? The bottom of that first page? "I will read it and then ask whether you would agree that you expand on that statement. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. You state at the bottom of the page, 'Contrary to reports that we used these contacts,' --referring to contacts with contras-- 'to provide tactical influence or to plan military operations, we urged the resistance leaders to forge a representative political front involving credible nonmilitary figures at achieving a democratic outcome in Nicaragua.' "You would agree, and I think that you have already testified to this, that that is not a fair	

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		summary of what the documents show Colonel North was doing with respect to the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I don't think that I would make that suggestion. This is administrative information which is true. It isn't intended to portray what the documents reflect. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, you continue it, I think, in the rest of that paragraph, and you say, for example, in the last two sentences of the paragraph, 'Throughout, we have scrupulously abided by the spirit and the letter of the law. None of us has solicited funds, facilitated contacts for prospective potential donors, or otherwise organized or coordinated the military or paramilitary efforts of the resistance.' "Actually, you have facilitated contacts for prospective, potential donors, had you not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I perhaps was drawing the distinction between when that was a matter of not proscribed in law, but unless you are talking about other contacts among private citizens in this country--are you--I mean, I-- "Mr. NIELDS. No, I was referring to Country Two and the fact that the actual donors had, as I understand it, Country Two was the actual donors-- "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And that you had not only facilitated contacts, but you had facilitated the actual contribution. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I will accept that, yes. I think I said that yesterday." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 85-88;	

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		JHICI Exx. 40 [McFarlane's handwritten list of 6 problem memos], 40-B [= Exx. JMP 12, OLN 109; McFarlane letter to Rep. Barnes, 9/12/85]. See JHICI Exx. 40-A through -E, 41, 41-A through -E [Congressional correspondence].)	
85/09/12-111 SEPTEMBER 12, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. And then you state at the end of the letter, 'Mr. Chairman, like you, I am most concerned that at a time when humanitarian assistance is being extended to the UNO, there be no misgivings as to the existence of any parallel efforts to provide directly or indirectly support for military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua. There has not been nor will there be any such activities by the NSC staff.' "Now, that--it is difficult, would you not concede, to square that statement with the memos that you had put on your list which show, for example, that North was receiving wish lists from a Central American country that had supplied false[end] user certificates for the contras? [See entries starting at 85/03/05-200.] "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't want to split hairs, Mr. Nields. I accept the responsibility for these things. I think to the extent that your question just now implies that I was witnessing at the time that Colonel North was engaged in providing himself channels and parallel effort for support of the Contras is not the case. With regard to	

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		the end user certificates that you mentioned, the fact of how Colonel North came by those, if he did in fact, isn't clear yet. The possibility that the Contras on their own had been instructed by the CIA during the time it was legal for them to do so, on how to get those end user certificates is a possibility. I think it unlikely but at the time the existence of an infrastructure of parallel support wasn't clear. "Mr. NIELDS. Actually, the end user certifications were supplied on their face, were they not--they bear the name of Mr. Secord's company? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think that is a valid point. Not until this investigation have I looked at the end user certificates, and if I had that would certainly have flagged my attention, because it it [sic (is)] an American company being referenced there. "Mr. NIELDS. But the end user certificates were attached to the very document that you pulled out of NSC files? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct, but I always did the action papers at the end of the day, at 6 o'clock, when people would go home and I would get most of my work done, paper work done between 6 and 10. So I would go through and determine what the operative requirement was for me, what am I being asked to do, in this case sign a memorandum asking whether or not a certain country ought to--be beneficiary of foreign aid. "That isn't an issue, of course they should, and I signed it. It was inattentive at least for	

me not to go back through each of the tabs. I don't always go back through each tab because if clearly on the merits of the case--as in this case--a Central American country being deserving or not, of foreign aid--the attachments were gratuitous to me, but it has resulted--and I am remiss because of it--has resulted in the failure of me to identify that there was a U.S. company involved here and that would have jumped out at me I think.

"Mr. NIELDS. You are testifying what you did or what you read at the time the memo was written?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then I take it you reviewed all these memoranda again shortly before you wrote the letter?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I did, but I still didn't look at the certificates.

"Mr. NIELDS. But you flagged the ones as problematic and wrote them on a list?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 88-91; JHICI Exx. 35 [North memo to McFarlane, "[Redacted] Aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance," 3/5/85], 40-B [= Exx. JMP 12, OLN 109; letter from McFarlane to Rep. Barnes, 9/12/85]. For McFarlane testimony following this excerpt, see 85/09/30-100.)

85/09/12-200
SEPTEMBER 12,
1985

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH:
McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS

NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on McFarlane's letter to Rep.

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		Michael Barnes concerning North's Contra-related activities: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [Y]ou also helped Mr. McFarlane draft [Ex. 109]? "Mr. NORTH. I probably did. I don't recall specifically. There were a number of these. "Mr. NIELDS. And in the middle of the second paragraph after citing to the Boland Amendments, it states, 'There have not been nor will there be any expenditures of NSC funds which would have the effect of supporting directly or indirectly military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.' ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. You were aware, I take it, that salaries were included in the Boland Amendment? "Mr. NORTH. No -- not mine. "Mr. NIELDS. How about airplane trips? "Mr. NORTH. I made every effort, Counsel, to avoid the use of proposed funds. As I said, that was why the decision was made in '84, before this proscription ever became law, to set up outside entities and to raise non-U.S. Government moneys by which the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters could be supported. "What I am trying to say is that there was an effort to comply with Boland. It was a hard and difficult task. We tried very hard. And aside from those letters, there were many many efforts to include the use of the operational account I described to you this morning, by which we tried very hard to live within the letter to the law. That is not necessarily the answer you are looking for about these letters, because these letters are	

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		clearly misleading. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, let's take a look at page 2 of this letter where it states at the bottom of the partial paragraph on the top of the page: 'Throughout we have scrupulously abided by the spirit and letter of the law. None of us has solicited funds, facilitated contacts or prospective potential donors, or otherwise organized or coordinated military or paramilitary efforts of the resistance.' "I take it that statement is misleading. "Mr. NORTH. Part of that is misleading, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Indeed. "Mr. NORTH. As I indicated this morning, I have never to my recollection solicited funds, but I have just admitted to you that these are misleading responses. "I would also, if you will indulge me, in finishing what I started earlier, I would also point out to you, Counsel, that this is not my preferred response. My preferred response, and I tried it several times in this process, was not to tell the Congress. . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 206-09; JHICI Ex. OLN 109 [letter from McFarlane to Rep. Barnes, dated 9/12/85]. See JHICI Ex. OLN 107 [letter from Barnes to McFarlane, dated 8/26/85].)	
85/09/12-395 AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 1985		INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD INQUIRY INTO NSC STAFF CONTRA-RELATED ACTIVITIES SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the IOB inquiry and the investigation conducted by its counsel,	

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		Bretton G. Sciaroni, see Iran-Contra Report, at 132.	
85/09/12-400 SEPTEMBER 12, 1985		IOB CONCLUSION: BOLAND NOT APPLICABLE TO NSC IOB MEMO: Memorandum from the President's Intelligence Oversight Board to Robert McFarlane. Memo concludes -- based on review of documents provided by NSC counsel Thompson (30-45 min. meeting) and a 5-10 min. interview with North -- that the Boland Amendment does not apply to the NSC. The NSC is not an intelligence agency named in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY85, and none of North's activities during 1985 would have violated Boland even if North came within its prohibitions. A copy of the memorandum, minus date and routing information, was later found in North's safe. (JHICI Exx. BS 9, 9-A; Sciaroni Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 3-29, 43-72, 123-35.)	
85/09/12-405 AFTER SEPTEMBER 12, 1985		IOB OPINION ON BOLAND POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LEON. Were you aware of the Intelligence Oversight Board opinion in September of 1985 in which it was concluded that the Boland Amendment does not apply to the NSC? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I was aware of that determination. "Mr. LEON. Did you have any reason to think that . . . that conclusion, that legal conclusion in that opinion was questionable or erroneous in any way?	

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		"Mr. POINDEXTER. No. I have a very high regard for not only the general counsel of the Intelligence Oversight Board but also the three members who are very distinguished gentlemen. "Mr. LEON. Did you see any reason to have that opinion re-evaluated and re-assessed by the Attorney General or the White House counsel? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. I did not. "Mr. LEON. Did you accept it as being correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I had made that conclusion on my own as a layman and this just simply reinforced it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 96.)	
85/09/12-406 AFTER SEPTEMBER 12, 1985		IOB OPINION ON BOLAND POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. You talked earlier about the fact that you had obtained a legal opinion or the NSC has a legal opinion that it wasn't covered by Boland; do you recall that? "A. Yes. "Q. Who asked for that opinion? "A. From the IO[B]? "Q. Yes. "A. I don't recall specifically. There was quite a bit of discussion at the time with -- we actually -- there were three lawyers on the staff at the time, Bob Kimmet, who was the executive secretary at the time, and Bob Pearson, his deputy, and Commander Thompson, the General Counsel, and there were several discussions by my recollection of the question of whether the Boland	

Amendment really covered the NSC staff; and as to who asked the IO[B], I don't know the answer to that.

"Q. Did you see the opinion that was issued?

"A. I don't recall actually seeing it, but I recall being aware of its contents.

"Q. Who made you aware of the contents?

"A. I don't recall.

"Q. Did you seek any advice, sir, from the Attorney General on that subject?

"A. I did not.

"Q. Or from the President's counsel?

"A. I did not."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 169-70.)

85/09/12-410
PRIOR TO
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NORTH-SCIARONI INTERVIEW
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified he could not recall having been interviewed by Bretton Sciaroni, counsel for the Intelligence Oversight Board, concerning North's Contra-related activities. North clarified, however, "I am sure if he asked me that question I denied it, because after all we viewed this to be a covert operation and he had absolutely no need to know the details of what I was doing.

"By my understanding, the Intelligence Board does not have oversight authority over the National Security Council staff, I don't think -- at least I didn't then.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. The question was that if you felt that the President's Intelligence Oversight

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		Board did not have authority to investigate the NSC, even if it was engaged in intelligence activities, that you felt free to lie to him. "Mr. NORTH. Well, I don't like the sound of that. I don't think I basically would have told him -- you know, I probably would have said it is none of your business, or whatever. In fact -- I mean no disrespect to this body, none whatsoever, not to this committee or the joint committee or to either House of Congress, but my approach, what I wanted to do in terms of answering these questions, was to simply not answer them at all, and I want to go back through what I said yesterday about a covert operation. "We had the lives of people at stake. We had this nation's foreign policy at stake. We had the lives of the people involved in the resistance activity at stake. And we have, as in any other covert operation, a problem of deniability. I was to be the deniability. I was to go when the time came -- political liability, he's gone. ". . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 200-03.)	
85/09/12-420 PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 12, 1985		NORTH-SCIARONI INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT (cont'd): "Mr. NORTH. Mr. Sciaroni, who is a member of the Bar, gave us an opinion that indicated that it was legitimate for the National Security Council to pursue these activities. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you testify yesterday that you felt that the Intelligence Oversight Board had no jurisdiction over the NSC and you didn't have	

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		to give him any facts? "Mr. NORTH. I did. "Mr. LIMAN. But when you had a favorable opinion from that Board, you prepared to rely on it, but you didn't want to give him any facts. They had no jurisdiction; is that what it amounts to? "Mr. NORTH. You can call it what you like." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 237.)	
85/09/12-500 1984-86		LEGAL OPINIONS ON BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever seek the opinion of [the President's Counsel,] either Mr. Fielding or Mr. Wallison as to whether the NSC was covered by the Boland amendment? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I personally did not. I am not sure about the rest of my staff, whether they did or not. I must say that we seldom referred to any issues--referred any issues to the White House Counsel." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 41.)	
85/09/13-100 SEPTEMBER 13, 1985			ROBERTSON BUMPS INTO NORTH AT THE AIRPORT ROBERTSON REPORT AND NORTH RESPONSE: "Mr. NUNN. Colonel, there is an article . . . in the Los Angeles Times dated July 11, 1987. Just so you and your counsel can take a look at it, I am going to quote one paragraph in here. I will send it to you and let you take a look at it. "It is a rather short article, and it says--the caption is 'Robertson says North told

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			him of Iran hostage talks.' "Going down to a paragraph which I have circled and labled 1, quoting from the article and this is a quote of Reverend Robertson, '"We just happened to bump into each other," Robertson said about his encounter with North on September 13, 1985, "at a private air terminal in Washington. He just happened to say, 'I'm going to Iran to meet some of the leadership to try to negotiate the release of some of our hostages.'"' "My question, Colonel North, did you--do you recall that conversation with Reverend Robertson? "Mr. NORTH. I do not sir. "I would also note that it goes on to say that North asked the Reverend Robertson to pray for me. I have done that often. I am grateful for the prayers of many. "I do not recall that conversation. I also note that if it was September 13, 1985, it is well before we had made those plans. I don't believe that we actually addressed plans to go to Tehran until February of '86. "Mr. NUNN. So you wouldn't have been going to Iran at that time? "Mr. NORTH. Sir, I only went once. That was in May of '86. "My recollection is that those plans were laid down actually for two trips in February of 1986, during our first meetings face to face with the Iranian government officials. "Mr. NUNN. So really this is an erroneous article and Reverend Robertson's memory is not correct on this point?

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			"Mr. NORTH. I am not sure this is a quote from Reverend Robertson. "Mr. NUNN. I am not either. But if it is an accurate quote, it is in error? "Mr. NORTH. It is in error, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 90-91.)
85/09/13-200 SEPTEMBER 13, 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: McFARLANE'S UPDATE FOR SHULTZ DoS CHRONOLOGY: "MCFARLANE tells GPS that the Israel/Iran dealings are 'not moving.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/09/17-100.)
85/09/14-000 SEPTEMBER 14-18, 1985			HOSTAGE RELEASE: Islamic Jihad tells a foreign news agency in Beirut on Sept. 14, 1985 that Rev. Benjamin Weir (kidnapped on May 8, 1984) has been released. Four days later, President Reagan announces that Weir is free and in the United States. State Department officials say they have kept news of Weir's release a secret for four days in the hope that the 6 remaining hostages would also be released. (CRS Rep. 86-190F [4/29/87 Update], at 23.)
85/09/14-100 BETWEEN JULY AND NOVEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: POINDEXTER'S KNOWLEDGE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Let's talk about Iran. When did you first learn that the United States was embarked on

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			an initiative with Iran? "A. Well, it was sometime in the latter half of '85. I became aware -- based on reports from Mr. McFarlane to me I became aware of the Israeli proposal. So to answer your question I don't remember precisely, but it was sometime between July and November. "Q. Was it before the President's operation or after? "A. I can't place it. "Q. Was it before or after the Israelis shipped the 508 TOWs? "A. I think I became aware of it before that, so that would place it sometime before the last of August, I guess. "Q. Did Mr. McFarlane tell you that the President had approved it? "A. I have a vague recollection of a telephone call that Mr. McFarlane got from the President when the President was at Camp David one weekend and Mr. McFarlane, I believe, reported that conversation to me and I think that's as best I can place it. "Q. What was the conversation about? "A. That the President agreed that the Israeli proposal should be pursued. You see, my recollection of it is very fuzzy, and my recollection was prompted by, I think, something that Mr. McFarlane said in the hearings. I do recall that the President was at Camp David one weekend and Mr. McFarlane told me about a telephone call that he had gotten from the President and that it was related to the Israeli

proposal. That's as best as I can --

"Q. Admiral, you understood that the Israeli proposal involved sending some TOWs?

"A. I'm not certain when I became aware of that.

"Q. When he told you that the Israeli [sic] President had given some kind of green light to the Israeli proposal, what was the proposal that he gave his blessing?

"A. That's what I don't have a good recollection.

"MR. BECKLER: Have you got memos?

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. I have something I could show you, but I don't know whether you've seen it and we'll mark it as the next exhibit, a July 13, 1985 document from the White House to the Secretary of State's aircraft, and it's by Mr. McFarlane.

". . . .

"Just so that when you read it you'll know the question you're going to be asked in the end, I'm not going to be questioning you about the merits of the contents. It's just whether you've seen this document and does it refresh your recollection that they were talking about 100 TOWs and hostages.

"(Pause.)

"A. I don't think I've seen this before. I may have, but it just doesn't ring any bells.

"Q. Does it refresh your recollection at all that the proposal that was under consideration involved the transfer of some TOWs by Israel and the expectation that there would be some hostages released?

"A. The TOWs just don't stand out in my memory. I clearly during this time frame knew the hostages were involved, but I frankly just can't recall TOWs being mentioned. And -- well, go ahead. All I was going to say is that I don't believe it was until sometime, it may even have been as late as the meeting with Nir on the second of January, that I realized that we had a commitment to sell the Israelis the 508 TOWs.

"That's what makes me a little skeptical exactly when I knew that TOWs were involved." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 336-38; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 34 [= Ex. GPS 9; Memo from The White House (RCM) to the Secretary of State's Aircraft, 7/13/85].)

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BETWEEN JULY
AND NOVEMBER
1985

SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: POINDEXTER'S KNOWLEDGE

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. Did you know in September of 1985 that the Israelis had shipped TOWs?

"A. I think at some point after the hostage -- the first one was Weir. After Weir was released I think my recollection is that I was aware that TOWs had been shipped.

"Q. Did Bud McFarlane tell you that there was a linkage between the release of Weir and the Israeli shipment of TOWs?

"A. Yes. I've got a vague recollection of that.

"Q. And is what you don't have a clear

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			recollection of that the United States had committed to replenish those TOWs? "A. That's correct. I don't think that that was clear to me until sometime later and maybe even as late as the January meeting with Nir. "Q. You were not present at the briefing of the President in the hospital? "A. No. "Q. Or the meeting in August of 1985 in the residence at which this was discussed with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense? "A. That's correct. "Q. Did McFarlane -- "A. Let me be careful here. What I missed was an NSPG meeting that was in August, the first week in August. I'm not sure where that meeting was. "Q. Well, there was a meeting in the residence as the President was recuperating. "A. Okay. I was not present for that. "Q. Were you present at any meeting at that time in which they were discussing Israeli shipment of TOWs? "A. Probably during that time period that would have been discussed at 9:30, but I don't have a recollection of it. "Q. The authorization of shipment of missiles to Iran would have been contrary to United States policy at that time, would it not have been? "A. It would have been, on the face of it, contrary to our stated objective, that's correct. "Q. Did we have -- "A. I would like to get more into that at

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			some point. "Q. Maybe we can go into it now. We did have a program called Operation Staunch, didn't we? "A. That's correct. "Q. And that was a program that was designed to discourage our allies from selling weapons to Iran; am I correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. And is it also fair to say that after a period of very cold relations with Iraq that you were aware that the State Department had been trying to develop some relationship with Iraq? "A. At this point let me -- the policy objective here was to end the Iran-Iraq war with no winners and no losers. We didn't want Iran to be the victor; on the other hand, we didn't want Iraq to be the victor. Our official position, public position, was one of neutrality. [Redacted.] "The reason that we pushed our allies not to ship arms had as its policy objective an end to the war. The efforts to staunch the flow of arms was a method to achieve an end, which was the policy objective. "Q. Well, I understand that. But the shipment of missiles to Iran was a deviation from this policy. "A. From our stated position with regard to shipment of arms to Iran, that's correct. It wasn't necessarily inconsistent with our policy objective, though. "Q. It would not be inconsistent with our policy objective if it would have the effect of

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			shortening the war as opposed to prolonging it, right? "A. It wouldn't be inconsistent if eventually it brought an end to the war, not with Iran winning but, in other words, our objective was to have some influence on the Iranian government. "Q. But we had up until then not authorized any one of our allies to ship arms to Iran, correct? "A. That is correct." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 339-42.)
85/09/14-102 BETWEEN JULY AND NOVEMBER 1985			SUMMER 1985 IRAN PROPOSALS: POINDEXTER'S KNOWLEDGE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Can you explain to me why if you had been told at that time that we were authorizing shipment of arms to Iran it wouldn't have left some imprint on your memory? "A. Well, I'm not sure I can answer that. "MR. BECKLER: He's testified that he remembered that there were TOW missiles shipped. It wasn't like he never remembered it. Your question is when did he remember it. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. The issue is whether he knew that we had -- "A. We had considered even before, as the record indicates, before the Israelis came in with their proposal, we had considered internally on the NSC staff the wisdom of limited arms sales to Iran.

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			"Q. That was part of that NSDD process? "A. That's correct. "Q. Were you involved in that process? "A. As a reviewer and recommender to Mr. McFarlane. I didn't actually participate in the drafting of it. "Q. Were you aware of the reaction of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State? "A. Generally. "Q. And that they were opposed to shipping arms? "A. Yes, for different reasons. "Q. But they came out with the same bottom line? "A. Yes. "Q. What was your position as a recommender to McFarlane? "A. I can't recall. You mean whether I thought the shipment of a limited amount of arms was appropriate? "Q. Right. "A. I was in favor of that. "Q. Had you dealt with Graham Fuller on this at the Agency? "A. No, I didn't deal with him; the staff did. "Q. So you just don't have a recollection of whether you were told at that time, in the fall of 1985, that we had committed to replenish the Israeli TOWs? "A. As I have said all along, that time period of July, August, September, October and November is very fuzzy in my mind because I was

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			not fully involved and fully informed. "MR. BECKLER: In that issue. "THE WITNESS: In that issue. And what I was aware of I supported and usually, when I don't have the direct responsibility for something, I just don't -- if I agree with it and I assume that somebody is handling it and is handling it properly, I just don't get heavily involved in it. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. Well, was the President briefed in your presence prior to November 1985 on the fact that Weir came out because Israel shipped arms? "A. He probably was, but I don't have a recollection. "Q. Do you recall any discussion of what the next step would be in the initiative after Weir came out? "A. I don't recall that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 342-44.)
85/09/14-180 SHORTLY AFTER SEPTEMBER 14, 1985 THROUGH 1986			IRAN ARMS SHIPMENTS: POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. Now, when did you first learn about the arms shipments to Iran? "Mr. POINDEXTER. With hindsight, and going over all of the exhibits and the information that has been provided to me within the past few months, it appears that I was aware of arms shipments probably shortly after the release of the first hostage. "It may have been shortly before that, but in that time frame. "Mr. SARBANES. So that would have been in the

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			fall of 1985? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Late--probably late summer of 1985. "Mr. SARBANES. And then were you aware of each subsequent shipment of arms to Iran? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I was. "Mr. SARBANES. Including the very significant shipments that were made directly by the United States through the Secord operation in 1986? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 35-36.)
85/09/14-200 AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 1985			ARMS FOR HOSTAGES WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. We now know in late August and early September of 1985 there was a transaction which involved Israel sending approximately 508 TOWs to Iran, and shortly thereafter there was a release of a hostage. At or about the time that occurred, were you aware of that? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I was not. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Did you have any knowledge that release of the hostages was related to the transfer of weapons to Iran? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I did not then and still don't know whether there was any connection." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 91-92. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 20-21 [Weir's release and Weinberger's unfamiliarity with the circumstances].)

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85/09/15-100 SEPTEMBER 15, 1985			SUMMER 1985 TOW SHIPMENT: 408 TOWs TO IRAN SUMMARY: Early on September 15, 1985, a DC-8 loaded with 408 TOWs flies to Tabriz, Iran. Benjamin Weir is released on the same day. (Iran-Contra Report, at 169 [citing the Israeli Historical Chronology].)
85/09/16-100 SEPTEMBER 16, 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MONEY DELIVERIES OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen travels to New York at the request of Copp (Secord), whom North has asked Owen to contact. Secord gives Owen an address and instructions for a meeting. It is Rosh Hashanah; the banks are closed; Secord need cash. Owen flies into New York and takes a cab to a corner Chinese market on the lower west side. Owen asks for a person by code name (Owen: "I think it was something like 'Mooey'"). A man walks behind the counter, rolls up his pants leg and pulls out a wad of $100 bills. Owen takes the wad and counts the bills. There are 95 of them. Owen returns to Washington and goes to meet Secord at the Sheraton Carlton. He sees Secord sitting at the bar. Owen goes downstairs to a pay phone and calls Secord at the bar. When they meet in the lobby, Owen passes Secord a newspaper with the money inside. At some point, Owen suggests to Secord that the money-changer has taken his five percent.	

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		Secord says, no, "that was to stay within the legal law [sic], so they kept it under the $10,000 so it would not have to be reported." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 14-17.) OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MONEY DELIVERIES OWEN ACCOUNT (cont'd): Owen subsequently makes two other trips to New York for cash at the request of North and Secord. He goes to a bank in the mid-40 cross-streets, goes to the sixth floor and asks for an envelope. Both times he is given an envelope, sealed. He does not see the contents, but feels that they are the shape and size of cash. He does not sign a receipt. Owen then returns to Washington and delivers the envelopes to North at his office. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 17-19.)	
85/09/17-100 SEPTEMBER 17, 1985			HOSTAGE RELEASE: STATUS REPORT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon BARTHOLOMEW tells HILL that WEIR said he was released to bring pressure for release of DAWA prisoners. BARTHOLOMEW states that he knows 'precious little about origins of this or who is involved.' Lunch meeting among GPS, CASEY, MCFARLANE, and WEINBERGER. MCFARLANE debriefs group on hostages, noting that the hostage release is 'not going anywhere.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/11/18-290.)

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85/09/18-100 SEPTEMBER 18, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WEAPONS REQUEST TO BE RELAYED TO PRIVATE DONORS MILLER NOTE: Richard Miller, in a handwritten note, refers to C4 explosives, M-79 grenade launchers, and "$415,000 - WEAPONS." According to Miller, North gave him this information with the understanding that it would be used for private fund-raising. (Iran-Contra Report, at 94 [citing Committee Document RM 971].)	
85/09/20-090 SEPTEMBER 20, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ: "Dear Felix: "AFTER READING THIS LETTER PLEASE DESTROY IT. You may keep the photographs. "Within the next 15 days, the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO)/Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) air arm will commence operations with two new types of aircraft: the C-7, CARIBOU and the M-740, MAULE STOL (see enclosures). These aircraft will be used for air drop/aerial resupply to units inside Nicaragua. "Two contract C-7s are scheduled to arrive in [redacted] on or about October 10. Initially the aircraft will be flown by U.S. citizens who are employees of the firm contracted to provide delivery services for the FDN. It is intended that these aircraft will operate primarily at night, performing paradrops to units deep inside. Nicaraguan aircrews will be trained to fly these	

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		missions as soon as possible. ". . . . "Since this is a completely compartmented operation, being handled by the resistance, you are the only person in the area who can set-up the servicing of these aircraft with [redacted] and [redacted] both have a high regard for you and you may use my name PRIVATELY with either of them but NO others. You must not advise [redacted], you must also keep knowledge of this project from [redacted] who is NOT working with our people. "-- This plan requires ONLY discrete [sic] use of the [redacted] space and no use of FMS; MAP; and/or Agency funds, equipment, and/or personnel. The contractor will guarantee discretion. "Please advise soonest as to [redacted] acceptance of this proposal. If [redacted] and [redacted] agree, a representative of the maintenance contractor will arrive and seek you out. He will identify himself as coming from Mr. Green. "Warm regards, hope all is well with you. We hear nothing but good reports about your work. Keep it up. Vaya con Dios!" (JHICI Ex. FIR 1 [emphasis in original].)	
85/09/20-100 SEPTEMBER 20, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE RESUPPLY OPERATION RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Felix Rodriguez receives a letter in Central America on Sept. 29, 1985 from Oliver North. The letter, dated 9 days earlier, requests a location at which aircraft can be maintained: "Mr. BARBADORO. . . . The letter notified you	

that the [UNO/]FDN air arm was going to commence a resupply operation using a C-7 aircraft and a [Maule] aircraft, is that right?

". . . .

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. That is correct.

"Mr. BARBADORO. What the letter asked you to do was to provide maintenance facilities at the air base in the country where you were working, is that right?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes[,] sir. Basically, to get a space. I was told that there would be no need for any local maintenance. . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. So the FDN would provide the mechanics to work on the planes, all that Colonel North wanted was for you to gain the permission of the government to use the air base as a place to work on the planes, is that correct?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. That is right.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did this letter say anything to you about storing arms and ammunition on this air base?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No[,] sir, nothing whatsoever. Strictly a space.

"Mr. BARBADORO. What did you do after you got the letter?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, sir, I contacted the individuals to help me in this and explained to them the need for this type of an operation. I got the concurrence to go ahead with it. It was in the best interest of every single contra in Central America.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you call Colonel North to tell him that you had gotten the permission to use

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		the air base from the authorities? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I called him the next day and I had to wait for the letter explaining somebody would contact me -- Mr. Green -- and he would help implement and set up the shop there." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 229-31; JHICI Ex. FIR 1 [North letter]. See Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 231-33 [Green calls; Rodriguez recognizes Quintero's voice]; id., 5/28/87, at 8-10 [North letter of 9/20/85].)	
85/09/20-110 1985-86		RODRIGUEZ' CONTRA ROLE AND NORTH'S DIRECTION: POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. And is it true that you knew that Colonel North had arranged either with Felix Rodriguez, or more likely an official in the country where Felix Rodriguez was working, to get logistics support for the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I was aware that he was doing what he could to pave the way for the logistics effort in the surrounding countries. "Mr. LIMAN. And is it-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. I would like to keep that general." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 191.)	
85/09/20-800 SEPTEMBER 20, 1985			ROBERTSON INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NUNN. . . . You said in your opening statement, Mr. Attorney General, and this relates to the hostages and so forth, sensitivity of the operation, 'We were all acutely aware that if word

of the initiative got out, however innocently or inadvertently, it would be fatal to the hostages and others helping in their release.'

"I don't want to go through this whole thing with you and I don't know about the interview Pat Robertson had with President Reagan in 1985--do you know about that?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I don't.

"Mr. NUNN. That probably answers the question. I'll read it to you briefly. This was a TV interview, and Reverend Robertson has twice, in interviews with the Los Angeles Times, said Colonel North told him he was relating and working with the Iranians to free hostages. Colonel North in testimony denied that. [See 85/09/13-100.]

"But getting directly to the question, I'm not trying to get you in that dispute, but Reverend Robertson on television asked President Reagan back in--on September 20, 1985, quoting from that interview, 'Word reached us that a member of the White House staff was dispatched on Sunday to Iran to seek the release of the remaining six'--and actually was seven at that time. 'Is there any word on that that might give hope to us?' And President Reagan, I won't read his whole reply, skirted the issue and handled it I think rather skillfully.

"The question I have to you is, did anyone say to you that this was a serious leak?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. I don't remember ever hearing about that before your reference to it now.

"Mr. NUNN. This is very puzzling to me. Here

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			everyone was compartmentalizing, or at least that was the effort, keeping this very secret. Your testimony and many others was that one of the reasons that you didn't let this get out to Congress or to the other people in the administration was the sensitivity, the lives involved. Yet, here the President of the United States was asked a question indicating some very sensitive information is in the hands of the interviewer, and no one knows about it. Nobody investigates it. Admiral Poindexter is never notified. You, as Attorney General, weren't notified. No one did anything about it. "Did somebody monitor what the President said and what he's asked on television? "Attorney General MEESE. Normally there are people who are watching those things. I cannot respond to you as to why this occurred. "Mr. NUNN. You don't have any knowledge of it? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 204-06 [quoting Meese opening statement, JHICI, 7/29/87, at 8].)
85/09/20-805 SEPTEMBER 20, 1985			ROBERTSON INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. NUNN. Switching to another subject, Admiral Poindexter, we discussed with Colonel North [see 85/09/13-100], I did the other day, The Los Angeles Times article about Reverend Robertson and what he had said in that article North had told him about the effort to get hostages back. I don't know whether you followed any of that or

not.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I followed it.

"Mr. NUNN. It has come to my attention that there was an interview that took place on television with Reverend Robertson interviewing President Reagan in a televised interview which was aired on September 20, 1985 and in that transcript, which I will read to you, Reverend Robertson says to President Reagan, 'Word reached us that a member of the White House staff was dispatched on Sunday to Iran to seek the release of the remaining six' and actually was seven at that time. 'Is there any word on that that might give hope to us?'

"President Reagan answers, 'Well, I can't really talk about what we are doing because I don't want to do anything that would endanger the prospects of the others being freed. I can only say that we have explored every avenue. We have been working for this all the time. Since the first one, Mr. Buckley, was kidnapped and I know that some of the families have grown impatient because they don't see things in the paper. We don't think we are doing anything' --that is the way it reads-- 'but going public and being in the paper is not the way to get the Reverend Weir back or any of the others.'

"My question is, were you alerted to that question having been posed to the Department?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall, Senator, being aware of that at the time.

"Mr. NUNN. If you had been alerted to that question being posed, would not that have caused

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			you considerable alarm? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It would have. As I testified yesterday, I was alarmed at what the President had told Mr. Van Atta. [See 86/04/24-600.] "Mr. NUNN. So that interview means that somebody evidently had told Reverend Robertson? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Or speculation. I simply don't know the facts surrounding it. "Mr. NUNN. So you never had an investigation about a leak or anything of that nature? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I believe I was unaware of that. This is the first time I can recall hearing it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 65-67.)
85/09/21-100 SOMETIME IN THE FALL OF 1985			PRESIDENT'S CONCERN ABOUT HOSTAGES KOCH ACCOUNT: Noel Koch, the top Pentagon official dealing with terrorism and conterterrorism, testified that, in the fall of 1985, North said to him after a meeting on the hostages, "[T]his thing is really eating him [sc. the President] and he is driving me nuts about it. And he wants them out by Christmas." Koch asked North, "Can we do it?" Koch testified that North responded, "I hope so." (Koch Testim., JHICI, 6/23/87, at 170-71.)
85/09/21-150 SOMETIME IN THE FALL 1985			PRESIDENT'S CONCERN ABOUT HOSTAGES NORTH RESPONSE TO KOCH: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, you knew from your meetings with the President that he had deep concern for

the welfare of these American citizens who were hostages?

"Mr. NORTH. He wanted them home.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell Mr. Koch of the Defense Department, as he has testified here, that the President was 'driving you nuts' to get the hostages back by Christmas?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall that conversation. A lot of things have been attributed to me that I allegedly said. I don't recall that.

"Mr. LIMAN. Were you being pressured to get them back in a hurry?

"Mr. NORTH. It was always very clear that our objective was to get as many home as fast as possible.

"Mr. LIMAN. That is different from my question. Did the President of the United States--

"Mr. NORTH. No.

"Mr. LIMAN. --ever make statements to that effect to you?

"Mr. NORTH. I heard the President say--I mean, the President never turned to me and said, 'Ollie, I want them home by Christmas,' but the President very clearly articulated in the meetings I was in with him in the Oval Office on this issue, in the meetings that I attended with him with the hostages' families, it was clear that the President wanted as many hostages home, all of them home as fast as possible."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 20-21.)

85/09/21-200 THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: OLMSTEAD ROLE

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SOMETIME IN THE FALL OF 1985		CASTILLO ACCOUNT: North notifies Castillo that Robert Olmstead will be arriving in Costa Rica to negotiate with the owner of the property on which the airstrip is to be constructed to "purchase or lease or [get] permission to use the property." Olmstead's primary role, Castillo understood at the time, would be to negotiate for the property. Once Olmstead acquires the land, Castillo does not see him again. (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 42-44 [Castillo: "I have heard the term $50,000, but I don't know how that sum figures into whatever the lease-purchase arrangement was."].)	
85/09/21-600 SOMETIME IN THE FALL OF 1985		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: INVOLVEMENT WITH NHAO OWEN ACCOUNT: After Congress passes a Contra humanitarian aid bill in August of 1985, the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) is set up under Robert Duemling, with Cresencio Arcos as his deputy. North decides to move Owen out of the airlift project and into NHAO. Evenor Baldivia, General Secretary of the United Nicaraguan Opposition, has a similar idea and sends Duemling a letter on September 3. Owen meets with Duemling and Arcos several times during September and October. Owen testified that Duemling was reluctant to hire him: "He wasn't quite sure how I would be able to help out. I think he also felt he may have been	

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		receiving undue pressure from possibly Colonel North or others to bring me on board." Owen testified he thought the interagency group composed of Abrams, North, and the CIA CATF had decided Owen should be hired by NHAO. Then, in October 1986, Alfonso Robelo, Arturo Cruz, and Adolfo Calero sent Duemling a letter asking that he retain the Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance (IDEA), a non-profit organization set up by Owen, to help disburse the humanitarian assistance. NHAO contracts with IDEA, and Owen stays with IDEA as its employee. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 10-11, 19-21.)	
85/09/21-700 SOMETIME IN LATE 1985		OWEN'S AND GADD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: TRANSPORTING HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES GADD ACCOUNT: Secord or North contacts Gadd and tells him to meet with Robert Owen "about additional business opportunities in Central America." At that meeting, Owen suggests to Gadd that he contact Mario Calero in New Orleans, "who was ostensibly in charge of FDN logistics in the United States." Gadd contacts Mario Calero, and eventually contracts with the U.S. State Department to fly humanitarian supplies from the U.S. to Central America. In December 1985 or January 1986, Gadd, accompanied by North, meets with Ambassador Robert Duemling and his staff at the NHAO office in Rosslyn, Virginia to describe his capability to transport the supplies. Gadd's company, Air Mach, gets the contract	

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		from the DoS. (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 24-26.)	
85/09/25-300 SOMETIME IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1985		SINGLAUB'S AND NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WEAPONS PROCUREMENT SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Mario Delamico, who in July had met Singlaub's arms shipment at a third country port on behalf of the military official of that country, calls Singlaub from Miami. Singlaub is in Los Angeles giving a speech. Delamico insists he will fly to Los Angeles and meet Singlaub. Later, they get together for "a several-hour conversation" in Los Angeles. Delamico claims he works for Ron Martin, "a recognized arms dealer from Miami." Singlaub takes his statements as a threat: that Singlaub must "never send another ship as we did in the past [but instead should] request and purchase the weapons systems from " Ron Martin. Singlaub responds that if Delamico's company can meet the quality and cost requirments, Singlaub will do business with him. In a meeting at North's office "in October of 1985 or thereabouts," Singlaub tells North about Delamico's message. Singlaub tells North he "hopes that there was not going to be any pressure placed on us to buy from this company which would give us only half the weapons for the same amount of money." North agrees it is a threat and states "that he would take whatever action was necessary on this." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 224-28. See above at 85/06/20-000 [Delamico meets Singlaub's shipment]. See also Rodriguez Testim.,	

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		JHICI, 5/28/87, at 21-23, 59-60 [Rodriguez' contact with Delamico].)	
85/09/30-100 SEPTEMBER 30 - OCTOBER 17, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: FOLLOW-UP FROM REP. BARNES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: [For McFarlane testimony preceding this excerpt, see 85/09/12-111.] "Mr. NIELDS. In your letter to Congressman Barnes you made no reference to his request for duplicates[,] didn't you? [Sic.] "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. "Mr. NIELDS. And that resulted in his sending you another letter? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And that letter is marked exhibit 40c. Do you have that in front of you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I do. "Mr. NIELDS. And that is a letter to you from Congressman Barnes dated September 30, 1985, is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is. "Mr. NIELDS. And it says in its third paragraph, 'I am sure you understand the pertinent documents must be provided if the committee is to be able to fulfill its obligations.' Do you see that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Congressman Barnes wanted to be able to look himself at the same documents which you had looked at? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.	

"Mr. NIELDS. And at that point in time, you did not want him to?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. It wasn't a matter of looking at them, but here the transmission and delivery of documents to the Hill is a decision that is fairly often drawn.

"Mr. NIELDS. But I take it you did not want him to look at those documents?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I invited him down to allow him to look at them.

"Mr. NIELDS. Before you did that, didn't you have a conversation with Mr. Thompson on the subject of whether it was proper to re-write the documents?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, but that didn't affect what happened to the documents prepared and collected for this investigation.

"Mr. NIELDS. But you did discuss that with Mr. Thompson and he told you that he thought documents that go from an inferior to a superior and that were put in NSC files could not be re-written?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And nonetheless, you had North draft some revisions to one or two of these documents?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it isn't nonetheless, because only after North made the distinction between what I interpreted and what was true and went away to write what he said to be the true case did he [sic] then consult with Mr. Thompson and based upon what he said, although I didn't take it as an informed opinion, truly, I did not integrate what Colonel North had written.

"Mr. NIELDS. So, first, you had North re-write a couple of the documents, then you [sic] went to Mr. Thompson and asked him if it was proper and he said no, and you, in fact, did not re-write any of the documents?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. None of them were integrated into existing files.

"Mr. NIELDS. Thereafter, one week after you had decided not to re-write the documents, you did contemplate withholding them from Congress, did you not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I asked the advice of counsel in the White House at the time, Mr. Fielding, and I was looking for his advice on how to handle an executive legislative matter, and this was a fairly common occurrence where various committees would seek information, and there were about a half a dozen different ways of meeting the needs of the Congress and the needs of the White House in this case, and they included such alternatives as sending the documents if they didn't involve any advice to the President, taking the documents to the Hill to be read at the Hill with staff, short of that, taking them to the Hill, but no staff, short of that, bringing the Member to the White House with staff, short of that, without staff, and so forth.

"But that kind of call was normally made by the Legislative Office or by the counsel in the White House, and that is why I asked Mr. Fielding about it.

"Mr. NIELDS. Or simply flatly asserting

executive privilege.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you discussed that with Mr. Fielding, did you not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 91-94; JHICI Ex. 40-C [letter from Rep. Barnes to McFarlane, 9/30/85].)

85/09/30-101
SEPTEMBER 30
- OCTOBER 17,
1985

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH:
FOLLOW-UP FROM REP. BARNES
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. And . . . I take it then it is the case since you contemplated changing the documents, and you contemplated withholding them altogether that you did not want to reveal them to the Congress.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is really not so. There was no question in my mind but that it would be an extremely torturous, conflicting, disagreeable outcome and that I hoped that we didn't come to that, yes, that is true, but at the same time it seemed to me that the nature of those infractions of law that I had been able to identify in point of fact were not the sorts of things that the Congress had been terribly concerned about.

"I had no illusions that it wouldn't become or could become from the political point of view quite an embarrassing thing but the documents were collected and the Congressman could have, had he chose[n], gone ahead to read them.

"Mr. NIELDS. In any event, I take it you communicated back to Congressman Barnes that you would not let any of his staff review them.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you told him to come down to your office and he did.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I invited him down, yes, that is right.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you had some documents on your desk when you met with him?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you met with him for a relatively short period of time, did you not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. How long was it?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think--

"Mr. NIELDS. Half-hour, hour?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Not more than 10 minutes or so.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you had budgeted a relatively short period of time, had you not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I take it it was part of your thinking that if a busy Congressman came down to your office and saw a substantial stack of documents, and you were having a short meeting, it was very unlikely that he would ask to read through the documents from one end to the other?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think that is true, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. But you also had available to you, did you not, a memorandum from Mr. Thompson that he had written you the day before? That would be Exhibit 70. Do you have that in front of you?

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		"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I do. "Mr. NIELDS. And that is a memorandum from Mr. Thompson to you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is. "Mr. NIELDS. Dated October 16, 1985? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And your meeting with Congressman [Barnes] was going to be on October 17? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Congressman Barnes, yes, that is right. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And . . . according to this memo, you had budgeted an hour, 8:30 to 9:30. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And Thompson writes in this memo, and I will read from the second and third paragraphs, 'In addition to assuring Representative Barnes that all the members of your staff are directly responsible to you for their actions, and that none of them has violated the letter or the spirit of the law, you should advise him that any contact with contras was at your direction and with your knowledge in furtherance of the President's initiatives.' "Then, it says in the next paragraph, 'Any documents pertaining to the above contacts are internal and deliberative in nature and are furthermore not NSC agency documents. As Presidential advisory papers, they fall under the dominion of the President and are no longer subject to your disposition.' "Do you see that?	

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		"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I do. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you receive this memorandum before the meeting? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Probably so, yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 94-98; JHICI Exx. 40-C [letter from Rep. Barnes to McFarlane, 9/30/85], 70 [Thompson memo to McFarlane, "Meeting with Congressman Mike Barnes," 10/16/85].)	
85/09/30-102 SEPTEMBER 30 - OCTOBER 17, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: FOLLOW-UP FROM REP. BARNES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, when you met with Congressman Barnes [see 85/10/17-000], I take it he never reviewed any documents? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, he didn't. "Mr. NIELDS. Did there ever come a point where you actually told him right then and there, Congressman Barnes, 'You can read all the documents'? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Are you certain of that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe the way it went was that I told him what I had done in conducting the search, what I had done by way of interviewing Colonel North, other members of the staff, said that I had assembled the documents, and that counsel advised that he could review them in the White House without staff, if he chose. "I believe that is exactly the way it went. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you have all of the	

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		documents on your desk at the time, including the problematic ones? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think so. "Mr. GARMENT. Including the problematic ones. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe so, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. In any event, Congressman Barnes never read any of the documents? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, he didn't. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it it is fair to say that North stopped writing documents like that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I can account for about another month until I resigned. Beyond that, I don't know. "Mr. NIELDS. But I take it that Colonel North did not change his conduct with respect to assisting the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I guess I don't have any first-hand basis for saying yes or no. "Mr. NIELDS. Then, could you turn to Exhibit 45(f)?. . ." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 98-99. For McFarlane testimony following this excerpt, see 86/02/27-301.)	
85/10/00-000 LATE FALL [OCTOBER?] 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH COUNTRY 3 SIGUR ACCOUNT: North approaches Sigur and asks him to go back to the same Country 3 official again to seek additional money for the Contras. The official returns with the message "Yes, we can" after a time lapse: "Took a while. . . . It was either late 1985 or early 1986 when he said[,] 'Yes, we	

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		can do it,' and another million." Sigur, again, does not discuss the event with McFarlane. He testifies later that he believed North was acting for McFarlane. (Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 119-21; see also id., at 104-16 [Sigur's prior contacts with the Country 3 official about the Contras].)	
85/10/00-010 1985 - SUMMER 1987		COUNTRY 3's CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. When were you first informed that country number 3 had contributed $2 million to the contras in 1985? "Secretary SHULTZ. I was--this has emerged here during the course of the hearings, and that is as I learned it. "Mr. BELNICK. You never were informed of that fact prior to these hearings? "Secretary SHULTZ. No." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 9.) See 85/08/00-000 [Sigur's contact with country 3].)	
85/10/00-040 DURING OCTOBER 1985		LAKE RESOURCES $200,000 DEPOSIT TO CALERO CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. You also received $200,000 from Lake Resources, correct? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. That was in October of 1985 that you received that $200,000? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you know at the time that money was coming from Lake Resources?	

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		"Mr. CALERO. No, I found that out in February of 1987 when my lawyer told me when Lake Resources became known, then my lawyer spotted--see, I had not seen the bank statements before. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North tell you that he was sending you some money at around that time? "Mr. CALERO. No. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you know that you had received $200,000 in October of 1985? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, but I don't know where from. "Mr. BARBADORO. Again, you were surprised and happy to get this money? "Mr. CALERO. No [sic], I was surprised because I connected this money with Channell's. "Mr. BARBADORO. So you assumed that the $200,000 had been raised by Channell and Miller for you, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. Have we now described all of the contributions you received during that period from 1984 until 1986? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. Yes. All the money contributions that were in our bank, and we had a lot of material, goods, that were given to us, medicines and uniforms and shoes, and that." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 26-27. See 85/02/00-800 [$32 million bank deposits to Calero's accounts, and over $1 million from Intel Corp.]; 85/04/01-699 [summary of money flow through Calero's bank account].)	

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85/10/00-100 SOMETIME IN OCTOBER 1985			IRANIAN REQUEST FOR MORE ADVANCED WEAPONS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane outlines events following the August-September Israeli TOW shipments to Iran: "Well, I think there were one or two false starts in the month of October, when Mr. [Michael] Ledeen came to my office and reported that in meetings that he had had in Germany, usually, the Iranians had expressed interest in getting various kinds of weaponry that were extremely exotic and quite near the top of our inventory. "It was just out of the question. I told him so. But the next concrete proposal that was made I believe occurred in November of 1985, when I had a visit from the Defense Minister of Israel." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 124-25.)
85/10/00-200 AROUND OCTOBER 1985			BURN NOTICE ON GHORBANIFAR GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. You do not recall talking with Colonel North about who Manucher Ghorbanifar was at that time [c. October 1985]; is that right? You didn't have a chat with Colonel North on the nature of Manucher Ghorbanifar? "Mr. George. Colonel North told me something about what the sam hill he thought he was doing and I apologize, I can't remember. I cannot bel[ie]ve he said I am dealing with Mr. Ghorbanifar and [redacted]. "Mr. Kerr. I assume that had you known that you would have apprised Colonel North of the perspective of the Operations Directorate on

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			Manucher Ghorbanifar? "Mr. George. Whatever else I did throughout this affair, when the name Manucher Ghorbanifar was put together with who he was, meaning I suddenly realized he was a man with a burn notice, I am afraid I made a bit of a fool of myself telling everybody that we should stay away from him. I would not have excluded Colonel North from that piece of advice. "Mr. Kerr. You don't have a perception today though as to whether or not North knew as of October 1985 of the agency's prior bad relationship with Ghorbanifar? "Mr. George. I do not know." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 289-90.)
85/10/01-300 SOMETIME IN OCTOBER 1985		NORTH-HAKIM CONTACT, AND THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP GADD ACCOUNT: Unsolicited, Gadd testified that North knew Hakim as early as October 1985 (compare 86/02/24-200 and -205) when both attended a meeting on the Costa Rican airstrip: "Q. In or about October 1985 did you attend a meeting with Oliver North, where North asked you to conduct a study to build an air strip in Costa Rica? "A. Yes. ". . . . "Q. And who else was present at this meeting? "A. General Secord, an associate of Colonel North, whose name I believe is Olmstead-- "Q. Did Colonel North introduce you to	

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		Olmstead? "A. Yes. "Q. And? "A. And I believe Albert Hakim was also at the meeting. ". . . . "Q. Did North say anything with reference to Olmstead and this airstrip? "A. Yes. "Q. What did he say? "A. He informed me that Olmstead had been at the location and had surveyed it, taken pictures, and dealt[] with the locals in the area. "Q. And was it indicated at the meeting by Oliver North or anyone else that the permission of the Costa Rican Government had been obtained? "A. Yes. ". . . . "Q. Were you subsequently hired or did you generally agree to conduct the study? "A. Yes. "Q. And did you hire personnel to draw up a plan to build the airstrip? "A. Yes. "Q. And who was to pay you for the airstrip, and your work? "A. General Secord stated that he would arrange for that payment. "Q. And did you subsequently construct the airstrip through one of your subsidiaries, EAST? "A. We supervised the construction of the airstrip. ". . . .	

"Q. Sir, could you estimate to the best of your ability what profit you obtained from working on this project?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And could you estimate how much profit you had obtained from this activity?

"A. The construction of the air strip?

"Q. Yes, sir.

"A. In terms of dollar amount?

"Q. Yes.

"A. I cannot estimate that. What do you mean by profit?

"Q. Well, you said you were making a profit on it.

"A. Correct.

"Q. [How] were you making a profit?

"A. Income exceeded expense.

"Q. That is my question. How much did the income exceed the expense by?

"(Discussion off the record.)

"(Whereupon, the reporter read the record as directed.)

"THE WITNESS: I do not know. However, gross receivables exceeded $100,000 for construction of that airfield.

"Q. And that was money paid to you through General Secord?

"A. That was money paid to the company through General Secord."

(Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 19-24.)

~~85/10/01-400~~
SOMETIME IN

THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: QUINTERO'S ROLE
CASTILLO ACCOUNT:

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OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER 1985		North informs Castillo that Rafael Quintero will be arriving in Costa Rica. He comes after the protracted negotiations to acquire land for the airstrip have concluded between Olmstead and Joseph Hamilton (the land owner). Quintero's role is to take charge of the airstrip construction. (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 44-46.)	
85/10/01-500 FALL 1985		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: CIA NON-AWARENESS CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Castillo testifying on why he did not relay word of the airstrip construction to his CIA superiors: "Mr. Eggleston. You have indicated that there are a couple of reasons you didn't report. You said they were clearing a plot of land and there is nothing illegal about that. They weren't clearing a plot of land to establish an apple orchard, you knew they were going to establish an airfield there apparently under the direction or control of Colonel North, to resupply contras in the southern part of Nicaragua. "That is correct, is it not? "Mr. Castillo. Well, yes, it was correct that they were going to construct an airfield. How much Colonel North was involved in the decision making process, I don't know. He was connected to it. That it was an airfield to be used eventually for the contras, yes, that is true, but in and of itself, it wasn't necessarily an illegal or an intelligence activity, by my interpretation. "Mr. Eggleston. And -- "Mr. Castillo. Anybody can fault me on the	

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		judgment call on it, but that is what I decided. I decided not to make it a matter of official record. "Mr. Eggleston. You knew as well, though, that this was a 'hot area'. This was a hot area -- the Boland amendment legally, and you have indicated several times that it was a hot area politically[. W]as part of the reason that you decided not to report on this [ ] because of the sensitive nature of the area -- so there will be nothing official reported about it? "Mr. Castillo. I am not trying to avoid the question. I simply don't know what my thoughts were at that time. Probably if there was anything, it is that I assume -- I would have assumed that headquarters simply wouldn't want to have known about it. ". . . . "Mr. Eggleston. Did you think the reason headquarters didn't want to know about it is because Colonel North was involved in establishing an airfield? "Mr. Castillo. I can't speak for why I thought headquarters would not want to know about it. That is a conclusion that I reached. I think that was in my mind at that time." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 104-06.)	
85/10/01-510 FROM OCTOBER 1985		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: C/CATF AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Carome. I take it that in the fall of 1985, the [redacted] was refusing to allow NHAO flights to go directly into [redacted] and that	

there were discussions at the RIG meetings that you attended about an alternative air base to use and that in connection with those discussions, Oliver North indicated or identified [redacted] that could be used to continue the flights; is that correct?

"[C/CATF.] That is correct. It was more early winter than fall, November, December.

"Mr. Carome. When did you become aware Felix Rodriguez, otherwise known as Max Gomez, was a key operator working on [redacted] project?

"[C/CATF.] I knew that Felix Rodriguez was in [redacted] in the fall, earlier in the fall of 1985, [redacted.] It was attendant to the discussions about arranging a transshipment facility that took place in November-December of 1985 that his name came up in the context of working in [redacted] as part of the transshipment operation.

"Mr. Carome. Would you please take a look at [C/CATF] Exhibit 15, the second page of that exhibit. This is an exhibit we looked at yesterday [see 85/08/29-250]. It is meetings [sic (minutes)] of a NHAO meeting dated October 1.

". . . .

"Mr. Carome. On page 2 there is a reference, it said Mr. Green said to call Max Gomez. Do you recall at that October 1 meeting there was a discussion of Max Gomez operating out of [redacted.]

"[C/CATF.] On October 1.

"Mr. Carome. That is correct. That is the date of these notes.

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		"[C/CATF.] I don't recall that, no, I don't. On October 1 I don't believe that the problem, to the best of my recollection, I don't believe the problem with [redacted] had come into full blow yet and I don't recall, as I testified in my deposition, a Mr. Green. "Mr. Carome. When did you become aware that the team at [redacted] was dropping lethal, as well as non-lethal supplies to the Nicaraguan contras? "[C/CATF.] Let me answer that in two parts. I would have understood that the team at [redacted] was transshipping lethal material from [redacted] or at least partial loads in small amounts in January of maybe late February, because we very much -- we have talked a lot about the 10 percent rule and whether or not partial loads could have been mixed in that transshipment and I believe members of the committee will recall those discussions. "It would have been about that same time or maybe a little bit thereafter that I would have begun to see these flights were also dropping into Nicaragua. "Now, I want to add that there was some [redacted] reporting that I have seen subsequently [redacted] which indicated that they were going to contract -- arrange for a contract for handling their resupply problem, and I don't recall at the time having linked that with [redacted] with the drops inside. I subsequently do, but I would say I really began to understand that the people who were handling the transshipment out of [redacted]	

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		were also going to be doing other missions in January at some point in time. "Mr. Carome. There is a reference, and I believe you have already referred to it, in this Exhibit 15, to a Mr. Green. Felix Rodriguez has testified that Mr. Green was a code name being used in the arrangements later in 1985 for a lethal drop to the contras. Do you recall the discussion at that October 1 meeting turning to the subject of a lethal drop being organized by Mr. Gomez? "[C/CATF.] I don't recall any discussions within the context of NHAO, and that would be within the context of the RIG where we discussed lethal drops, and I don't recall a Mr. Green and I think it is very important to establish at this juncture because we are going to be moving into this that there are parts of this story that I will know and there are parts of this story that I don't know, and I kind of phase in and out of it and I will testify as we go along." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 2-5; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 15. See C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 67-70, 78-81 [the resupply operation and CIA involvement]. See also 85/08/29-250 [C/CATF Ex. 15].)	
85/10/03-810 OCTOBER 3, 1985			BUCKLEY'S MURDER REPORTED: Islamic Jihad claims on October 3, 1985 to have killed hostage William Buckley in retaliation for the October 1 bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunisia by Israel. Buckley had worked as CIA Chief of Station in Beirut prior to his kidnapping

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			in Lebanon on March 18, 1984. (See CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 3-4.)
85/10/03-815 1984-86			REPORTS ABOUT BUCKLEY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. With regard to Mr. Buckley and the release of Mr. Buckley, during the time you were Mr. McFarlane's deputy, Buckley was a captive and was in the process of being tortured. You were aware of that, were you not? "A. Right. I'm not exactly sure at which point I learned he was tortured. "Q. You did get reports at some point he had been removed to Iran and was undergoing interrogation and torture, did you not? "A. Yes, we did. We were never quite sure of the validity of those reports. "Q. Did you also receive reports that were supposedly tapes of these torture sessions? "A. Yes. I don't think we learned that until after we had established the Iranian channel. "Q. To what extent was -- "A. At some point we did learn that. "Q. To the best of your recollection, to what extent was the desire to free Buckley a principal motivating factor in the President's Iran Initiative or the earlier shipments in late August through November of 1985? "A. I wouldn't say that the President singled out Buckley any more than the rest of them. "Q. You didn't view that as being a principal or driving factor? "A. No, not distinguishing Buckley from the

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			rest of them. "Q. How about with Director Casey, did you have any knowledge or insight as to the effect that was having on him from the point of view of proposals he would make, suggestions he made to the President? "A. I don't know the answer to that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 110-11.)
85/10/03-820 1985-86			CONCERN ABOUT WILLIAM BUCKLEY LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "A. . . . I have read no end of reports saying that the American government was obsessed with Buckley to the point where the Buckley matter was the driving force for this entire initiative. And I have said, every time this question has come up--and I shall continue to say it--that I was not aware of any particular sense of urgency on the part of the American government regarding Mr. Buckley. Nobody ever pushed me on the matter of Buckley--not North, not Casey, not McFarlane; it never came up. When I talked to people about what was said by Mr. Ghorbanifar and what was transmitted through him from the Iranian government--they raised the question of Buckley and I reported it. But there was no huge sense of urgency, at least that reached me. There may have been, but I was not aware of it. ". . . ." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/22/87, at 136-37.)
85/10/07-050 OCTOBER 7-9,	ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKED SUMMARY:		

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1985	The Italian ship, the Achille Lauro is seized by four Palestinian hijackers on October 5, 1985. One hostage dies; the rest are released two days later. (See Tower, at III-8.)		
85/10/07-053 AFTER OCTOBER 7, 1985	NORTH, LEAKS, AND THE ACHILLE LAURO POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. CHENEY. There are news reports out today that Colonel North was responsible for briefing Newsweek Magazine on the Achille Lauro incident. Do you know anything about that? Do you have any reason to believe those reports are valid? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I haven't seen the reference that you are making. I assume that this is the Newsweek article that appeared at the time, shortly after the Achille Lauro? "Mr. CHENEY. Yes. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't have any basis on which to feel that Colonel North provided that information. I don't know. "Mr. CHENEY. Okay. Well, I don't want to-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. It certainly did not come from me." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 54. See below at 86/04/14-200 [North on leaks from Congress that seriously jeopardized the Achille Lauro mission].)		
85/10/07-100 OCTOBER 7, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: McFARLANE'S ASSURANCES TO CONGRESS NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on written responses submitted	

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		by McFarlane to the HPSCI after McFarlane's briefing of the Intelligence Committee a month earlier on September 10, 1985: "Mr. NIELDS. And you helped prepare those answers to those questions, did you not? "Mr. NORTH. I am sure that I did. "Mr. NIELDS. And if you look at the first page . . . of the answers, the second page of the exhibit, there is a question 3, and it says, 'When the CIA had to withdraw from their day-to-day contact with the rebels, it has been alleged in the New York Times that Colonel North tried to fill the void partly through helping facilitate the supplying of logistics help. Did Colonel North in his capacity as a staff member of the National Security Council use his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies either raised privately in this country or otherwise to the contras?' "And the answer reads as follows: 'Lieutenant Colonel North did not use his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies to the resistance.' "That is false, too, isn't it? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Then if you go to the fifth page of the exhibit, there is a question No. 2, which is, 'General Singlaub has stated in the Washington Post that he would often talk to Colonel North and inform him what he was doing, and then state that if it was a dumb idea for North to send him a signal. Is that your impression of the relationship between Singlaub and Colonel North?	

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		"The answer is not a simple yes or no. The answer is, 'There is no official or unofficial relationship with any member of the NSC staff regarding fund raising for the Nicaraguan democratic opposition. This includes the alleged relationship with General Singlaub.' "That is false, too, isn't it? "Mr. NORTH. I don't know what the definition of an official or unofficial relationship is, but I certainly saw General Singlaub a lot related to support for the Nicaraguan resistance. I have testified to that. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Going back to page 2 again, . . . there is a question 2 and an answer 2. The question refers to newspaper allegations and the answer reads as follows: 'The allegation that Lieutenant Colonel North offered the resistance tactical advice and direction is, as I indicated in my briefing, patently untrue.' "That wasn't true either, was it? "Mr. NORTH. I never sat down in the battlefield and offered direct tactical advice, but I certainly did have a number of discussions with the resistance about military activities, yes, to include the broader strategy for for the southern front and an Atlantic front and an internal front." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 198-200; JHICI Ex. OLN 121 [McFarlane letter to Rep. Hamilton, dated 10/7/85].)	
85/10/07-500		CONTRA RADIOS	

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OCTOBER 7, 1985		DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ABRAMS reports to GPS that opposition forces are broke because of foolish spending on huge arms shipment. Advises they need secure communications equipment. Suggests approaching third country which manufactures such equipment." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 85/10/08-100.)	
85/10/08-100 OCTOBER 8-15, 1985		CONTRA RADIOS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS asks senior official of Country 8 if his government would be willing to supply the radios. Official says he will get back to GPS. He subsequently calls GPS and tells him that Country 8 no longer manufactures equipment needed." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 85/12/08-100.)	
85/10/08-200 OCTOBER 8, 1985			GHORBANIFAR IN WASHINGTON GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. . . . With regard to what is going on during that period of time, we now know Mr. Ghorbanifar came to the United States on or about October 8, 1985, and at that time the only American official with whom he met apparently was Michael Ledeen, and you have as [George] Exhibit 35 a copy of Charles Allen's memorandum from October 7, 1985, in which Mr. Allen asks for [redacted] that is blocked out but he goes by Ashgari, who[m] we now know to be Mr. Ghorbanifar.

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			"Let me set the stage by asking whether or not the operations directorate knew during the first week of October 1985 that Manucher Ghorbanifar was in Washington, D.C. in a hotel and ultimately in the Executive Office Building meeting with American officials. "Mr. George. No, we did not. "Mr. Kerr. Mr. Allen has testified that when he sent up this memorandum, [redacted] he didn't know who Ashgari was. He has testified he didn't know Ashgari's identity until early December 1985. "Do you have any knowledge of Mr. Allen on behalf of himself or on behalf of the National Security Council asking for an identifier on either Ashgari or Ghorbanifar in the fall of 1985? "Mr. George. I do not, sir." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 284; JHICI Ex. CG 35.)
85/10/08-300 OCTOBER 8, 1985			WASHINGTON MEETING: THE FIRST CHANNEL LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "A. So we had then the next meeting of which I have a record or a clear recollection is -- takes place in Washington, the first week in October, according to the Tower Commission report [at B-29], this is the eighth of October. I will point out to you that in my earlier testimony, I have placed this meeting in November. "However, it is the one that is listed on North's calendar as the eighth of October and it actually makes more sense to me in many ways if that date is taken as correct. So I am going to accept that date.

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			"Ghorbanifa[]r, Schwimmer and Nimrodi came to Washington for this meeting. This was because on the fairness principle that I had had to travel to all the previous meetings, it seems only fair that for once we can have one where I lived. "Q. I take it as of this time you were the only American official -- and I guess you were an official, to the effect you were a NSC consultant, who had met with Mr. Ghorbanifa[]r? "A. Yes. After living in Italy all those years, the verbal is much less important than the gestures. "They came to Washington . . . . ". . . . "Q. . . . Was there a reason there was no Kimche? "A. I think he wasn't available. "He had other responsibilities. "Q. Had you called for the meeting? I mean, had Mr. McFarlane indicated to you a meeting was necessary or how did the meeting develop, I guess is the way I want to ask the question. "A. It was clear we had to meet after Weir came out because we had to evaluate where things stood and what, if anything, we were to do in the future. "Q. Okay. "A. We met in the Executive Office Building -- Old Executive Office Building, and although the Tower Commission [at B-29] has drawn the conclusion that North was present at this meeting because he had it on his calendar, I am quite clear in my memory that he was not present at the

meeting. My recollection is that in connection with this meeting, I had introduced Schwimmer to North because Schwimmer had asked to meet North and North had said he was happy to meet Schwimmer. So I introduced them.

"My recollection is this would have been either the day before or the day of this October 8th meeting. It says on North's calendar according to the Tower Commission that this happened earlier in September. I am not sure which is correct, but in any case, by the time of this meeting North and Schwimmer either had met or did meet.

"I think that is the important fact.

"North did not attend these discussions, was not present at them. He was told that if he wanted to attend, that was fine, but he did not. He was busy the whole day.

"Q. Was he told that by you?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there any discussion about whether he ought to attend?

"A. No. He was so deeply involved in this thing, [redacted] and what-not, that I thought among other things it would be a good idea for him to meet Ghorbanifa[]r so he could get a sense of Ghorbanifa[]r for himself, personally, because this was one of the major things that had to be evaluated, whether Ghorbanifa[]r was reliable or not.

"In any case, he was invited and did not appear, and we spent -- this meeting went on all day, several hours in the morning. We ate lunch

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			there, and several more hours in the afternoon." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 70-73. Ledeen's response continues in next entry.)
85/10/08-301 OCTOBER 8, 1985			WASHINGTON MEETING: THE FIRST CHANNEL LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Ledeen's response continues from preceding entry:] "[A.] The conversation dealt with the basic two questions. Ghorbanifa[]r conveyed from his Iranians the promise of more hostages for weapons. Clearly now, as it had not been in the original context, but clearly now a matter of hostages for weapons. "And all kinds of weapons. Weapons, some of which I had heard, some of which I had not heard. I did not know. I must tell you I am not particularly well informed on the subject of weaponry. It is not my field. "But he talked about everything from Phoenix missiles to Sidewinders to harpoons, Hawks, TOWs, everything known to man and many things -- "Q. Not known to that man? "A. Not known to this man, anyway. "I jotted these things down so that I could describe it. There was also considerable discussion of future contacts with Iranians willing to cooperate with the United States Government in order to change the policies of that regime and he gave us names of individuals and promised to arrange a meeting with one of the most important of these in the month of October. And I stressed that I thought this was probably the most

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			important thing that he could do then. "I expressed at the meeting a strong personal antipathy to any further discussion of hostages and weapons. The Israelis were quite eager to pursue the matter of weapons for hostages, and, in fact, accused me at a certain point of being indifferent to the fate of my countrymen. "And I said, look, in any case, it wasn't going to be my decision to make. I was just expressing a personal antipathy to this business, but that I would report what their feelings were. "I asked Ghorbanifa[]r what his feelings were. And he said that he, in fact, agreed with me that he thought it was a mistake to get involved in the matter of the hostages and said that if we get involved in this, we shall all become hostages to the hostages. "We shall not be able to do anything except this, and this will then become the one and only subject. "I reported on this discussion -- "Q. Before you move off the discussion, let me just ask you a few questions. . . . [W]as it clear from what Mr. Ghorbanifa[]r said that he wanted either the United States to supply the w[e]apons, Israel to supply the weapons, or didn't care as long as he got the weapons? "A. That question never came up. "Q. Are you the only American official who attended this meeting? "A. Yes. "Q. Was there any discussion about a phased hostage for arms release?

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			"A. Th[e]re may very well have been. That is one of the questions I have here in my notes. "Q. As -- "A. On some of -- on at least one of those occasions, there was certainly such a discussion, so many weapons, so many hostages, so many weapons, so many hostages, a kind of alternating swap. "Q. Do you have a sense just so that I can put it in my head about how much or how many or dollar value of weapons that he was talking about at that time? "A. I can't help you with that, because I did not and do not know what these weapons are worth. "Q. Right. "A. I don't know what a Hawk missile costs." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 73-75. On Ledeen's contact with McFarlane following the 10/8/85 meeting, see id. at 77-79. On the 10/8/85 meeting with Ghorbanifar, see generally Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/22/87, at 132-42, 182-83, 227-30.)
85/10/08-305 OCTOBER 8, 1985			WASHINGTON MEETING: THE FIRST CHANNEL LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Colonel North's calendar shows a meeting with you on September 26th at 11:00 and a meeting with Mr. Schwimmer at 11:30 on the same day. Do you recall meeting with Colonel North on that day and do you recall Colonel North meeting with Mr. Schwimmer immediately after your meeting? "A. No. "Q. Is it fair to say that you don't remember Schwimmer being in the United States during this

period?

"A. I don't. I think that the first time that those two met was about ten days later, when Schwimmer and Nimrodi and Ghorbanifar met with me in the EOB.

"Q. Okay. According to records we have, that meeting occurred on October 8. Does that sound about the right time for you?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And the people that met at the OEOB were Ghorbanifar, Schwimmer, Nimrodi, and you?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was Kimche there?

"A. No.

"Q. What was the purpose of this meeting?

"A. Well, this was the first meeting since Reverend Weir had been released so we were meeting to assess what had happened and how it had happened and where we stood and where we were going to go.

"Q. Is it fair to say that Ghorbanifar was discussing the possibility of Israel making additional arms shipments to Iran?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And that he was making representations that additional arms shipments would result in additional hostages being released?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Were there discussions of any particular type of weapons at this meeting?

"A. Oh, yes.

"Q. Were Hawk missiles discussed?

"A. Hawks, Phoenixes, Harpoons, Sidewinders, every missile known to man or beast.

"Q. And what was the reaction of the Israelis when Ghorbanifar would raise a possibility of additional arms shipments?

"A. Well, it didn't exactly happen that way. He gave us long lists of missiles that he's like to have and I expressed an opinion that I thought that this was as good a time as any to get out of this whole business and that we ought to just stop talking about the hostages altogether.

". . . .

"Q. Did you feel that, by this point, what had been a two part proposal with arms exchanges for hostages being only one small part of the proposal, had now become a one part proposal which was solely arms for hostages?

"A. No, because the other part was there. The discussion of the political matters had, in fact, Ghorbanifar asking us for dates when we could start to meet with some of the Iranians and try to arrange the set-up of such meetings, where could we meet them and so forth and who would be present. So that was certainly there and indeed, when I said I thought that we ought to get out of his hostage business, Ghorbanifar endorsed it. I asked him, I said look, I'm not in a position to make a decision anyway, but what I propose to say to McFarlane is that I think it's a lousy idea, what do you think. He said, I think that that is correct and that if we continue with this, we shall all become hostages to the hostages." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 81-84. See id. at 119 ("[T]he Iranians were asking for

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			everything, I think, that they could find in a catalogue." They did not talk about nuclear weapons.].)
85/10/08-306 OCTOBER 8, 1985			WASHINGTON MEETING: THE FIRST CHANNEL LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Isn't it fair to say, though, that Ghorbanifar was very much interested in continuing with the arms part of the arms for hostages? "A. There was no way to continue with the arms part of the arms for hostages without continuing with the hostage part. "Q. So you think he was prepared to abandon his efforts to obtain arms for Iran as of October 8? "A. All I can do is report to you what he said at the meeting. At the meeting, he said that he thought it was a mistake to continue with the hostages for the reasons stated. That we would find our hands tied and we would be unable to move on other matters because we would be locked into the hostage question. That proved to be an accurate forecast. He--there is sometimes a confusion between what Mr. Ghorbanifar believes and what he is being asked to transmit by his government and one should try to distinguish between those two. "Q. Do you think you can? "A. Well, sometimes you can. Sometimes you probably can't. His was, and probably still is, [an] unusually delicate and complicated position. It's a complicated area. I don't know many people

capable of doing it. All I can tell you is that is what he said on that occasion. And I was struck by it. And I was struck by it at the time. It was, in fact, one of the things that led me over time to revise my original profound skepticism of him because if, indeed, he were willing to take that position, then I thought one might want to re-think who he was, and all that.

"Q. Was Colonel North present at this meeting on October 8th?

"A. No.

"Q. As of this time, had you told Colonel North who Ghorbanifar really was?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did you know that Ghorbanifar was also being referred by the alias of Ashgari?

"A. Yes.

"Q. But you're quite certain that you had told Colonel North as of October 8th, that Ghorbanifar's name was Ghorbanifar and not Ashgari?

"A. Oh, yes. I had told him what Ghorbanifar's name was. I told him, indeed, the name of the passport on which Ghorbanifar was travelling which was neither Ghorbanifar nor Ashgari.

"Q. What was it?

"A. Krayless.

"Q. Krayless. Was Ghorbanifar one of the many that got a White House tour?

"A. Not that I know of. I did not give White House tours.

"Q. Do you know whether he was shown into the

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			White House while he was there? "A. Not that I know of. I showed him only to the OEOB and out again. "Q. In whose office did you meet with him? "A. We met in no one's office. We used an empty conference room on the third floor. "Q. Why did you decide to meet with him there rather than at your home or some other place? "A. I think because originally the intention was that Ollie would attend to at least part of the meeting and it would be more convenient for him just to walk down the hall rather than to go out of the building and have to go someplace else and then come back. "Q. As far as you know, did Ollie meet with them at all when they were in the United States at this time? "A. I think that Ollie met with Schwimmer at that time and he may have met Ghorbanifar. I just don't remember but I don't think so." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 85-88.)
85/10/17-000 OCTOBER 17, 1985		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: BARNES VISITS THE NSC McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Rep. Barnes makes a brief ("[n]ot more than 10 minutes or so," according to McFarlane) visit to McFarlane's office to review documents relating to Oliver North's activities. (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 96; JHICI Ex. 70. See entries starting at 85/08/16-150 for detailed discussion.)	

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		"Mr. NIELDS. Did you have all of the documents on your desk at the time, including the problematic ones? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think so. "Mr. GARMENT. Including the problematic ones. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe so, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. In any event, Congressman Barnes never read any of the documents? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, he didn't." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 99. See 85/08/16-210, 85/09/30-102 [further McFarlane testimony on Barnes' visit to the NSC].)	
85/10/19-100 OCTOBER 19, 1985		OWEN'S WEDDING PRESENT OWEN ACCOUNT: North, just back from Central America, gives Owen $1,000 in traveler's checks as a wedding present. At the time, Calero has been short of money and has not fully paid Owen. North tells Owen, "We want you to have it." North does not explain who, but Owen assumes he includes Calero, since he had also invited Calero to his wedding. (Calero apparently did not go.) Owen testified, "Maybe Adolfo Calero thought that would be a nice wedding present for me." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 53-54.)	
85/10/19-110 OCTOBER 19, 1985		OWEN'S WEDDING PRESENT CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. Robert Owen testified yesterday that Colonel North gave Owen $1,000 in	

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		travelers' checks as a wedding present. Did Colonel North tell you he was going to do that? "Mr. CALERO. No, not to my recollection." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 51-52.)	
85/10/31-800 SOMETIME IN OCTOBER 1985			CREDIT SUISSE ACCOUNT LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . I seem to recall a little paragraph [in the Tower Report at B-29] about Schwimmer opening an account at the Credit Swiss [sic (Suisse)] around October, and the Tower Commission reports that he gave you an account number and you gave an account number to North; is that correct? "A. Yes, around the time of the conversation with the Senior Iranian official [see 85/11/00-200], we talked about the possibility that it might be necessary to provide people like him with some expense money, or something like that from time to time, and it might be a useful idea to create an account in the event that became necessary. Then we wouldn't suddenly have to create an account on the spur of the moment. So with this contingency, an account[] was opened[.] "Q. Did you know the name of the account? "A. No. What I knew was that I, my name was not on the account. I wasn't entitled to draw on it. "It was an account that S[ch]wimmer opened, and he gave me the number of the account. "Q. I take it you don't have the number? "A. No. . . ." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 96-97. See id. at 138 [Ledeen testified he was unaware whether

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			this account was ever used].)
85/10/31-805 LATE OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1985			BANK ACCOUNT OPENED FOR PAYMENTS TO IRANIAN OFFICIALS LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. I want to go back to the contact you had with the senior Iranian official [see 85/11/00-200] in the Fall and ask you if you ever learned that Ghorbanifar had made payments to that official? "A. Yes, I did learn that he had made payments. "Q. How much did you understand that Ghorbanifar had paid that official? "A. He said, if I remember right, that it was in the neighborhood of $300,000. "Q. When did he tell you about this payment? "A. I don't remember but it was certainly by December. "Q. Could it have been earlier? "A. It could have been. "Q. Did he say where this money had come from? "A. My understanding was that he had advanced it. "Q. He, Ghorbanifar? "A. He, Ghorbanifar. "Q. Did he, Ghorbanifar, say how he expected to recoup the costs of his payment? "A. He said he hoped, in essence, to make it part of the expenses associated with it and he hoped that he could get it out of future sales. "Q. And here you're talking about arms sales,

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			correct? The arms sales from Israel to Iran? "A. Yes. "Q. Do you also recall a discussion with Mr. Schwimmer about the possibility that payments would have to be made to this senior Iranian official or other Iranian officials? "A. Well, I would put it differently. Schwimmer, Nimrodi, and I had a conversation in which we considered the possibility that at some time in the future, it might be necessary to provide money for a cooperative project with people like this senior Iranian official and/or others and that, in the event that that became necessary, it might be wise for us to have a separate account in which any money used for that project would be placed or through which it would pass so as not to confuse the two accounts for the arms sales on the one hand, and then this on the other. "Q. What were these payments to be used for by [sic] these Iranian officials? "A. Well, it wasn't clear but it was in the manner of a contingency account in the event that we wished to do it, so whether we wanted to provide things like communications gear for them, or weapons or ammunition, or airplane tickets to travel to meet with us from time to time, or hotels overseas to stay in if we were going to talk to them, or whatever it might be. "Q. Or to give them money to be used for expenses they had in Iran? "A. It might be conceivable that that would happen, also. What was never discussed was

anything like personal money to them or bribes to them.

"Q. What prompted you to suggest that an account should be opened?

"A. Simply looking ahead and thinking in terms of possible contingencies.

"Q. And your best estimate as to when you asked for this account to be opened would be late October?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And what prompted you to ask for the account to be opened at that time?

"A. Could we go off the record for one second?

"[Brief discussion off the record.]"
(Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 102-05.)

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BANK ACCOUNT OPENED FOR PAYMENTS TO IRANIAN OFFICIALS: A DIVERSION PROPOSED
LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. At the time you suggested to Mr. Schwimmer tht an account might be opened to handle money that might be used to pay expenses in connection with the proposed relationship with this senior Iranian official, was there any discussion about the possibility of funds generated by the arms sales to Iran being used as a source of money for these expenses?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Who raised that possibility with you?

"A. I don't remember. I think it was Schwimmer or Nimrodi.

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			"Q. What did he tell you? "A. He pointed out that if funds were going to become necessary for this project, that it might be possible to generate at least some of them through proceeds from weapons sales to the Iranians. "Q. What was your reaction? "A. I said that that's one of the things that would have to be discussed and I would raise that with McFarlane as well. "Q. Did you raise that with McFarlane? "A. I don't recall and I don't think that I did. I think that the way I probably presented it to him was to describe contacts and the kind of relationship that was proposed and asked him to make a decision on that and that if the decision on that were positive, I would then present to him the operational matter. It wouldn't make any sense for me to ask him about a tactical question when he hadn't resolved the strategic decision. "Q. Shortly after this discussion with Schwimmer, you learned that he had indeed, opened an account, correct? "A. Yes. He gave me the account number. "Q. And you gave the account number to Colonel North? "A. Yes, at some later date. "Q. Do you recall whether you mentioned to Colonel North the reason why this account had been opened? "A. I don't think I did. "Q. Why would you have given him the account number?

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			"A. Because he replaced me in the Iran initiative. "[Brief discussion off the record.] "BY MR. BARBADORO: "Q. What is your best estimate as to when you gave Colonel North this account number? "A. The second half of November. "Q. Would it have been around the time that you were removed from the initiative? "A. Yes. "Q. Do you recall whether you ever told Colonel North about the possibility that had been discussed with you of using funds generated from the arms sales to pay expenses of officials inside Iran? "A. I doubt that I did. "Q. You don't think you talked to Colonel North about it? "A. This question never became a real question. It was only a hypothetical issue so long as I was involved. "Q. And, in fact, the account that Mr. Schwimmer had opened and given you is an account that has never been used? "A. Correct." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 105-08. See id., 9/10/87, at 25 [profits for Iranians].)
85/11/00-000 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1985			RABIN-McFARLANE MEETING ON IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [W]hen is the next time [after September 1985] you heard anything more about weapons to be transferred to Iran by Israel?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I think there were one or two false starts in the month of October, when Mr. Ledeen came to my office and reported that in meetings that he had had in Germany, usually, the Iranians had expressed interest in getting various kinds of weaponry that were extremely exotic and quite near the top of our inventory.

"It was just out of the question. I told him so. But the next concrete proposal that was made I believe occurred in November of 1985, when I had a visit from the Defense Minister of Israel.

"Mr. LIMAN. That was Mr. Rabin?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Tell us about that.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it was clear that his purpose was to reconfirm that the President of the United States still endorsed this concept of Israel negotiating these arms sales, and I told him, based upon recent questions and reaffirmation by the President that I had received, yes, he does, and he said all right; he expressed some of his own misgivings, and --

"Mr. LIMAN. What do you mean by that?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it would seem to me Mr. Rabin had some concerns about the reliability of the Iranians with whom we were dealing or with whom he was dealing, and I concurred in that. By this time, we were getting intelligence from various sources on the way in which the Iranian intermediaries were conducting themselves with Tehran, and there were [sic] very graphic evidence that these were not your normal Western Jeffersonian kinds of persons.

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			"Mr. LIMAN. You knew one of them was Ghorbanifar? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And he was a merchant? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is charitably put. "Mr. LIMAN. And you had some question as to what his motives were? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And his reliability? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Had you discussed this at all with the President? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Not at any length, a passing reference here or there. I did have a quite lengthy conversation with the President after we returned from the summit. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, let's stay before you returned. You told Mr. Rabin, Minister Rabin, that the authorization for Israel to continue to sell subject to replenishment remained in effect? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And that, you said, was based on some conversations you had with the President? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And the President had told you that he still was willing to pursue this endeavor? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, he did. "Mr. LIMAN. So long as it didn't change the balance of power and met the other conditions that you have outlined? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 124-26.)

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85/11/00-001 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1985			FIRST MENTION OF HAWKs McFARLANE ACCOUNT: [Continuing from preceding entry:] McFarlane learns there are HAWKs involved: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, did Minister Rabin tell you that Hawks were on the list of what the Iranians wanted? "Mr. MCFARLANE. He may have. Surely, I learned it within a matter of two or three days." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 126-27.)
85/11/00-030 DURING NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION SUMMARY: For additional discussion of the sequence of events of the 11/85 HAWK transaction, see Iran-Contra Report, at 176-92; Tower, at B-29 to -34.
85/11/00-200 SOMETIME SHORTLY AFTER OCTOBER 8, 1985			MEETING IN EUROPE LEDEEN ACCOUNT: Soon after he meets in Washington with Ghorbanifar, Schwimmer and Nimrodi (see 85/10/08-300 and -301), Ledeen attends a meeting at an unspecified location in Europe with an otherwise unidentified "senior Iranian." After Ghorbanifar notifies Ledeen that the meeting is set, Ledeen informs McFarlane and gets his approval to attend. The group at the meeting consists of Ledeen, the senior Iranian, "plus the usual suspects" -- Kimche, Schwimmer, Nimrodi, and Ghorbanifar. Ledeen testified on the conversation at the

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			meeting: "He provided us with considerable information about what was going on inside the country. And he said that he believed that with proper support and cooperation from the United States, that a significant degree of change could be achieved in Iran peacefully through elections. "He thought that he and his people were sufficiently strong, that they could place their people in a series of key positions in the government, and that one way in which that could be helped would be little ways in which we could demonstrate that he had the support of the United States, since this would carry weight inside Iran and show his people that this was, in fact, the case. "He offered to establish not only a close working relationship, but a secure communications channel. And he asked if we could provide him with secure communications. So we could be in regular contact with him so he would be sure what he did was in sync with what we thought it was desirable to do, and he could ask for advice, provide us with information and all those other things. "At the conclusion of our co[n]versation, he provided me with a document, a signed letter which expressed not only his willingness to cooperate in various ways in which he would cooperate, and the kinds of objectives that we might achieve together, but also the names of all the other Iranians who felt the same way, and for whom he spoke, and who would do this. And he asked that

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			we check with the American Government, and make sure that this project would go forward, that we should meet again within 30 days, and that if everybody agreed to this, then we could go forward with this cooperative program. "Q. . . . Was there any discussion of arms in that conversation? "A. Yes. The discussion of arms in two contexts. He was vociferously opposed to what had been done in providing weapons to the Iranian regime over the course of the past couple of months, said that all we could achieve by sending arms to Iran was to strengthen the Khomeini regime, which was the opposite of what he thought we were about, and said that this was a terrible thing, and had cost them the possibility of achieving a significant advance in that period, since those people had been weakening, and the arms shipment had, in fact, strengthened them. So he did not like that at all. "[Redacted.] ". . . ." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 79-83. On Ledeen's informing McFarlane after the trip, see id. at 83-86. See also Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 88-93; id., 6/22/87, at 267-70; id., 9/10/87, at 19-21, 44-45 [meeting with Senior Iranian].)
85/11/01-400 NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER 1985 THROUGH MARCH		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Construction continues on the Santa Elena airstrip in Costa Rica. (Castillo Testim., JHICI,	

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1986		5/29/87, at 46-47.)	
85/11/01-420 SOMETIME IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PRIVATE FUND-RAISING MILLER NOTE: Handwritten note by Richard Miller records a "pitch" to be given by "Green" (alias for North) to Mrs. Newington to elicit a contribution for the Contras. The note states that "[you are] the most secure person we know in the U.S." and that "[w]e are asking you to take on a project that requires your kind of person." (Iran-Contra Report, at 94 [citing Committee Document RM 1042; see Miller Dep., 8/20/87, at 248-50]. On private fund-raising for the Contras, see generally 85/04/30-800; 85/08/01-410, -420. See also Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 205 [Fawn Hall identifies Green as a code name for North].)	
85/11/06-100 NOVEMBER 6, 1985		OWEN'S NHAO GRANT NHAO CONTRACT: Owen signs a contract with NHAO to provide the services of his company, IDEA (Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance), in coordinating humanitarian aid to the Contras. The contract provides: ". . . . "that Mr. Robert W. Owen shall not during the term of this Grant perform any service which is related to the acquisition, transportion, repair, storage or use of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition or other equipment, vehicles or material which can be used to inflict serious	

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		bodily harm or death. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. RWO 17.)	
85/11/08-000 NOVEMBER 8, 1985			McFARLANE CONTACT WITH RABIN AND KIMCHE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane meets with Kimche prior to the November arms transaction between Israel and Iran: "Mr. NIELDS. Now, the person whom you were dealing with in Israel was -- at that time was Mr. Kimche? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it you were in periodic contact with Mr. Kimche during the months of September and October? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And there came a time, did there not, on November the 8th, when Mr. Kimche came and had a meeting with you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And Mr. Kimche told you at that point in time, did he not, that another transaction involving arms was being contemplated? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't know that I could tell you everything that was in that conversation. I accept what you say. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, I will just state that in the Tower Commission report, it states that Mr. McMahon, who was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, learned from you on the 14th of November that Mr. Kimche had visited and proposed another transfer of weapons to Iran. That is

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			consistent with your recollection, isn't it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It is entirely possible. "Mr. NIELDS. Then, on November 15th, Mr. Rabin met with you in your office. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. You had not dealt with Mr. Rabin previously, had you, on these arms and hostages issues? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. "Mr. NIELDS. But this time, Mr. Rabin talked to you about the upcoming transaction? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And he was interested about replenishment of Israeli weapons that were going to be sold to Iran, isn't that true? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And he wasn't concerned about replenishment of oil drilling equipment. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think so. "Mr. NIELDS. He was Minister of Defense and he was concerned about replenishment of Israeli weapons. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. By the way, Mr. Rabin told you what kind of weapons he needed replenished, didn't he? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't really recall what Mr. Rabin had to say. I think you are right that his foremost concern was that if they made transfers of any description, would they be able to get them replaced, and that is true."

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			(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 38-41. See Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/22/87, at 231-33 [Kimche-McFarlane meeting, 11/7/85].)
85/11/15-100 NOVEMBER 15, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY: North asks Elliott Abrams to tell a Latin American country that "A.C.E. [a shell company set up by Richard Gadd to hold title to the aircraft for the resupply operation; see 85/09/00-003] is O.K." (Iran-Contra Report, at 62 [quoting North notebook entry, 11/15/85; Committee Document Q 1311].)	
85/11/15-250 NOVEMBER 8-15, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: McFARLANE INVOLVEMENT MCFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: [For McFarlane's testimony on the White House Chronologies which immediately precedes this excerpt, see below at 86/11/18-347 through -355.] "Mr. NIELDS. I would like to turn for the moment back in time to November of 1985, when this Hawk missile transaction was actually happening. I think you testified yesterday to the September transaction involving TOWs? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I think you testified about a time when you were asked to select which hostage should be released in exchange for those TOWs? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. [See 85/09/00-010.] "Mr. NIELDS. And thereafter, I take it there were continuing efforts to obtain release of the remaining hostages?

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, the person whom you were dealing with in Israel was--at that time was Mr. Kimche? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it you were in periodic contact with Mr. Kimche during the months of September and October? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And there came a time, did there not, on November the 8th, when Mr. Kimche came and had a meeting with you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And that is reflected in your calendars, is it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Excerpts of which you have made available to the committee? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And Mr. Kimche told you at that point in time, did he not, that another transaction involving arms was being contemplated? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't know that I could tell you everything that was in that conversation. I accept what you say. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, I will just state that in the Tower Commission report, it states that Mr. McMahon, who was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, learned from you on the 14th of November that Mr. Kimche had visited and proposed another transfer of weapons to Iran. [Tower Report, at B-30.] That is consistent with your recollection, isn't it?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. It is entirely possible.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then, on November 15th, Mr. Rabin met with you in your office.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. You had not dealt with Mr. Rabin previously, had you, on these arms and hostage issues?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No.

"Mr. NIELDS. But this time, Mr. Rabin talked to you about the upcoming transaction?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Mr. Rabin was the Minister of Defense of Israel, wasn't he?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he was interested about replenishment of Israeli weapons that were going to be sold to Iran, isn't that true?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And he wasn't concerned about replenishment of oil drilling equipment?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think so.

"Mr. NIELDS. He was Minister of Defense and he was concerned about replenishment of Israeli weapons.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And in your meeting with Mr. Rabin, it was late in the afternoon on a Friday, wasn't it?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That sounds right, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And later that afternoon, you contacted Colonel North and had a meeting with him?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I accept that if it is on the

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			schedule." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 38-40.)
85/11/15-251 NOVEMBER 8-19, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: McFARLANE INVOLVEMENT McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. We might as well look at the schedule and be certain, and that is Exhibit 64. Do you have it in front of you, and have you found the date 11-15-85? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. That is at the bottom of the page, it shows a meeting with Minister of Defense Yitzak Rabin, which ends at 5:02 in the afternoon? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. By the way, Mr. Rabin told you what kind of weapons he needed replenished, didn't he? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't really recall what Mr. Rabin had to say. I think you are right that his foremost concern was that if they made transfers of any description, would they be able to get them replaced, and that is true. "Mr. NIELDS. At 7:00 that same evening, you had a meeting with Admiral Poindexter or some time after 7, and that is reflected on your calendar on the next page? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Then you have a meeting with Oliver North at 8:38? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And then it shows the following

morning at 7:59 a.m., a meeting with Defense Secretary Weinberger?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And that was immediately prior to your departure for Geneva?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. In fact, it was 10 minutes before you departed for Geneva?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, did you not discuss with Secretary Weinberger at that time the question of replenishment of Israeli Hawks?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I don't know is the short answer. I really doubt it. I believe that Secretary Weinberger's concerns, which were understandable, concerned the positions that the President would take in his talks with Mr. Gorbachev concerning arms control and that that is what we talked about.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, the committee has--

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Also I think, and this is frankly just a knee-jerk reaction, that--wasn't there a story in the newspaper that morning that there was a leak that had come from the Defense Department--I have forgotten what it was--but I recall that Cap's point was to say that Defense did not leak the document.

"And then later, on the way over, some unnamed official characterized it as sabotage of the summit. I fact, I am sure that was what it was about and not about Hawks.

"Mr. NIELDS. Mr. McFarlane, the committee has information that as early as the next Tuesday,

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			which would be one business day later, Mr. Weinberger's assistant, General Powell, was tasking people under him-- "Mr. GARMENT. I am sorry, I didn't follow that. You say one business day later? "Mr. NIELDS. This is a Saturday meeting with Mr. Weinberger. The next Tuesday, the committe has information that Mr. Weinberger's assistant, General Powell, was tasking people under him to find 120 Hawk missiles in connection with the transaction involving Iran and Israel. "Now, are you saying that to the best of your knowledge, that fact is unconnected with Mr. Rabin's visit on Friday and your conversation with Mr. Weinberger on Saturday? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I just tried to tell you. As best I can recall, when these matters came up and in what fashion and concretely what was said, and I just don't believe that it was discussed between the Secretary and myself, but I am perfectly open to suggesting that, because I do know that in fact, Hawks were transshipped that it was likely that my deputies or someone with minority [sic] would have gone ahead to deal with the Defense Department. "I accept your point, but not that it occurred as you are portraying." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 40-43; JHICI Ex. 64 [excerpts from McFarlane's calendar].)
85/11/15-252 NOVEMBER			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION MCFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 3:

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
8-19, 1985			[Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. You are saying that perhaps you communicated Mr. Rabin's concern to Poindexter or North on Friday, and they were the ones who made queries with the Department of Defense? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think I left word with my deputies of whatever was discussed with Mr. Rabin, but in point of fact, we didn't get into the concrete issues of trying to help alleviate the problem, because we didn't know of a need to do so until I had the call from Geneva from Mr. Rabin. "Until that time, I don't think there was a request from Mr. Rabin for us to help him with anything, and that first arose when he went to New York, I went to Geneva and he called me there to resolve the problem. I called back to my deputies and they proceeded to do it, which it seems likely to me would have generated the kind of discussion with the Defense Department that you have summarized. "So, I am ready to presume that it did happen, but I think in the way I just described it. "Mr. NIELDS. Did Mr. Rabin, when he called you in Geneva, raise the issue of replenishment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't remember. I doubt that the Defense Minister, who is a very cautious person, would have discussed the weapons on a non-secure trans-Atlantic call. I believe he said, 'That I have a problem in the shipment, can you help?', and I said I would try to, and put somebody in touch with him from Washington. "Mr. NIELDS. The issue of replenishment was in fact raised by Mr. Rabin in his face-to-face

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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			meeting with you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Was it as a result of his face-to-face meeting with you that the Defense Department was asked to look for Hawk missiles as they did one business day later? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think that is true. "Mr. NIELDS. Are you saying that you were not aware of the fact at the time that the Defense Department was asked to look for 120 replacement Hawk missiles? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I will accept that I was made aware of that, and I would not have been troubled or puzzled by it, because you are right, Mr. Rabin had made clear they were going to make a shipment and they would need to replenish whatever they shipped, so I support your point, and take responsibility for it. "I am saying that it probably played out in conversations between Defense staff and my own, Monday, Tuesday or whenever you say. I don't think I discussed it with Mr. Weinberger, but that doesn't alter the point that there were discussions. "Mr. NIELDS. Would such a search have required your approval? "Mr. MCFARLANE. For events-- "Mr. NIELDS. For one of your deputies to make a request of Defense to look for 120 replacement Hawk missiles? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, not necessarily. "Mr. NIELDS. Are you saying that the Defense Department could be tasked to look for 120

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			replacement Hawk missiles in connection with a transaction with Government of Iran without your knowledge and acquiescence? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, bear in mind that the Defense Department, the Secretary was fully aware of the fact that the President had approved the authority for Israel to make such shipments in the understanding that they would then come to the United States to purchase replacements. "And so, for that process then to play out as he could have expected it would, I don't think would have been surprising. This was--I guess I am saying that it is quite true that it would have been essential that the Cabinet officers take part in the decision. Once taken, its implementation could have been handled by subordinates, even, but there was no question in the mind of the Secretary that while he was against it, the President had approved of the policy. "Mr. NIELDS. There was something else that was involved in this transaction besides replenishment of Hawk[s], was there not, and that was hostages? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 43-46.)
85/11/16-100 MID-NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane testifying on whether the President authorized the Israeli HAWK shipment in Novembe 1985: "Mr. STOKES. . . . You have testified that in

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			August of 1985 the President had approved the sale of weapons by Israel to Iran. Did the President specifically approve the November 1985 shipment of Hawk missiles by Israel to Iran or was it a case of your simply informing him that the Israelis intended to ship the missiles? "Mr. MCFARLANE. The latter, sir. "Mr. STOKES. The latter? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. STOKES. What if anything-- "Mr. MCFARLANE. The former, too, that is the September shipment, too. That has been an area that has been kind of murked up because the President provided the authority in early August for Israel to undertake, to sell arms to Iran, and to then come to the United States for replenishment, to buy new ones. "That didn't require then the Israelis to come back to us on each occasion and get new approval. It also had limitations on it, so that it just wasn't open-ended, but -- well, that is the way it was." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 38-39.)
85/11/17-000 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1985 [NOVEMBER 17, 1985]			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: EARLY PROBLEMS, THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY, AND THE REPLENISHMENT ISSUE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. When you were in Geneva, did you receive a phone call about a shipment to Iran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Who called you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Mr. Rabin called from New

York to say that he had a problem that came up in the transfer of certain items. . . .

"I said that I would have someone be in touch with him, and I got in touch with Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North and summarized what I had been told by Mr. Rabin; and I said please take steps to see if you can be of help.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [Y]ou understood he was talking about the shipment of Hawks?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . I knew about it within a day.

"Mr. LIMAN. While you were in Geneva?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

". . . .

"Mr. MCFARLANE. [I had a] report from Colonel North saying that the nature of the problem was twofold, one that Israel had arranged for a shipment but it was on an El Al airplane which might raise eyebrows if it drove into Teheran.

"And secondly, that their route of travel was going through a third country with whom they had not arranged customs clearances for those items in question, and that he believed that he could help solve the first problem but that the second problem . . . would perhaps need an intervention from my level to ask their cooperation. . . . I reported to the President.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. And did there come a point during your European trip that you telephoned the foreign minister of this third country to try to expedite clearance for the flight?

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you learn at any time while you were in Europe for the summit meeting and the aftermath that Colonel North had solved the transportation problem by bringing in General Secord? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. In any event, by the time you left Europe did you know that the shipment had been consummated of some Hawks? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I expected that it had. I don't believe I heard further, but I knew I would have heard further if it didn't, so I assumed that it did. "Mr. LIMAN. Was there any discussion in Geneva about a cover story that some oil drilling equipment was being sent, not Hawks? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it is a little unclear to me. I do recall that in the exchange with Colonel North, that there was uncertainty as to just what was in the shipment. I was in no position to know. . . . "But the short answer is that I believe he [North] determined during the course of those two or three days of the summit that it was, in fact, weapons. "Mr. LIMAN. You knew it was -- you were told it was weapons? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. It was Hawks? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Rabin asked your permission to

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			send weapons? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 129-34. See id., 5/11/87, at 136 [oil-drilling equipment story]; id., 5/13/87, at 43 [on the El Al airplane and the customs difficulties: ". . . I wouldn't blame the Israeli intelligence service on that. This was being handled by private Israeli citizens."].)
			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: EARLY PROBLEMS, THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY, AND THE REPLENISHMENT ISSUE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Israeli Defense Minister Rabin (in New York) calls McFarlane while McFarlane is at the Geneva summit. Rabin informs McFarlane that a problem has arisen with the arms shipment. "MR. NIELDS. Did Mr. Rabin, when he called you in Geneva, raise the issue of replenishment? "MR. MCFARLANE. I don't remember. I doubt that [he] . . . would have discussed the weapons on a non-secure trans-Atlantic call. I believe he said, 'That I have a problem in the shipment, can you help?', and I said I would try to, and put somebody in touch with him from Washington. "MR. NIELDS. The issue of replenishment was in fact raised by Mr. Rabin in his face-to-face meeting with you? "MR. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 44-45.)
85/11/17-009			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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MID TO LATE NOVEMBER 1985			OF THE U.S. McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. . . . [I]t was suggested in an exchange this morning with Colonel North that the defects in the delivery of the Hawk parts in November of '85 on the part of Israel may have reflected a design to draw the United States into that supply effort, in other words to bring us into the web. You were at Geneva and of course made the phone call to the foreign minister of a European country to expedite the transfer when the problems occurred. "Do you have any reason to suspect that this was an effort to involve the United States in that regard? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't have any conclusive evidence, Senator Sarbanes, that that was the motivation; no, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 259. See North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 54-67 [North on Israel and the 11/85 HAWK transaction].)
85/11/17-100 NOVEMBER [17], 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: NORTH'S KNOWLEDGE NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on his knowledge of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment: "I was intimately aware at the point in time when it all began to happen, I was apprised of it." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 64.) THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: NORTH'S KNOWLEDGE NORTH ACCOUNT (cont'd): North testified further on his involvement

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			with the HAWKs shipment: ". . . I got a phone call from Mr. McFarlane in Europe that you now have a copy of, the contemporaneous notes that I made at the time, actually the first call I got was from an Israeli official, and it wasn't Mr. Kimche, it was from an Israeli official who was visiting the United States in New York who apprised me that he had just talked to Mr. McFarlane, and Mr. McFarlane had told him that he should call me and that I would 'fix it.' "I think it was while I was still on the phone with this Israeli official calling from New York that I got a call from Mr. McFarlane, who told me I would be called shortly by an Israeli official. Mr. McFarlane was, I believe, at the time at the Summit in Geneva. I told him I was already on the phone with the official." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 75-76.)
85/11/17-101 NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: NORTH'S CONTACT WITH McFARLANE AND POINDEXTER NORTH ACCOUNT: Both McFarlane and Poindexter knew of and authorized North's involvement with the HAWKs shipment, according to North: "Mr. NORTH. . . . Mr. McFarlane and I had a number of conversations about this transaction in November of 1985 and [ ] I recorded in my notebooks records of that. I communicated with both Mr. McFarlane and Admiral Poindexter about this transaction. I got authority to use a CIA proprietary.

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			"Mr. NIELDS. At the time, you are talking about? "Mr. NORTH. Yes." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 77.)
85/11/17-118 NOVEMBER 17, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: REPLENISHMENT NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY: According to North's notebooks, McFarlane told him to solve the Israelis' replenishment problem and "to keep orders under $14M" each -- the threshold figure for reporting foreign military sales to Congress. (JHICI Ex. OLN 69-A [North notebook entry, 11/17/85 (Committee Document Q 1312)]; Iran-Contra Report, at 177.)
85/11/17-120 NOVEMBER 17, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: EARLY PROBLEMS, NORTH INVOLVEMENT, AND REPLENISHMENT NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. . . . It is my recollection that on November 17, I received a phone call in the evening from an Israeli official, who was in New York, indicating a problem. I then--I think while I was still on the line with him--got a call from Mr. McFarlane. My contemporaneous note at the time indicates that the two calls were, if nothing else, sequential. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it this was a call from Mr. Rabin? "Mr. NORTH. It was. "Mr. NIELDS. What was the problem? "Mr. NORTH. At that point, he didn't go into it in any detail. There was a problem with a shipment, a movement on the project that I knew

about.

"I then got a call from Mr. McFarlane from Europe telling me that Mr. Rabin would call. I told him I had already talked to Mr. Rabin. He said, 'Look, you go take care of that problem.' This was a transatlantic, open-line telephone call as I remember it.

"So my recollection is, I flew up immediately to talk with Mr. Rabin. He then sent several of his Ministry of Defense representatives to talk with me.

"It was in that period of time that I became aware of what was really trying to be moved. Now, I may have already known some of that . . ., but the full parameters of it were laid out for me by Mr. Rabin and his representatives.

"As I recall, the Director of Central Intelligence was out of town, and in my discussions which followed with the MOD representatives, they specified a replenishment problem. In addition to solving the immediate problem of getting the Hawks, the original number of which was to be 120, moved from Israel through a European country and then on to Iran, there was the problem of replenishing the TOWs which had been shipped in August-September.

"As I recall, I made a number of telephone calls to the Department of Defense, to my point of contact. I think it was at that point either Mr. Koch or General Powell [was] trying to ascertain the cost of a Hawk system, the cost of a TOW system. There was a rather protracted period of time in which all of this was worked out.

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			"I also took at that point in time a decision, with the approval of Admiral Poindexter and Mr. McFarlane, and asked General Secord to fly to Europe to see what he could do to straighten out the mess. "My recollection is General Secord was reluctant to do that. He was already busy with another covert operation, which I am sure you will want to talk about, and he was up to his ears in alligators. He nonetheless went. "There were a series of meetings he had with Israeli representatives in Europe, then in Israel, and at some point in the next--between the 17th and the 24th, I believe, he asked me for the name of a proprietary or--actually, what he asked me for is, does Langley know of any discre[et] airlines that can provide the services that the Israelis were going to provide themselves? And basically, it was an air-support problem that had been developed. "The reason I asked General Secord to go is he had contacts in the European country that they were planning to move these things through because of the other covert operation. He had a lot of experience in the aviation business, fixing aviation problems, particularly covert ones, and he was an expert on Iran; and so he went, met with the Israelis, met with a number of officials in the European country. "The long and short of it was, I got the name of a proprietary from the CIA. The proprietary was passed to General Secord, and he contracted with the proprietary to pick up the Hawks. The

aircraft flew to Israel, then flew in a circuitous route to Iran, and delivered the Hawks.

"I believe the actual delivery took place on or about the 24th or 25th of November."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 133-36.)

85/11/17-125
1985-86

NORTH'S BACK CHANNEL CONTACT WITH ISRAEL:
SHULTZ' REACTION
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. CHENEY. In your discussions and your testimony obviously one of the themes that comes through repeatedly is your relationship with various officials of the Israeli Government, Israeli intelligence services, Israeli citizens working apparently as emissaries or on behalf of their government.

"Would you call those back channel communications between the President or the President's representatives and the Israeli Government?

"Mr. NORTH. 'Back channel' has a connotation to it that I am not sure is necessarily--

"Mr. CHENEY. I don't mean it in a negative sense at all. I am questioning whether or not, for example, the Secretary of State would be unhappy if he were to discover that the NSC staff were communicating with another country without his knowing about it.

"Mr. NORTH. I'm not trying to characterize the Secretary's opinion of me, but my sense is he is very unhappy.

"Mr. CHENEY. When he finds out about it?

"Mr. NORTH. When he found out about it.

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			"Mr. CHENEY. Can you relate that to us, how he expressed his dissatisfaction to you? "Mr. NORTH. I would rather not. "Mr. CHENEY. Can we let the record show that your activities in that regard, though, did generate a certain amount of friction between yourself and key members of the President's Cabinet, or at least in this case-- "Mr. NORTH. Apparently so. "Mr. CHENEY. --the Secretary of State. "Apparently so. All right." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 214-15. See generally Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 46-47 [Abrams on back channel communications].)
85/11/17-300 NOVEMBER [17,] 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: REPLENISHMENT NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on what he knew of the arrangements to replenish the weapons sent to Iran from Israel: "[M]y recollection is that we had made a commitment unbeknownst to me, and it was a confusing commitment. The Israelis expected to be able to, initially, the way they presented it, to have gratis given to them, 508 TOWs in replenishment for what they had shipped in August and September. And the same thing applied to the November Hawks. "My introduction to this was a discussion with a senior Israeli official in New York, and it was not until January of 1986 that we came upon a way to actually replenish the Israeli stocks. "Mr. McFarlane described one answer that he

had given to the Israelis; the Israelis described another answer that they heard about replenishment. And when Mr. McFarlane resigned in December, I was left holding the bag of how to replenish the Israeli TOWs.

"We eventually got the Hawks back, so we didn't have to replenish those. But there were clearly two different understandings as to what replenishment meant going all the way back to 1985 . . . ."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 117-18. See id., 7/7/87, at 122 [North: "I think the actual understanding I reached with the Israelis on replacing the TOWs was reached in January, late January in a meeting in Europe."].)

85/11/17-400
NOVEMBER 17,
1985

THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: LEGAL CONCERNS AND REPLENISHMENT

NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on how he first came to learn of the complications of the Arms Export Control Act and the replenishment problem:

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . I take it it is true that you were aware long before November of 1986 that there was a problem under the Arms Export Control Act with the Israeli shipments?

"Mr. NORTH. I think I became aware of a problem as early as November of 1985, when we began to work on what I came to call the replenishment problem.

"I want to make it very clear, I didn't know there was a replenishment problem until I met directly with the Israeli officials on or about

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			the 17th of November, that I recall. "I recall vividly being told that they understood that there was a commitment for immediate replenishment. "Mr. McFarlane was still in Europe and I began to work on solving that problem as well as solving the problem of trying to get beyond the Hawks issue." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 6.)
85/11/18-100 AROUND NOVEMBER 18, 1985		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: SECORD INVOLVEMENT SECORD ACCOUNT: Gen. Secord is already involved in the "airlift project," designed to make parachute air drops to Contra forces. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 115-17.) Secord also testified that before starting on the airlift project in 1985, he had obtained a legal opinion from Patton, Boggs & Blow, a Washington law firm, "about a possible violation of the Neutrality Act." Secord provided the opinion to Richard Gadd and "all the other principals in the operation . . . to make sure everybody knew that we were conducting a lawful operation and that we would have to assiduously comply with the law." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 143. But compare JHICI Ex. 23 [opinion dated Aug. 22, 1985, but marked "RECEIVED MAY 08 1986"] with Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 209 [Secord: "And the opinion is addressed to me and it is dated the 8th of May 1986."].)	THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: SECORD INVOLVEMENT SECORD ACCOUNT: North contacts Richard Secord for his assistance with regard to Iran. The next day, North sends Secord a letter (signed by North on behalf of Robert McFarlane, who is at the Summit in Geneva) to request Secord's "discrete [sic?] assistance is again requested in support of our national interests." Secord then meets with North at North's office to learn the details. North asks Secord to help resolve logistical difficulties in transferring missiles from Israel to Iran. North tells Secord "this was a sanctioned--meaning sanctioned by the United States--operation and that it involved[,] among other things, the possibility of getting some of our hostages out of Lebanon." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 219-21; see also JHICI Ex. 1 [Letter to Secord from McFarlane, signed by North and dated 11/19/85].)

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85/11/18-102 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1985		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: VENEZUELAN AIRCRAFT GADD ACCOUNT: Around November 1985, Gadd locates three C-23 aircraft for purchase for the resupply operation. Secord tells Gadd that the cost will be paid by "donation." Gadd arranges to tell Secord the price, after which Secord will transfer the funds to the seller. North intercedes to help the sale by "a letter, a message or . . . a telephone call to . . . the American embassy in Carac[a]s, Venezuela." (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 16-19.)	
85/11/18-120 NOV. 18 OR 19, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: DoD INVOLVEMENT Gen. Colin Powell testified that on Monday or Tuesday, Nov. 18 or 19, 1985, he received a request to obtain information about HAWKs -- how many were available and how they could be transferred. The request came from Poindexter, North, or the Secretary of Defense. Powell then passed the request on to Noel Koch, who passed it on to Henry Gaffney. (JHICI, 6/23/87, at 134 [Saba summary of Powell Dep.]; Gaffney Testim., JHICI, 6/23/87, at 138.)
85/11/18-130 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: DoD AWARENESS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Were any officials at the Department of Defense aware that 18 Hawk missiles or some number of Hawk missiles had actually been shipped by Israel to Iran?

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			"Mr. NORTH. Again, I believe that they may . . . well have been, because I think I made several efforts to coordinate with them the replenishment of the Hawks. I think I had a discussion, if I remember properly, with DOD officials about both Hawks and TOWs. I wouldn't be asking them about Hawks if they hadn't already been ordered up as a need for replenishing. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . . Who in the Department of Defense was told that there had actually been a shipment, if anybody? "Mr. NORTH. An unrefreshed, long-time-ago memory would tell me that I probably talked about that delivery with Mr. Koch, possibly with General Powell, possibly with Mr. Armitage." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 190-91.)
85/11/18-150 NOVEMBER 17 OR 18, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: DoD INVOLVEMENT Noel Koch, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, contacts Henry Gaffney of the Defense Security Assistance Agency within the DoD. Koch relays a request from Gen. Colin Powell, Weinberger's military assistant, for a point paper. The paper is to analyze how the U.S. could ship 120 HAWK missiles to Iran and to explore ways to break up the shipment to avoid Congressional notification requirements. On about November 21, 1985, Gaffney gives the paper to Koch. Either Gaffney or Koch then delivers it to Powell. (Gaffney and Koch Testim., JHICI, 6/23/87, at 133-48. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 22-28 [Weinberger testimony on

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			the Gaffney paper on HAWK missiles for Iran].)
85/11/18-290 NOVEMBER 18, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE DoS CHRONOLOGY: "At the Geneva Summit, MCFARLANE tells GPS that four hostages will be released in a few days, and that Israel is sending an airplane to a European city with 100 HAWKS, which will be shipped to Iran if the hostages are released. MCFARLANE says he has cleared this with the PRESIDENT. GPS objects, both to the plan and to being notified too late to be able to stop it." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/11/22-300.)
85/11/18-291 NOVEMBER 18-23, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [I]n November 1985 you were with the President at the summit in Geneva, correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. Correct. "Mr. BELNICK. And you had a conversation at that time with Mr. McFarlane about what we now call the Iran initiative. "Can you recall that conversation, sir? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. It came in the form of a secure phone call that I took in the little box that goes around with me with a secure phone, and my executive assistant was present in the box with me, and it came just before we were getting ready to go to the last kind of occasion in the meetings between the President and Mr. Gorbachev.

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			"We had had very good meetings, and this was a social dinner that the President was the host for. "But it was very clear to me that, as far as I was concerned, it was going to be a working dinner because we--while we had made headway and I thought we had things pretty well under--they weren't nailed down as to exactly what was going to happen the next morning, and we had a big negotiation going on about a statement, so that was what I was preparing myself for, how to make that into something productive, which it turned out to be. "And this phone call came in kind of out of the blue, about a hostages release and arms sales to Iran. "Mr. BELNICK. And did Mr. McFarlane tell you that it was then proposed that Israel would send an air shipment--through a European city--of some 100 Hawks to Iran? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. That was--he described the structure of a deal in which a plane would go from I think someplace in . . . [a European country], as I remember, and it would be contingent on release of the hostages, a rather complex arrangement. "Mr. BELNICK. But the burden of it was if the hostages came out, the weapons would go to Iran; if they didn't, the weapons wouldn't? "Secretary SHULTZ. Exactly. It was a straight-out arms-for-hostages deal. "Mr. BELNICK. What did you tell Mr. McFarlane? "Secretary SHULTZ. I told him I hoped that

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			the hostages would get out, but I was against it, and I was upset that he was telling me about it as it was just about to start so there was no way I could do anything about it. "But anyway, if it was happening, I hoped the hostages would get out. "Mr. BELNICK. After you objected, though, you learned within the next several days that no hostages had been released and your information was that the deal had, therefore, collapsed? "Secretary SHULTZ. Exactly." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 69-72.)
85/11/18-300 NOVEMBER 18, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE COOPER ACCOUNT: Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper testified about an interview on November 22, 1986, at which Meese questioned Shultz about the November 1985 shipment: "Ms. NAUGHTON. And what did Secretary Shultz tell you regarding the November, 1985 shipment? "Mr. COOPER. He related an account that was quite closely similar to what I had been given to believe he would relate, that indeed there had been a conversation, he thought it was in person, [in] which while they were in Geneva at the Summit, Mr. McFarlane came to him and described to him an event in the offing that would involve the transfer of a quantity of Hawk missiles and that it was contemplated that the American hostages would be released [as] the consequence of that. "Ms. NAUGHTON. So Secretary of State Shultz was informed in advance of the Hawk shipment?

"Mr. COOPER. Well, that was his understanding, and he said the conversation took place on the 18th, so that seemed to be accurate.

"Ms. NAUGHTON. Did Secretary of State Shultz indicate to you that this conversation was documented in any way?

"Mr. COOPER. He did. It may well have been [his aide, Charles] Hill who indicated that, but in any event, Mr. Hill had notes. It was Mr. Hill who had the notes of the conversation. I had suspected when we arrived that it was actually the Secretary of State himself who had taken notes, but that was not the case. Hill had taken the notes as the Secretary of State related the conversation to him.

"Ms. NAUGHTON. Did you ultimately retrieve a copy of Mr. Hill's notes on this subject?

"Mr. COOPER. Yes, a couple days later." (Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 83-85; JHICI Ex. CJC 17 [Hill notes].)

85/11/18-305
NOVEMBER 18,
1985 AND
NOVEMBER 20,
1986

THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE SOFAER ACCOUNT:

On November 10, 1986, as differences in recollections of the November 1985 transaction emerge, the Secretary of State tells his legal adviser, Abraham Sofaer, to get the details of what occurred from Charles Hill, Shultz' executive assistant.

"Q. Did you then proceed to a briefing with Hill?

"A. Yes.

"Q. This was in Hill's office?

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"A. We started the briefing in Hill's office, and it went on for a considerable length of time with Hill reading from a summary based on his notes. I have a set of notes of that.

"Q. Please refer to them. In the course of that briefing, did you learn from Hill that there had indeed been a pre-January '86 transfer of weapons in addition to the September '85 transfer that you had heard about from Poindexter and Thompson?

"A. Yes, I did.

"Q. What did you learn?

"A. I learned that on November 18th, 1985 several things happened. One was a story about Ollie North stumbling on a warehouse in a certain country. And then a call from Bud McFarlane to the Secretary, or a conversation in which he said that the hostages, American hostages in Lebanon were going to be released on November 20th.

"He said that Israel would fly 100 Hawks to [redacted] and transfer them to another plane. If the hostages were released, the plane would fly to Iran. If the hostages were not released the plane would fly to Israel.

"Q. This was McFarlane talking to Shultz in November of 1985?

"A. Yes. It was a recorded conversation. I got the clear impression that there was a record of a conversation about that arms shipment in Charlie's notes.

"Q. And Hill told you also, judging from your notes, that Shultz had [opposed] what McFarlane told him . . .

"A. Had opposed.

"Q. Had opposed what McFarlane told him, and McFarlane said nothing further?

"A. Well, nothing further was said about the whole matter. It later developed that that whole plan fell through. The hostages were not released. But the Secretary was not told that the Hawk missiles were actually delivered to Iran until he was told that they had been returned." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 30-33.)

85/11/18-400
NOVEMBER 18,
1985

DIVERSION FROM THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, our records reflect that one million dollars was actually deposited into Lake Resources on the 20th of November, which is also earlier than Mr. Secord testified was the first time when he had any obligations whatever with respect to transporting merchandise. And I need to ask you this question, it is an important question.

"Was there any understanding or discussion that a million dollars would be deposited into the Lake Resources account for the benefit of the contras?

"Mr. NORTH. Not at that point, no. I do not recall a specific discussion of that until much later.

"Mr. NIELDS. And when was the conversation that you do recall?

"Mr. NORTH. My sense is it was sometime in January or maybe even February when the Israelis were asking what about the rest of the money that

THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: LEGAL CONCERNS AND FINANCING
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North records in his notes, "Ben Yousaf start buy orders at $14 million or less."

North testified on July 7, 1987 that Ben Yousaf of the Israeli purchasing office was to keep below a $14 million ceiling to avoid the Congressional reporting requirements of the Arms Export Control Act.

North's notes also read, "Schwimmer move $1 million to Lake." North testified, "As I recall, the intention of that million dollars was to cover the cost of this whole transaction in terms of renting airplanes and warehouse space and the appropriate charges for various people on the ground, those kinds of things.

"That was my understanding of it."

North was then questioned further:

"Mr. NIELDS. Whose idea was it that a million dollars for that purpose would be put into the Lake Resources account?

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		was originally put up for the November Hawk movement, since we didn't do all that was to be done, where is the rest of the money? And I told them we used it for the purpose of the contras, and they acknowledged that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 145-46.) See col. 3.	"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall. It was probably arrived at mutually among General Secord, the Israelis and [me]. "Mr. NIELDS. Now-- "Mr. NORTH. I am not sure who actually originated the figure. I am sure the Lake Resources account was one known to me and since he was going to be the one, the charter agent, my sense is it was kind of mutually arrived at. "We were very concerned that they had demonstrated a certain ineptness in trying to pull this whole thing off." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 140-43. See JHICI Ex. OLN 69-S [North's notes].) THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: FINANCING NORTH ACCOUNT: North elaborated on the $1 million deposited in the Lake Resources account: "Mr. NIELDS. Well, are you saying that as of the 18th, Mr. Secord was the one who was going to take care of transporting and paying for the cost of transporting Israeli arms? "Mr. NORTH. No, I think what we are talking about is trying to arrange a better way of doing it and having him be the person to do that, and I--if my notes are accurate and I made that notation of the 18th on the 18th, the ideas at least occurred to me as early as the 18th, and so whether I actually communicated that to them, my recollection is that this all came out of a mutual understanding among the Israelis, General Secord and myself and probably Admiral Poindexter and Mr.

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			McFarlane; although Mr. McFarlane may well not have been aware of it specifically at this point because he was still overseas. "Mr. NIELDS. How did you arrive at the figure of one million dollars? "Mr. NORTH. I have no recollection of it at all. Although we did see . . . large quantities of money which were being moved to take this process forward. "I confess not to be able to remember how the one million dollar figure came up. "Mr. NIELDS. Was the one million dollars to cover both the transporting of arms from the U.S. to Israel and from Israel to Iran or just one? "Mr. NORTH. Well, as I said just a moment ago, it was at least the latter and may well have by this point in time included both. "I simply don't recall. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, our records reflect that one million dollars was actually deposited into Lake Resources on the 20th of November, which is also earlier than Mr. Secord testified was the first time when he had any obligations whatever with respect to transporting merchandise. And I need to ask you this question, it is an important question. "Was there any understanding or discussion that a million dollars would be deposited into the Lake Resources account for the benefit of the contras? "Mr. NORTH. Not at that point, no. I do not recall a specific discussion of that until much later.

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			"Mr. NIELDS. And when was the conversation that you do recall? "Mr. NORTH. My sense is it was sometime in January or maybe even February when the Israelis were asking what about the rest of the money that was originally put up for the November Hawk movement, since we didn't do all that was to be done, where is the rest of the money? And I told them we used it for the purpose of the contras, and they acknowledged that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 145-46.)
85/11/18-402 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: THE ISRAELIS' $1 MILLION LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. Did there come a time in late November of 1985 when Colonel North asked you to place a phone call to Mr. Schwimmer? "A. Yes. "Q. What did he tell you about why he wanted you to place that phone call? "A. He said that he had, in the course of cleaning up the mess with the Hawk sales, he had incurred a million dollars of expenses and that Schwimmer had said that that would be paid for and that the money had not arrived and would I please call Schwimmer and tell him where's the money. So I called Schwimmer and said Ollie says you owe him a million dollars and Schwimmer said tell him to look in the account. It's there. And that's the last I ever heard of it. "Q. Did you know what the million dollars in expenses were for?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you know where Ollie was expecting the money to be?

"A. Yes, I think I knew it was in Switzerland.

"Q. So, it's fair to say that you knew that North had some kind of control over an account in Switzerland, is that right?

"A. Well, Copp did, remember. I knew that Copp had been sent there to do this so I knew that Copp, at least--there was a bank account where Copp could receive a million dollars.

"Q. Did you understand Copp to be a U.S. Government official?

"A. I had no idea who Copp was.

"Q. But you knew that he had worked with Colonel North on the November Hawk shipment?

"A. That's what I knew.

"Q. What did you know about what he had done?

"A. The question is when did I know it. After a[ ]while, I knew pretty much what had happened. That the Israeli planes had turned around and that they had to organize a whole new airlift and that there was quite a bit of activity. In a general sort of way, I knew that Copp had gone in and figured out how to get these Hawk missiles from Israel to Iran. It's a short answer. And I didn't know very much in the way of detail.

"Q. And when Ollie told you that a million dollars in expenses had been incurred, who did you think had incurred these expenses?

"A. I thought that's what Copp had spent in

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			doing all this." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 108-10.)
85/11/18-405 DURING NOVEMBER 1985		DIVERSION FROM THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: FINANCING POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Let me go back to the November HAWK shipment for a moment. Did North or anyone else tell you that the Secord organization received $1 million from the Israelis for the shipping costs of the HAWKs? "A. I can't recall that figure or knowing that. I mean, I knew that as the way it finally worked out that Secord was involved in that shipment, and I assumed that he had some expenses. "Q. Did anyone tell you that the profit that Secord and his group made on that shipment was going to the contras? "A. Well, you mean -- "Q. On the November shipment. Let me just give you some facts, Admiral. The Secord organization, Lake, received a transfer of $1 million from the Israelis. It incurred costs of under $150,000 in chartering the airline from the CIA proprietary and in other out-of-pocket expenses, and General Secord testified that [t]he Israelis said that he didn't have to refund the balance but could use it for the contras. "Now does that ring any bell? Did anyone tell you that? "A. You know, it's conceivable that I was told that. I don't recall it. My general level of knowledge in that time frame was that Dick was involved in the private logistics support of the

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			democratic resistance and that because of his connections [redacted] that Ollie brought him into the Iranian effort [redacted.] "Q. This would have been an $850,000 donation by Israel. I'm not talking about the fact that it went to Secord. "A. I understand what you mean. But, you know, it's possible that Colonel North reported that to me. I don't recall it. "MR. BECKLER: You don't recall. It's possible. Let's go on to the next question." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 366-67.)
85/11/19-100 NOVEMBER 19, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: SECORD INVOLVEMENT McFARLANE LETTER: McFarlane letter (signed by North) to Secord: "Your discrete [sic?] assistance is again required in support of our national interests." (JHICI Ex. 1.)
85/11/19-105 NOVEMBER 19, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: SECORD INVOLVEMENT McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. And did you learn at any time while you were in Europe for the summit meeting and the aftermath that Colonel North had solved the transportation problem by bringing in General Secord? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. I'll ask you to look at what has been marked as Exhibit 1, which is a letter to Major General Secord. . . . It bears the name Robert C. McFarlane, but it is signed Colonel North.

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			"You don't have it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That's all right. I've seen it before. "Mr. LIMAN. I can read it. "'Your discreet ["discrete" in original] assistance is again required in support of our national interests. At the earliest opportunity, please proceed to' --the third country-- 'and other locations as necessary in order to arrange for the transfer of sensitive material being shipped from Israel. As in the past, you should exercise great caution that this activity does not become public knowledge. You should assure that only those whose discretion is guaranteed are involved.' "Signed, Oliver North, Robert C. McFarlane. "Did you know that this letter was being sent out by Colonel North? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think so. I have no recollection of it at all. "Mr. LIMAN. It begins with, 'Your discreet assistance is again required.' "Had you ever asked for General Secord's discreet assistance before? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I had not, no. "Mr. LIMAN. Were you aware of any request by North at that time for his discreet assistance before? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I wasn't." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 132-33; JHICI Ex. 1.)
85/11/19-200			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: WHO KNEW

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AROUND NOVEMBER 19, 1985			SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord testified in his deposition that Thomas Clines and two local arms company employees were aware in November 1985 that the flights being arranged were to contain HAWK missiles. The HAWKs were to be shipped from Israel to a European city where they would be unloaded, stored and then placed on a different airline for shipment on to Iran. Secord testified the foreign minister and prime minister of the European country were both informed of the cargo the planes would carry. Because the planes would be unloaded during the transshipment, Secord testified, the host country officials had to be informed of their contents. (JHICI, 6/24/87, at 261-62 [Eggleston summary of Secord deposition].)
85/11/20-010 SOMETIME BETWEEN NOVEMBER 20, 1985 AND JANUARY OR FEBRUARY 1986		DIVERSION NORTH ACCOUNT: At some point between the deposit of the $1 million with Lake Resources and early 1986, the funds left over from the HAWK shipment are used for the Contras. North did not clarify in his Hearing testimony when this decision to divert the funds was made. By the time the Israelis learn of it in January or February 1986, the funds have already gone to the Contras: "Mr. NIELDS. Now, our records reflect that one million dollars was actually deposited into Lake Resources on the 20th of November, which is also earlier than Mr. Secord testified was the first time when he had any obligations whatever with respect to transporting merchandise. And I	DIVERSION NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		need to ask you this question, it is an important question. "Was there any understanding or discussion that a million dollars would be deposited into the Lake Resources account for the benefit of the contras? "Mr. NORTH. Not at that point, no. I do not recall a specific discussion of that until much later. "Mr. NIELDS. And when was the conversation that you do recall? "Mr. NORTH. My sense is it was sometime in January or maybe even February when the Israelis were asking what about the rest of the money that was originally put up for the November Hawk movement, since we didn't do all that was to be done, where is the rest of the money? And I told them we used it for the purpose of the contras, and they acknowledged that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 145-46. See 86/01/22-140 for North testimony following that quoted in this entry.)	
85/11/20-050 NOVEMBER 20, 1985		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH PROF: North provides talking points to Vince Cannistraro, an NSC colleague, for a call by Cannistraro to a Latin American country about one of the resupply operation's offshore companies, ACE (see 85/11/15-100): ". . . . "A reputable business organization called A.C.E. Inc. is negotiating with your air force to	

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		buy three excess C-123 aircraft, a number of engines (48) and some spare parts. "A.C.E. is a legitimate company which will use the aircraft for a good purpose that is in the interest of your country and ours--humanitarian aid deliveries to anti-communist resistance forces [(redacted] Nicaragua). "Apparently the [redacted] was concerned that A.C.E. (Amalgamated Commercial Enterprises) may not be legitimate or that the A/C could be used for drug running or the like. This is not the case. "It would be very helpful if you could contact someone who can clarify the good reputation of A.C.E. and encourage [redacted] to consum[m]ate the offer which has been made by A.C.E. The need is great for these planes. They will help the cause of democracy where it is most needed. . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 87 [North PROF to Cannistraro, "Your Telephone Call," 11/20/85]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 62-63.)	
85/11/20-100 NOVEMBER 20, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: SECORD INVOLVEMENT SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord travels to a European city to resolve the difficulties in transporting 80 I-HAWK missiles between Israel and Iran. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 223-35.)
85/11/20-299 NOVEMBER 20, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: TERMS OF DELIVERY NORTH PROF: In a PROF to Poindexter, North lays out the terms of delivery for the Israeli shipment of

HAWKs to Iran:

"The Israelis will deliver 80 Mod HAWKS to [the capital of Country 15] at noon on Friday 22 Nov. These 80 will be loaded aboard three chartered aircraft, owned by a proprietary which will take off at two hour intervals for Tabriz [Iran]. The aircraft will file for overflight through the [capital of Country 16] FIR enroute to Tabriz from [Country 15]. Appropriate arrangements have been made with the proper [Country 16] air control personnel. Once the aircraft have been launched, their departure will be confirmed by Ashghari [a pseudonym for Ghorbanifar] who will call [the Second Iranian official; see 86/01/11-180] who will call [an Iranian in Damascus] who will direct [another Iranian in Beirut] to collect the five rpt five Amcits [American citizen hostages] from Hizballah and deliver them to the U.S. Embassy. There is also the possibility that they will hand over the French hostage who is very ill.

"There is a requirement for 40 additional weaps of the same nomenclature for a total requirement of 120. $18M in payment for the first 80 has been deposited in the appropriate account. No acft will land in Tabriz until the AMCITS have been delivered to the embassy. The Iranians have also asked to order additional items in the future and have been told that they will be considered after this activity has succeeded. All transfer arrangements have been made by Dick Secord, who deserves a medal for his extraordinary short notice efforts.

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			"Replenishment arrangements are being made through the MOD [Israeli Ministry of Defense] purchasing office in NYC. There is, to say the least, considerable anxiety that we will somehow delay on their plan to purchase 120 of these weapons in the next few days. IAW [in accordance with] your instructions I have told their agent that we will sell them 120 items at a price that they can meet. I have further told them that we will make no effort to move on their purchase LOA [Letter of Offer and Acceptance] request until we have all five AMCITS safely delivered. In short, the pressure is on them. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 17 [= Ex. 42; North PROF to Poindexter, "Private Blank Check," 11/20/85, with bracketed explanations and substitutions for redacted material as supplied in Iran-Contra Report, at 180].)
85/11/20-300 NOVEMBER 20, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: TERMS OF DELIVERY NORTH PROF: McFarlane testified about Ex. 42, a PROF from North to Poindexter (see 85/11/20-299 for text): "Mr. NIELDS. . . . . It is dated the 20th of November, 1985, and it starts off, 'The Israelis will deliver 80 MOD Hawks at noon on Friday, the 22nd of November. These 80 will be loaded aboard three chartered aircraft owned by a proprietary which will take off at two-hour intervals for Tabriz.' " . . . [I]t refers to the fact that there is going to be a release of 'five, repeat five AMSITS

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			[sic]' -- that is American citizens, is it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Those are the hostages, 'from Hizballah, and they will be delivered to the U.S. embassy.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [A]fter indicating a price of $18 million will be paid for the 80 Hawk missiles, it says, 'No aircraft will land in Tabriz until the AMSITS have been delivered to the embassy.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. So it is contemplated there that the Hawks will not be delivered until after the hostages have been released. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And that is to avoid the kind of situation that you faced in September, I take it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And then in the next paragraph it says, 'Replenishment arrangements are being made through the MOD purchasing office in New York.' What does MOD refer to these? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Ministry of Defense, I imagine. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. There is, to say the least, considerable anxiety that we will somehow delay on their plan to purchase 120 of these weapons in the next few days. That is anxiety by Israel, I take it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And it indicates that they

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			anticipate getting their 120 weapons in the next few days? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [I]f the hostages don't come out and they [the Israelis] deliver their weapons, they won't get any replenishments? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Isn't it true that you were aware of the fact that there was an incipient exchange of Hawk missiles for American hostages? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think I was. I was certainly hopeful. I didn't give it more than about a 20 percent probability, but, yes, hopeful. "Mr. NIELDS. And you communicated that in Geneva to the President, did you not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. You told him that the Israelis were shipping weapons and that there was hope that the hostages would come out by the end of the week. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you also communicated it to the Secretary of State in Geneva? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it he did complain? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I have to take your word for it. I don't recall it that way. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And there was a foul-up in the ability to transship the Hawk missiles from Israel

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			to Iran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And then there came a time when you learned from [your deputies] that they had been unable to straighten it out and they needed your help? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And you called a foreign minister of a third country in order to obtain transit rights for the Hawk missiles? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, the hostages did not come out? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 47-53; JHICI Ex. 42. See id., 5/12/87, at 165-67.)
85/11/20-301 NOVEMBER 20, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: TERMS OF DELIVERY NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY: Although in a PROF sent on November 20, 1985, North stated that the plan was to have the hostages released before weapons were shipped (Ex. 42; see 85/11/20-299), his notes present a different plan. North's notes suggest that 2 hostages were to be released after a first shipment of 27 HAWKs, 3 more hostages after a second shipment of 27 missiles, and 1 hostage after a third shipment of the remaining 26 missiles: "One 27 - 2 "27 - 3 "26 - 1

"6 + 1 French"

Other North notebook entries from the same day suggest that further arms shipments were contemplated. For example, North wrote:

"After - 40 more HAWKs
"200 SW [Sidewinder] missiles
"1900 TOWs"

(Iran-Contra Report, at 177; JHICI Ex. JMP 84 [North notebook entries, 11/20/85 (Committee Documents Q 1325, 1327)]. See JHICI Ex. 42 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Private Blank Check," 11/20/85: "No acft [aircraft] will land in Tabriz until the AMCITS have been delivered to the embassy."].)

85/11/20-303
MID TO LATE
NOVEMBER 1985

THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: PRESIDENT INFORMED
REGAN ACCOUNT:

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Moving then to the Geneva summit which took place in November of 1985, you attended that summit with the President?

"Mr. REGAN. I did.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And during that summit, we have heard testimony about Mr. McFarlane telling you and the President about an ongoing shipment of Hawk missiles which Israel was engaged in at the time?

"Mr. REGAN. That is right.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. What is your recollection of what Mr. McFarlane told you and the President?

"Mr. REGAN. Prior to the time we left, I recall just a momentary conversation, which was not a detailed briefing to the President, that there [was] something up between Israel and Iran.

It might possibly lead to our getting some of our hostages out, and we were hopeful, but I would keep the President apprised of what was going on.

"Quite obviously, that was not the number-one topic on our minds, at least I put it out of my mind until at one point, on the margins of the meeting, McFarlane asked if he could talk to the President about a different subject. So we went off in a corner, as I recall, and he told the President that--it was a very convoluted arrangement in which a plane would go to a warehouse in . . . [a European country] or some other such spot, and would pick up planes--pick up arms there and fly them to Israel. They would then go to one or another city in Iran, and at the same time, they were making arrangements to try to get hostages out. It was a very complicated maneuver.

"And he said he would keep the President up on whether or not it had happened. We heard nothing more about it until after we got back from Geneva, in which he said that the thing apparently hadn't gone satisfactorily, the wrong shipment had been made, so on.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And he made it clear that the item that was being delivered was Hawk missiles or some type of missile?

"Mr. REGAN. Oh, yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Back even prior to going to Geneva, Mr. McFarlane told you and the President that something such as that was being contemplated and may take place; isn't that correct?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes. But I don't recall whether

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			or not he said Hawk missiles at that time. Certainly he said Hawk missiles in Geneva. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Okay. And you and the President understood that Israel would want replenishment of the material that was sent to Iran? "Mr. REGAN. Yes, but as I recall, it was a lot more than 25, something in the neighborhood of 80. "Mr. SMILJANICH. What did the President say he would do about the matter of replenishment? "Mr. REGAN. Well, let's see what happens. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Again, he didn't rule that out? "Mr. REGAN. He didn't rule it out. He didn't rule that in. He didn't make a commitment." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 30-33. See 85/09/00-014 [Israeli understanding of the U.S. view of the HAWK shipment].)
85/11/20-304 SOMETIME IN MID TO LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: COVER STORY ABOUT OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOMFIELD. You have testified, Mr. Regan, that you heard or were told that in case of a breach in security over the Iran arms initiative, reference to oil-drilling equipment would be a cover story. "Who told you to use the oil-drilling story as a cover, and when did you learn of the need for a cover story? "Mr. REGAN. I believe it was told to me in Geneva by Bud McFarlane at the time he was

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			describing, as I called it, an intricate maneuver involving those 80 TOWs [sic]." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 208.)
85/11/20-305 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: POINDEXTER INVOLVEMENT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, in November of 1985, Mr. McFarlane went off to the Summit with the President and the Secretary of State; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And you were left behind in Washington? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right. "Mr. LIMAN. And during that period of November 1985, did you get drawn in to a transaction that the Israelis were having involving Hawks? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, I would not characterize it as 'I was drawn in.' While Mr. McFarlane was in Geneva, I received a telephone call from Commander Thompson who was his military assistant and later mine, and said that Mr. McFarlane had called Colonel North to ask him to work on an Israeli problem that they were having with aircraft. "Commander Thompson was very oblique in his references to the telephone, over the telephone, because it was a non-secure line. The purpose of the call, I assume, was just to alert me that Colonel North had received some tasking from Mr. McFarlane in Geneva and after that I called

Colonel North over to find out what the issue was, and I can't recall whether in that first meeting with Colonel North that it was clear that the Hawk missiles were involved, but it was my recollection--my recollection is that it was clear that some kind of weapons w[as] involved.

"Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall, if you look at Exhibit [JMP] 17--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I have it.

"Mr. LIMAN. And this is a PROF note . . . to you from Oliver North?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, it is.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it is November 20, 1985 PROF note in which Mr. North stated, 'The Israelis will deliver 80 modified Hawks.'

"He went on to say, and I am still quoting, 'There is a requirement for 40 additional weapons of the same nomenclature for a total requirement of 120.'

"Then he referred to the fact that as a result of this there was an expectation of the five hostages being released and that the only requirement for the United States was to provide replenishment of those Hawks.

"Do you recall that, sir?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I do now.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you have looked at a lot of documents over the last month, and do you also recall that you got involved in dealing with the Defense Department at one point in seeking the reimbursement of the Hawks for the Israelis?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, Mr. Liman, that is correct.

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			"I would like to add one point here, and that is that as everybody can imagine, with the importance of the issues that are being discussed here, I have spent a lot of time since leaving the White House trying to reconstruct, to the best of my ability, what happened. "And the committee staff and the White House, as I said, have recently made a significant number of documents available, and I have gone through many of these, so my recollections have been refreshed from what they were in November of 1986." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 39-41; JHICI Ex. JMP 17 [North PROF to Poindexter, 11/20/85].)
85/11/20-307 DURING NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: POINDEXTER INVOLVEMENT POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. You do recall, because we went over it last time, that when McFarlane went over to the summit in Geneva you got pulled into that HAWK shipment? "A. That's correct, from the standpoint that Commander Thompson called me and said that Mr. McFarlane had called Colonel North to ask him to work on an Israeli aircraft problem. "Q. And we looked over some PROF notes that you received at that time. Were you told in November of '85 before McFarlane went to Geneva that he had been visited by Rabin? "A. That Mr. McFarlane was visited by Rabin? "Q. Yes. just before he left for Geneva.

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			"A. I don't remember that. "Q. Do you recall -- "A. I could have been, but I just don't remember. "Q. Do you recall that even before McFarlane went to Geneva there was discussion about the fact that the Israelis would be shipping some HAWKs to Iran and that we would be getting hostage back? "A. I can't recall that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 344-45.)
85/11/20-330 NOVEMBER 20, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: TERMS OF DELIVERY McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. I would like you just to refer briefly to Exhibit No. 42. It is one of these PROF messages and it is from Mr. North to Mr. Poindexter. I am simply going to read some of it into the record and then I will ask you questions about it. "It is dated the 20th of November, 1985, and it starts off, 'The Israelis will deliver 80 MOD Hawks at noon on Friday, the 22nd of November. These 80 will be loaded aboard three chartered aircraft owned by a proprietary which will take off at two-hour intervals for Tabriz.' "At the bottom of the first paragraph it refers to the fact that there is going to be a release of 'five, repeat five AM[C]ITS'--that is American citizens, is it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Those are the hostages, 'from Hizballah, and they will be delivered to the U.S. embassy.'

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. It states in the next paragraph, after indicating a price of $18 million will be paid for the 80 Hawk missiles, it says, 'No aircraft will land in Tabriz until the AM[C]ITS have been delivered to the embassy.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. So it is contemplated there that the Hawks will not be delivered until after the hostages have been released. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And that is to avoid the kind of situation that you faced in September, I take it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And then in the next paragraph it says, 'Replenishment arrangements are being made through the MOD purchasing office in New York.' What does MOD refer to there? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Ministry of Defense, I imagine. "Mr. NIELDS. That is Israel? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. [']There is, to say the least, considerable anxiety that we will somehow delay on their plan to purchase 120 of these weapons in the next few days.['] That is anxiety by Israel, I take it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And it indicates that they anticipate getting their 120 weapons in the next few days? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. [']In accordance with your

instructions, I have told their agent that we will sell them 120 items at a price they can meet.['] It says, 'I have further told them that we will make no effort to move on their purchase LOA'--what is LOA?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Letter of offer and agreement; that is the terms of a weapons sale--

"Mr. NIELDS. [']Until we have all five AM[C]ITS safely delivered. In short, the pressure is on them.['] 'Them' here is the Israelis?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I suppose so, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Because they--if the hostages don't come out and they deliver their weapons, they won't get any replenishment?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then it refers to dispatching a covert hostage debrief team to W[ie]sbaden, and it says [']there is the distinct possibility that at the end of the week we will have five Americans home and the promise of two [sic (original document reads "no," not "two")] future hostage takings in exchange for selling the Israelis 120 MOD Hawks?[']

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 47-50; JHICI Ex. 42 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Private Blank Check," 11/20/85].)

85/11/20-331
NOVEMBER
18-20, 1985

THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: TERMS OF DELIVERY
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. Isn't it true that you were aware of the fact that there was an incipient exchange of Hawk missiles for American hostages?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think I was. I was certainly hopeful. I didn't give it more than about a 20 percent probability, but, yes, hopeful.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you communicated that in Geneva to the President, did you not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. You told him that the Israelis were shipping weapons and that there was hope that the hostages would come out by the end of the week.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you also communicated it to the Secretary of State in Geneva?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And, indeed, in the Tower Commission report at page B-31 it states that 'Secretary Shultz testified and told the board that McFarlane told him on November 18, 1985 in Geneva that four hostages would be released on Thursday, November 21. He said that Israel would fly a plane with 100 Hawk missiles to a third country and transfer them to another aircraft. If the hostages were released, the airplane would fly to Iran. If not, it would fly to Israel. Israel would buy replacements for these missiles from the U.S. and would be paid by Iran.'

"And then he says, 'I complained to McFarlane that I had been informed so late that it was impossible to stop this operation.'

"My first question is, did you tell these things to Secretary Shultz in Geneva?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I take it he did complain?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I have to take your word for it. I don't recall it that way.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then there was a foul-up, was there not, which you learned about while you were in Geneva that needed to be straightened out?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And there was a foul-up in the ability to transship the Hawk missiles from Israel to Iran?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And at first you learned about it from Minister Rabin over the telephone?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you communicated to your deputies in Washington?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And asked them to see if they could straighten it out?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is right.

"Mr. NIELDS. And then there came a time when you learned from them that they had been unable to straighten it out and they needed your help?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And at that time you were in Rome?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you called a foreign minister of a third country in order to obtain transit rights for the Hawk missiles?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, the hostages did not come out?

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. No. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that was a matter of some disappointment to all concerned, including you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 50-53.
85/11/20-350 NOVEMBER 20, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: TERMS OF DELIVERY AND MISSION OBJECTIVES NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [Y]our notes of the period, November 20, for example, describe[] '120 Hawks equals 5 American citizens and a guarantee that no more,' and the sentence isn't completed, but that no more would be taken or no more terrorist ransom [paid]. "Mr. NORTH. I do recall those kinds of things being discussed. . . . ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. . . . Again, just to take note of the fact as I got more engaged in this thing as time went on, I made a definite effort working with Mr. Sporkin and others at CIA to include in a finding the broader objectives that I thought ought to be there and I think that Mr. McFarlane shared and certainly the President. "Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, when the finding was done in November, it was a finding that was straight arms for hostages and that described the state of play on the Israeli Hawk transaction; fair to say? "Mr. NORTH. And the previous TOW transaction. "Mr. LIMAN. And the previous TOW.

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And the point I want to elicit is the Tower Board indicated that this started as a broad initiative and evolved during your period of management of it into a straight arms-for-hostages transaction, and is it fair to say that from the time of your active involvement in November, you found it as an arms-for-hostages transaction . . ., or you attempted to evolve it into something that was broader?

"Mr. NORTH. Again, I am not trying to pass the buck at all, Counsel. In the discussions I had[,] and the very first person to address this issue with me, I believe, was Mr. Ledeen, he clearly saw, envisioned the broader objectives even though that initial finding did not articulate that and I think that is probably because of the compartmented nature of the preparation of that initial finding, it is almost cyclical.

"You had an intent back in June-July-August whenever that all began, the expression of that intent, I think, is flawed in that November finding, and my effort was in January to get it back on track and that was certainly shared in the discussions I had with Director Casey, one of which was at his home in the preparation of that second finding."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 3-4; JHICI Ex. OLN 69-A [North notebook excerpts].)

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THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: DoS INVOLVEMENT

The U.S. Embassy in a particular European

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1985			country first becomes involved in the HAWKs shipment. The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) is summonded to the foreign minister's office which, he is informed, has already been contacted by an employee of a local arms company. Summarizing the message in a cable to the State Department, the DCM wrote that the local arms company "manager stated that he hoped foreign ministry authorization would be given to two aircraft to transit [redacted]. They would be carrying arms provided by Israel for Iran. [The foreign ministry official] said that the [arms company] official (apparently acting as broker for the arms deal) referred to an 'American General' involved in the undertaking and to close relations of [the local arms company] with the U.S." The U.S. Embassy, unaware that the U.S. Government had decided to permit an arms shipment to Iran, informed the foreign ministry of the host country that the shipment was not authorized and conflicted with USG policy. (JHICI, 6/24/87, at 262-64 [Eggleston summary of deposition of DCM; JHICI Ex. C-1.)
85/11/20-405 NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: DoS INVOLVEMENT SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. Did you know that the officials in the embassy in a friendly European country were working to try to move shipments of Hawk parts through that country to Iran in November of 1985? "Secretary SHULTZ. I didn't know that at the time.

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			"On the other hand, in that particular instance there were some representations--I guess I would have to call them misrepresentations--to Ambassador Oakley in the department, and so in that case there was a departmental contact that was--which the charge' involved, I think, relied on. So I think that is a little different kind of case." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 188-89.)
85/11/21-300 NOVEMBER 21, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT Dewey Clarridge, the CIA Chief of European Division, testified at his deposition that North contacted him on the evening of Nov. 21 for his assistance in obtaining a flight clearance for a plane coming into a particular European city. Clarridge agreed to help and sent a message that night instructing the senior CIA officer in the European city to report immediately to the station. In the course of a series of cables between Clarridge and the officer, the officer was instructed to give Copp (Secord) whatever help he needed. The officer spoke with Copp by phone, and then tried but failed to reach foreign ministry officials. (JHICI, 6/24/87, at 264-65 [Eggleston summary].)
85/11/21-305 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Eggleston. . . . Is it true that late in the evening or afternoon of November 21, 1985, which was a Thursday, you received a telephone

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			call . . . from Colonel North? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. I would guess that it was sometime in the early evening or mid-evening of the 21st. "Mr. Eggleston. And at the time that you received the call, he asked you if you could provide some assistance to him with regard to something that was taking place in [redacted.] "Mr. Clarridge. That is right. "Mr. Eggleston. What did he tell you about what it was that was going on and what he needed your assistance in? "Mr. Clarridge. I don't recollect exactly, but I think he said he needed to get an aircraft landing rights to come into [redacted.] ". . . . "Mr. Eggleston. There comes a time shortly after that when there is sent a cable telling them [antecedent ambiguous because of redactions] that they should assist a Mr. Copp if he should require assistance, is that fair? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. The cable mentioned not only Mr. Copp, but it also mentioned that Mr. Copp was Mr. Secord. Both names I believe were used. "Mr. Eggleston. As of the time that you sent the cable, which tells them to provide assistance to Mr. Copp or Mr. Secord, did you know from Colonel North what it was this operation was about? "Mr. Clarridge. I don't believe so at that point. I think all I knew at that point was that [redacted] needed to be instructed to contact or would be contacted by Mr. Copp-Secord.

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			"Mr. Eggleston. You knew though that a flight was coming in from someplace and needed the permission [redacted] to land [redacted.] "Mr. Clarridge. Yes, I don't know whether I knew the flight had actually left from Tel Aviv at that point or not. "Mr. Eggleston. That was my question: You knew it was coming from Tel Aviv? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. But I probably only knew that once I had gotten to the office. "Mr. Eggleston. Which would have been Friday, November 22nd? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes, sometime in the early morning, it might have been as early as 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock in the morning. "Mr. Eggleston. Did you know at that time what kind of plane it was that was coming in? "Mr. Clarridge. At some point during that time, I was told that the plane was an El Al 747. "Mr. Eggleston. As of this early time, your initial conversation with Colonel North, did you know or had you been informed by Colonel North what was on the plane? "Mr. Clarridge. No, I was not." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, 5-8.)
85/11/21-306 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. Let me ask you to direct your attention to Exhibit [DRC] 2 in the book. ". . . . "Mr. Eggleston. This is a State Department

cable that was sent by [redacted] back to Headquarters of the State Department, dated November 22, and it relates events which occur, I believe, on November 21. I would like to direct your attention to the second half or so of paragraph 2 of the cable where it begins, 'The [redacted] manager', do you see that?

"Mr. Clarridge. Correct.

"Mr. Eggleston. I will just read it to you. The [redacted] manager stated that he hoped Foreign Ministry authorization would be given for two aircraft to transit [redacted.] They would be carrying arms provided by Israel for Iran. [Redacted] said that the [redacted] official apparently acts as broker for the arms deal referred to an American general invol[v]ed in the undertaking and the close relations of [redacted] with the United States. [Redacted] wondered if the embassy had information about the strange case perhaps involving a retired U.S. general, and the response, -- if you go on, I won't read it -- the response, as you go on, essentially relates that the embassy [redacted] related to [redacted] that they didn't know anything about it.

"It take it that this cable, which makes explicit reference to arms going from Israel to Iran through [redacted] involving a retired U.S. General, is not something that you knew about at or about November 22nd?

"Mr. Clarridge. No, this is the first time I have ever seen this cable.

"Mr. Eggleston. You were then in the office on November 22, and I believe you begin sending

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			and receiving a series of cables relating to this problem of obtaining landing rights for this flight. Do you recall that occurring on Friday? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. "Mr. Eggleston. Let me direct you to one which is a sample of others, number [DRC] 1-6. . . . "Mr. Eggleston. Let me just read the first paragraph of this one. It is a sample of others. NSC has requested that you ask [redacted] to weigh in with appropriate [redacted] officials on this matter, pull out all stops as aircraft is one hour from its abort time. This is a cable sent, I take it, by you to [redacted]? "Mr. Clarridge. That is correct. "Mr. Eggleston. Is this what is called a privacy channel cable? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. That indicator at the top indicates that it was the European Division's privacy channel. ". . . . "Mr. Eggleston. So the result of doing this on privacy channels was that you would receive copies of these cables and in addition to you, the DO would receive some as well? "Mr. Clarridge. Right, the deputy director for operations would also receive all of them. ". . . . "Mr. Eggleston. . . . As of the time that you sent this cable to which I have just referred your attention, indicating that [redacted] is to pull out all stops and enlist the aid of the charge' in pulling out all stops, do you know

anything more about this initiative other than that Colonel North has asked you to obtain permission from [redacted] to permit a flight to land?

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes. By this time, I assume that Charlie Allen had come to see me and had shown me some intelligence reports having to do with an effort under way to get the hostages out of Lebanon."

(Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 8-13.)

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THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. Eggleston. So you recall that by Friday morning, you have had a conversation with Charlie Allen [redacted,] is that right?

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes.

"Mr. Eggleston. Do you remember how many [redacted] you were shown?

"Mr. Clarridge. I don't remember how many or even their content.

"Mr. Eggleston. Obviously, you remember something about their content because you remember that they relate to getting hostages out of Lebanon.

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes, I do.

"Mr. Eggleston. Do you remember anything else about their content?

"Mr. Clarridge. No, I do not.

"Mr. Eggleston. Do you remember that there were references [redacted] to negotiations between Americans and Iranians?

"Mr. Clarridge. I don't specifically remember that.

"Mr. Eggleston. Do you have any recollection that [redacted] made reference to weapons?

"Mr. Clarridge. No, I don't.

"Mr. Eggleston. You do not remember that there were any references to weapons [redacted?]

"Mr. Clarridge. Not at all.

"Mr. Eggleston. Are you confident that this meeting with Mr. Allen took place on Friday morning, November 22nd?

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes, I'm confident about Friday -- it must have been, because it seemed to me that in my conversation on the phone with Colonel North, he mentioned that he would have Charlie Allen come to see me with some material that would explain what was going on.

"Mr. Eggleston. As of this time, do you have any idea what it is, why there is a problem with [redacted] permitting this plane to land?

"Mr. Clarridge. Well, I don't know -- I think the cable traffic has it all, sort of spells it out step by step. There was a problem that it [redacted] and apparently some arrangements that Mr. McFarlane had made with the Foreign Minister or somebody had not jelled.

"Mr. Eggleston. Let me ask you, Mr. Clarridge, if you could look at cable [DRC] 1-7. Do you have that in front of you?

"Mr. Clarridge. Right.

"Mr. Eggleston. This is a cable also dated 22 November 1985. . . .

". . . .

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			"Mr. Eggleston. And this is a cable from [redacted] to you; is that correct? "Mr. Clarridge. This is correct. "Mr. Eggleston. Let me read to you from the first paragraph -- it says, 'At 1603 hours local, Copp,' which is Secord, 'advised that [redacted] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in principle opposed clearance and would recommend same to Minister.' "Then if you go down to paragraph 2, it reads: 'Copp called back again while I was writing this message. I advised him above. He called White House and recommended authorization for [redacted] to pull Minister out of cabinet meeting. He said McFarlane was being pulled out of meeting with Pope. He said my instructions were to pull out all stops.' "[Redacted.] As of the day that these messages are taking place, do you yet have any knowledge, have you been told what it is that is on the aircraft? "Mr. Clarridge. I cannot recall specifically when I was told that there were sophisticated oil-drilling spare parts on the aircraft. I don't know whether it was by this time or later on in the day." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 13-16.)
85/11/21-308 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. You think sometime on November 22nd you were told that the content of

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the airplanes was oil-drilling equipment?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is what I think is quite possible.

"Mr. Eggleston. I know you were asked this in the deposition. I take it it is your testimony that you were not informed that it is something other than spare parts for the oil-drilling industry until substantially later, maybe as late as January '86?

"Mr. Clarridge. I think, as I said in the deposition, Charlie Allen tells me that by the 26th or 27th, he would have showed me some [redacted] reports that would have indicated to me that the equipment shipped in on the 25th was in fact weapons or munitions or whatever.

"Mr. Eggleston. But the information that you are relating to us is information that you received from Charlie Allen [redacted] not as a result of anything that Colonel North or anyone else would have told you?

"Mr. Clarridge. Not at that point, to my recollection.

"Mr. Eggleston. When is the first that you believe Colonel North indicated to you if ever that there was something other than oil-drilling equipment onboard the flight?

"Mr. Clarridge. Well, he has stated that he told me sometime around the 25th, 26th, 27th, I believe. He may well have done that, but I don't specifically recollect it. Maybe he did and maybe he didn't.

"The thing is that perhaps I knew by the 27th when Charlie Allen showed me [redacted] and when he told me or when I asked him, it just didn't make that big an impression on me.

"Mr. Eggleston. Your testimony in your deposition was fairly clear that you did not know shortly after the flight that these flights contained weapons and you certainly had no recollection of Colonel North telling you prior, I think you said, to maybe as late as January, '86 --

"Mr. Clarridge. I didn't say anything about Colonel North telling me in January, '86. I said that I officially learned in January, '86, that there were Hawk missiles onboard. I also stated in my deposition that I was -- Charlie Allen says that he showed me material at least by the 26th that would have indicated that there were at least weapons onboard.

"Mr. Eggleston. Do you recall Charlie Allen showing you that material?

"Mr. Clarridge. I remember Charlie Allen showing me material all the way along. I don't specifically remember him showing me material where it mentioned weapons.

"Mr. Eggleston. And you do not have this recollection either before or after the flight; is that fair?

"Mr. Clarridge. When you say 'before', you mean when he first came to see me on the 22nd?

"Mr. Eggleston. Yes, sir.

"Mr. Clarridge. That is right.

"Mr. Eggleston. And indeed, you do not recall now that Charlie Allen showed you [redacted] after the flight which indicated they were weapons; is

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			that correct? "Mr. Clarridge. That is right. "Mr. Eggleston. So your testimony is based on something that Charlie Allen has told you subsequently? "Mr. Clarridge. That is correct. "Mr. Eggleston. When do you, sir, first have it in your head through a recollection of your own that you knew that there was something other than oil drilling equipment on the flight "Mr. Clarridge. When I remember being told officially that there were Hawk missiles onboard was some time in January. That is what I recollect. "Mr. Eggleston. Do you know who told you that in January? "Mr. Clarridge. No, I don't. But I know it had something to do with the time that the finding was being put together." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 16-19.)
85/11/21-309 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 5: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, throughout November 22nd you also continue or begin to arrange not just a landing clearance for a flight coming in [redacted] but you begin to arrange a -- clearances for flights going from [redacted] into Iran and you become involved in getting the [redacted] involved to get an overflight clearance [redacted,] do you recall that? "Mr. Clarridge. That is correct. I do

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			remember that. There are two parts to that, actually. "Mr. Eggleston. Okay. I will make you or ask you to refer, if you could, to cable number [DRC] 1-12. . . . ". . . . "Mr. Eggleston. This is, I take it, the first cable or appears to be the first cable you have sent to [redacted.] The beginning of it indicates that you are communicating to [redacted] that this is an initiative that has the highest levels of United States Government interest; is that correct? "Mr. Clarridge. That is correct. "Mr. Eggleston. And the rest of that cable goes on to discuss the need for three overflight clearances for this flight, which is going to Iran; is that correct? Mr. Eggleston. As of November 22, I take it, you know that there is a flight from Israel into [redacted] you know or believe that it is going to be broken down into at least three flights and fly from [redacted] into Iran, you know that it relates to the hostages in some fashion, you know -- and you also believe that -- it is your understanding as of that time that the cargo onboard is oil drilling equipment; is that a fair summary of the state of your knowledge as best you recall it today as of November 22nd? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. It depends on -- yes. I think basically it is, Mr. Eggleston. We are talking about day, time, [redacted] minus five is [redacted] on the 22nd. Now, I don't -- as I

said, there are two parts to the request of communicating with [redacted] as far as overflight clearances. Apparently the first one on -- or the first requirement was that becuase the El Al 747 had to abort, and went back to Tel Aviv, there was an effort made in Tel Aviv to re-do the flight in a different form. And again, apparently they wanted to use [redacted] as the breakpoint on the flight into Tehran.

"So that is one part of [redacted] thing. I don't know if that is what is going on right now. The second part of the need for the overflight from [redacted] was when the decision was taken not to use [redacted] anymore and to go from Tel Aviv through some other country to Tehran.

"Mr. Eggleston. Right. Let me get to that in a second.

"I think we are going to see some cables late in the day at least Zulu [sc. Greenwich] time, November 23rd, that indicated there is a decision made not to pursue the initiative through [redacted.]

"Let me just ask you, though, once again, because I am not sure I quite understand this, as of the 22nd then, you know there is an initiative underway that has very high level United States Government interest. You believe that it involves what appears to be an ordinary cargo plane carrying spares for the oil industry. We have just reviewed a cable where despite the fact that there is high level pressure involving Mr. McFarlane pressuring high level people in the [redacted] that [redacted] have made a decision,

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			at least tentative and initial, not to permit this plan carrying oil drilling equipment to land [redacted.] "What is it that you think is causing as of this time, as of November 22nd, what is it you thought was causing all the problems with [redacted]? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, I mean I haven't gone through this to look at that particular point, but to the best of my recollection, there was still a problem of getting the right authority in [redacted] to agree to the flight coming in. "It seemed to be that -- whatever arrangement had been made before was not working and an effort was underway to try to get McFarlane to contact who[m]ever he had talked to before to get things loosened up." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 19-22.)
85/11/21-310 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 6: [Continuing from preceding entry;] "Mr. Eggleston. My question, Mr. Clarridge, is what is it about this operation that you even though [sic] required such a high level of interest and attention at both the United States Government and [redacted] level. After all, all we are talking about in your mind as of this time is a landing of a single flight containing nothing but ordinary routine cargo. "What did you think in your mind was causing the [redacted] to balk over the landing of an ordinary cargo plane?

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			"Mr. Clarridge. Well, at some point, and it becomes clearer in the traffic as you go along, they wanted a diplomatic note stating why we wanted to do this. Now, that may have been the problem at the time. "Mr. Eggleston. Do you recall that one of the things that they wanted in the diplomatic note as well was an indication of what the nature of the cargo was? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. I see that in the traffic coming in [redacted]. They also wanted, in a second diplomatic note, a statement that was unacceptable to the White House. "Mr. Eggleston. And do you recall what that statement was? "Mr. Clarridge. It had -- there were two parts to the second note and the second part was a statement that what was going on here was an arrangement to get the hostages out, and the White House was unwilling to have that statement made. "Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, let me ask you now, not directed to this initiative perhaps as much as perhaps just generally, is it fair to say that weapons require special handling on aircraft and airports? They require a different kind of handling than other forms of non-lethal cargo? "Mr. Clarridge. I am not an expert, but I suppose so. Certainly munitions do. "Mr. Eggleston. Munitions would? "Mr. Clarridges. Yes. "Mr. Eggleston. You now know what was contained on these flights was going to be Hawk missiles which I understand are highly explosive.

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			Would it be fair to say that Hawk missiles would require different kinds of storage and handling and loading and unloading and other types of facilities at the [redacted] airport than oil drilling equipment would have required in terms of handling on the scene? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, again, I mean -- I don't know that much about it. It sounds right to me. "Mr. Eggleston. Sounds logical? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. "Mr. Eggleston. Indeed, although this had not been made available to you and if you want to challenge it, you can, Mr. Secord testified in a deposition before this committee that, indeed, there was simply no way in which you could possibly unload these flights, load them into other planes in [redacted] airport without [redacted] and a number of other people knowing perfectly well what was in the flight because, after all, as he indicated, all sorts of special handling would be required. "Mr. Clarridge. Well -- "Mr. Eggleston. Did it occur to you at any time, Mr. Clarridge, that the difficulty with this flight, the reason that [redacted] was objecting to the landing of this flight, was because of something about the nature of the cargo? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, I can't say for sure whether it did or it didn't. I can't recall back then. But I don't recall thinking that it had something to do particularly with the cargo. What I felt was the problem was that whatever

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			arrangements had been made and because of the issue involved of the hostages and the requirements that [redacted] might have had in that regard that that was what the problem was." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 22-25.)
85/11/21-311 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 7: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. But it never occurred to you that the reason that they were objecting to the landing of this otherwise perfectly ordinary cargo flight was because there was something about the nature of the cargo that was causing the problem? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, it is not exactly, you know, perfectly ordinary cargo. The U.S. had an embargo on oil drilling equipment at that time, and maybe [redacted] considered that sensitive. But, frankly, Mr. Eggleston, I cannot remember -- and maybe I did think through some things at the time, but I cannot recall now sitting down trying to figure out why [redacted] wouldn't let the cargo in. All I was trying to do was to get the God-damned cargo in. "Mr. Eggleston. And send a number of cables back and forth to that effect. Let me move this forward, if I could. "On November 23rd, which would have been a Saturday, the cables indicate and continue to reflect efforts to get the flight clearances into [redacted] and then the overflight clearances from [redacted] over [redacted] into Iran. "Let me ask you to look, if you could, to

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			cable 1-19. "This is a cable from [redacted] dated November 23rd at [redacted] Zulu, which would have been late morning on Saturday, November 23rd, D.C. time; is that correct? "Mr. Clarridge. No. It would be fairly early. About [redacted] in the morning. "Mr. Eggleston. Okay. Let me ask you to . . . direct your attention to the . . . second paragraph. It is a little hard to read because of the photocopying. Let me read it to you anyway. "'At 1130 hours charge went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and met with [redacted] and [redacted.] They stated they needed a note because note would confirm U.S. Government really involved as they had had doubts. Charge presented note[.] They agreed to meet and advise decision soonest.' "Move down to paragraph three where it says, ['redacted] met with Copp in brief car meeting at 1130 hours. Coordinate action and brief each other.' "The final thing I want to direct your attention to is paragraph four which indicates [redacted] are concerned, [redacted.] "Do you recall seeing this cable when it came in? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes, I do. "Mr. Eggleston. And let me ask you first about [redacted] is a [redacted] company that is an arms company. By this time, by November of 1985, you had been chief of Europe for approximately a little over a year, year and a

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			month, maybe; is that correct? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes, that would be about right. "Mr. Eggleston. Was the name [redacted] familiar to you? "Mr. Clarridge. No, it wasn't. "Mr. Eggleston. It had not, as they seem to say in the CIA, come across your scope during the time that you were chief of the European Division? "Mr. Clarridge. No. I can't remember it. It may have, but I can't remember it. [Redacted] arms company is not a particular big deal. "Mr. Eggleston. This was, as I understand it, at least a fairly major arms dealer, exporting company, in Europe. Nevertheless, this was not something that you know anything about? "Mr. Clarridge. No. I mean, you have got to remember, Mr. Eggleston, the European Division is the biggest division in the Directorate of Operations. There are an enormous number of things going on at any given time. The fact of the gray arms trade was not particularly a big issue that the European Division of the Directorate of Operations was concerned with, frankly." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 25-28.)
85/11/21-312 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 8: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. I might say, as well, Mr. Clarridge, you don't need to look at it, but paragraph 5 of this cable [Ex. DRC 1-19] to which

I have directed your attention is the cable where [redacted] are indicating that they would like a formal diplomatic note indicating the origin and destination of the flight, the equipment, U.S. commitment that operation not be made public and airports other than [redacted] but in [redacted] that are being used.

"This is a situation now where things are escal[]ating that [redacted] now wants a very formal diplomatic note setting forth the outlines and just exactly what is happening with regard to this cargo flight flying into [redacted] is that correct?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is correct. Then they asked for a second note.

"Mr. Eggleston. And they ask for a second?

"You, I think, have been advised by now, Mr. Clarridge, that the reference in the paragraph three to which I directed you about [redacted] meeting with Copp in a car, you have probably been advised that [redacted] has indicated that as of that time, at least, Mr. Secord instructs him or tells him specifically that the flight is going to contain Hawk missiles and that Hawk missile[s] are going to be shipped in return for the release of the American hostages.

"You are aware that [redacted] has testified to that effect, are you not?

"Mr. Clarridge. Yes, I am.

"Mr. Eggleston. And I am certain you are also aware [redacted] indicated that he sent the cable which is 1-19 an[d] that he also sent a subsequent cable shortly thereafter which dealt only with

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			that conversation in the car with Mr. Secord. That is something you are aware of, that he has testified to that; is that fair? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. That's fair. "Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, let me just review for you in light of the testimony that [redacted] knew what was going to be in the flight. Let me just review with you if I could who it was who knew that this flight was going to contain weapons as opposed to oil drilling equipment as of midday on November 23rd. "And let me just analyze it in terms of the problem that had arisen. The problem was [redacted] was balking over landing rights. The person who brought you the problem, Colonel North, he obviously knew and he's testified here before us that he knew that the flight was going to contain oil -- excuse me, Hawks and not oil drilling equipment. "The person that you were principally directing to solve Colonel North's problem, [redacted] has testified that as of this date, he knew that there were weapons going to be on the flight. "We have received deposition testimony from [redacted] who was also part of the solution to this problem that he knew that there were going to be weapons on the flight. "[Redacted] has told us as well that [redacted] knew there were going to be weapons on the flight. [Redacted] testified that that was what the problem was. [Redacted] didn't want to be seen as transporting weapons to Iran without a

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			diplomatic note from the United States telling them that they could do that because they didn't want to be left holding the bag in case this initiative fell apart. "Mr. Clarridge. That was the first instance. It's clear the requirement for the second note was the note that made everything fall through." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 28-31.)
85/11/21-313 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 9: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. What is it, you understand[] is the difference between[] the two notes? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, as is clear in reading this material over that in the -- the first note, that was delivered by the embassy to the Foreign Ministry, or whomever, contained all of the required information that is spelled out in here that [redacted] were asking for. Now clearly they must have told [redacted] what was on the aircraft, because that is what [reacted] asked for. "Mr. Eggleston. It is your understanding that they told [redacted] the aircraft was going to contain weapons? "Mr. Clarridge. I don't know that. I have never been told that. I just heard it from what you said these other people said. But it is interesting that that note must have satisfied [redacted]. Then there came a requirement for the second note and the second note, the White House refused to mention anything about hostages and the

whole thing came a cropper.

"Mr. Eggleston. Correct. But my point was [redacted] is one of the actors in this.

"Mr. Clarridge. That is right.

"Mr. Eggleston. [Redacted] is essentially the problem. They know there are going to be weapons on the plane?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is right. They did, if you look at this traffic. The note they asked for, they asked for what's on board. They must have been satisfied with the answer which they got.

"Mr. Eggleston. Okay. But they knew weapons were going to be on the flight?

"Mr. Clarridge. If that is what you tell me, yes. I can see this, they must have.

"Mr. Eggleston. The person who gave you the problem knew. The person you gave the problem to solve knew. The person who was helping [redacted] knew. [Redacted] knew. But you did not know?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is the way it was.

". . . .

"Mr. Eggleston. The committee has also done a study in trying to collect all of the cables that were sent out [redacted] on the afternoon of November 23rd. . . . And there are two cables that are simply missing and we have been advised by the Office of Legislative Liaison that those cables are simply not available within the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Have you heard that?

"Mr. Clarridge. Well, no, I hadn't heard that specifically.

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			"Mr. Eggleston. So in any event, we are left with a situation where two cables are simply unfindable from the afternoon of November 23rd that were sent out [redacted.] No explanation? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, I'm not an expert on how the cable traffic operates in our system. But I understand that there are people who are, who are prepared to come and talk to you about how it works and the efforts the Agency has made to find those cables. "Mr. Eggleston. Okay. I think they would testify their efforts to find the cables have been prodigious but they have been unable to locate them despite looking in a lot of different places. ". . . ." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 31-32, 36-37.)
85/11/21-314 NOVEMBER 21-27, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA INVOLVEMENT CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 10: [Continuing from preceding entry:] ". . . . "Mr. Eggleston. In fact, if you look at Cable [DRC] 1-49, this is a cable that is actually sent after the flight had landed in Iran. And the bottom of the second paragraph indicates there is confusion over exactly what is in the flight. Your [redacted] had told [redacted] this was oil industry spare parts. The telex from the carrier stated it was medical supplies. And the pilot of the plane, the person who was actually flying the plane, told the ground controllers he was carrying military equipment.

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			"Now did it alarm you at all that the pilot of the aircraft is the person who -- the person who obviously is closest to whatever it was that was inside the plane, did it alarm you at all that he is the one who was indicating that it was military equipment, when you believed it was something other than military equipment? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, alarm may be too strong a word. Obviously I was interested in clarifying the matter. "Mr. Eggleston. If you just look at [Ex. DRC] 1-52, this is the cable you sent back a couple of hours later and in paragraph 3, you indicate again that the cargo was spares for the oil industry and you cannot understand why it is the pilot thinks he's carrying military equipment. "Mr. Clarridge, you, of course, are here in Washington and the pilot is over there with cargo. Do you recall if you took any steps between the first cable I showed you and this cable to verify for yourself what it was that was inside the plane prior to the time you cabled back to [redacted] that he should make a representation to [redacted] that the pilot was in error and it was actually spares for the oil industry? "Mr. Clarridge. Well, I can't recollect specifically doing so, but from the tone of my language here, it sounds to me like I must have. "Mr. Eggleston. Do you have any recollection of what it was that you would have -- it seems to me that you probably did as well? Because you are now learning specifically in a cable that the pilot said it was military equipment. Do you have

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			any recollection what it was that you did? "Mr. Clarridge. No, I don't have any specific. But I assume I probably talked to Colonel North because he was the fellow who had told me in the first instance there was oil drilling equipment on there. I can't recall making a telephone call per se. "Mr. Eggleston. I take it there wouldn't have been anyone else other than Colonel North whom you could have called to find out what was in it? "Mr. Clarridge. No. "Mr. Eggleston. If you talked to anybody on the morning of November 25th to determine what it was, you would have spoken to Colonel North? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 38-40. Clarridge testimony continues at 85/11/23-221. For further Clarridge testimony on the 11/85 HAWK transaction, see Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 87-99, 195-200.)
85/11/22-100 NOVEMBER 22, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AND McFARLANE INVOLVEMENT At around midday, the senior CIA officer in the European city receives a cable telling him that the DCM was "to pull out all stops in order to obtain landing rights for the aircraft." That afternoon, McFarlane is pulled out of a meeting with the Pope to call the foreign minister to provide landing rights for the aircraft. Planning for the flights continues into the evening, and the European country request a formal diplomatic note setting forth, among other things,

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			the contents of the cargo and stating that the reason for the shipment is the release of U.S. hostages. (JHICI, 5/24/87, at 265-66 [Eggleston summary].)
85/11/22-300 NOVEMBER 22, 1985			HOSTAGE RELEASE IN EXCHANGE FOR HAWKs ANTICIPATED DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS is advised by OAKLEY of information from various sources that the hostages will be released for 120 HAWKS at $250,000 apiece. GPS learns also that the proposed release date has slipped in order to get flight clearance from a European country." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/11/23-050.)
85/11/22-400 NOVEMBER 22-23, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: DoD ASSESSMENT GAFFNEY PAPER: Henry Gaffney at the DoD completes a paper on the Iran arms sales, titled "Hawk Missiles for Iran." The paper lists the price and availability of HAWKs in the U.S. inventory, as well as the political drawbacks of a weapons transfer to Iran. (JHICI Ex. DoD 5 [DoD Point Paper, "Hawk Missiles for Iran," undated]; Iran-Contra Report, at 178.)
85/11/22-800 NOVEMBER 22, 985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: PROBLEMS NORTH PROF: After 7:00 p.m. (Washington time), as the transaction is underway, North sends a PROF message to Poindexter:

82-743 O - 88 — 33

". . . .

"Unbelievable as it may seem, I have just talked to Schwimmer, in TA [Tel Aviv,] who advises that they have released their DC-8s in spite of my call to DK [David Kimche] instructing that they be put on hold until we could iron out the clearance problem in [the capital of Country 15]. Schwimmer released them to save $ and now does not think that they can be re-chartered before Monday."

North then informs Poindexter that Secord can solve the problems:

"Advised Copp of lack of p/u [pick up] A/C [aircraft]. He has advised that we can use one of our LAKE Resources A/C which was at [the capital of Country 15] to p/u a load of ammo for UNO [United Nicaraguan Opposition]. He will have the a/c repainted tonight and put into service nlt [no later than] noon Sat so that we can at least get this thing moving. So help me I have never seen anything so screwed up in my life. Will meet with Calero tonite to advise that the ammo will be several days late in arriving. Too bad, this was to be our first direct flight to the resistance field at [redacted] inside Nicaragua. The ammo was already palletized w/ parachutes attached. Maybe we can do it on Weds. or Thurs.

"More as it becomes available. One hell of an operation."

(JHICI Ex. OLN 45 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Private Blank Check," 11/22/85, with bracketed explanations and substitutions for redacted material as supplied in Iran-Contra Report, at 182].)

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85/11/23-050 NOVEMBER 23, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: HOSTAGE RELEASE DEAL COLLAPSES DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS learns that no hostages have been released and the deal has therefore collapsed. He tells HILL: 'It's over.'" (JHICI Ex GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 85/12/05-900.)
85/11/23-051 NOVEMBER 18-23, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: HOSTAGE RELEASE DEAL COLLAPSES SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Your notes indicate . . . that you told your executive assistant on November 23, 1985, it is over? [See 85/11/23-050.] "Secretary SHULTZ. That was what I understood. "Mr. BELNICK. Did Mr. McFarlane tell you during this period, November 18 to 23, 1985, that our embassy in the European country had been approached to contact the foreign minister or other officials of that country to try to get flight clearances for the Israeli plane that was intended to go with the Hawks to Tehran? "Secretary SHULTZ. No. "Mr. BELNICK. Did Mr. McFarlane or anyone else inform you that in addition to having the embassy in that European country make those contacts, the embassy was also asked and directed by the NSC to send a diplomatic note to that European government--which appears at Exhibit

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			[GPS] 14--saying thanks but no thanks for that country's declining to provide the flight clearances? "Secretary SHULTZ. No, but I believe what happened was, as I now understand it--though this is all news to me since this came out--that the communications were via a non-State channel and that Ambassador Oakley, who was then our Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, was approached and asked to help on this and he authorized a cable to the charge about it. "So there was that--the State Department was in the loop to that extent. Not in describing to Ambassador Oakley what was being shipped, but just that there was a sensitive shipment that they wanted to get cleared, as I understand it. You may want to talk to him about that. "Mr. BELNICK. We have. If you look at Exhibit [GPS] 55, Mr. Secretary, you will see and the panel will see a copy of an affidavit from Ambassador Oakley in which he records what he was told at the time in November 1985 by Colonel North so that he would contact your embassy in the European country. You will see on the first page of that affidavit, that Colonel North told Ambassador Oakley that . . . he, Colonel North, had become aware of Israeli arms shipments to Iran, that he had discovered that relationship be[cause] somebody from his staff had tumbled to an arms warehouse in the European country while there to try to obtain arms for the Nicaraguan resistance. "That is how Colonel North learned of the

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			Israeli shipment, according to what he told the ambassador, and then said, if you turn to page 2, 'We are having trouble getting flight clearances.' "You will also see in paragraph C of the affidavit [t]hat Colonel North advised Ambassador Oakley that you were aware of this matter and had been contacted in Geneva. There was no statement, however, to Ambassador Oakley that you had objected to the proposal; and also, sir, as I understand from your testimony, no one had said to you that this originated with somebody stumbling upon an arms warehouse in a European country while they were seeking arms for the Nicaraguan resistance? "Secretary SHULTZ. Later on, as I believe Admiral Poindexter was describing this to people, he stated that it all started with stumbling on a warehouse. "Mr. BELNICK. That was in November 1986? "Secretary SHULTZ. But since I had personally seen what I regarded as the start of it with the Ledeen visit and so on, I though that was a cock-and-bull story. "Mr. BELNICK. And the record will show, Mr. Secretary, that that story was told by Admiral Poindexter on November 10, 1986, to you and the President of the United States in a meeting at the White House. "Moving from November, your conversation-- "Secretary SHULTZ. This statement of being aware-- "Mr. BELNICK. Yes, sir. "Secretary SHULTZ. I don't know whether that

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			was presumably a reference to the phone conversation that I had with Mr. McFarlane that we talked about earlier or not. But presumably it could have been said. "Mr. BELNICK. In any event, Ambassador Oakley was only informed to the extent that his affidavit indicates, as he has testified to us, and you were informed to the extent of what you have said this morning? "Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 72-75; JHICI Ex. GPS 55 [Oakley Affidavit, 7/2/87].)
85/11/23-100 NOVEMBER 23, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: DoS INVOLVEMENT In the morning on Nov. 23, the DCM submits a diplomatic note to the European country. The note does not comply with the foreign ministry's request for specifics on the plane's cargo. (JHICI, 5/24/87, at 266 [Eggleston summary].)
85/11/23-200 NOVEMBER 23, 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AND DoS AWARENESS OF HAWKs At about 11:30 a.m. on Nov. 23, the senior CIA officer meets with Copp in a car in a hotel parking lot in the European city. He learns that Copp's real name is Secord, whom he believes had a former tie to the CIA. Secord tells the officer that the flight will involve HAWK missiles which will be shipped to Iran to secure the release of U.S. hostages. The CIA officer returns to his office and sends two cables. The first, a situation report, mentions a meeting with Secord in the car but does

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			not set forth the substance of the meeting. In the second cable the CIA officer specifically sets forth the substance of the conversation with Secord. The two cables are sent by private channel to Clarridge, the CIA European Division chief. Clarridge testified in his deposition that he did not know the flights involved weapons for Iran. He believed, he testified, that they contained oil-drilling equipment. He denied, as well, receiving the second cable. The DCM, who had worked closely with the senior CIA officer between Nov. 22 and 25, testified at his deposition that he had read many of the cables going out to Clarridge from the officer at the time. The DCM testified he recalled either having read the cable informing Clarridge the flight involved HAWKs, or having been told by the senior CIA officer that he had sent a cable with the information. The CIA communicator on duty at the time sending cables from the European city also recalled that he sent a cable to headquarters with information about missiles. (JHICI, 6/24/87, at 266-69 [Eggleston summary].)
85/11/23-210 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on Clarridge's awareness that HAWKs were involved in the November 1985 shipment, and on events leading up to the CIA's insistence on a Finding: "Mr. NIELDS. Isn't it true that the foreign

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			country wanted us to acknowledge in writing what it was that was landing? "Mr. NORTH. That is right. "Mr. NIELDS. The actual material, the Hawks. "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. We weren't willing to do that? "Mr. NORTH. Not at all. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you discuss that with Mr. Clarridge? "Mr. NORTH. I do not recall exactly what I discussed with Mr. Clarridge. I know there was a point in time where he certainly did become aware, and it may be through . . . intelligence, because the intelligence showed what was being moved, and I did at some point along there confirm to him that it was not oil drilling equipment but that it was Hawks, as was very obvious to almost everybody out there at that point, because they were reading the same . . . intelligence that I was. "When I say that point, I don't know exactly what point it is. But I did at some point confirm to him that that's what was taking place, and that -- and it may have been after the fact, I am not saying that it was before the fact, and at that point Mr. McMahon was very upset with me. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, at what point was Mr. McMahon very upset with you? "Mr. NORTH. As I recall, it was after the pilots returned from their mission or in which [sic] he saw a part of the . . . intelligence. And I don't recall the specific timing, but it was at that point that we began to work on the finding with Mr. Sporkin, I think."

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			(North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 160-61.)
85/11/23-220 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on Clarridge's awareness that HAWKs were involved in the shipment: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [W]hen you suggested to Mr. McFarlane that he obtain approval from the foreign government official, are you telling us that it was your understanding that Mr. McFarlane wasn't going to mention what he was asking approval for? "Mr. NORTH. I was going to leave that up to Mr. McFarlane's judgment. He knew what was on that airplane. I knew what was on the airplane. I am asking him to talk to the foreign official to get permission for him -- to get the airplace on the ground. I didn't -- I don't think I made a recommendation one way or the other when I communicated with him. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [W]as Mr. Clarridge aware at the time when he was responsible for sending cables back and forth on this issue that the thing had run aground because we were unwilling to identify the cargo in writing? "Mr. NORTH. And I cannot answer that question because I don't know. "Mr. NIELDS. Are you saying you don't know or your don't recall? "Mr. NORTH. Well, the way you asked your question was Mr. Clarridge aware. And I don't recall when Mr. Clarridge became aware. I do

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			recall confirming to him at some point that it was not oil drilling equipment, that it was Hawks, and it was my understanding that at that point, he talked to either the Director of Operations or to the Deputy Director who became angry, and I think there may be a contemporaneous note in my notebooks to that effect. "Mr. NIELDS. In other words, you are saying that you told Mr. Clarridge what the real cargo was prior to the time the Deputy Director got angry and insisted on a finding? "Mr. NORTH. I am not saying that for sure. I am saying that is the way it may well have happened. I do recall, although I do not recall the time and date, confirming to Mr. Clarridge when asked, 'The cargo is not oil drilling equipment, the cargo is Hawks.' "Okay. Now, I cannot tell you, Mr. Nields, here at this point, a good while after the fact, when that point was. "Mr. NIELDS. But I take it you were saying it was very close in time to when the shipment actually was sent and your best recollection is that it was prior to the time that the Deputy Director hit the roof, so to speak? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "My recollection is that is why he hit the roof." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 164-66.)
85/11/23-221 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 1: [Clarridge testimony continues from

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			85/11/21-314:] "Mr. Eggleston. On November 25th, did there come a time when you spoke to Mr. McMahon? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. In the evening. Or he called me. "Mr. Eggleston. Did he ask you to come to his office? "Mr. Clarridge. No, he didn't. "Mr. Eggleston. So it was not a face-to-face conversation? It was a telephone conversation? "Mr. Clarridge. Very brief telephone conversation. "Mr. Eggleston. Was the conversation about this flight that had taken place? "Mr. Clarridge. He mentioned simply on the phone that he had learned of the flight and the use of our proprietary and he said to me that it didn't make much difference as far as he could see whether they were oil drilling spare parts or it was gunpowder or weapons or whatever, that a finding might be necessary. And that was the total sum of the conversation. "Mr. Eggleston. You have a recollection then of him saying something about he didn't care what it was, whether it was oil drilling spare parts? "Mr. Clarridge. He also mentioned that in either case, they would be embargoed items. "Mr. Eggleston. Did you have any conversation with him about where he had gotten the notion that there could possibly have been weapons onboard? "Mr. Clarridge. I did not. "Mr. Eggleston. You had not heard, I take it, other than this cable from the -- that reflected

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			what the pilots had said, it is your testimony that you hadn't heard that it was anything other than oil-drilling equipment? "Mr. Clarridge. I had not. "Mr. Eggleston. Did you correct him as you corrected [redacted] earlier in the day that it was not oil-drilling equipment? "Mr. Clarridge. I don't recall whether I did or didn't. "Mr. Eggleston. You indicated earlier that you have some familiarity with the testimony of Colonel North on the issue of the state of your knowledge. It is in front of you as Exhibit [DRC] 6-A. . . . "I'm going to ask you to look at 6-A. Directing your attention to page 42, line 921 on to page 43, line 925 -- "Mr. Clarridge. This is where I actually, I think the testimony here is incorrect. The final reason for not allowing the plane to land had nothing to do with what was onboard that aircraft. It was the failure of the second note to state that the reason for this whole operation was to free hostages. Whatever that meant. "Mr. Eggleston. Is it fair to characterize his testimony as saying that he had told you as best he recalled by the time you spoke to Mr. McMahon, he had confirmed to you that there were weapons and not oil-drilling equipment onboard the flight? "Mr. Clarridge. I'll have to read the whole thing here. "No, I don't think that is necessarily true

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			from what he said here. He says at some point, he remembers telling me. "Mr. Eggleston. If you look at page 43, line 947 through 952, it says, question by Mr. Nields: 'But I take it you are saying it was very close in time to when the shipment was actually sent and your best recollection is that it is prior to the time the deputy director hit the roof, so to speak. "'Mr. North: Yes. My recollection is that is why he hit the roof.' "I take it Mr. McMahon hit the roof when he found out there had been the flight? "Mr. Clarridge. He didn't with me." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 40-43 [citing North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 165-66 (text here cites half-day transcripts); North testimony is quoted above at 85/11/23-220].)
85/11/23-222 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. Is it your testimony that you were unaware that Mr. McMahon had become upset when he learned that the flight -- "Mr. Clarridge. That is correct. He had a very moderate conversation with me and he had always had in every conversation, he certainly did not hit the roof with me and I've given you to the best of my recollection the statement that he made at that time. "I don't recall that I corrected him on whether they were spare parts or weapons or

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			whatever. "Mr. Eggleston. It is Colonel North's testimony that he believed that by the time you spoke to Mr. McMahon, he had advised you that it was Hawk missiles and not oil equipment? "Mr. Clarridge. Fine. "Mr. Eggleston. It is your testimony, I take it, that that is inaccurate? "Mr. Clarridge. I don't know whether it is inaccurate. I don't remember specifically when and if he told me that there were Hawk missiles on that particular aircraft or whether I asked him. I simply don't know. Just like if you look at one of his notes in the notebook here, it again doesn't make any sense whatsoever in connection with all of this. "Mr. Eggleston. Do you have a particular note in mind? "Mr. Clarridge. It is one of these -- I guess it is out of his notebooks. I don't know whether we have those here. It is where he says something about 'this is criminal.' "Mr. Eggleston. Please look at Exhibit [DRC] 5-23. "Mr. Clarridge. Okay. Yes. It says 'Call from Clarridge.' Now, it says 'summoned in by Clair and McMahon.' If he's talking about me being summoned in, I never was summoned in. If he's saying that he was telling me that he was summoned in, I don't know whether he was or he wasn't but I can tell you, I never was. "Then 'this is criminal,' and I don't understand this one, 'total Agency was

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			freight-forwarded by Dewey.' "Mr. Eggleston. The last line essentially describes what your view of the Agency's position was, isn't it, that you were acting as courier -- "Mr. Clarridge. I never said that. That is Mr. Juchniewicz's position. I never said when we were asked for a charter airline and the final decision was to use the proprietary, that the Agency was simply throwing business to our proprietary; I've never said that." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 43-45.)
85/11/23-223 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Eggleston. Let me ask you a few questions about [Ex. DRC] 5-23. It appears to say 26 October. I'll represent to you that this was received by us in a series of other notes which would lead to the inference that he has mislabled this and it should be 26 November '85, the ones in front and behind it both say November. I think the conclusion is that he simply put the wrong month. "Do you recall speaking to Colonel North in the early-morning hours on November 26th about what had taken place? "Mr. Clarridge. I don't remember whether I did or didn't, but I specifically don't remember this telephone call and it is inaccurate. "Mr. Eggleston. Did you have a conversation on the 25th or the 26th with both Mr. McMahon and Clair George?

"Mr. Clarridge. No, I did not. There was one point when Ambassador [redacted] sent a message in to the DCI asking whether he should continue efforts to get [redacted] flight clearances and I wrote a message and took it to McMahon to sign off on as the acting director.

"I'm not sure Mr. George was in town on 26 November, if this is the date of this particular thing.

"Mr. Eggleston. But in any event, to 'this is criminal,' this reference purports to relate a conversation that you had with Colonel North about the conduct that had taken place in the previous couple of days, you don't recall any such conversation with Colonel North taking place?

"Mr. Clarridge. No, and I was never summoned by Clair George or McMahon to any meeting.

"Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Clarridge, after the flight lands on the 25th, there is a finding as a result of McMahon learning about this. I'm sure you've heard now that there was a finding prepared and sent to Admiral Poindexter. You may have heard Poindexter's testimony that it was actually signed on November [sic (December)] 5th and subsequently destroyed by Admiral Poindexter.

"Did you know that the finding first was being prepared?

"Mr. Clarridge. No, I did not.

"Mr. Eggleston. You knew that Mr. McMahon had objected to the flight that had taken place over the weekend because there had not been a finding?

"Mr. Clarridge. That is not what I said. What he said was he called me up and he said that

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			he didn't think that it mattered much whether there was oil-drilling spare parts or weapons onboard that flight; both items were embargoed and that we might need a finding. "Mr. Eggleston. Then you certainly recognized that he had a concern that a finding might be required? "Mr. Clarridge. Yes, I did. "Mr. Eggleston. Did you know that he had consulted with the general counsel Stanley Sporkin about whether or not a finding was required? "Mr. Clarridge. No, I had nothing to do with that or no knowledge. "Mr. Eggleston. Did you have further conversations with Mr. McMahon about whether or not he had gone ahead and sought to have a finding? "Mr. Clarridge. No, I did not. "Mr. Eggleston. So between November 6th and when you left town December 5th, you continued to send cables arranging for landing rights, over-flight clearances, but you do not know at that time whether there had been a finding or whether there had been a decision that a finding has to take place? "Mr. Clarridge. That is correct, and supposedly the people superior to me getting the cable traffic [who] are not telling me to cease, must have a reason to tell me to continue on." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 45-48. See id., 8/4/87, at 87-99, 195-200 [continued Clarridge testimony on the HAWK transaction].)

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85/11/23-224 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 1: Clair George, Deputy Director for Operations of the CIA, testified on his knowledge of the events of the 11/85 HAWK transaction: "Mr. Kerr. Moving ahead into November, there is an incident that we have all heard about that occurred when the agency was . . . asked to provide some air support to Colonel North. Let me ask you to focus on that. We are now [at] the 22nd, 23rd, 24th of November 1985. Your testimony usually picks up on that Monday, the 25th, but bring us into focus on when you learned of this incident. "Mr. George. I left Washington for a weekend that weekend. [Sic.] I left Thursday morning and came back Sunday afternoon. I went into the office on Monday morning and John McMahon was in my deputy's office, my deputy was Ed Juchniewicz and John McMahon was visibly and outspokenly disturbed. I don't remember how I put it all together, but I finally got the following picture. Over that weekend, Colonel North had called the chief of my European division and said that it was critical to arrange for an Israeli plane to land [redacted.] We had sent cables to [redacted] and [redacted.] This we now know was General Secord at the time. Our [redacted] stayed up all night -- it was a charge, there was great confusion going to a foreign government at night and getting special permission for a plane from Israel to land is not easy, no matter who you are. John McMahon

said to me that Monday morning -- I heard him say to Ed Juchniewicz, and I do remember this, not only did you send the cables, but you let the goddamned airplane go to Tehran. Now we know the story I am telling. I put a cable package -- John said get me those damned cables and I put a cable package together with him, my secretary and I, and delivered it to him, I am sure that very day.

"Mr. Kerr. Let me take you back. You would not have been in the office that weekend, correct?

"Mr. George. I was in the Hilton Hotel in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

"Mr. Kerr. And no one contacted you in the Hilton Hotel in Pittsburgh about this matter?

"Mr. George. No.

"Mr. Kerr. In terms of what happened Monday morning, you come in and it becomes apparent to you that Mr. McMahon is disturbed?

"Mr. George. As William Sa[f]ire said that was the famous through-the-overhead weekend.

"Mr. Kerr. Did you, as part of the task that you were given at that point, have a meeting with Mr. Clarridge?

"Mr. George. I talked to Dewey several times during that day, I said to Dewey, 'Bring me the damned cables', I said to my secretary, 'Dig up what we have here, get me a package of these things. I've got to get them to McMahon.['] I am sure I talked to Dewey more than once.

"Mr. Kerr. Do you recall having a meeting of Clarridge and yourself with Mr. McMahon that day?

"Mr. George. I don't, but we could have certainly.

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			"Mr. Kerr. With regard to the cable traffic, my assumption is that you tried to get as complete a collection of cables as you could? "Mr. George. It was simple. There were cables sent out from the European Division to [redacted] dealing with a flight that was going to originate in Israel and whether I knew whether it was going to Tehran or not, I certainly learned quickly, so it is not a complicated problem to find that traffic and put it together. There is not that much of it." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 290-93.)
85/11/23-225 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Kerr. Did it come to your attention from the numbers or otherwise that there were cables in the sequence missing? "Mr. George. No, sir. "Mr. Kerr. You had your staff do that? "Mr. George. Yes. "Mr. Kerr. No one told you there was a cable missing? "Mr. George. Among us, it would be my secretary would say, 'All right, Clair[], we have this little pile of things here in a manila envelope, this is it.' She wouldn't, nor would I have ever expected her to say, ['Redacted] is not there', and so there was no, to me, that Monday any such discussion. "Mr. Kerr. So to the best of your knowledge, you didn't have an awareness of a missing cable?

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			"Mr. George. I did not that day. "Mr. Kerr. And until the recent events occurred, did it come to your attention that there were [redacted] cables missing at that time? "Mr. George. No. I can't remember, so many things have been going on in the last few months, but, no, there never was an issue that there was a cable missing. "Mr. Kerr. In terms of the cables, they were coming in on the privacy channel? "Mr. George. They were coming in on what we call a privacy channel, a variety of links we have established, I have one, the Director has one, the Deputy Director has one and each of my geographic division chiefs had one. The primary purpose of this is to handle extremely sensitive personnel matters, of which we have many, as people have serious problems abroad. "The way it works is, in this case, it would be Mr. Clarridge's privacy channel in Europe. I get a copy of every privacy channel sent out of the Directorate. You cannot communicate with your man overseas without my receiving a copy of it in the privacy channel. "Therefore, if the cable -- I have discussed this on many occasions -- if the cable went in and out of the privacy channel, I should have received a copy. The only person who can cable in and out of the building without any other distribution, other than the Office of Communications, is the Director himself. "Mr. Kerr. You are familiar with the testimony given by [redacted?]

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			"Mr. George. Very well, and a very close friend for 30 years. I have great faith in [redacted] and consider him an outstanding officer. "Mr. Kerr. You are aware that [redacted] has testified that he sent two cables after a meeting with Mr. Copp? "Mr. George. I saw [redacted] when he came back to testify and talked to [redacted] for a long time, and [redacted] said he and Dick Secord, known to him I guess only as Copp, stood in the parking lot outside of Copp's hotel in [redacted] and Copp said, 'Do you know what is going on here?' And poor [redacted] had been up for 72 hours trying to get [redacted] to let an Israeli plane land, and he said, 'Excuse me, sir, I don't.' [Redacted] reports that the good General Secord said we are trading missiles for hostages." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 293-96.)
85/11/23-226 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Kerr. As I understand, you have told me previously I take it, it continues to be your recollection that you did not see such a cable? "Mr. George. I promise you, no matter how many cables we send in and out over a month, that one would have grabbed me. "Mr. Kerr. You are aware, as you not, that the agency has been unable to find a [redacted] cable that there is a number for? "Mr. George. That is correct.

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			"Mr. Kerr. Do you know of any explanation for what happened to that missing cable? "Mr. George. I suppose three times in the last 20 years I have seen a cable eaten alive by the relay station [redacted. T]he odds are so high, I am afraid we would be foolish to think that happened. A cable could have been sent in a nonprivacy channel. [Redacted] swears the traffic was in privacy channel, he could have put a slug, a signal at the top of the cable which would have sent it somewhere else, all copies then to a single person. The issue which [I] have discussed with your staff and with the staff of the Independent Counsel -- I would find it impossible unless there is a cabal of people engaged in a cover-up to sort of send a cable like that, somehow get all the copies of it and make it disappear. "Mr. Kerr. And that is because there are a number of people that are supposed to get copies? "Mr. George. I am the Office of Protection, and it is not just me. I have a deputy, there are four secretaries, and I have my own registry, mail room in our language, and these things are seen. Even I couldn't fast enough whip up a cable like that and pick up all the companies [sic (copies?)] and make sure no one had seen it. "Mr. Kerr. In terms of the work that was done to collect the cables on that famous Monday morning of November 25th, were you relying on cables that were already in your office -- "Mr. George. I think we went to Clarridge and said, Dewey, bring us over the weekend cable

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			traffic, please, on this issue with Colonel North. We would almost certainly have depended on that as our record, because other than my own privacy channel, my office just because of paper flow, is not an office of record. So I would have had those cables but I never can swear that I have everybody's privacy channels. "Mr. Kerr. It is within the realm of possibility that Mr. Clarridge, who was working that weekend, could have actually taken delivery of the cable traffic as it arrived. "Mr. George. He cannot get his hands on the copies that are coming to my office. "Mr. Kerr. He cannot, as a matter of policy? "Mr. George. He cannot. The policy is that if you are working the privacy channel, which again is mostly about tragedies of personal lives abroad, you cannot take my copies away from me. The only channel[] that I cannot see is a slip-up -- in terms of my access to sensitive CIA international cable traffic, the only two people who can out-deal me are the Director and the Deputy Director, as it should be. "Mr. Kerr. Is there any logging system in your office that would show the arrival by number or otherwise of cables? "Mr. George. I don't know. No. "Mr. Kerr. So there is no document -- "Mr. George. I cannot say to you, I tell you on this weekend this cable did or didn't come in. There are great piles of them, counsel." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 296-99.)

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85/11/23-227 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing in the following day's testimony from preceding entry:] "Mr. Kerr. With regard to events that you were involved in that Monday when you came back. "Mr. George. Yes. "Mr. Kerr. If you would look at [George] Exhibit 43 at page Q-1353, there is an excerpt from the North diary which apparently makes reference to a telephone conversation between North and Mr. Clarridge in the early morning hours of -- ". . . . "Mr. Kerr. That makes reference to a telephone call that Colonel North received from Mr. Clarridge. It talks about being summoned in by Clair and McFarlane [sic (McMahon)] and then there is the phrase 'this is criminal'. "From our previous conversation, it is my understanding that you do not recall participating in a meeting on the 25th of November in which a statement to that effect was made? "Mr. George. This never happened. For John McMahon and me to call in a staff employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, the operations directorate, and say -- imply your behavior is criminal, two things would happen. I would never forget it; and secondly, we would certainly take it to the Department of Justice. "Mr. Kerr. So this comment was not made by you and was not made in your presence; is that

correct?

"Mr. George. No.

"Mr. Kerr. The committee has heard testimony on the description of the cargo that was carried by the CIA's proprietary. You will recall the description that was utilized at the time was oil drilling equipment.

"The committee has heard testimony from Don Regan, for example, that he knew that that was a cover story, that there was military cargo being carried by the proprietary. People like Charley Allen, for example, have testified in deposition that he was suspicious of the oil equipment cover story that weekend and by the evening, early morning hours of the 26th, [redacted] which suggested that military equipment had been carried.

"The agency's lawyer, Mr. Spork[i]n, said that on the 25th of November, he learned that the proprietary had carried military equipment. You would have known, isn't it correct, on Monday or Tuesday the 25th and 26th of November that the proprietary had, in fact, carried military equipment to Tehran?

"Mr. George. That is not my recollection. My recollection was that at that moment that week there was confusion as to what that plane had carried, but the story being given to me as I returned was it was carrying non-lethal equipment, oil drilling equipment.

"Mr. Kerr. That story would have been given to you first and foremost by Mr. Clarridge?

"Mr. George. I cannot -- I think the story

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			would have probably been given to me first by my own personal staff in my office. When I am running around, as we discussed yesterday, collecting the cables from that weekend for Mr. McMahon, as I am doing this, I am sure I am saying 'What is it? Why did it happen? Where? Why and what?' "It was told to me by them. I do not remember Mr. Clarridge saying it was or wasn't oil drilling equipment." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 2-4; JHICI Ex. CG 43.)
85/11/23-228 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 5: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Kerr. With regard to what you did understand at the time, based on your experience, the state of Israel was not in the business of -- or at least not known for exporting oil drilling equipment, was it? "Mr. George. Well, I wouldn't agree with that statement. The complexity of the Israeli-Iranian relationship over the years -- as I am sure everyone is familiar with -- the importance of that relationship to the state of Israel, they had attempted since the fall of the Shah to open doors in Iran, as they properly should geopolitically. "I don't see any reason why they wouldn't ship oil drilling equipment although certainly the coin of the realm in the Middle East is called 'arms'. "Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir. Just one more thought on that score

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			"Do you have any explanation for how the CIA's attorney, Mr. Spork[i]n, knew that military equipment was being carried by that airplane when the agency's chief covert operations operative did not? "Mr. George. I do not. "Mr. Kerr. Okay. With regard to what was known during that period of time, the -- you were aware, from your testimony yesterday, that Mr. McMahon was concerned that a finding was required? "Mr. George. Absolutely. He so told me. "Mr. Kerr. You have previously testified, however, that you were not aware of the fact that a finding was drafted and submitted to Admiral Poindexter for the President on November 26th? "Mr. George. One of the more bewildering experiences I have had throughout this affair took place in late November, early December, of 1986 when I testified under oath to the Senate Select Committee and Senator Cohen of Maine held a sheaf of papers in front of me and said here are all the findings. And I said all the what? "And I said I had one finding. The finding I had was the finding that was shown to me in the White House. I was not involved nor was I -- I knew John McMahon said, 'You will not support this activity--' --and I now know John knew more about that activity than I did -- '-- without a finding.' "But the preparations of the finding which -- again, gentlemen, much of this comes from your hearings and from the press -- the preparation of the many variations of that finding[,] I was not

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			made privy to that." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 5-6.)
85/11/23-229 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: CIA AWARENESS GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 6: "Mr. George. May I, counsel, briefly? "As I left last night, I would like to make a point to the committee and to you, sir. "I want to lead you back to the famous flight on the last weekend in November. I hope I did not leave you with the impression that I believe there is a missing cable. I don't know. "I talked about how a cable could be missing and some of my colleagues felt I might have left the impression I agreed that is a missing cable. I don't know. I know both sides of the story. "Mr. Kerr. So we are clear, the only point I was trying to get across is you are familiar with the fact there are two cables by number, at least, that have not been provided to us from that time? "Mr. George. So I am told." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 11.)
85/11/23-230 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK SHIPMENT: WHO KNEW NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. . . .[W]ho in the government was aware of the Hawk transaction at the time it occurred? I take it you were aware? "Mr. NORTH. I was aware. "Mr. NIELDS. Admiral Poindexter was aware? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, he was. "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. McFarlane was aware? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

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			"Mr. NIELDS. You have already given some testimony about Dewey Clarridge. I would like to ask you a few more questions about that. . . . ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . .[I]f Mr. Clarridge is telling you . . . that the cargo must be listed as machine parts, spares for oil industry, does that indicate that he was then aware of what the real cargo was? "Mr. NORTH. Not necessarily to me. Because what that may indicate is that he had made arrangements with the people in the circles through his station chiefs for a clearance with a manifest that reads a certain way. And what he's telling me is to go back through Copp, General Secord, and make darned sure that the proprietary is instructed accordingly. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . . I think you have said that you do not know from looking at this note [Ex. OLN 69-A] one way of another whether Mr. Clarridge was yet aware. "Mr. NORTH. That's correct. But I do want you to know there came a point in time when I confirmed with him, with integrity and honesty, that's what is aboard there. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . .[W]as the President aware of the shipment at the time it occurred? Mr. NORTH. I do not know. I was told that the President had approved it. I have a contemporaneous note to that effect. "Mr. NIELDS. In one of your notebooks.

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			"Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. Was Mr. Casey aware of it at the time that it occurred? "Mr. NORTH. I believe he was. If he was not aware of it at that instant, it was only because he was on a trip, and I don't recall whether he had returned by this point or not. But shortly thereafter, he was fully aware because he and I met several times on the issue, and it was he who sent forward the original finding which Mr. Sporkin prepared. "Mr. NIELDS. So you met with him on this topic, i.e., the shipment of the 18 Hawks, shortly after the shipment occurred? "Mr. NORTH. I believe it was afterwards, yes, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. But it might have been before? "Mr. NORTH. It may have been. . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . . Was the Attorney General aware at the time that Hawks were being shipped? "Mr. NORTH. I was told -- at least I understood, I don't know if I was told, but I understood that he was because it was through that effort that we ended up getting on the right track for the finding. . . . "I thought that he had seen and approved the November finding. And he had provided an explanation for why this was a legitimate way to go about doing it. All this on approximately the 25th or 26th. "All findings are reviewed by the Attorney General, and that finding which eventually got signed by the President I thought had been seen by

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			the Attorney General, and I thought it was the Attorney General who had provided the earlier French Smith determination on the legitimacy of this process. "I also believe it was the Attorney General who had, something to the effect, said, 'Look, if the President made a mental finding back in July or June or whenever it was, that that can simply be ratified by this later finding,' and that's why those words were put into the finding that Mr. Sporkin and I worked on. But I did not talk to the Attorney General directly about it, nor did I talk to the President directly about it." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 178, 184-87.)
			North testified he did not discuss the HAWK shipment with Donald Regan or with the Vice President. (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 192.)
85/11/23-231 LATE NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 TRANSACTION: McMAHON'S REACTION GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Cohen. You also made a reference this morning to Mr. McMahon's anger over the CIA role in November. I think you also talked about that on pages 77 and 78 of your deposition. . . . My question is Mr. McMahon was fairly upset, was he not, about the CIA's role in the shipment during November? Is that a fair characterization? "Mr. George. He was terribly upset. "Mr. Cohen. He communicated that visible anger, I assume not only to you but to Mr. Clarridge?

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			"Mr. George. I was a bystander that Monday morning because I had just come back from a trip. I found him ranting and raving -- I am sorry to -- that's a slight exaggeration -- at Ed Juchniewicz, my deputy. Whether John McMahon personally telephoned Dewey Clarridge or saw him, I can't recall. But Dewey damned well knew that John McMahon was angry." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 157-58. But see 85/11/23-221, -222 [Clarridge on McMahon's reaction].)
85/11/23-235 NOVEMBER 1985			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: POINDEXTER'S VIEW OF THE SCREW UP POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "A. . . . Very frankly, in November of 1985, both Colonel North and I felt that this whole operation was screwed up. "Q. What operation? "A. The Iranian business; and that's one of the reasons that in December of 1985, when I took over, I wanted to get the whole thing on a much more organized basis. I wanted to get the CIA formally involved because of their expertise in logistics; and I wanted to get the thing on paper as to what our objectives were and exactly what the President approved, because in November of '85, I was very confused as to what had been approved and what hadn't been approved and frankly thought that it had been run in a very slipshod manner." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 98.)